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The Institute of Economic Sciences at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
launched a new series of publications entitled “Verseny és szabályozás” 
(Competition and Regulation) in 2007. Eight annual volumes have been 
published so far, all in Hungarian. The current volume is the first one in English, 
and it contains 12 selected translations from the crop of the first seven years. 
It offers the reader a glimpse into the current state of research in its chosen 
field in Hungary. The published studies covered a very broad range of topics. 
Some articles of general theoretical and methodological nature dealt with the 
background in the law and economics of regulated markets. Others investigated 
current legal, economic and policy issues and cases. Others again dealt with 
regulation and the regulators themselves. The functions, methods, analytical 
tools, the institutions and the impact of regulation were discussed in those 
articles. Special attention was paid to regulation by the European Union, and 
also to recently de-monopolized key industries such as communications, energy, 
media, the postal sector or water and sewage. The publications were designed 
to provide a meeting place for economists and lawyers to work together on the 
economic background of legal problems and the legal solutions to economic 
problems. Five of the 12 articles selected for publication in English in this tome 
deal with broad economic and legal issues of competition and regulation, 
while the remaining 7 discuss the state and specific problems of key industries 
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PREFACE
The Institute of Economic Sciences at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences launched 
a new series of publications entitled “Verseny és szabályozás” [Competition and 
Regulation] in 2007. Eight annual volumes have been published so far, all in Hun-
garian. The current volume is the first one in English, and it contains 12 selected 
translations from the crop of the first seven years. It offers the reader a glimpse into 
the current state of research in its chosen field in Hungary.
As the title suggests, the main objective of the publications was to open up 
a much-needed new forum for home-grown Hungarian research on the legal and 
economic issues of the regulation of imperfectly competitive markets. The published 
studies covered a very broad range of topics. Some articles of general theoretical 
and methodological nature dealt with the background in the law and economics of 
regulated markets. Others investigated current legal, economic and policy issues 
and cases. Others again dealt with regulation and the regulators themselves. The 
functions, methods, analytical tools, the institutions and the impact of regulation 
were discussed in those articles. Special attention was paid to regulation by the Eu-
ropean Union, and also to recently de-monopolized key industries such as commu-
nications, energy, media, the postal sector or water and sewage. More than a half of 
the articles of the first seven publications dealt with the problems of key industries. 
The publications were designed to provide a meeting place for economists and 
lawyers to work together on the economic background of legal problems and the 
legal solutions to economic problems. They also had an educational function. In 
an introductory manner and by relying on timely surveys of recent developments 
in the analysis of imperfect markets and regulation, articles suitable for educational 
use have been regularly published.
Over the years, the series has become a major undertaking. Its 49 contributing 
researchers (40 economists and 9 lawyers) appeared in it a total of 100 times as au-
thors or co-authors of 84 articles. Twenty of them became recurring contributors, 
authoring or co-authoring at least two articles each. A steadily growing interdiscipli-
nary circle of dedicated researchers has formed around the publications. Interactions 
among the authors increased over time. Significant lawyer-economist cooperation 
demonstrated itself by the large number of contributing lawyers and articles about 
legal issues (9 lawyer authors produced 18 such articles), and by the emergence of 
articles co-authored by economists and lawyers.
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Five of the 12 articles selected for publication in English in this tome deal with 
broad economic and legal issues of regulation, while the remaining 7 discuss the 
state and specific problems of key industries in Hungary and, in some cases, in the 
surrounding region.
The first article by A. Kovács examines the practice of judicial reviews of regu-
latory decisions, and finds it harmful if information which is pertinent to, or even 
crucially important for, the reviewed case is declared a commercial secret in the 
regulatory proceedings, and thus remains unavailable for the reviewer. The author 
recommends limitations to the right to protect commercial secrets. Reaching back 
to Law & Economics, it is suggested that protection may be appropriate only when it 
improves resource allocation in the economy. Otherwise commercial secrets should 
be made public to varying degrees, depending on their nature.
The second article by B. Muraközy and P. Valentiny takes a look at two of the 
various possible alternatives to straightforward government regulation: self-regula-
tion and co-regulation (self+governmental). The authors explain how these regimes 
work, what variants may exist, how their history evolved, and how the Anglo-Saxon, 
French (Napoleonic), German, Scandinavian and the so-called socialist legal systems 
provide incentives and counterincentives for the development of self-regulation. 
An extensive survey of studies and models of self- and co-regulation is provided.
The third article by G. Csorba is a survey of empirical studies of Hungarian 
market structures. In this field of research, often referred to as Empirical Industrial 
Organisation, a fairly large number of studies have been produced in Hungary in 
recent years. The author identifies numerous generic uses in competition policy and 
regulation of the results of market structure studies. Among them market definitions, 
evaluations of market power, and the estimated consequences of various forms of 
market behaviour are emphasised as particularly important ones. An outline of 
the history of empirical market structure studies is followed by descriptions of the 
surveyed studies, which are organised into three groups according to the nature 
of the data they utilise. Studies of the first group use price data and estimate the 
relationship between market concentration and prices or the impact of structural 
and behavioural changes on prices. In the second group we find price and volume 
data on products and/or services sold in the target markets of the studies. The most 
basic findings of these studies are estimates of demand characteristics, particularly 
those of own price and cross price elasticities. Some variants of the classic demand 
function are mentioned. The third group contains models using elaborate struc-
tural information on the supply side of the market and estimating the properties of 
demand for factor inputs.
The fourth article by L. Halpern and B. Muraközy tackles one of the most popu-
lar topics: the relationship between competition and the research and development 
(R&D) activities of competing firms. Initially the authors draw attention to some 
problems, such as the erroneous measurement of R&D by its inputs rather than its 
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outputs. Errors caused by not distinguishing between endogenous and exogenous 
R&D are also mentioned. Based on their empirical results, the authors accept the 
inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and R&D at the firm level as 
well as at the industry level, meaning that innovative activity is lower in firms that 
operate either in highly concentrated or highly competitive industries than in firms 
in moderately competitive sectors of the economy. Interpretations are provided. 
There is some inconsistency in the results. The presence and intensity of compe-
tition were measured by different metrics and only some of them seemed to have 
had an impact on the innovative investments of firms. The empirical results are ac-
companied by an account of difficulties in modelling the relationship. Simultaneity 
(i.e., competition causing R&D and R&D causing competition at the same time) is 
singled out as an important problem.
The fifth article by F.L. Kiss revisits the important but lately somewhat ignored 
field of productivity analysis. The author argues that the socially responsible reg-
ulator must study and understand what makes productivity grow in the regulated 
suppliers of imperfect markets. Following a brief conceptual clarification and over-
view of the method of measurement, the author focuses his attention on two topics: 
1. intra-firm and inter-firm comparisons of productivity levels and changes (gains), 
and 2. decomposition of firm-level productivity gains into components caused by 
increased production volumes, cost-saving technological changes, pricing and the 
characteristics of corporate demand for inputs. Having accomplished these analyti-
cal tasks, the author then combines the two and causally decomposes the compared 
measures of firm-level productivity. An empirical study rounds out the presentation. 
Productivity comparisons and decompositions as well as an attempt at econometric 
forecasting of factor inputs are carried out for two real-life regulated companies. 
The resulting deep insight into the efficiency of the production processes of the 
two firms is demonstrated.
The sixth article by C.I. Nagy examines the influence of the European Union 
on price regulation by its member states. Three areas are identified in which such 
influences may exist: competition law, liberalisation law, and internal market (free 
movement) law. A thorough investigation of EU jurisdiction and the relevant le-
gal cases revealed no document that would deal with this issue. The only positive 
finding of the author is a declaration in one legal case, that price regulation by the 
state does not constitute subsidy by the state, because it does not involve subsidy 
by the state budget. Thus price regulation by member states is neither forbidden 
nor explicitly hindered by the EU. However, the author notes that limitations and 
restriction may exist in connection with the application of other principles and 
provisions. It is forbidden to hinder the free movement of goods and services within 
the EU by any means, including price regulation. There are cases mentioned in the 
article in which setting maximum or minimum prices or some upper boundary 
such as unit cost would violate internal market law. Regulated prices may also act 
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as obstacles to market liberalisation, free access to markets. The natural gas and 
electricity markets are examined in some detail. Price regulation is also one of the 
possible means of artificially creating economic advantages and disadvantages 
among market players.
The seventh article by I. Major and K.M. Kiss deals with the regulation of access 
prices for firms with interconnected networks under imperfect and asymmetric 
information. Its point of departure is a long series of studies that address the is-
sue of interconnection, access prices, and termination charges in particular, under 
the assumption that the regulator has perfect information about the true costs of 
providing inter-firm network access services. Interconnection is revisited under 
the assumption of imperfect regulatory information and informational asymmetry 
between the regulator and the regulated firms. Comparing incentive regulation 
(whereby the regulator offers the regulated firm an incentive-based contract menu) 
with regulation by cost-based pricing, it is concluded that under imperfect infor-
mation cost-based pricing may give perverse incentives to regulated firms not to 
improve the efficiency of interconnection, and cost-based pricing of call termination 
ultimately rewards the less efficient types of regulated firms. In contrast, incentive 
regulation produces no perverse incentives and allows the efficient firm to earn high-
er profits. Various aspects of incentive regulation are discussed. It is concluded that 
incentive regulation works with smaller social welfare loss than cost-based pricing 
or bottom-up cost accounting. Principal-agent models of price regulation are more 
“knowledge intensive” but less time consuming than cost accounting. Most impor-
tantly, a regulatory mechanism that takes into account the existence of asymmetric 
information between the regulator and the regulated firm induces cooperation be-
tween the contracting parties, while cost-based pricing induces cost manipulations 
by the companies and inevitably brings about conflicts with the regulator.
The eighth article by L. Paizs is about the electricity balancing market. The term 
“balancing” refers to the correction of very-short-term market disequilibria that 
regularly result from various unforeseen fluctuations in the volume of demand for 
electricity. Deviations between demand and supply require efficient real-time cor-
rections to the volume of energy supply. These are crucially important for network 
safety and the efficiency of the entire market. Liberalisation has brought with itself 
market-based institutional arrangements and processes of balancing. These and 
their applications to the Hungarian electricity industry are described in the article. 
Balancing takes place through positive and negative corrections to volumes, and 
involves prices and penalties. In the article it is investigated how the stakeholders’ 
behaviour is affected by the properties of these prices and penalties. The main 
conclusions are: Suppliers have strong incentives to keep their portfolio balanced. 
Asymmetry in the penalties makes suppliers inclined to under-contract. The struc-
ture of purchase and settlement prices is such that it motivates the public utility 
wholesaler to nominate more than their expected load.
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For years, the Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research at Corvinus Univer-
sity in Budapest has been modelling European regional electricity markets. The 
ninth article by A. Kiss presents a regional simulation model of wholesale electricity 
markets, comprising of Hungary and six neighbouring countries. It is emphasized 
during the presentation of the structure and workings of the model that this market 
is characterised by very high concentration. Few large electricity generators, having 
high degrees of market power, dominate the wholesale market and drive up prices. 
Mark-ups due to market power are estimated to have amounted to 25-40 percent 
of actual wholesale prices. An examination of congestions and shortages indicates 
that prices could be lowered by tighter market integration resulting in improved 
flows of electricity and reduced market power. Simulation results, however, show 
that market integration alone is not nearly sufficient to eliminate the dominance by 
large power stations, or to realize the potential welfare gains of competition.
The tenth article by P. Kaderják et al. presents the elaborate Danube Region 
Gas Market Model of the Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research. This model 
depicts the combined gas infrastructure of 15 countries of Central and Southern 
Europe in a consistent and unified manner. Following a detailed description of the 
model, simulations are carried out in order to determine various economic conse-
quences of a series of important existing or planned or proposed gas infrastructure 
investments. The estimated effects include price effects (among them spill-overs to 
third countries), benefit-cost analyses, impacts on social welfare, improvements in 
European market integration and the security of gas supplies in the region.
As the use of mobile telephony started spreading beyond the wildest initial 
dreams of market analysts, worldwide attention became urgently focussed on the 
issue of the relationship (substitutability and/or complementarity) between fixed 
and mobile telephony. This relationship was of enormous importance for the fu-
ture size and structure of telecommunications markets. Results from an empirical 
study were reported in the eleventh article by B. Édes et al. A Hungarian survey of 
the access and usage preferences of 1000 people was used to analyse consumers’ 
responses to price changes and the effects of lifestyle and demographic character-
istics on demand. The own-price elasticities implicit the responses were low (-0,3) 
for mobile access and high (-1,4) for fixed access, suggesting that mobile access was 
much less readily substitutable by fixed access than fixed access was by mobile access. 
However, results with respect to cross-elasticities were somewhat inconsistent and 
required deeper analysis and evaluation by the authors, whose ultimate conclusion 
was that in Hungary mobile access was a substitute for fixed access. The rate of 
usage substitution was significantly lower in the short run (i.e., in the presence of 
existing subscriptions) than in longer-term access decisions.
The last study by K.M. Kiss is of monographic nature, as it introduces the reader 
to a single key market, the Hungarian postal sector. The article consists of three parts. 
The first one provides detailed descriptive information on the sector’s recent history 
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and current structure. The second part deals with the introduction of competition 
into, and regulation of, the postal sector. Market and regulatory developments are 
placed into the broader environment of the European postal reforms. The author 
mentions some negative phenomena, discusses important legal-regulatory cases 
of anti-competitive behaviour, and also points to areas in which some progress has 
been made in Hungary. The third part completes the description by introducing 
performance indicators and using them to measure the sector’s performance.
The editors
• András György Kovács •
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO 
PROTECT COMMERCIAL SECRETS
The fundamental statement of this article is that in the regulated markets, the basic 
hindrance to the effective judicial review of the regulator’s decisions derives from the 
fact that the factual basis for the regulator’s decision is usually considered to be a com-
mercial secret. For this reason, a new relationship must be established between the 
right to the protection of commercial secrets and regulatory intervention, by placing 
limitations on the right to the protection of commercial secrets. This article uses the 
accepted apparatus of law and economics to assess whether the goals of the right 
to the protection of commercial secrets are acceptable. It aims at finding an answer 
to the questions when the protection of commercial secrets enhances the proper 
allocation of resources and when it does not. The article puts a special emphasis on 
the economic effects of the information which constitutes a commercial secret of 
future behaviour. The conclusion of the article is that the legislator should consider 
making the commercial secrets used in regulatory procedures partially or fully public.
INTRODUCTION
The legal institution of commercial secrets is an inherent element of a market 
economy. We consider it natural that the constitution – along with the freedom to 
conduct business and the freedom of competition – protects the privacy rights of 
businesses, thus we presume that the protection of the secrets of businesses con-
stitute a fundamental right. Consequently, commercial secrets – if not formally, 
but substantially – are constitutional rights.1 Nonetheless, it is far from obvious to 
associate legal persons and corporations with Article VI Paragraph 1 and 2 of the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary, containing the provisions on the right to private 
and family life, home, communications and good reputation, and the right to the 
protection of personal data. The origin of these rights is to be found in the relation-
ship between the state and its citizens, derived from the protection of the separated 
private sphere, and its extension only seems necessary in a world ruled by modern 
market economy institutions (businesses and mostly legal persons). This is a global 
phenomenon and the “global law” can be traced back to the interpretation of the 
 1 The practice of the Constitutional Court is mostly related to the constitutional questions of special 
types of secrets, but many decisions clearly prove this statement. See for example the 24/1998. 
(VI. 9) and 61/B/2005. decisions of the Constitutional Court.
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Hungarian constitution as well.2 For instance, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) held that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights3 about 
the right to respect for private and family life also applies to business entities, thus 
the private and family life of businesses is also entitled to protection in democratic, 
market economy, rule of law states.4
This extended interpretation, however, has its own price. On the one hand, business-
es have to precisely keep track of all the data related to their economic activities (rules of 
accounting), and make them at least partially public (business registry, balance sheet). 
The reason for this is that the state has to be aware of all the relevant economic data of 
a company (mainly for tax purposes), moreover, some information from the balance 
sheet and the annual report has to be disclosed to competitors and other market par-
ticipants (e.g. creditors) in order to ensure safe business relations and safe transactions.
There are some business relations (for example between a bank and its client) 
that make it necessary to disclose private data and commercial secrets. Due to these 
special business relations and the state’s need for information, specialized sectoral 
secrets (tax-secret, bank-secret, insurance-secret, etc.) have been separated from 
the legal institution of commercial secrets. Beyond the state’s want for information, 
the requirement of transparency in government functions also calls for limitations 
on the right to protect commercial secrets. In a modern market economy, where the 
state is the largest investor, the transparency of the functioning of the state is not only 
a question of democracy (and the possible violation of democratic principles), but 
also a concern for competition policy.5 The economic relations between a business 
and the state are generally seen from the perspective of the business as a commercial 
secret, however, the state views data as being of public interest. Commercial secrets 
enable not market-oriented, irrational state decisions – mainly through the dangers of 
corruption – which deteriorates market economy efficiency and distorts competition.
 2 The definition of commercial secrets as defined in the civil code (Act V of 2013) is based on the 
fundamental international norm, the TRIPS Agreement (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights) Article 39. 1. and 2. (Act IX of 1998. 1. C) supplement). (See: Bobrovszky [2006] 
p. 1385, which refers to the fundamental international agreement of the protection of industrial 
property, the 1883 Paris Convention; Nagy [2008] p. 555) The TRIPS Agreement is a cornerstone 
of the world trade system established in Marrakesh (together with the GATT and GATS), which 
was published in Hungary by Act IX of 1998. Section 2 of Article 39 of the Agreement defines 
commercial secrets by referring to Article 10bis of the Paris Convention, which latter was published 
in Hungary by the 18th Regulation with the force of a statute in 1970.
 3 Act XXXI of 1993 on the publication of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Rome 4.XI.1950 and of the supplementing eight Protocols.
 4 Case of Societé Colas Est and others versus France (Application no. 37971/97). European Court 
of Human Right, Strasbourg, 16 April 2002.
 5 The regulation of public procurement – as part of the Community’s competition policy – is based 
on community directives. (See: the Preamble of the 89/665/EGK Directive of the European Council 
of 21 December 1989. or Section 4 of the Preamble of the 2004/18/EK Directive of the European 
Parliament and Council of 31 March 2004., etc.)
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This phenomenon was acknowledged by the former Civil Code of Hungary (Ptk.), 
when the commercial secret definition envisioned by the fundamental international 
norm, the TRIPS Agreement (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), 
was incorporated and supplemented with additional provisions.6 These made it clear 
that the business relations between the state and the private entities, in relation to 
public procurement, state (and EU) aid or other financial relations connected to the 
state budget, are public information, and could not be classified as a commercial 
secret. As a result of this trend, the Hungarian state could not have any commercial 
secrets from 22 May 2009, based on Paragraph 1 of the XXXI Act of 2009. However, 
the new Civil Code of Hungary that entered into force on 15 March 2014 has seem-
ingly reversed this trend, diminishing the results of the early years of the 2000s in 
substantive law, by returning the commercial secret definition applicable before 2003, 
which does not contain the limitations on state functions.7 So long as the Hungarian 
legal development did not abandoned the general standards,8 commercial secrets 
have gradually become increasingly subordinated to pubic interest in the economic 
relations between state and business. This can be detected even today, when the 
right to the protection of commercial secrets is in conflict with other constitutional 
right. The fact that the protection of a commercial secret as a fundamental right 
can only be justified by an extended interpretation of the constitutional text which 
results in a situation, in which when it is in conflict with another constitutional 
right – especially with one of the fundamental norms defining our socio-economic 
system – the protection of commercial secrets will turn out to be the weaker and 
can be restricted. This is also the cost of an extended interpretation. For instance 
the fundamental right to legal remedies, laid down by Article XXVIII paragraph 
7 of the Fundamental Law, is supposed to be a stronger right than the right to the 
protection of commercial secrets, thus courts – based on the necessity and propor-
tionality test – must provide access to data, information or documents classified 
as commercial secrets. Also this is generally true for administrative procedures.9
These clashes lead to a number of practical problems. On the one hand, business-
es often tend to classify their submissions in administrative and judicial proceedings 
 6 Act IV of 1959 (old Civil Code Section 2 Paragraph 81). The restrictive provisions were added by 
the Paragraph 16 of the Act XXIV of 2003, which entered into force on 9 June 2003 (old Civil Code 
Section 3-4 Paragraph 81)
 7 Act V of 2013 (Civil Code) Section 1 Paragraph 2:47
 8 We will see later that even before the FIDESZ government with the two-third constitutional ma-
jority from 2010 and since, the situation was not clear, because the development of substantive law 
has gradually restricted the right to the protection of commercial secrets, but in the procedural 
legislation the lobby power of the opposite side has appeared as restrictions strengthening the 
protection of commercial secrets appeared, which made the protection of commercial secrets 
powerful even against constitutional rights. See the next footnote and the conclusion of the study.
 9 This was undoubtedly true before the amendment of Act III of 1952 on the Civil Procedure Code 
on 1 January 2009. We will discuss the current procedural rules at the end of the study. 
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as commercial secrets, however, when they are asked to specify which exact data 
they are referring to as a commercial secret, hesitation is prevalent.
A detailed – yet at this point failing – regulation would be needed for the access 
to commercial secrets in judicial proceedings, which requires a lot of administra-
tion in the course of judicial review. This is especially true in the cases of judicial 
review of regulatory authorities’ decisions. A good example for this is the legality 
review of price regulation decisions related to dominant market position in the field 
of info-communications, where the determination of cost-based price is based on 
the use of fundamentally important commercial secrets. The resistance to making 
these data available is nicely shown by the fact that in the field of info-communica-
tion even the regulatory authority is refusing – contrary to the law – to publish the 
preparatory documents for its market regulatory decisions, apart from the draft de-
cision. Nonetheless, so far this approach has not hindered the judicial review, since 
the administrative authority is forbidden from making such documents public that 
were classified as commercial secrets by the interested parties.10 It is, however, also 
doubtful that the cost-calculation method used by the authority to assess an effec-
tive service [bottom-up long-run incremental cost model (BU-LRIC)] is published 
in such detailed fashion as it is required by the statute.11
Effective and substantial judicial review is, however, unimaginable without access 
to the most fundamental commercial secrets. 12 If for example the judicial proceeding 
is about whether the cost-model used to determine the cost-based price was appro-
priate, the plaintiff company affected by the price regulation is allowed to access 
the fundamentally important commercial secrets of other service providers, since 
without such access the appropriateness of the cost-model could not be assessed. 
This alone – without considering the outcome of the case – provides a competitive 
advantage to the plaintiff company, which could unfairly distort competition, as 
opposed to the regulatory objectives. 13
10 Point b) Section 1 Paragraph 36 of Act C of 2003 on electronic info-communication (Eht.). The 
interested parties classify basically all existing data as commercial secrets. 
11 See: Section 4 Paragraph 108 of the Eht. This conclusion is based on the experiences of the judicial 
proceedings of ex 16, then 7 markets. (voice transmission call termination wholesale service in 
specific mobil radio-telephone network wholesale markets).
12 The regulation of electronic info-communications is based on community directives, and com-
munity law obliges nation courts to effectively enforce community law in the judicial cases. This 
is the principle of effectiveness. (Steiner–Woods [2000] p. 441–443.). Before the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treating on 1 December 2009, this principle could be deducted from Article 10 
(before Article 5) of the Treaty on the European Communities. After the Lisbon Treaty it is based 
on the second sentence of Section 2 Article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union. In the field 
of electronic info-communications, Section 1 Article 4 of the 2002/21/EK Directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and Council of 7 March 2002 mandates the member states that effective judicial 
remedies against the decisions of the national regulatory authorities must be provided.
13 The fundamental hypothesis of this article is that the existence of effective judicial remedies is an 
essential legal and economic-efficiency element of an effective regulatory regime. This is, however, 
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By providing a general analysis to the legal institution of commercial secrets, this 
article aims to show that there is a theoretical possibility to make fundamentally 
important commercial secrets public based on the regulatory interests. This ques-
tion should be worth exploring from practical aspects as well, however, since the 
author is not an economist, it is outside the scope of the article. Thus in the general 
economic analysis of the right to the protection of commercial secrets, we will not 
be providing a detailed description to those questions that do not relate tightly to 
the issues mentioned above, even though they might be essential and important 
elements of the economic analysis of the right to the protection of commercial se-
crets. The protection of commercial secrets plays a crucial role in vertical relations, 
such as between employer and employee, the analysis of which is mostly needed for 
understanding the justification for the legal institution of commercial secrets. Due 
to reasons of space, however, we will only make some brief remarks in this regard.
Lastly, it is important to note that this analysis is building on the current Hun-
garian legal environment, thus the conclusions are adapted to the Hungarian situ-
ation, consequently, it describes a special case of the economic analysis of the right 
to the protection of commercial secrets, the generalisation of which might need 
some corrections.
THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION OF  
COMMERCIAL SECRETS
The legal definition of commercial secret
“Business secrets shall comprise all of the facts, information, conclusions or data 
pertaining to economic activities that, if published or released to or used by unau-
thorized persons, are likely to imperil the rightful financial, economic or market 
interest of the owner of such secrets – other than the State of Hungary –, provided 
the owner has taken all of the necessary steps to keep such information confidential.” 
(Section 2 of Paragraph 81 of the former Civil Code).14 This was the general defini-
tion of commercial secrets, applicable to all fields of law, based on the old Civil Code 
not at all evident, so it is worth analysing. Similarly a further hypothesis of the study: a substantial 
judicial review includes the economic overview of the authority’s discretionary power based on 
economic considerations, which could also be debated.
 See: Tóth [2006], Kovács [2006], Koppányi [2006–2007] EU law, nonetheless, requires the effective 
judicial review. (See: previous footnote.) 
14 Section 1 of Paragraph 4 of the act on competition refers back to this definition. (Act LVII of 1996 
on the prohibition of unfair trading practices and unfair competition, Competition Act) The 
Criminal Code uses the same definition for commercial secrets, see the reasoning for Paragraph 
18 of Act XCI of 2005.
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up until 15 March 2014.15 Section 1 of Paragraph 2:47 of the new Civil Code con-
tains the new definition, which from a functional perspective is not fundamentally 
different. Presumably, similar conclusions could be drawn from the new definition 
of commercial secrets as well, nonetheless, since it is in force only since 15 March 
2014, no relevant case-law and practice has evolved around it. Thus we will use 
the old definition in the article to show what the general definition of commercial 
secrets could be, which could also be applicable in any legal system.16 The defini-
tion shall be approached in three ways. The first is the subject of the commercial 
secret, the second is the relevant conduct that could result in an injury of interests, 
and finally is the required conduct of the person entitled to the secret (the formal 
element of the definition) to make the commercial secret concretely identifiable 
with an external interference.
The subject of a commercial secret is the information. The definition of infor-
mation is, however, an exceedingly wide category.
• According to some the world is nothing else then matter, energy and information. Nev-
ertheless, others think that it is a fact that Sz. L. is a member of B. law firm, while it is 
a circumstance that he has an armchair in the left corner of his office, and the way Sz. 
L. usually sits in this chair, his individual body position is some sort of a solution. And 
it is just a mere data that Sz. L. writes 15-page longer claims than the average length of 
others’ claims. If we can acknowledge a connection (even if there is or is not) between 
these facts, circumstances, solutions and data that is an information. Given that it is 
due to Sz. L.’s individual way of sitting in front of the computer that he is able to stare 
at his monitor 20 % more each day than the others (which can be verified by the aver-
age of time spent by the other lawyers in front of the computer), and thus he is able to 
write 15-page longer claims, then Sz. L. can evidently give a competitive advantage to 
his employer. This is an important commercial secret, because if it was made public, 
then either others would copy his special way of sitting, or Sz. L. would have to be paid 
more in order for him to be able to refuse the different daily job offers.
15 In the course of the analysis we will use this statutory definition, even though the current statutory 
definition of commercial secrets is partially different, and this definition could be analysed separate-
ly in each legal system Nagy [2008] (p. 554). For example five major theories may be distinguished 
for the justification of the regulation of commercial secrets. The Hungarian dogmatic approach is 
based on the personality and its protection, as we have already mentioned it in the introduction. 
However, the study must refer to the so-called contractual theory, the fiduciary theory (United 
Kingdom), and the misappropriation theory (United States), since these theories has significantly 
influenced the international legal literature of the economic analysis of commercial secrets.
16 Making this decision we took into account that the Hungarian version of this article was closed 
on 31 December 2009, and in this English version we aim only at signalising for the reader the 
changes that have occurred since, but we were unable to completely rewrite some parts based 
on the new regulatory regime/reaching the same conclusions, since this collection contains the 
original studies, not new analyses.
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The terms fact, solution, data and circumstance are thus seen as elements of the 
information.17 The statutory text expands the definition of commercial secret to all 
valuable sub-information that in themselves do not contain information, that could 
not be the subject of a commercial secret, because the threat of an injury in inter-
ests is only present with the acquisition of the information itself. The law considers 
the questions of evidence. It is extremely difficult – often impossible – to prove the 
realisation of the causal link between two facts that constitute two sub-information, 
which means that even the acquisition of the two sub-information that are individ-
ually invaluable can violate commercial secrets, if putting them together they can 
threaten financial, economic or market interests.
Making an information public or letting it be used by unauthorized persons can 
only violate the legitimate financial, economic or market interests of a business, if 
that information provides some kind of competitive advantage, including the level of 
command over resources.18 An information kept in secret, thus, is nothing more in 
economic sense, then a competitive advantage. Then it is not surprising that beyond 
the general norms of the Civil and the Criminal Code, competition law is the one that 
protects commercial secrets with a separate provision (Competition Act, Article 4).
The person entitled to the commercial secret has to perform all necessary meas-
ures in order to keep the information in secret.19 This element of the definition has 
a role in making the commercial secret, the legally protected information identifiable 
for third persons, including the law enforcement authorities. This shows that there 
is an information kept in secret, thus the owner of the information realised its value.
This element of the definition contains other important substantive criteria for the 
economic analysis, namely that it is the owner of the secret solely that can decide whether 
the information is valuable or not. Thus the commercial secret has no normative content.
17 By using the results of the formalistic information theory, we could have a more exact starting 
point for the analysis, so the results could be better generalised. It should be noted that in the data 
protection regulation the definition of data is wider, while the category of information is narrower. 
This approach is due to the special word-set of the data protection regulation, which is distinct 
from the legal vocabulary. Section 1 Paragraph 2:27 of the new Civil Code uses fact, information 
and other data, or a compilation thereof.
18 The “rightful” part could be separately analysed. From the standpoint of our study this is only 
relevant, because the reference to “rightful” strengthens the hypothesis that the advantage cannot 
come from outside the normal functioning of a market economy, thus it can only refer to advan-
tages gained from the economy, so only legitimate competitive advantages. For example the real 
information behind a commercial that states content unfairly influencing consumer choices cannot 
be the subject of commercial secrets. However, the information behind a commercial with valid 
content can be, so it is often only an authority that can assess the validity of commercial statements, 
but not the consumer.
19 Section 1 Paragraph 2:47 of the new Civil Code states the condition goes as: the entitled person 
is not liable for protecting the secret, so their conduct related to the protection was what can 
be generally expected in the given situation. There is no substantive difference between the two 
solutions from the perspective of our analysis.
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• This, however, does not mean that it would constitute a commercial secret if the owner 
of the secret would classify information as commercial secret that do not violate or 
threaten economic or market interests, or already public, let alone of public interest. 
Obviously this element of definition is important in a criminal proceeding regarding 
the violation of economic secrets or in a judicial case of commercial secret violation 
or of access to public interest data. First and foremost judicial cases regarding access 
to public interest data are when this element of the definition plays an important role. 
The cases that are relevant to this article, so when the subject of the judicial or admin-
istrative procedure is not the classification of a commercial secret, then this element 
of the definition is disregarded in the realm of the classification of commercial secret, 
and it only has a role in the disclosure of commercial secrets relating to assessment 
of the necessity and proportionality of the reasons for disclosure. This means that so 
long as in a case about the classification of a commercial secret does not decide on the 
character of a certain information, law influences the regulated subjects’ conduct as 
if any information classified as a commercial secret by the owner of the information 
would in fact be a commercial secret. This determines both the procedure of the reg-
ulatory authority and the judicial review thereof.
Without presuming the economic theory related consequences of information 
society’s impact on modern market economy, it should be noted that precisely 
the competitive advantages gained from information are the greatest in modern 
market economies, because the core competences which cannot be copied by oth-
ers, are the ones that can ensure a long-lasting competitive advantage. Such core 
competences derive from institutional culture, institutional knowledge that are 
specific to the institutional structure, and are the collection of such institutional 
practices and knowledge that might only be partially known or stay hidden even 
from the management, because the procession and evaluation of this enormous 
amount of information is almost impossible. Due to this later fact, businesses at-
tempt to classify as commercial secrets all information related to their economic 
functioning, and it is due to this that they have difficulties in giving reasons for 
such classification in an official – administrative – procedure. Nonetheless, for 
an economist it is clear that a rational business company is the sole authentic 
decision-maker in the question which information is providing its competitive 
advantage, thus which information is worth spending money on classifying and 
keeping as a commercial secret.
In summary: from an economic perspective a commercial secret is all the com-
pany’s information kept as a secret that is able to provide a competitive advantage 
against the competitor companies. This is exactly the Anglo-Saxon definition of 
commercial secrets, which deeply influenced the TRIPS Agreement.
The Restatement of Torts (1939) for example says that a commercial secret is any 
information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to 
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obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.20 Under US law 
the definition goes as follows: A commercial secret is any information that can be 
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently val-
uable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.21
Information in microeconomic models
As a starting point, we should remember what presumptions the classical – stat-
ic – economics model (competitors’ model) establishes: there are a large number 
of smaller buyers and sellers, with competing homogeneous products, the capital 
goods also come in homogeneous units, none of the market participants are able 
to change to price alone (everyone is a price-taker), market entry is free, prices and 
goods can move without any limitations, market participants possess all relevant 
information to make an informed decision (even the consumer knows all the pos-
sible alternatives). There are no mechanisms in place to win over buyers, such as 
reducing prices, increasing the quality of goods, or using advertisements, also there 
is no personal relationship between buyers and sellers. In such a market the long-
term profit is zero, both the buyers and the sellers act as a homo oeconomicus (who 
can make optimal decisions) and there are no transaction costs.
Thus in the classical analysis the existence of information is a crucial starting 
point in numerous regards (advertisement, winning over buyers, even acting as 
a homo oeconomicus assumes it). If being perfectly informed is such an important 
starting condition, then we should rightly presume that the existence of a legal 
institution like the protection of commercial secrets is against the competition, 
consequently, competition law should per se prohibit it. Controversially, the situ-
ation is that competition law does not only prohibit commercial secrets, but even 
protects them.
The obvious model-nature of the starting conditions of a competitors’ market is 
even apparent – contrary to public opinion – in the classical microeconomic studies. 
Economics views asymmetric information as one of the main reasons for market 
failures. If asymmetric information causes market failures in the functioning of 
market economy, then the existence of the legal institution of commercial secrets, 
which protects secret information, still seems unjustifiable, and thus the existence 
of asymmetric information shall be removed through legal measures.
20 Restatement (First) of Torts Sec 757, Comment b (1939), http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/ 
owadisp.show_document?p_table=standards&p_id= 10103 (25 February 2010). 
21 Section 39 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, Business Torts & Unfair Competi-
tion: A Practitioner’s Handbook, American Bar Association, 1996, ISBN: 1-57073-294-9168.
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Contrary to this viewpoint, there are other economic models describing a com-
petitors’ market. For example the paradigm of the new Austrian school22 – based 
on the more realistic presumption of limited rationality (Simon [1982]) – sets the 
unavoidable imperfection of human knowledge as a starting condition, and its focus 
is not the determination and theory of an equilibrium price, rather the market as 
a mechanism for spreading information. Its perspective is fundamentally different 
from the classical theory, since it considers the differentiation of products to be 
an immanent element of competition. The market is in motion not because of the 
buyer and the seller (producer), but only because of the intermediary merchant, the 
profit-oriented company. While the buyer and the seller are simply price-takers, the 
competition of entrepreneurs makes the profit disappear, because the difference be-
tween production prices and retail prices are always levelled. It must be noted that in 
this theory information has a completely different role as in the classic competitors’ 
market model. Here information is the driver of competition, and in this regard this 
theory stands on entirely different grounds as the classic competitors’ market model.
The existence of asymmetric information belongs to competition, without it we 
could not talk about competition. By this the legal institution of commercial secrets 
could be nicely explained. The legal institution of commercial secrets protects the 
intermediary entrepreneurs, who can – by disseminating information – influence 
the prices and who are the cornerstones of market economy and competition. In 
this context, however, the Pareto-optimality of market competition comes into ques-
tion. The less profit those market participants who are able to influence prices can 
make, meaning that the less the price of information is, the more efficient a market 
competition in the allocation of resources is.
The modern theories of institutional economics, such as the property rights 
theory, the principal-agent theory, or the theory of transactional costs, may further 
differentiate our views on market economy as the dominant economic-regulatory 
mechanism. These theories influenced other disciplines, including organisational 
studies, or some areas of law, thus creating the school of law and economics that 
holds the economic analysis of legal institutions as its core subject of inquiry.23
Market exchange is just one form of economic processes, and distributions. The 
reproduction of goods in a company happens through administrative channels, in-
stead of market regulatory mechanism, consequently, it cannot be stated that market 
exchange, the far from uncontroversial price-system is alone or even dominantly 
22 The new Austrian school was founded in the 1960s and 1970s by Ludwig von Mises, its most in-
fluential representative was Friedrich von Hayek, nowadays its lead figure is I. M. Kirzner (In this 
topic we are relying on the monography of Mátyás [2003] and the study of Mátyás [2004])
23 Law and economics is the subject of major legal researches also in Hungary, especially in the field 
of civil law. (Vékás [1998], Sajó [1984]). The international literature of the subject is enormous. 
See on the different viewpoints: Burrows–Veljanovski [1981], Cooter–Ulen [2005], Kelman [1987], 
Polinsky [1989], Posner [1996].
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responsible for economic regulation, even in a so-called market economy (Coase 
[1990]). The importance of Coase’s work lays in his acknowledgement that the basis 
for well-defined property rights and a functioning system of market exchange – in 
other words the basis for the prevalence of market economy – is a more or less un-
controversial price-system. Without well-defined property rights, it is unavoidable 
that one of the reasons for market failures is to be the existence of negative (and 
positive) external effects (Coase [1990]). It follows Coase’s basic argument that 
optimal solutions can arise, only if the value of transactional costs were to be zero. 
Consequently, the existence of transactional costs is the reason for the losses in ef-
ficiency. In cases where transactional costs create barriers to market solutions, law 
has to intervene. So if commercial secrets increase transactional costs, then it results 
in the loss of efficiency and can be a barrier to market mechanisms. Thus law has to 
intervene against commercial secrets, as against one element of transactional costs.
The principal-agent theory is also influential on our views about market economy, 
which describes processes beyond the well-defined property rights.
According to the members of the new institutional school (Williamson [1981]), 
who considered Coase as their forerunner, in the case of special capital goods, trans-
actional costs are exceptionally high. This fact has, however, become dominant in 
the extremities of international division of labour, and become the obvious reason 
for the rise of bilateral monopolies. Two other models of microeconomics (the 
Azariadis–Baily–Gordon-model and the Okun-model) – based on the contract the-
ory – explain the long-term contractual relations between seller and buyer, which 
relationship increasingly resembles the long-standing relations between employer 
and employee, by the high-priced nature of information. This explains not only the 
permanency of wages, but also of prices, thus imposing limitations on the function-
ing of classical market mechanisms. Based on commercial contracts, Williamson 
concluded that in the long-term commercial relations for specific capital goods 
the contractual partners develop so-called relational contracts and – due to the 
high transactional (mainly exchange) costs – they are often interested in collective 
profit-maximisation.
The literature of negotiation game theory is expansive, and includes a large num-
ber of meticulously executed experiments. One of the main results of the experi-
ments was the realisation: the more definite the rights of the bargaining partners are, 
the more they tend to co-operate, while the less transparent their legal relations are, 
the smaller the chance is that they reach an agreement. According to Robert Cooter 
and Thomas Ulen, the negotiations become complex and burdensome, when private 
information is needed for the decision. Private information hinders negotiations, 
because mostly they must be made public in order to reach the rational conditions of 
coordination. In general: a negotiation is costly, if a lot of private information needs 
to become common for a deal (Cooter–Ulen [2004] p. 93). This makes it clear that 
commercial secrets between seller and buyer increase transactional costs.
24 András György Kovács
Lastly, it is worth referring to the empirical study showing that within a com-
pany the most effective tool to increasing competition between employees is to 
withhold information, especially in relation to employees who have accomplished 
performance-based successes within the organisation (Hámori et al. [2007]). How-
ever, here the causality chain is reversed. According to company leaders, one of 
the most crucial detrimental effects of in-house competition is the hindrance to 
the flow of information, which encourages the avoidance of too intense in-house 
competition. This fact shows that an intense competition leads to limitations on 
the flow of information, consequently, too intense competition is avoidable. Is it 
possible that the legal institution of commercial secrets was brought to life by the 
too intense competition? Would this mean that the legal institution of commercial 
secrets legitimises a detrimental effect?
We can conclude so far that information plays an increasingly important role in 
economic theories, and could be the basis of a new theory. The heightened attention 
is, however, understandable, since the “informational boom”, the evolution of infor-
mation technologies created a new – information – society, in which the functioning 
of institutions and market participants, and thus the functioning of the market econ-
omy, is fundamentally transforming. By the 21st century, information has become 
a key resource, while due to globalisation, market competition is ever increasing. 
There is almost no production factor left, including natural treasures, cheaper man-
ufacturing technologies, qualified or cheaper workforce, which is out of the reach of 
a multinational company. Consequently, complex information-centred competition 
strategies have arisen, and the acquisition of unmatchable competitive advantages, 
the achievement of long-term competitive advantages has become a core competence.
All of this has the consequence that the problem of asymmetric information 
appears in a more complicated, complex form. Although it would follow – espe-
cially in the markets ruled by multinational companies – that the legal institution 
of commercial secrets, as a means of competition between companies, has been 
integrated into the protection of privacy and private secrets, nonetheless, the gen-
eral purpose of that right – along with the rules on data protection – is to ensure 
information freedom rights, and to eliminate asymmetric information between 
companies and consumers for the sake of private individuals, and for the loss of 
companies (Vikman [2006] p. 23).24
As a consequence of this evolution, the literature on law and economics does not 
consider information as an external condition anymore, rather as a good with its own 
market. In the following sections, we will examine this theory and its plausibility.
24 However, this development is a dichotomy. While under the prior practice of the data protection 
ombudsman the commercial data handled by authorities was considered public data, and for 
example a decision stating the violation of a statute was a clearly public interest data, but under 
the newer practice the commercial secrets handled by authorities do not considered public data. 
(Majtényi [2006] p. 428, Jóri–Bártfai [2005] p. 159–164).
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THE MARKET OF INFORMATION
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen apply in their already mentioned work the prop-
erty rights theory to information as well (Cooter–Ulen [2004] pp. 120–122). Here 
two difficulties are identified regarding the property rights of information and the 
creation of a market for information. Information has two distinct features that dif-
ferentiate transactions of information from the transactions of regular private goods. 
The first of these features its non-excludability, while the other is its authenticity.
Its feature of non-excludability, makes information resemble to common goods. 
Information is difficult to create, however, it is usually easy to transfer. Informa-
tion is sold by its creator for a fraction of its value. The use of information is free of 
competition, because – as opposed to other goods – the use of information does 
not reduces its quantity and its gains for others. “The use of information is thus free 
of competition” (Cooter–Ulen [2004] pp. 120–121). It is difficult to exclude others 
from the use of information, due to this the free rider problem exists. Consequently, 
similarly to public goods, the market is unable to produce the sufficient amount of 
information. Since the private sector on market grounds offers less than the optimal 
amount of information, in unregulated markets there is a lack of ideas, knowledge 
and most importantly creations embodying thereof.
It follows from the public good nature of information that it is either ensured by 
the state,25 or in the realms of contracts the protection of commercial secrets cre-
ates the regulated market for commercial secrets, or supplementing the protection 
of commercial secrets intellectual property rights are also regulated. It seems from 
this that the legal institution of commercial secrets could be sufficiently justified.
The question of authenticity is usually mentioned in relation with contracts. This 
is based on the negotiation theory in the US literature, which provides a perfect 
terrain for game theory analysis.
The aim of the contracts system that can be created based on game theory is 
to transform games with non-efficient solutions to games with efficient outcomes. 
The enforceable contract transforms a game with a non-cooperative outcome to 
cooperative. The further aim of contracts is to promote the efficient publication of 
information within contractual relations. Situations with asymmetric information 
could be managed with this, leading to the redistribution of welfare rather than the 
extension of welfare, thus barely relating to our topic.
The two aims stand in a means-ends relationship. The efficient distribution of 
information enables cooperative outcomes. The problem of authenticity stems from 
the fact that the buyer is unable to assess the value of information before receiving it. 
It is a common problem that the information has to be revealed before the buyer in 
25 Cooter–Ulen [2005] refer to the system of charity donations (p. 133), which, however, is equivalent 
with indirect state financing.
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order to determine the value of it, but then what is the reason to pay for the known 
information? To understand the problem, we will shortly describe how contract law 
can contribute to the efficient disclosure and transmission of information.
In economics information is public, if in a negotiation process both parties are 
aware of it, while it is private, if only one party knows it, while the other does not. 
The stimulator of a transaction is private information. The transmission of infor-
mation and the trade of goods enables one to take over control of knowledge and 
resources. Due to the fact that private information lies at the heart of transactions, 
law usually treats contracts based on asymmetric information as being enforcea-
ble. Nonetheless, efficiency requires that the merger of the control over knowledge 
and resources would be of the lowest cost, respectively to the costs of information 
transmission and of the trade of goods. Consequently, a contract is not legally en-
forceable in cases of omission of guidance, fraud, or bilateral misconception (in this 
case there is not even a bargain), however, it is enforceable in the case of a unilateral 
misconception. 26 By this, law attempts to promote efficiency through benefiting the 
pursuit of information and the merger of control of knowledge and goods. There is 
a possibility, nevertheless, that information was acquired by chance, thus without 
the costs of pursuit, and so the unilateral mistake of the other party does not lead 
to a boost in efficiency.
a) For this reason, the literature classifies information based on its effects on 
economic efficiency. According to their nature, there are information that enhance 
welfare (productive information) and that redistribute welfare (redistributive 
information). Productive information are for example discoveries, inventions, 
etc. Contrary to this, redistributive information provide such an advantage to 
its holder, which can be used in a negotiation in order to redistribute welfare 
according to the holder’s interests. For instance, if someone acquires the 
information before others where new rail-roads will be built by the state, it 
gives him a great advantage on the real estate market. Investments made for the 
acquisition of redistributive information may seem on the one hand like a luxury, 
but on the other hand it encourages those who do not wish to suffer welfare losses 
to be better informed so as to carry out defensive investments. The investments 
with a defensive aim are, however, only created obstacles to redistribution, but 
do not create new value.
b) Additionally, information can be labelled according to the method of acquisition. 
Information can be acquired in an active manner, namely by investing resources 
into the recovery of information, or by chance, accidentally.
26 Under Hungarian law, a contract may only be challenged based on unilateral misconception, if the 
clearly false information was provided by a legal counsel advising both parties, and the miscon-
ception was regarding an essential question.
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From an efficiency standpoint, there is only one combination of the nature 
and manner of acquisition of the information that clearly justifies the enforcea-
bility of a contract. This is the productive information, which was a result of an 
intentional investment.
Most information, however, is in practice both productive and redistributive 
at the same time, thus mixed information. Most information also seems to be 
mixed from the aspect of being acquired through investment or accidentally. It 
can be asked for example whether the information acquired from the market sit-
uation itself – not intentionally, but as some kind of positive externalities – was 
gained accidentally or in an active way. If for instance we pursue a legal education, 
and later as a lawyer handle a lot of real estate contracts, we might accidentally 
acquire the information about where the next rail-road will be built. Conducting 
any kind of economic activity, we can come across a number of accidental expe-
riences, which can be acquired by anyone pursuing the same economic activity, 
but in order to start such an activity we need a large amount of information and 
knowledge. Are these information the fruits of the investment into knowledge or 
the results of chance? It is a further difficult question, whether the accumulation 
of huge corporations’ institutional knowledge is the result of intentional invest-
ments or accidents, the latter of which is a statistical necessity.
The literature distinguishes between three principles of economics: “1. A con-
tract has to be enforced, if some productive information was not at the disposal 
of all parties, especially if that information was a result of the investment of one 
party. 2. Most contracts should be enforced, in which a mixed information (both 
productive and redistributive) was not at the disposal of both parties at the time 
of signing the contract. 3. A contract shall be annulled, if the party holding the 
information has not increased, only redistributed welfare, or the information was 
acquired accidentally. ” (Cooter–Ulen [2004] p. 283)
c) The third possible way to classify information according to its nature may be 
connected to the questions of authenticity: whether there is an obligation to 
give guidance or not. The obligation to provide guidance triggers the definition 
of security information. Security information refers to a knowledge that helps 
people to avoid damages. Naturally, law requires the parties to share with each 
other all security information they possess. Law often requires the seller to be 
aware of such information in an explicit manner.
There is another side to the problem of authenticity, which is independent of the lack 
or ambiguity of information and may be understood from the game theory analysis 
of such single transactions that are of great value. Single transactions of great value 
can often be described as the results of manoeuvres, of using unfair, but not illegal 
techniques against the other party. In these cases, the parties making offers to each 
other mostly disregard the losses caused by the breach of the promises. Separate 
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studies deal with the issue of the appropriate amount of damages that deteriorate 
from the breach of contracts, but at the same time do not cause a loss in efficiency, 
thus the disproportionate amount of damages do not discourage from contracting 
(Cooter–Ulen [2004] pp. 205–206).
Contemplating this, the risks (ambiguities) are not only caused by the incomplete 
information known about the other side, which could only be eliminated through 
contract law with considerable transactional costs, but also they are caused by the 
fact that there are only a known and a definite number of games. If we are building 
a long-term, lasting relationship, of which duration is unknown, then we are facing 
an infinitely repeated game, in which cooperation is more likely than competition. 
Logic is that simple. It is well know that at any round of the repeated game, in which 
the principal (first player) invests money, the agent (second player) gains immediate 
profit by the expropriation. The principal may strike back by not investing anything 
in the following rounds, as a result of which the return of the agent will be zero. So 
long as the agent is unaware of which round is the last, and may assume that there 
are an infinite number of further rounds, expropriation is not a winning strategy, 
because he can expect more profit from the next rounds than from a once-only ex-
propriation. As a result of this, long-term business relations are far more efficient 
than the single-time relations.
It can be observed in the economy that the intermediary commercial activities 
are attempted to be covered by exclusive distribution contracts, through which the 
advantage given to the agent ensures the continuous and long-lasting relationship. 
This on the other hand is advantageous to the principal.
Infinite games contribute to the enhancement of information authenticity, the 
improvement of business trust. A number of risk factors may be eliminated through 
this, nonetheless, the costs of exchange increase. Apart from the market of goods 
that can be acquired through single-time transactions of law value, the markets of 
all other goods and services are built on business confidence, which prerequisites, 
however, long-term relations and contracts, leading to the permanency of prices. 
Consequently, the distortion of market competition is not the result of the mere 
existence of asymmetric information, but of a game theory proved situation that 
derives from the lack of information regarding future action.
It can be noted that for the analysts of law and economics, asymmetric informa-
tion brings market processes, market exchange and competition into motion. Similar 
conclusions have been reached by the members of the new Austrian school as well, re-
serving that they do not differentiate between productive and redistributive informa-
tion, rather consider both as a source of profit, thus the driver of market competition.
Law and economics use the theory of transactional costs to show that transac-
tional costs are the cost of the disclosure of asymmetric information. The bargaining 
process is about nothing else but the costs of negotiations and other expenses of 
signing a contract. Contract law attempts to reduce these costs. The other corner-
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stone of law and economics holds: in an efficient market economy, the most re-
sources belonging to the one who pays the most for them, because he values them 
the most. We can thus conclude that the one who values resources the most, is the 
one with the better information. 27
If ceteris paribus the person (company) possess the same amount of resources, 
the individual who will be more efficient is the one who is able to utilise those re-
sources more effectively, consequently attaining a higher level of production. This 
derives only from advantages in information. In general terms, this means that there 
is no competition without asymmetric information.
As a consequence the question is not only whether competition is the most 
efficient allocator of resources, but in a dynamic perspective also whether compe-
tition is putting technical innovation into motion. An innovative enterprise in the 
Schumpeterian-sense is the one that induces market competition. The existence 
of asymmetric information is an essential condition of technical innovation. This 
asymmetric information situation is efficient, only if it involves new information – 
yet completely unknown and created not by chance, but through investment. Con-
sequently, the new information is without doubt a productive information.
However, the static competitors’ model that considers a perfect informational 
situation as a baseline, is not in contravention with the information-market approach. 
Namely, the new information could mean a new product and thus a new market, 
which is the basis of product diversification. There are claims that product diversi-
fication reduces the intensity of competition due to incomparability. If we take the 
approach of the new Austrian school, which considers product diversification not 
as feature of monopolies, but rather as a natural by-product of market competition, 
then we can conclude that the above mentioned critical view is only true, if there is 
no new information involved in the product diversification. The fact that in a certain 
market the intensification of competition can be sensed when new information is 
used, only means that the new product is a close substitute of the previous one. If 
we talk about new markets in these situations, then only a correction mechanism 
dependent on interchangeability relations starts on the previously Pareto-optimal 
competition market. If the two products are completely interchangeable, then the 
previous market disappears. If they are only partially interchangeable, then due to 
the reduction in the demanded amount, the market for the older product is neces-
sarily curtailed. If the new information is disclosed with others and can be utilised, 
then soon the equilibrium price will be reached once more.
This, however, also shows that it is not new and non-productive information 
which sustains competition, but in fact hinder the emergence of a Pareto-optimal 
situation. Thus the product diversification leads to a loss of efficiency, only if it is 
27 The one, who is badly informed and thus pays larger sums, will not be the holder of resources for 
long, because shortly will go bankrupt…
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based on redistributive information. It follows that legal instruments may contrib-
ute to the strengthening of market competition, only if they are aiming at creating 
a market for productive information. Since the completely new information are defi-
nitely and undoubtedly productive, the legal system couples these up with property 
entitlements. This is the function of intellectual property rights. This is the basis 
for the recognition of intellectual property rights, patent rights, and trade mark 
rights28. The innovations and know-how also create such property rights, but these 
are special or borderline cases, because the former prevails in an employer-employee 
relationship, while the subject of the latter is difficult to define, thus in both cases 
the productive effect is harder to prove.
If we simplify the concept of know-how it can be considered as a special sub-
section of a commercial secret, which deals with information that is partially or 
fully protected with property rights, and in the given market situation it is more 
reasonable for the company to treat them as commercial secrets. Know-how is 
a special commercial secret in way that it is the most productive. As it is explicitly 
mentioned in the Civil Code, 29 this analysis disregards know-how, so all the con-
clusions of this study is limited to non-know-how commercial secrets. The reason 
behind this, is that know-how would require a separate analysis, which could lead 
to different conclusions in a number of questions.
The main feature of a market is that it enables the appropriation of information 
for a limited time – and sometimes with limitations, thus temporary monopolies 
can arise. The temporary nature of such monopolies compels their utilization, which 
could have major effect on other markets as well. The time limitation on the mo-
nopoly should be construed in a way to allow the emergence of a new market. The 
regulation should allow for monopoly rights so that after the emergence of a new 
market they should enable the evolution of a competitive market. This question 
could be analysed concretely, and it is the subject of the discipline of law and eco-
nomics. With regard to trade marks the situation differs, because the time-frame of 
the protection is determined by the duration of the actual utilization.
The protection of trade marks is productive, because market value is only at-
tached to these rights, if they are indicating a quality above the market average (or at 
least they are perceived by consumers as such). Since quality has a productive effect 
by definition, moreover, it reduces the consumer’s need for information, strengthen-
ing business confidence, and thus eliminating problems regarding the authenticity 
of information about the product, it can be considered as a border-line means of 
productive product diversification.
28 This is only limitedly true for trade mark, because the trade mark provides new information for the 
consumer in the producer-consumer relation. The role of trade mark is more important in the reduc-
tion of search costs and in the fight against “market for lemons”. The legal institution of trade mark 
would also need an economic analysis, just as now this article is providing it for commercial secrets.
29 Section 2 Paragraph 2:47 of the Civil Code.
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It should be emphasised that our analysis of the legal institution of commer-
cial secrets focuses on information other than the above mentioned, and although 
there might be interesting overlaps with know-how (for example it can be kept as 
a secret as well), but it is not the subject of this study, just as patents and intellec-
tual properties.
We could think based on this that the legal institution of commercial secret pro-
tects information, which kept as a secret results in wastefulness, and loss of efficiency, 
thus the legal institution is not efficient in an economic sense. Especially so, as the 
subject of commercial secrets covers all economy-related partial information, thus 
its scope is seemingly endlessly expandable – except for the statutorily, explicitly 
defined, concrete information. Companies try to classify all information regarding 
their management and functioning as commercial secrets, which is only limited by 
the costs of the necessary actions to protect commercial secrets. We can thus assume 
that most of this information is not productive, other legal institutions remove most 
of the productive information from the range of commercial secrets. Consequently, we 
consider the legal institution of commercial secrets as consisting of mixed and distrib-
utive information. 30 Such an interpretation of commercial secrets raises a number 
of basic questions in the literature, which although can be answered based on our 
analysis, are not part of this article (See on these issues: Cooter–Ulen [2007]).
First of all, it must be observed that commercial secrets as information have no 
legally created market. The Anglo-Saxon legal theory has come up with two justi-
fications for the necessity of the protection of commercial secrets. 1. Based on the 
property rights theory a commercial secret is a property, which inspires its owners 
for innovation. [See the US Supreme Court decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-1004 (1984)] Due to this, some consider a commercial se-
cret to be an intellectual property right. 2. Under the other theory, the protection 
of commercial secrets derives from the law of damages (and contracts). If someone 
transfers someone else’s commercial secret without permission, he breaks a contract, 
and violates the due diligence requirement towards the entitled person, and owner. 
This due diligence requirement can be justified with the preservation of commercial 
morals and fair competition.
Since a commercial secret as an information has no market, the conclusions of 
the property rights theory may be debated. First, it is not clear how innovation is 
promoted by commercial secrets. Second, commercial secrets are distinguishable 
from intellectual property rights, since the protection is attached not to ownership, 
but to possession.
30 This assumption might be debated based on a more detailed analysis. After finishing the study, 
anyone could correct the results based on a wider interpretation. It should be noted that security 
information could not be classified as commercial secret, the reasons for which we will deal with 
in the next chapters. 
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According to Bobrovszky [2006] “the cohesion, the common ground of intellec-
tual property… lays not in exclusive rights, those are only the core of it, but rather 
in its subject being different goods with intellectual values, and the two levels of 
protection… are separated from a private law standpoint”: 1. One level being a de 
facto possession-like based on the protection of commercial secrets, 2. And the 
other being a de jure ownership-like based on patent and other exclusive rights 
(Bobrovszky [2006] 1388.p.).
Nevertheless, the de facto character of the protection of commercial secrets 
differentiates it from the protection of “other” forms of intellectual property, so 
defining it as a right is difficult. It follows that even the elimination of the legal in-
stitution of commercial secrets would not mean that the commercial secrets would 
not exist. It would be a mistake to assume that the economic analysis of the right to 
the protection of commercial secrets means that the scientific analysis that if there 
are no commercial secrets, then there are no redistributive or mixed information 
in market competition, which appear as asymmetric information. Studying this 
would only be reasonable in connection to such a legal institution that requires all 
redistributive and mixed information to be published and not kept as a secret. Such 
a regulation would cause “infinite” social costs, since the number of this information 
is practically endless, for this reason there exists no such regulation.
If we consider that commercial secrets exist without the legal institution of 
commercial secrets, then the function of the legal institution of commercial secrets 
should be searched elsewhere. This statement is proven by the fact that the acqui-
sition of market information by deducting the competitor’s commercial secret from 
the competitor’s product is an approved practice. So the existence of a commercial 
secret is a factual matter, not a legal one.
If we take into account that information in itself (as opposed to a patent as a right) 
cannot be considered as an object, thus it cannot be the subject of a property right,31 
then it is easy to realise that the right to the protection of commercial secrets is 
not to be associated with property rights, but rather it is a product of contract law.
This view is underlined by the analysts of law and economics, who always refer 
to examples taken from contract law, when dealing with problems of the protec-
tion of commercial secrets – especially from the employer-employee contractual 
relations (Cooter–Ulen [2008] p. 134). They also state as a general opinion that the 
weaknesses of the legal regulation of the protection of commercial secrets under-
mine the efficiency of the system as a whole.
31 Section 1 of Paragraph 5:14 of the Civil Code holds that the subject of ownership may be all things 
of a tangible nature which are capable of appropriation. Section 2 states that the definition of things 
also include money and securities, including natural resources that can be utilized as capital goods. 
While Section 3 refers to the special rules regarding animals. It is, however, difficult to interpret 
information as a “natural resource”. 
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If for instance A as an investor signs a non-disclosure agreement with his em-
ployee B, who then discloses A’s secret to C, and C did not know or could not have 
known about the breach of contract, then without a contractual relationship between 
A and C, A cannot bring a claim against C. Moreover, the disclosed information that 
is known by the given industrial sector may be utilised by anyone without compen-
sation, if everyone is aware of the fact the information was made public with the 
violation of the non-disclosure agreement (ibid).
This example shows one of the main functions of the legal institution of com-
mercial secrets. If non-disclosure could be obliged only by means of contract law 
– namely to keep information and prevent its transmission (so an obligation to en-
dure) – then A can typically bring a case only against a (former) employee based 
on the contract, but then C could not even be held responsible, even if he knew 
(or should have known) that it was regarding a commercial secret. Not even if it 
had been C, who convinced B of breaking the contract. For one thing, it is quite 
probable that B as a regular (former) employee without the necessary funds would 
not be able to reimburse the damages caused by the breach of the secret. This is 
apparent, because B can calculate the loss from the breach of contract based on 
the multiplication of the probability of being caught and the damages caused. Since 
the subject of the commercial secret is unreasonably wide, and not well-defined, 
moreover, its utilization necessarily happens in secret and its public results only 
appear indirectly, then the multiplier of the probability of being caught is below 1, 
close to 0. It follows that an employee can be easily tempted, since chances are low 
that the breach of contract will be exposed, thus the compensation given by C for 
the breach of contract would not cover the caused damages. The legal institution 
of commercial secrets eliminates the too extensive – and thus not efficient – risk 
of breach of contract. It ensures that C can have a claim brought against them, if 
he knew (or should have known) that it is regarding a commercial secret, also if C 
abetted B to disclose the secret. If the legal institution of commercial secrets did 
not exist in civil law – without being of a contractual character – it would be as if 
criminal law only punished the thief, but not the dealer of stolen goods.
It should be noted that the legal institution of commercial secret creates a legal 
relation between A and C by a unilateral declaration. Consequently, C is not al-
lowed to lawfully use a document labelled as commercial secret, even if he acquired 
it by coincidence and legally. (Such a document can be used only for what was 
permitted by the entitled person. If no permission was given, then the document 
cannot be used at all. It follows that even without special regulations, employees 
of public authorities and courts are obliged to keep the commercial secret. In 
the course of a judicial proceeding, the person entitled to the commercial secret 
discloses the commercial secret voluntarily – generally in a civil case for example 
because he wishes to use it for the case, so the other party has to make a statement 
of non-disclosure.)
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It is, however, still a question whether innovation and market competition is 
enhanced by the acknowledgement and enforcement of such contracts between 
A and B, or by the legal relationship between A and C based on the existence of the 
protection of commercial secrets.
Cooter–Ulen [2007] (p. 134) has brought attention to the limited efficiency of the 
protection of commercial secrets. Empirical studies conducted in the Silicon-valley 
showed that employees working there often switch workplaces and in such cases 
they bring with them most of the commercial secrets of their prior employer. In 
more cases, employees do not even notice when they are breaking the contract, 
because the laws governing commercial secrets are in violation with the business 
norms of Silicon-valley. It is well-known that the real places of innovation in Sili-
con-valley are the pubs, where employees of similar status but coming from different 
companies spend their spare time.
The case of the Silicon-valley is a nice example of how the weaknesses of the 
protection of commercial secrets may be the driver of innovation, since the world’s 
most successful IT companies are in Silicon-valley, which proves that regulating 
commercial secrets as a contractual matter hinders competition, so does the legal 
institution of commercial secrets.
If the legal institution of commercial secrets is an obstacle to innovation, what 
might be the reason for sustaining the legal institution of commercial secrets from 
the perspective of economic efficiency? It is shown by our earlier example that the 
legal institution of commercial secrets has important functions within the company, 
in employer-employee relations.
Section 2 Paragraph 4 of the Competition Act emphasises that “an unfair access 
to trade secrets shall also mean where access to such trade secrets has been obtained 
without the consent of the data proprietor through a party in a business relationship 
- including the provision of information, negotiations and making proposals prior 
to making a deal, where no contract is signed subsequently in consequence - or in 
a confidential relationship with such person - such as a contract of employment or 
any similar relationship, or membership at the time of, or prior to, gaining access 
to the secrets.” Under b) and c) Subsections of Section 3 ‘confidential relationship’ 
shall, in particular, mean employment relationship, other work-related contractual 
relationship and membership; while ‘business relationship’ shall comprise the pro-
vision of information, negotiations and making proposals prior to making a deal, 
whether or not a contract is subsequently signed in consequence.
This definition of commercial secrets fulfils an important function even in other 
business relationships, such as the buyer-seller (company – principal – consumer). 
Consequently, in the following sub-chapter we will shortly summarise our conclu-
sions on the role of commercial secrets in vertical relationships.
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THE ROLE OF COMMERCIAL SECRETS IN VERTICAL RELATIONS
The main research area of asymmetric information even within the buyer-seller 
relation is the consumer markets, retail markets (Carlton–Perloff [2000]). In these 
cases usually commercial secrets are not – or only indirectly – responsible for the 
existence of asymmetric information situations. For one thing, the sellers are obliged 
to provide consumers with all safety information, so these cannot constitute a com-
mercial secret. Safety information helps to eliminate the problem of limited infor-
mation regarding the quality of the product, and the company is highly motivated 
to make all the positive quality characteristics public. Since the Competition Act 
prohibits – in the course of advertisement and consumer information – the con-
cealment of information regarding the essential features of a product, thus none of 
this information can constitute a commercial secret.
Nonetheless, the legal institution of commercial secrets has a direct effect on 
how informed the consumer is, because if information as a whole or part constitute 
a commercial secret, then the validity of the facts and data behind the consumer 
information cannot be controlled. For example a credit-line contract of a bank and 
a retail company behind the interest-free, “costless” credit offered by the retail com-
pany might be a commercial secret, and the credibility of the provided information 
can only be checked through administrative procedures. Moreover, the protection 
of commercial secrets as a legal institution do not even play a role in these cases, as 
the holders of the commercial secret – the employees of the retail company or the 
bank – are not at all interested in the disclosure of the commercial secret. Conse-
quently, this information would be kept as a secret, even if the legal institution of 
commercial secrets did not exist.
Since the sole interest of the consumer is to acquire all relevant information 
regarding the price and quality of the product, which is also required by other legal 
provisions, the company has no obligation to provide information about either the 
other features of the product or the market opportunities related (e.g. where the 
product is on sale), so the legal institution of commercial secrets has no influence 
over these market relations.
Regarding the quality and the price of a product, the company is not allowed to refer 
to commercial secrets against the consumers. This information in the company-con-
sumer relation is protected by neither contract law, nor by the legal institution of com-
mercial secrets. The fact that the consumer can acquire such information anyway, the 
information loses its commercial secret characteristic, since it can be freely transferred 
(regardless of whether the company would like to withhold it from the competitors).32
32 An example for this is the case of double price-discrimination between new and existing custom-
ers, when the existing customer does not terminate the contract only because the service provider 
– when realising the determinate intention – offers the discounts given to new customers, although 
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When neither retail or consumer markets are involved, but rather it is regarding 
the market of production factors in a broader sense, including the distributional, 
wholesale markets, when typically companies close deals with companies, then 
the information channels for prices and quality might differ. These questions have 
a wide literature, mostly in marketing.33 Commercial secrets play a crucial role in 
the negotiation of the parties, and not only regarding contractual terms, but also the 
prices. Contrary to consumer markets, in the market of production factors the list 
prices and price reductions of the delivery contract between the parties constitute 
a commercial secret, thus the buyer is obliged to keep it. This only limits the buyer 
in using certain physiological techniques in the bargaining process (negotiations 
with other companies regarding prices cannot be referred to), but in general the 
company is not restrained in making an informed decision. At the same time, the 
legal institution of commercial secrets protects this information from the compet-
itors on the seller’s side.
It is, however, often not efficient that the seller34 provides a greater price reduc-
tion to only one of its buyers, without being able to double-check the information 
from the buyer’s competitors. Moreover, information regarding price as a com-
mercial secret can only be redistributive information, thus it is not efficient in an 
economic sense either. Handling price information as a commercial secret on the 
market of production factors thus only leads to loss of efficiency.
The role of commercial secrets (and its legal institution) in these situations is 
limited to horizontal relations, so the efficiency of the regulation is dependent upon 
whether the legal institution of commercial secrets can be considered efficient in 
the relations of the competitors.
The employer-employee relation, in connection with the principal-agent the-
ory in the literature on asymmetric information, has been in the spotlight of eco-
nomic analysis as well (e.g. Spence [1973]). We have already showed that one of 
the main features of the legal institution of commercial secrets is related to the 
relationship of employer and employee. This comes from the fact that in the mod-
ern market economy governed by organizations, a large number of people represent 
under its official communication it is not allowed to. This option is a commercial secret towards 
the competitors, but the customer can get hold of the information. This information then could 
be shared with other customers, or even competitors.
33 Microeconomic studies do not really deal with this. The reason for this is that microeconom-
ic models assume that the companies making rational and optimal decisions are also acting as 
well-informed and expert participants in the market of production factors. Otherwise they would 
stay behind in the competition. Alternatively these supplier markets in the system of long-term 
contracts are prevalent, which follows from the already mentioned views of game theory and from 
the problems of the validity of information.
34 The literature of economics uses the term supplier for the seller of factors markets based on 
accounting jargon. We kept the term seller in this case, because supplier as a legal terms means 
something else.
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the certain knowledge and information, which provides the company’s competitive 
advantage, thus without the protection of commercial secrets this competitive 
advantage would be in all likelihood lost. For reasons of space, we do not have the 
opportunity to give a detailed account of this question from the aspects of eco-
nomic analysis, so we will only discuss shortly the relevant assertions of an other-
wise detailed analysis.
In the course of an employment, a commercial secret is best protected by the 
common/mutual interests of the employer and the employee, for this reason nei-
ther the contract law provisions for commercial secrets, nor the legal institution of 
commercial secrets can be justified from an efficiency standpoint by the conflict 
of interests between them, which is the alleged policy justification for regulating 
commercial secrets. However, as the conflict of interests can most efficiently be 
resolved by property rights on the side of the employer, thus without the regulation 
of commercial secrets inefficient situations may arise. The reason for this is that 
even the owner decides on “selling” a commercial secret based on the amount of the 
foreseeable profit. If the commercial secret belongs to more owners (and it is so in 
the case of property rights on the part of the employees), then the marginal cost of 
a single owner will be lower than the marginal benefit thereof of another company. 
In a situation like this a deal is struck even if the company selling the commercial 
secret could benefit more from the utilization of it than the other company. This 
outcome is not efficient.
Those employees are especially valuable for the company who make strategical 
decisions, and determine the company’s business plan, goals, and specific actions 
for the future.
Information regarding future market behaviour is such a special information 
that there is a marginal benefit for a competitor company – if they exist – is always 
greater. The reason for this is the following. Let’s assume that A company acquires 
the commercial secret of B about their future market conduct. This creates an asym-
metric information for A company, because B company is not aware of A’s future 
market actions. Let’s assume that B company also acquires the commercial secret 
of A about their future market conduct. In this case B company has an advantage 
based on asymmetric information. Since one company’s behaviour is modified by 
the information about the alleged actions of the other company, it is always that 
company with the competitive advantage based on asymmetric information, which 
acquired the other’s commercial secret last. Let’s assume that A and B companies 
acquire each other’s commercial secrets at the same time. For this situation, game 
theory can give a description on when the returns are the highest. The outcome 
depends on whether they are aware of the fact that the other acquired their secret, 
and whether they know both sides are aware that the other side knows this. If both 
A and B knows all the facts, then they are in exactly the same situation regarding 
competitive advantages, as if they had never known each other’s commercial se-
38 András György Kovács
crets. Because the new steps that are based on the acquired information will not 
be known by either of them. If either company has more knowledge, for example if 
A knows about the simultaneous acquisition of commercial secrets, but B does not, 
then A has an informational advantage.
All this means that the protection of commercial secrets creates a symmetrical 
informational situation in relation to information on future market behaviour, and 
without the protection of commercial secrets far more asymmetrical informational 
situations would arise!
If such information (business plans, future price increases, expected innova-
tions, patents, advertising campaigns, etc.) could be transferred by ex-employees, 
then the cost of keeping such information undisclosed would follow its benefits 
and advantages for the competitor. In such a situation the wage of the employees 
handling such information would be disproportionately high. The protection of 
commercial secrets is not efficient even at this point, which is proven by the fact 
that managers possessing such information have a higher income as compared to 
their performance, responsibility, etc. 35
All these questions, however, belong not to the relations of employee and em-
ployer, but rather to the relations of competitors. 36
COMMERCIAL SECRET IN COMPETITIVE RELATIONS
So far we have asserted that the legal institution of commercial secrets only in-
creases situations with asymmetric information, with regards to mixed and purely 
distributive information. However, we have also shown that in case of some informa-
tion, for example regarding future market behaviour, the number of situations with 
asymmetric information would increase without the legal institution of commercial 
secrets. 37 As a general observation, we can realise that since commercial secrets 
exist even without the legal institution of commercial secrets, then the commercial 
secret itself is responsible for asymmetric informational situations, and the legal 
institution of commercial secrets only worsens this by making the acquisition of 
commercial secrets more costly. For example, if A competitor company discovers 
35 We should note that this is not only due to the informational power of some people, this is only 
a factor. The control over resources for example can be just as important, which could justify the 
high level of management salaries.
36 For reasons of space we are not dealing with the non-compete agreements after the termination 
of an employment relation, the treatment of which is similar, because just as for the existing em-
ployment relations they ensure the protection of secrets on a contractual basis. 
37 It would only “increase”, because even without the legal institution of commercial secrets com-
mercial secrets would exist, so generally even without the legal institution of commercial secrets 
two companies would not know each other’s future market steps.
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B company’s cost-structure for a certain product, then this creates an asymmet-
ric informational situation, which could only be balanced by B getting acquainted 
with A’s cost-structure for the same product.38 In order to preclude an asymmetric 
informational situation from arising, not only the legal institution of commercial 
secrets shall be abolished, but also the data underlying the commercial secret shall 
be mandated to be made public. Nevertheless, as we have shown, this would mean 
“infinite costs”, thus such an intervention would not be efficient.
It has also become clear that the real function of the legal institution of commer-
cial secrets appears not between relations of company and consumer or company 
and employee, but rather it influenced informational situations between compet-
itors. 39 Consequently, the law and economics analysis of the right to the protec-
tion of commercial secrets must be carried out for horizontal relations of market 
competitors. This, however, brings us to the problem that it matters what kind of 
commercial secret we are dealing with.
So far we have discussed that the commercial secret is regarding as mixed and 
redistributive information, and the protection of these cannot be justified with any 
kind of argument for economic efficiency, except for their advancement of symmet-
rical informational situations. However, we have also seen, that making public the 
information about market actors’ future behaviour cannot be symmetrical, thus con-
cealing these is required if asymmetrical informational situations are to be avoided.
For the reasons above, first we will differentiate between the main categories of 
information constituting commercial secrets, and with these categories taken into 
consideration we will – assuming different market structures – analyse what effects 
the elimination of the legal institution of commercial secrets would have. According 
to this, we differentiate between information regarding the future (behaviour) and 
factual information, and within this latter part also between price- and cost-infor-
mation. Naturally, a number of other types of information might exist, but since the 
category of commercial secrets is open logically, a conclusive and closed system of 
categories cannot be created. As for the market structures, the role of commercial 
secrets and role of the legal institution of commercial secrets will be examined on 
competitive markets, on oligopolies, on monopolies and on monopolistic market 
situations, as well as on a special case of regulated markets (price regulation).
38 Naturally, it is another question that based on the market structure this could lead to various com-
petition situations. For example in case of a duopoly, the intensity of competition could decrease.
39 This statement is only true with the limitation that we disregard the seller-buyer relations on the 
market of workforce regarding employer and employee. However, even this proves that on the 
market of workforce the legal institution of commercial secrets is rather harmful in the seller-buyer 
relationship, and it pushes the average of wages down from the market balance to the detriment 
of the seller-employee (the buyer side is better-informed).
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Categories of information
Information regarding the future is created by companies based on factual informa-
tion. Factual information is not only information about the prices and costs, but also 
on quality, on selling conditions, or on clients and suppliers, etc. The availability of 
prices as factual information is critically important for consumers, but also crucial 
for market competitors. So it is in the interest of the company that the least people 
know what they are selling to whom and for what price.
• The ignorance of consumers regarding prices is valuable for companies. Carlton–Perloff 
[2000] describes the case of Ronald Kahlow, who attempted to take notes in a Best-Buy 
shop of the prices of different television sets. The shop took action against him and 
asked him that “for the sake of competition, please, do not take notes of the prices. It 
upsets the other costumers”. The court held that taking note of prices is not against 
the law, so Kahlow was innocent.
It makes one wonder why a Best-Buy shop would go through all the trouble just to 
refrain a single consumer from making an informed choice. It is more likely that 
Best-Buy mistook Mr. Kahlow for someone coming from the competition. What 
argument can Best-Buy make against noting down the prices? Only something relat-
ing to commercial secrets. As we have mentioned the prices listed in a show room 
cannot be the subject of a commercial secret, while prices determined in closed 
negotiations (mainly in the market of production factors), prices used in trade are 
strictly under the protection of commercial secrets.
If the single most important indicator of an efficiently functioning market econ-
omy is a prices system, then how is it possible that the concealment of information 
about prices is protected by law? This is also a crucial question, since buyers are 
only interested in keeping the prices of a long-term frame-agreement in secret, if 
there exists some kind of anti-competitive alliance of interests between seller and 
buyer.40
Internet-based price comparison pages are able to make consumers better in-
formed and also enable the comparison of different products. The success-story of 
mandatory motor vehicle liability insurance can serve as an interesting example, 
when the period for changing contracts was reduced to one month. (This statutory 
provision was abolished in 2010.) The reduction resulted not only in a price com-
petition between service providers, but also for this one month (November) real 
competition had evolved. By reducing the competitive market for one month, infor-
mation had become more concentrated and transparent, and the costs of transferring 
40 This is for example when a major public undertaking stands on the buyer side, which is not only 
profit oriented, but political connections might also play a role in the decision-making.
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had been significantly reduced (for example the certification of reward and penalty 
were handled between insurance companies, the whole process was conductible via 
internet, etc.). The fact that the prices were not constantly changing, made the price 
information on the market more traceable, resulting in well-informed consumers. 
It was less feasible to use higher prices than the competitive price, moreover, com-
panies had to adopt a more focused and deliberate price strategy, also by analysing 
the competitors’ prices. 41
Companies can gain a dominant position on the relevant market, if consumers 
are unaware of the prices, but also if they are uninformed about the quality. Limit-
ed information may lead to a monopoly price even on a market, where otherwise 
competition would dominate.
Since the other side of the price-competition is the competition in quality (prod-
uct diversification), regarding which information is more complex, thus the analysis 
of price information might be coupled with the questions of – here not discussed 
– standardised contracts.
Information related to the cost-structure of a certain product can tell us not only 
where and what kind of competitive advantage does one company have regarding 
the use of production factors, but also it can be assumed whether the relevant mar-
ket is competitive. The cost-structure also shows how much the capital-cost of the 
certain product is for the company. The reports and the balance sheets of a company 
are only appropriate to assess the cost-structure, if the company is a single-product 
company. However, in case of multi-product companies all these constitute com-
mercial secrets.42 In the intermediary commerce, for example, it is understandable 
that no one would like to reveal to the competitors what it sells for, how much and 
to whom, because the existence of intermediary commerce is based on this infor-
mation constituting commercial secrets.
Lastly, it should not be forgotten that price- and cost-information could be 
information regarding the future, for instance, if they are concerning the future 
prices of a company. Competition authorities consider it a cartel, if companies 
inform their competition about their future prices, because it enables them to 
coordinate their behaviour (concerted practice, collusion). The most difficult ques-
tion related to information regarding the future is to decide whether this may be 
mixed information, or only redistributive by effect. It may be entirely possible that 
none of the above mentioned categories is appropriate for information on the fu-
ture market conduct.
41 The LXII Act of 2009 eliminated this system of contracting 
42 It should be added that precisely determining the item-cost of one product of a multi-product 
company raises serious problems in methodology, so it is not only about keeping the cost-structure 
as a commercial secret, but often the commercially valuable information are not even known by 
the company that is producing the given product.
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Commercial secrets on the competitive market
To begin with, we will use a game of logic to represent the real reasons behind the 
existence of commercial secrets. In the static model of the competitors’ market the 
notion of commercial secrets is unknown, thus dissolving the assumptions of this 
model, we will attempt to introduce this term.
On a competitive market every actor is a price-taker, consequently, price is public 
data by definition. If a specific price (which is not the market price) is classified as 
a commercial secret by the company, then it would influence the equilibrium price. 
This, nonetheless, can only happen, if the consumer is under-informed, which cre-
ates some monopolistic power. The buyers are well-informed about the price on 
a competitive market, it is not possible to reach a price that is different from the 
market price, so there is nothing to be kept as a secret. Alternatively, if someone 
succeeds in selling at a higher price, then it has to be the result of product diversi-
fication. If a company finds out that a different company was able to sell something 
(somewhere, sometime, to someone, etc.) at a higher price, then it will attempt 
to acquire this segment of the market. Since on a competitive market there is no 
transactional cost, and the products are homogeneous, it cannot occur that prices 
are handled as a commercial secret.
The situation is comparable with costs and cost-structure. In theory, the costs 
of companies on a competitive market cannot be different, thus concealing the 
cost-structure would not create a competitive advantage.43
Although it is a rare case when new and cheaper technology is used to create 
the same product as the prior ones, but it is not unimaginable (this happened for 
example in the case of industrialisation of agricultural production). If the technol-
ogy is indeed new, then it is not protected by commercial secret, but by the legal 
institutions of intellectual property law. If it is a solution constituting a commercial 
secret that is causing the reduction in the volume of production and at the same 
time in marginal cost (increasing economies of scale),44 then a natural monopoly 
is created.45 This example thus does not belong to the questions of competitive 
43 Naturally, in reality the cost-structures are different even in the competitive market, because there 
is never a long-standing perfect balance situation, thus in the course of a competition law analysis 
in practice the characteristic of a competitive market is the price dispersion due to the distinct 
cost-structure, which is a result of a number of objective circumstances (for example some level 
of market dominance that is always present in practice). The harmonised raise of prices – due to 
the differences in cost-structure – always raise the suspicion of cartel. 
44 It is natural to not refer to the case, when with increasing marginal costs, the marginal cost still 
remains the average cost even with a production size covering the whole market, because then 
the conclusions of the previous footnote are relevant.
45 This conclusion is only true in case of mono-product companies. For more products Evans–Heck-
man [1983] showed that it can be economies of scale even without cost-subadditivity (natural 
monopoly) (See Kiss [2009] p. 93). All this, however, does not affect the validity of the statement. 
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markets. If by increasing the volume of production, marginal cost is increasing 
after reaching the ideal size of production (decreasing economies of scale), then 
the acquisition of a market share is not depending on whether the company treat-
ed the solution as a commercial secret. However, if a company conceals that it is 
conducting investments for the implementation of the newer technology – that is 
know to others – and later unexpectedly appears on the market with lower prices, 
then time can be highly relevant to the increase in market share, and so can also 
the treatment of the investment as a commercial secret. In this case the informa-
tion treated as a commercial secret is productive, since it enables the company to 
reach the necessary production volume for the optimal production size. If others 
become aware of the company’s intention of making an investment in technology, 
then – for the sake of staying on the market – they will also start investing, which 
could easily lead to a situation in which the advantages of the optimal production 
size could not be exhausted, and the industry will be characterised by oversupply 
and surplus capacities.
Nevertheless, it can be observed that this case is an example not for the con-
cealment of costs as factual information, but for keeping the future investment 
plans of the company a secret, so the only consequence that could be drawn from 
it would be that the knowledge of future market behaviour is important even in 
competitive markets. Information of costs as facts, however, are generally known 
market information.
• If someone is considering giving up his well-paid profession, in order to live on truffle 
cultivation, he can look up all the websites that roughly show the returns of the invest-
ment in truffle cultivation. These would show that the cultivation of fruits or potato 
would bring at least the same returns as truffle cultivation, but due to the differences in 
technology, with different cash-flow. If someone has been cultivating truffles for years, 
he has such experiences that could give him a competitive advantage. Presumably, he 
would not be keen on sharing the knowledge gained through hard work with anyone, 
but the inherent characteristic of such information is that they result from combined 
experiences, so they cannot be easily transferred. The theory of easy transferability and 
impossible appropriation of information does not prevail for these kind of professional 
knowledge, so there is no need to protect these as commercial secrets.
At first, we could assume that the competitive model of the classical economics based 
on all information does not even require knowledge about the individual future mar-
ket behaviour. The need for information is always connected to the specific situation, 
and the price movement carries this market information, based on which we may 
determine our future market behaviour. It follows, however, that information on 
other companies’ specific future market behaviour is not market information. Since 
the competitive model presupposes that none of the market actors can influence 
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the price, then the cost-benefit arising from one market actor’s investment cannot 
be of a volume that can in itself influence market price, even if the company itself 
is able to sell at a lower price.
As a consequence, even if a company does not conceal its cost-reducing invest-
ments, it cannot happen that for this reason others start cost-reducing investments. 
In fact, the number of companies on a competitive market is so large that market 
actors usually conceive technological changes in the industry as a market incident. 
It follows that at times of technological change competitive markets may be highly 
unstable, because a lot of companies going through technological change at the 
same time results in huge oversupply.46
All this means that the future market behaviour – as opposed to our earlier 
stand – is in fact not a relevant market information, in order to collect all relevant 
market information, it is sufficient to follow past market occurrences.
As a result, the legal institution of commercial secrets plays absolutely no role in 
competitive markets. It is true though that the legal institution of commercial secrets 
is not beneficial, but it is also not detrimental in these markets, since commercial 
secrets have an insignificant effect on market competition.
Commercial secrets in oligopolies and monopolies
In an oligopoly the price can be influenced by a single market actor. The mechanism 
of this influence is disparate based on type of the oligopoly and the market situa-
tion. For example in an oligopoly with one dominant actor, it is most commonly 
the dominant actor who dictates the price, if it raises, the others will follow a bit 
later. As is evidenced , by the market of production factors vertical restrictions are 
common, such as treating prices as commercial secrets, which is due to the fact 
that in these market – even on the side of the buyers – the market situation is often 
oligopolistic (or oligopsonic). The concealment of list prices and price reductions 
from competitors in the case of long term contracts of huge volume enables the less 
effective functioning of the market price-mechanism. This also effects the stability 
of economic relations, and mainly – based on the conclusions of game theory – the 
more effective functioning of cooperation.
The transparency of prices and cost-structure would make the competitors’ 
future market behaviour more predictable. The more transparent the functioning 
of an oligopoly, the more it can be expected that the competitors’ reactions will be 
predictable. On completely transparent markets, companies are able to concert their 
46 It is a common situation in agriculture, and not only at times of technology change. If the high 
cost of strawberries induce a change in one year, then as a consequence everyone will operate with 
losses on the strawberry market in the following years.
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practices even without agreements, which is considered parallel conduct in absence 
of intentional information sharing.
If companies share their future intentions, prices with each other, it leads to collu-
sion (concerted practice), for this reason in oligopolies the law prohibits the sharing 
of any information regarding the future conduct, so these have to be kept secret.
If the legal institution of commercial secrets did not exist, and one company was 
more dominant than the others in the market, then this dominant company could 
invest more resources into the acquisition of commercial secrets, which would cre-
ate asymmetrical informational situations to its advantage, leading to a competitive 
advantage against the others.
The real problem, nonetheless, is that the acquisition of commercial secrets 
is often a result of chance or a series of coincidences, and in absence of the legal 
protection of commercial secrets the companies of an oligopoly would gain com-
petitive advantages in an unpredictable way. If A company hears that B company’s 
competitiveness highly depends on its suppliers, and the market has high barriers 
to entry, then it can easily occupy the capacities of the supplier without the fear that 
B company will shortly be able to find a new supplier.
For this reason, in all the oligopolies, where one company has some kind of advan-
tage against the others, the lack of protection of commercial secrets would accelerate 
the processes leading to a monopolistic market situation.
It is also clear that the protection of the commercial secrets of a monopoly com-
pany is a factor increasing barriers to entry. If these commercial secrets were not 
protected by law, then the entry costs will be lower, reducing monopoly prices to 
a certain level at which other companies could not be able to enter the market.47
Without the legal institution of commercial secrets, the competitive advantage 
of the monopolistic company with a competitive margin will increase the most. 
Without the legal institution of commercial secrets, oligopolies would be more 
transparent, which would enhance the chance of deviation from the equilibrium 
price, since it would be easier to predict future market behaviour.
In summary: the legal institution of commercial secrets is inevitable in case 
of oligopolies, which can counterbalance the absence of the starting conditions of 
a competitive market (barrier to entry, price-taking, etc.). The legal institution of 
47 This is the common case, when in a geographically well-defined market the dominant companies 
define – according to wording of the Supreme Court – such “imaginary prices”, which are just un-
der the price increased by entry (transfer, local knowledge, etc.) of the product that is outside the 
geographic market but same or substitute. If one element of the barrier to entry decreases, then it 
means that the company outside the geographic market becomes competitive, and can enter the 
geographically defined monopoly market, unless the monopoly company decreases the price. If 
the monopoly still remains after the decrease of entry costs, then this reduced price will still be 
over the competitive price. For term “imaginary price” see the Magyar Autóklub contra GVH case 
of the Supreme Court (Kf.II.39048/2002/13.) concerning the judicial review of the competition 
authority’s Vj.152/2000/51. decision.
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commercial secrets prevents the unfavourable market situation from developing 
into a worse situation, and helps reaching a status quo, which is characterised by 
the limited competition of some market actors. The absence of the legal institution 
of commercial secrets in such markets would only be beneficial for companies with 
the most dominant market position.
If there is a dominant company on a market, then the complete lack of the legal 
institution of commercial secrets would help him. However, if law did not protect 
the commercial secrets of only the dominant companies, then it would cause a sig-
nificant competitive disadvantage to the dominant company. In this situation, the 
acquisition of the commercial secret by other companies would redistribute welfare 
for the weaker companies, as well as decreasing the costs of market entry.
PRICE REGULATION AND COMMERCIAL SECRETS – CONCLUSIONS
What kind of conclusions could be drawn in the light of the foregoing for a market 
with price regulation?
As an example, we chose the already mentioned area of electronic info-com-
munication.
In the case when the state regulates the prices of the service providers with 
significant market power in electronic info-communication law, it subjects the 
economically dominant companies to an asymmetric regulation to the favour of 
other companies. Such a price regulation is often coupled with transparency, pub-
lication, accounting separation standards, without which the service providers with 
significant market power would handle a number of information as commercial 
secrets. The existence of commercial secrets is so significant in these procedures 
that the legal dogmatic of the regulatory procedures fundamentally differs from 
a traditional administrative procedure. These distinctions derive from the fact that 
a large number of commercial secrets are managed by the procedure (See also 
Kovács [2008a], 2012]).
In these regulated markets, if the cost-data on which the price regulation is 
based was not protected by the legal institution of commercial secrets, then for 
instance, in a court proceeding the service providers with significant market pow-
er would not challenge the cost-model behind the price regulation, because their 
cost-data could easily become public as opposed to the others not challenging the 
regulation.
Contrary to this, if law mandated the publication of all cost-data that served 
as a basis for the price regulation – namely that the national info-communications 
authority would publish its draft decision with all the evidence in full length – then 
this would burden all service providers with significant market power, while also re-
distributing welfare among the companies without significant market power.
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In this case companies would not see any risk relating to commercial secrets in 
the judicial remedies, while the judicial proceedings and the information shared 
between parties would accelerate, making the legal remedy more effective.
In these instances the welfare redistribution is not to be criticised, because it 
reduces significant market power, which intensifies competition, thus creating the 
effect of welfare increase for consumers. In theory, there is a possibility that even 
less efficient service providers can enter the market,48 but after the regulatory peak 
this problem is corrected by the market, if the significant market power and the 
related additional obligations disappear in time.
It would be especially advantageous, if the market could better control the re-
liability of information provided by service providers. At present authorities are 
not equipped with any kind of reliable control-mechanism to verify the validity of 
the data provided.49 The national statute enables the authority to impose fines for 
providing false or misleading information, but the question is rather how the sub-
mission of false information can be detected.
Since companies with significant market power have some assumptions regard-
ing their competitors – mainly based on their own market experience – they often 
have an estimate of the costs and other features of the competitors. If the provided 
data is public, then the market actors themselves are able to check the validity of 
the competitors’ data, and signal if they have doubts about the reliability of the data, 
since in this game situation, it is in their best interest. If someone is submitting real 
data, then it is in his fundamental interest that others would do so.
It must be also seen that if cost-data serves as a basis for price regulation, then 
treating a set of cost-data related to the administrative price as a commercial secret 
could result in limited competitive advantage. This question is, however, more com-
plex in the case of multi-product companies, since the cost-model calculated for 
one product might contain the cost-data not only for the price regulated wholesale 
product (service), but also for the freely priced product competing on the retail mar-
ket. The data acquired in such way may be made quite transparent by an oligopoly 
retail market structure, leading to increasing prices even without concerted conduct.
Moreover, in an oligopoly the growing transparency might in itself reduce the 
intensity of competition, stimulating the emergence of parallel conduct, which could 
result in the consequences of intentionally concerted conduct, in a way that the ex 
post legal remedies of competition law could not be applied.
48 Since as a result of the redistribution of welfare the new entries or the smaller actors gain advan-
tage, it can happen in case of a sufficiently big advantage that they can operate in a competitive 
manner even if compared to the incumbent it is less efficient.
49 Problems stemming from asymmetrical information based on the principle-agent theory also arise 
in the relation of regulatory authority and regulated service provider. These questions have a vast 
literature in regulation-economics. (See: Kiss [2007] p. 63, in detail: Lafont–Tirole [1991]). 
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It may be suggested that in the course of procedures on significant market pow-
er, there are instances when the market as a whole provides information classified 
as commercial secrets for the regulator, in order to decide who can be considered 
a service provider with significant market power. Additionally, the commercial 
secrets of service providers without significant market power become available. 
Since in the procedures on significant market power far less information is made 
public on service providers without significant market power (as they still consti-
tute commercial secrets), thus the asymmetric informational advantage deriving 
from the asymmetric regulation is still on the side of service providers without 
significant market power. Additionally, treating smaller providers’ data as a com-
mercial secret is a manageable problem even in the legal remedy proceedings, be-
cause – due to the large number of smaller market actors – there are acceptable 
technical options to recover these in an anonymous way. Obviously, it makes no 
sense to create anonymous versions of the data of the large service providers with 
significant market power for the judicial procedure, because this data shows that 
it could be easily connected to the provider.
The above mentioned proposal, consequently, is not about diminishing the le-
gal institution of commercial secrets, but rather about the classification of the data 
needed for the regulation of significant market power as public data. Making these 
data available for the public could eliminate the asymmetric informational situa-
tion, which results from the neglect of the legal institution of commercial secrets, 
between those initiating judicial review and those who do not.
Nevertheless, since the publication of such data could result in various conse-
quences depending upon the oligopoly market situations on the adjacent and in-
terconnected markets, and the enhancement of transparency on markets with few 
actors increases the threat of “legal collusion”. The advantages and disadvantages of 
making data public shall be considered based on the detailed and precise analysis of 
types of data, in order to efficiently assess the set of data that could be made public. 
In case of the various marginal cost-based cost-models50 that are currently used in 
the regulatory practice – based on the requirements of the European regime – the 
results could differ from for example the regulatory price determined through the 
optimal Ramsey-margin that uses the price-flexibility of demand. Our regulatory 
recommendation is worth considering in the former case, so in the current practice 
the publication of most information used for the regulatory process is viable.
When designing a regulatory regime, especially, if the law-maker intends to cre-
ate a functioning system of legal remedies, it is necessary to change the system in 
this direction. Also EU law mandates all member states must ensure effective and 
substantial legal remedies.51
50 Different variations of Fully distributed costs (FDC), Long-Run Average Incremental Cost (LRIC), etc. 
51 See footnote 12.
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In light of EU law and the constitutional criteria mentioned in the introduction, 
the rules under the Code on Civil Procedure (Act III of 1952) are entirely unexplain-
able. The rule52 amending section 2 of paragraph 119 of the Code on Civil Procedure 
and the related section 3 of paragraph 192, which entered into force on 1st January 
2009, made it dependent on the statement of the person entitled to the commercial 
secret whether the commercial secret can be used in the judicial proceeding.
This solution questions our basic hypothesis that the right to legal remedies 
as a constitutional right is stronger than the right to the protection of commercial 
secrets. Moreover, in the recent – procedural – legislation it is apparent that there 
is a tendency of placing the right to the protection of commercial secrets ahead of 
the right to legal remedies, contrary to constitutional arguments.
This legislative tendency is questionable not only from a constitutional, but also 
from an EU law standpoint, since in the future, the judicial trials on price regulation 
cannot be conducted, because the data serving as the basis for the decisions will 
constitute commercial secrets. The procedures may become increasingly complex 
and slow in a technical sense, especially in cases, when defining the relevant market 
is based on the data constituting commercial secrets of hundreds of service provid-
ers. This is because in these cases hundreds of notifications must be sent out – with 
the signalisation of the specific character of the commercial secret. Moreover, in 
relation to market definition and market analysis, even one service provider with-
holding consent could be enough to block substantial review, since the judge has no 
margin of discretion, and the basic data of market definition and market analysis 
can only be assessed based on the submissions of all market participants. If there is 
only one service provider, who is withholding consent, then the differences between 
the aggregated data of submissions and revealable data submissions precisely show 
the data of the exact company, who prohibited the revelation of its commercial 
secrets, so the commercial secret will remain concealed even when the company 
– actively or by not submitting a statement – consented to the recognisability of its 
commercial secrets.
The new regulatory regime, however, not only eliminated implicitly the substan-
tial judicial review of cases regarding regulated markets, but it can also make reach-
ing a judicial decision impossible in a large number of other cases. These procedural 
rules result in a situation, where if an authority has used a commercial secret, but 
the entitled person does not consent to the revelation of the specific commercial 
secret, then the data cannot be used as evidence. The only loophole in the regula-
tion is, when the plaintiff withholds consent of using his own commercial secrets 
as evidence, since under section 1 paragraph 164 of the Code on Civil Procedure in 
most cases the plaintiff is obliged to prove his case, so then he could not succeed, 
52 Paragraph 10 and Section 1 of Paragraph 32 of the XXX Act of 2008 amended the cited provisions 
of the Civil Procedure Act.
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which is clearly not in his interest. In all the cases, however, when the person enti-
tled to the secret is a co-defendant/co-plaintiff, the opposite party or a third person 
outside the procedure, it is impossible to finish the procedure, if consent is withheld. 
Since in a judicial proceeding the defendant, administrative authority is an equal 
party to the plaintiff, the commercial secrets used by the authority without consent 
must be excluded from evidence. Consequently, the administrative decision must 
be vacated based on the lack of substantial evidence.53
Although the judge and his assistant may access this evidence in theory, but in 
practice they will not, if the given evidence cannot be used in the case, because such 
evidence should not influence the judicial decision.
So far in the judicial practice, a similar problem only arose in case of classi-
fied data. Then the right solution54 seemed to be that the judge can request access 
from the person entitled to the secret (mostly from the National Security Authority, 
NSA), but the parties55 are not allowed to access the data during the trial, and the 
judgement – just like the administrative decision – cannot contain a substantial 
reasoning. This procedure, however, could not be considered as effective and sub-
stantial judicial review. The only legal guarantee against the authority available to 
the client is that the final decision in the case was not made by a public servant of 
the secret service, but an independent judge had – at least a formalistic – oversight 
over the “decision” of the secret service. In case of a clear abuse of discretionary 
powers, there is the theoretical possibility to reverse the administrative decision – 
although without providing a reasoning. But even for this, the consent of the NSA 
was required, which was usually given after consultations between the leadership of 
the courts and the NSA. The National Security Authority as an important organi-
sation of a democratic, rule-of-law state was aware of the criteria of the rule-of-law, 
and only upheld a theoretical option for refusing consent.
This kind of self-restrained behaviour is, however, not to be expected from 
a business company, moreover, they explicitly have – even a constitutional – right 
to prohibit the use of their commercial secrets.
The current rules on commercial secrets intensely interfere with the functioning 
of one of the pillars of rule of law, the judiciary, by not even providing a formal con-
trol like in the case of classified information, and by allowing for the exclusion of the 
use of commercial secrets in a trial, if the consent of the entitled person is withheld.
All this is not only makes it impossible to conduct judicial review over regulated 
markets, but also effects other judicial proceedings of administrative law, including 
53 At least this would follow based on the rules of formal logic. The practice would in all likelihood 
try to come up with a more elaborate solution.
54 We cannot say that the judicial practice is coherent, due to the serious difficulties of handling the 
problem.
55 To be precise, the plaintiff, because the defendant administrative authority is usually aware of the 
used state secrets. 
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for example competition law cases. Cases of cartel and abuse of dominant position 
are built on a large amounts of commercial secrets. In these cases – even if unin-
tended by the parties – the effective judicial review might be eliminated. Additionally, 
it effects also civil law cases, where the decision depends on the commercial secret.
The legislative intention behind hindering the judicial review in large economic 
and administrative cases related to business companies is unknown, along with the 
question that whose interest, or lobbying resulted in the rules, which are clearly 
and vigorously violate the rule of law, the principle of legal certainty, and the right 
to effective legal remedies. The legislative report of Act XXX of 2008, which intro-
duced the amendments, is silent about the motivations and substantive reasons 
behind the amendment. Consequently, it is clear that creating a nuanced regulatory 
regime for the commercial secrets of regulated markets, is only possible after the 
abolishment of these obstacles.
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ALTERNATIVES TO STATE REGULATION: 
SELF- AND CO-REGULATION*
In this study a brief overview is provided of the alternatives to direct governmental 
regulation of imperfectly competitive markets and of the evolution of the use of 
self-regulation in the past decades. We take into account the arguments in favour of 
alternative regulatory forms and compare these with their possible shortcomings. We 
show how the divergent features of different legal origins influence the framework 
of alternative regulation, including that of self-regulation. Because of the diversity of 
markets affected – at present or perhaps in the future – by self-regulation (from food 
industry through environment and lawyer services to internet, media and network 
services), we provide a detailed review of the literature dealing with the theoretical 
models of self-regulation, and attempt to categorise the various types of regulations 
according to their actors, origin of licences as well as type and degree of regulations.
INTRODUCTION
The past decade witnessed an upsurge of interest in the alternatives of governmental 
regulation of markets. This can be explained by a withering faith in the omnipotence 
of the modern regulating state that was established in the second half of the 20th 
century, intention to improve the quality of regulation, need for better governance, 
reduction of administrative burdens, and new solutions generated by regulatory 
failures. In relation to the 2008 crisis, the analyses mention the deficiencies of pre-
vious regulations and the need for strengthening governmental regulation. Some of 
the more in-depth studies call attention to the fact that the coexistence of various 
modes of regulations dates back to a longer period, their relative weight changed 
a number of times even in the past century, and alternative regulatory measures 
often complement each other (Bartle–Vass [2005]). This is the approach we chose 
as well, since we believe that the activity of market actors – especially in modern 
economies – is regulated by differing degrees of state influence, and activities of 
self-regulation, co-regulation and joint regulation can be placed along this line as al-
ternative, in some cases, supplementary solutions to direct governmental regulation.
  * This paper is a shortened, edited version of an earlier one prepared with the support of a grant 
GVH VKK AL/1206/2011. We are grateful to István Ilyés for his excellent research assistance. We 
also acknowledge support from the grant of OTKA No. 81235.
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QUESTIONS OF DEFINITION AND OPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVES
Between the two extremes of governmental regulation and no regulation, there are 
several options for shaping and influencing the behaviour of market actors. Among 
these, the most explored themes in the literature are opportunities in information 
provision, the operation of certain market mechanisms, self-regulation and co-reg-
ulation (BRTF [2005], Bartle–Vass [2005], Hepburn [2009]). Those wanting to inter-
vene because of negative developments in the market conditions (market failures), 
must consider if any type of intervention delivers greater benefits than the costs 
of market failures. If it does not, then there is no intervention. An extreme point 
among alternative choices is governmental regulation,1 when legal means are used 
to create a regulatory framework and an organisation responsible for observing and 
enforcing compliance. As a middle ground, the desired aim is achievable with the 
help of certain market mechanisms (such as tax and support incentives); or perhaps 
information and education campaigns can be launched with the use of possible cer-
tificates, labels and emblems; the self-regulation of market actors can be trusted; or 
self-regulation can be developed by government incentives (co-regulation).
Most reports and studies dealing with the topic divide state interventions accord-
ing to their intensity, with some variation in the number categories defined. However, 
questions pertaining to regulations may also be analysed from other perspectives, for 
instance, according to the market structure of regulated areas, formal or informal 
modes of regulation, root causes, objectives, or the measures of regulations. The 
focus of analysis may of course also differ depending on whether the purpose is to 
describe an existing regulatory condition, or to change it.
Alternatives beyond existing governmental regulations however show that differ-
ent divisions and typologies do not neatly correspond to regulations in the real world. 
The diversity of regulatory processes and differences in real life scenarios demand 
diverse regulatory solutions, the majority of which are some combination of the 
versions described in typologies (Bartle–Vass [2005], Coglianese–Mendelson [2010]).
In the following, we restrict our analysis to self-regulation and joint regulation.2 
partly because even this area contains ample varieties, partly because these regula-
tory forms – which incorporate elements (for example, certain market mechanisms, 
information provision agreements) of other kinds of regulation – is the most preva-
lent. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that this restriction also distances 
our analysis from the traditional approach to discussing market and sectoral regula-
 1 Governmental regulation may include: legislation, governmental implementation of public policy, 
general competition regulation and sectorial regulation as well. The categorisation of rule-makers 
and regulations as well as the role of legal and technological rule-making are analysed in detail in 
the studies of Ferenc Kiss (Kiss–Major–Valentiny [2000], Kiss [2008]).
 2 Co-regulation might be called as meta-regulation (Coglianese–Mendelson [2010]), situated between 
governmental and self-regulation. It alloys of the features of both. 
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tions, as it inevitably addresses regulation on the supply side of the market, which is 
primarily driven by the need for compliance. For this reason, self-regulation was left 
outside the regulatory literature of classic economic theoretical framework for a long 
time, and only surfaced on the horizon of regulatory analyses in the past decades.
Coglianese–Mendelson [2010] worked out a useful analytical method for the 
separation of basic characteristics of regulation. Their method takes into account 
four factors of regulations: the regulated, the regulator, the regulation as a command 
and the consequences of regulation (command).
1. The regulated is usually a business firm but it can also include individuals, 
government organisations, or non-profit organisations. One of the main features 
of the target is that it bears the consequences of non-compliance.
2. In this relationship, the regulator creates the rules and enforces compliance. 
Traditionally, the state is regarded as the regulator but as we will see this is 
holds only in some cases. It is not true if, for example, regulation is devoid of 
government regulation, or it is an activity remote from governmental interest, 
or there are signs of independency from the government. In reality, the modern 
state exhibits at least a “passive interest” in self-regulation (Bartle–Vass [2005]).
3. In the regulatory process, commands encourage or discourage certain forms of 
behaviour by the regulated (target) entities. Regulation can specify not only the 
goals but also the means to achieve them, for example, when they direct the 
regulated activity into the desired direction by standards, or they can prescribe 
performance targets.
4. Regulatory commands can have negative and positive consequences. Fines 
and sanctions can be expected for non-compliance, and subsidies or perhaps, 
exemptions from restrictions for compliance. However beyond a  certain 
magnitude of consequences the direction of negative and positive effects may 
no longer make sense. A massive subsidy given to firms that comply, for example, 
can be equal to a very serious penalty to firms that fail to comply.
This theoretical framework can also be applied to self-regulation and co-regula-
tion. Self-regulation means regulatory conditions, whereby the regulated entity 
gives commands for itself and bears the consequences. Thus, in this situation the 
regulator and the target are in a close relationship with each other. In contrast, in 
co-regulation the main role is played by an external regulator, and only the remain-
ing process phases may concur with those experienced in self-regulation. The term, 
compelled regulation is, therefore, also often used for this type, indicating that the 
regulation was initiated by an external regulator.
The origin of self-regulation is typically associated with the regulatory processes 
of primitive societies, where belonging to or being excluded from a group make 
certain behaviour more or less desirable. In these circumstances modern theories 
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examine, among others, the free-rider problem, network effects, or for instance, 
the question of credibility (Ogus–Carbonara [2011]). If conditions are given, and 
there is an opportunity for self-regulation, a number of advantages can be men-
tioned in comparison with government regulation. As a result of proximity to the 
regulated, the accumulated experiences and professional knowledge can be used 
more efficiently, self-regulation can respond to changes more rapidly and flexibly, 
putting less burden (cost) on the state and the target, and finally, the markets also 
work more efficiently due to a higher degree of commitment and loyalty on the 
part of the target. Naturally, all these advantages can only be enjoyed if public in-
terest can – beside the private one – prevail during self-regulation, anti-market 
endeavours can be prevented, and efficiency is strengthened by transparency and 
accountability.
Self-regulation or co-regulation most often take place when the collection of 
information indispensable for regulation can be solved by them. This situation 
may arise, among others, in fast changing sectors or in highly complex regulatory 
scenarios. There are many cases when an external, governmental regulator does 
not even recognise the existence of the problem awaiting regulation, or if it does, 
then cannot see the full scale and expected effects of regulation. Regulators should 
be aware of the weight of the problem that awaits solution, the damages associated 
with unsolved problems, and the likelihood of damages. The difficulty of judging 
these issues may tip the balance in favour of self-regulation when it comes to choos-
ing between alternative forms of regulations. After all, what matters in practice is 
whether the entities in self-regulation (and co-regulation) succeed in deciding in 
favour of the common social interests over the individual interests (Coglianese–
Mendelson [2010]).
REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES AND LEGAL ORIGINS
The global map of regulation has significantly changed in the past two decades. Even 
though the regulation of competitive markets is not a new phenomenon, compre-
hensive legislations that regulate competition are a relatively recent development. 
Some literary sources estimate that there are about a hundred countries that adopted 
such legislation. In one available sample of seventy countries it became apparent 
that 60-70 per cent of the countries adopted the first modern competition laws 
in the past two decades. According to analyses of the relationship between legal 
traditions and competition rules, the differences in legal traditions are reflected 
in the institutional and procedural systems of the application of competition rules 
(Lee [2005]). Summarising the effects of legal origins, La Porta et al. [2008] also 
find that the differences in rule making and regulations are to a significant extent 
determined by legal origins. Previous colonial empires played a crucial role in the 
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spread of different legal origins. There are five larger legal origins differentiated 
in the 152 examined countries: the Anglo-Saxon legal origin based on legal prece-
dence (common law), 42 countries are listed here, the continental legal origin (civil 
law) including the French (84 countries), German (19 countries), and Scandinavian 
(5 countries) sub-system; and finally the socialist legal origin (2 countries). Figure 1 
shows the influence of each legal origin in the world.
It is worth comparing this map to the annual report of the World Bank that 
takes into account the most important factors of business environment (adminis-
trative burden, constraints, costs, legal certainty, predictability) and ranks countries 
according to the broader regulatory environment of doing business (http://www.
doingbusiness.org/rankings). According to the June 2011 survey, more than half 
(11) of the first 20 countries most conducive for doing business belonged to the 
Anglo-Saxon legal system, five into the Scandinavian, and four into the German.
This picture can be further elaborated if we look at the history of public service 
regulations. In the past century, three countries played the most important role 
in the creation of sectoral regulation: the United States, Canada, and the Unit-
ed Kingdom. The former two because of their more than century-old regulatory 
traditions, the latter because of the new regulatory structure created in the 1980s 
Source: La Porta et al. [2008] p. 289.







 ALTERNATIVES TO STATE REGULATION: SELF- AND CO-REGULATION 59
that diverged from the American model and followed a European organisational 
framework for public services. The two regulatory frameworks also proved seminal 
for each other, many elements were transferred between the two, and this process 
was later enriched by the experiences of other countries as well. There were two 
other Anglo-Saxon system countries that have become front-runners in radical 
recreation of regulations, developing new methods and incentives, and reducing 
over-regulation: Australia and New Zealand. The accomplishments and failures of 
these countries also often feature in the literature of regulatory theory and practice, 
but noteworthy solutions were used in South-Africa (Anglo-Saxon), Malaysia (An-
glo-Saxon) Korea (German) and Chile (French). In Europe mostly the Scandinavian 
countries, the Netherlands (French) and occasionally Spain (French) followed the 
increasingly prevalent British regulatory innovations.
While law making originating from the Continental law characterised, primarily 
the area of public services (the prevalence of state monopoly, centralised law making 
and regulation), the Anglo-Saxon legal order – where case laws are characterised by 
higher uncertainty – provided more opportunity for the creation of decentralised 
regulatory forms.
Soon, besides government regulations, other regulatory solutions also appeared 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and these served as examples for other nations. At 
the same time, in the use of government regulation and self-regulation, one can 
observe a period of varying intensity even in the Anglo-Saxon countries. There 
were fluctuations between both the increase and decrease of demand for regulation 
as well as the two regulatory forms. In the United States the progressive period is 
considered to be the development of the governmental regulation (the period be-
tween 1890 and 1920), while during New Deal new forms of regulations had been 
developed (Ogus–Carbonara [2011]). In the United States the use of self-regulatory 
systems has by now become a standard practice. The Federal Trade Commission of 
the United States recently prepared a report on the self-regulatory systems in the 
alcohol industry (2008) online behaviour advertising (2009), and marketing food 
to children (2008) (http://www.ftc.gov/reports/index.shtm).
The fluctuations were typical in Great Britain as well. In the 19th century, after 
the industrial revolution, a number of forms of self-regulations were established, but 
by the second half of the 20th century their further applicability had been questioned, 
especially in periods when corporate bankruptcies increased because of business 
management problems, and in order to ensure compliance with laws, more effec-
tive deterrents were needed than before. Despite all this, today, the 21st century is 
considered the renaissance of self-regulation in Great Britain.
Using the evaluation of Bartle–Vass [2005], it is worth further exploring the 
changes in self-regulation and co-regulation in the British system. The areas that, 
even today, exhibit various forms of self-regulation have strengthened in the 19th 
century: manufacturing industry, various trades (doctors, lawyers, engineers, audi-
60 Balázs Muraközy–Pál Valentiny
tors) and financial affairs. A series of laws provided opportunity for self-regulation 
[Factory Act (1833), Medical Act (1858), Companies Act (1862)] that only laid down 
the general framework of regulation and essentially relied on cooperation, agreement 
and supervision by the regulated entities themselves. Thus, in this case one can talk 
about co-regulation that constituted a deeply rooted and fundamental element of 
British regulation until the second half of the 20th century. For this period – despite 
the emergence of opening markets in numerous sectors, and a general trend of 
dismantling unnecessary regulations (deregulation) – there were also several signs 
of strengthening government regulation. The privatisation of public services in the 
1980s and 1990s created a new regulatory environment and government regulatory 
system, but in the financial regulatory environment, the former self-regulatory sys-
tem was also tightened [Financial services and Markets Act (2000)] which resulted 
in the incorporation of nine, previously partially self-regulatory bodies into a single 
government regulatory organisation. In some professions the extent of self-regu-
lation was reduced: the profession of auditors was re-regulated in 1990, then in 
2002, that of lawyers in 1990, and in both cases the former autonomy of sectors was 
reduced. In the field of education and health, in this period, incentives of certain 
market mechanism were increasingly used, but especially, for this reason the role 
of controls and government regulators also increased.
Among the reasons that decreased self-regulation, Bartle–Vass [2005] highlight 
the decline of trust, adaptability and the strengthening of risk-avers behaviour, which, 
coupled with cases of business scandals and abuses of dominant positions, com-
pelled successive governments to introduce stronger regulations. The rearrange-
ment between the individual types of regulations, however, was not unidirectional. 
Due to globalisation, contradictory processes were also under way in trans-nation-
al regulations. In the case of trans-national activities, new regulatory forms were 
initiated by business actors, most of which took self-regulatory or joint-regulatory 
forms. One of the examples is the internet, where self-regulation by the actors of 
the industry was later supplemented by state actors as well. The classical areas of 
government regulation, such as the regulation of public services, have also grad-
ually transformed. Many believed that established regulatory mechanisms were 
too rigid and there was over-regulation. Even those who did not share this opinion, 
had increasingly admitted that there were more and more areas and submarkets 
in these sectors, which could be opened up to market mechanisms. To this end, ex 
ante type sectoral regulations were limited and the use of analytical tools in com-
petition rules were adopted as well. In some cases, there were attempts to develop 
a regulatory framework based on self-regulation, but, for example, in the case of 
connection fees, the attempt of Oftel, a British telecommunication regulator, had 
proved to be unsuccessful.
By the second half of the 1990s, demand increased for rethinking different forms 
of regulations as well as developing better, more efficient regulations, which some-
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times led to various conferences and the proliferation of different organisations, in-
stitutions and committees responsible for regulating regulations. Driven by a desire 
to improve conditions, and later, as part of its agenda, the OECD organised a num-
ber of conferences, held roundtables and prepared recommendations in the theme 
of regulatory reforms (OECD [1997a], [2001], [2004], [2009a], [2010a], [2012]). In 
Great Britain, an advisory committee (Better Regulation Task Force, BRTF) set up 
by the government in 1997 prepared recommendations for the improvement of 
regulation, which prescribed the reduction of direct government interventions and 
a more frequent use of self-regulation as an option to consider again (BRTF [1999], 
[2000], [2003], [2005]).
Between 2006 and 2008, the advisory body was renamed Better Regulation Com-
mission and its powers were increased. Concerns for improvement were also en-
acted in legislation affecting regulatory authorities. The Energy Act (2004) obliged 
authorities to follow the principles of better regulation and implement good prac-
tices. Pursuant to the Communication Act (2003), regulatory authorities, besides 
the previously mentioned obligations, had to take into account the expected bur-
den of regulations, and where possible, were obliged to promote self-regulation. In 
certain markets, the act also recommended the use of codes of conducts adopted 
in self-regulatory frameworks. Also, touching on also the operation of Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT), the Enterprise Act (2002) emphasised the importance of the 
prevalence of the codes of conduct, which was later clearly interpreted by the OFT 
as a broader applicability of self-regulation.
In 2005, the British government established the Better Regulation Executive 
(BRE) that coordinates the government’s activities in regulatory affairs. The office 
is currently under the Department for Business, Innovations and Skills (BIS) and 
its task is to evaluate the regulatory plans of the government in two respects. First, 
it must be examined whether a regulatory alternative exists that could replace and 
bring the same result as the regulation intended by the government. If it does not 
exist, the introduction of new regulation can only be endorsed if it reduces red 
tape created by existing regulations or implies deregulation (http://www.bis.gov.
uk/policies/bre/principles-of-regulation). This is also helped by the principle that 
every time a regulation is approved an existing one needs to be cancelled, and in 
the case of new regulations, their planned end data or termination must also be 
indicated (BRE [2011a], [2011b]). A recent innovation is that in order to facili-
tate better selections from classical regulatory opportunities (the use of market 
mechanisms, information and education campaigns, self- and joint regulation), 
the findings of behavioural economics must be taken into consideration (Dolan 
et al. [2010], OFT [2010]).
As well as the British government, the Australian one also made great efforts 
to promote a more widespread use of self-regulation. The minister responsible 
for consumer protection and the regulation of financial markets established an 
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advisory body called Taskforce on Industry Self-regulation (TIS) in 1999. A re-
port published by the advisory body in 2000 examined the cases when self-regu-
lation could become the most and least efficient regulatory solution (TIS [2000]). 
A Consumer Competition Act enacted in 2010 dealt with the form of self-regula-
tion set out in the codes of conduct. The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission (ACCC) developed self-regulatory guidelines to facilitate 
compliance with the act by professional and occupational organisations as well as 
companies operating in consumer markets (ACCC [2011]). Not even the regulated 
markets were left out from the new wave of self-regulation. A case in point is the 
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). A report developed 
by this authority summarised the optimal conditions of efficient self-regulation 
and co-regulation (ACMA [2010]).
The development of better regulatory systems was supported by the systematic 
use of Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIA). A more substantial review of the quality 
of regulations also enabled increasingly more in-depth analyses of regulations in 
terms of transparency, consultation mechanisms, institutional solutions, monitoring 
and progress checks (Valentiny [2008]). This process that had started in the United 
States in the 1970s, spread to a number of countries by the 1980s, and afterwards the 
use of regulatory impact analysis was articulated by the OECD recommendations 
and incorporated into the practice of the European Union as well (OECD [1997b]). 
A recurring aspect of impact analyses is the consideration of regulatory alternatives. 
According to a survey by the OECD published in 2008, the consideration of regula-
tory alternatives was obligatory in all of the 31 examined member states, but there 
was no obligation to do so in writing in nine countries, at least one written analysis 
was required in 14 countries, and at least two in eight countries (OECD [2009b]). 
Data pertaining to individual countries is provided in Table 1.
Regular quality control of regulations and impact assessments were intro-
duced in the European Union at end of the 1990s. Many consider the disclosure of 
the Mandelken report as a decisive moment in this process (Mandelkern Group 
[2001]). The report summarised the most important principles of good regulation 
and emphasised the importance of impact assessment and weighting of alterna-
tive instruments. Following the Mandelken report, annual reports analysing the 
practice of better regulation (http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/
reports_en.htm) and the use of impact assessments (http://ec.europa.eu/govern-
ance/impact/key_docs/key_docs_en.htm) were established in the European Union. 
The Commission thus decided that in this way it could speed up the process. As 
a result of improved regulation, it was expected that, on one hand – to use a new 
term – smart regulation would be realised in the whole policy cycle, from the 
design of pieces of legislation to implementation, enforcement, evaluation and 
revision, and on the other hand, the most affected parties would have a key role 
in the process (EC [2010]).
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TABLE 1 • Alternative regulations in OECD countries
Country
Assessment of potentially feasible alternative instruments 
Regulators are required to assess 
alternative instruments before 
adopting new regulation
It is required to be provided  
in a written form
This written assessment is  
required to include more than  
one alternative
Australia always Y Y
Austria always Y N
Belgium occasionally N –
Canada always Y N
Czech Republic always Y N
Denmark always N –
Finland always Y Y
France occasionally – –
Germany always Y N
Greece occasionally Y N
Holland always Y N
Hungary occasionally Y Y
Iceland always Y N
Ireland always Y N
Italy occasionally – –
Japan always Y Y
Korea always Y N
Luxembourg occasionally N N
Mexico occasionally Y Y
New Zealand always Y N
Norway always N –
Poland always Y N
Portugal occasionally N –
Slovakia occasionally N –
Spain occasionally N –
Sweden always Y N
Switzerland always Y Y
Turkey occasionally Y Y
United Kingdom always Y N
United States always Y Y
European Union always Y N
Source: OECD [2009b] p. 106.
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TABLE 1 • Alternative regulations in OECD countries (continued)
Country

















Australia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Austria N – – – – – –
Belgium Y Y N Y Y N Y
Canada Y Y N N Y N Y
Czech Republic Y N N Y Y N Y
Denmark Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Finland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
France Y N N Y Y N Y
Germany Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Greece N – – – – – –
Holland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Hungary N – – – – – –
Iceland N – – – – – –
Ireland Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Italy Y N N Y Y Y Y
Japan Y N N Y Y N Y
Korea Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Luxembourg N – – – – – –
Mexico N – – – – – –
New Zealand Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Norway N – – – – – –
Poland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Portugal N – – – – – –
Slovakia N – – – – – –
Spain N – – – – – –
Sweden Y N N N Y Y Y
Switzerland Y N Y N Y Y Y
Turkey Y N N Y Y Y Y
United Kingdom Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
United States Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
European Union Y N N Y Y N Y
Source: OECD [2009b] p. 106.
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The search for direct alternative instruments was from the outset included in 
the implementation of better regulation. Earlier, the widespread use of self-regula-
tion and co-regulation only formed an integral part in the decentralised “soft law” 
framework of Anglo-Saxon legal systems. Other countries, concerned about the 
potential erosion of government, put restraint to such initiatives. However, a White 
Paper published in 2001 as well as subsequent sectoral recommendations laid down 
the generally accepted principles of self- and co-regulation. The final push was giv-
en by an Inter-institutional Agreement on better law-making (2003) between the 
three institutions of the European Union (Parliament, Council and Commission). 
The joint resolution stipulated that in cases where the Maastricht Treaty did not 
require the use of legal instruments, there was also an opportunity for the use of 
alternative regulatory instruments. The resolution also identified cases where this 
could not be done, namely, the cases, where there were fundamental rights and 
important political questions at stake, or where laws had to be used uniformly in 
all member states.
This document was the first attempt to define in the framework of the European 
Union what was meant by self- and co-regulation. Self-regulation is perceived as 
an opportunity by economic actors, social partners as well as non-governmental 
organisations and associations to develop directives (primarily codes of conduct 
or sectoral agreements) for and among themselves (Interinstitutional Agreement … 
[2003] Article 22). In co-regulation, the legislative power defines an objective and 
empowers the above actors (economic actors, social partners, non-governmental 
organisations and associations) to reach that by their own means (Ibid. Article 22). 
The resolution articulated the conditions for the use of regulatory instruments, and 
the control of implementation of the agreement.
In most member states, self-regulation, of course, has already been at place 
for a long time in certain occupations and in the form of technical standards. But 
a more extensive, European-level self-regulation has been taking place only since 
the beginning of the 1990s (for example, advertising agencies, legal counsellors, 
restaurants, travel agencies, internet providers, hairdressers, real estate agents, etc). 
These were primarily concerned with training, recognition of qualifications, rules 
of rule-making, and hence, facilitated the flow of activities in the given professions 
among the member states. In the past years, self- and co-regulation have been 
extended by the inclusion of consumers. The number of European-level self- and 
co-regulations has been increased by the improvement of product information qual-
ity, the development of security-enhancing purchase conditions (payment, service 
provisions, maintenance, handling of complaints, etc.) and new challenges posed 
by electronic commerce (EESC [2005]).
In order to increase the scope of alternative regulatory forms and share best 
practices, an independent database was established, linked to the monitoring system 
of the internal market, which would support the analysis of self- and co-regulation. 
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In the evaluation in 2009, there were 108 operating and 17 completed regulatory 
initiatives in the database. 83 were related to the European Commission and 25 
to the European Economic and Social Committee. Among these, there were 47 
(5 terminated) self-regulations and 61 (12 terminated) co-regulations. The Euro-
pean Commission examined 78 regulations (including 17 closed cases). In 2011, 
the list was extended by four new regulations (http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i= 
portal.en.self-and-co-regulation-enter-the-database). The database features the 
legal background that led to the creation of the regulation, the objective, methods 
of monitoring and sanctions, geographical coverage, type of financing and the Com-
mission’s opinion on the regulation.
The summaries of the database analysis provide a glimpse into self- and co-reg-
ulations in some of the more important fields of activity of the European Union 
(Hoogen–Nowak [2009]). Most regulatory initiatives arose in connection with the 
European Union’s internal market, this was followed by regulations pertaining to 
enterprises and industries, and thirdly, by the energy and transport sector (Table 2).













































1 4 1 1 3 1 11
Energy, 
transport
3 3 3 2 2 13
Enterprise, 
industry
2 1 1 1 3 1 1 4 2 1 17







2 2 1 1 3 1 10
Information 
society, media
1 1 2 1 2 7
Internal market, 
services 




Research 1 2 3
Total 2 1 2 0 0 1 1 4 4 7 9 10 11 14 13 15 8 3 105
Source: Hoogen–Nowak [2009] p. 151.
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EXAMPLES OF SELF- AND CO-REGULATION
Empirical case studies
Self-regulation often occurs when the regulated entities are “threatened” by upcom-
ing government regulation. In these cases, those involved in self-regulation usually 
choose self-regulation as a preventative action. By accepting quality parameters for 
products and services in the framework of self-regulation, it might be possible to 
achieve more favourable outcomes for the industry than under the conditions of 
possibly stricter government regulations. But these tactics can backfire, as it is often 
the self-regulatory steps that draw the government’s attention to an area that is not 
or not adequately regulated. In other cases, self-regulation is developed or changed 
in reaction to a shock effect. As mentioned by Coglianese–Mendelson [2010], among 
the classical examples is a relatively unsuccessful self-regulatory attempt following 
the Indian chemical disaster in Bhopal, and a more successful one in reaction to 
the nuclear accident on the Three Mile Island in the United States. Both cases have 
been studied extensively.
In reaction to the former case, the Chemical Manufacturers Association in the 
United States launched a programme called Responsible Care in 1988, which was 
shortly followed by Australia and Great Britain as well. In the framework of the 
programme, participants made a commitment that they would develop codes of con-
duct pertaining to environmental, health and safety measures. These commitments 
were developed by companies one by one regarding their activities and they defined 
how the stipulated objectives should be achieved. However, the association did not 
disclose to the public if its members fulfilled their commitments and no company 
was excluded for non-compliance or poor compliance from the association. The 
flow of information between the members was poor, board members could learn 
the names of non-complying companies only since 1996, and internal ranking lists 
on the compliance of companies have been created only since 2000. Participants’ 
compliance have only been verified by a third party since 2007. Research dealing 
with the programme could identify few positive aspects and claimed that there was 
more paper work than impact on the environment. There was a study which found 
that companies not participating in the programme could more significantly reduce 
their toxic emissions than those who participated in the programme (Coglianese–
Mendelson [2010] pp. 154–155).
The other example confirms though that self-regulation can be successful. Before 
the nuclear disaster on the Three Mile Island there was no need in the nuclear indus-
try to develop safety plans on a sectoral scale. After the disaster, a report prepared by 
the Kemeny Comission recommended the revision of sectoral standards, the regular 
collection of information and the preparation of independent, third-party evalua-
tions. According to some, the institute (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, INPO) 
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established by the leaders of the nuclear industry prevented the federal ownership 
of nuclear power plants. The INPO conducts regular reviews in power plants based 
on a list of recommendations compiled from 417 reports that have been prepared up 
to now. The two-week review is carried out by 20 persons and upon the completion 
of their task they prepare operative recommendations. During reviews a ranking is 
created comprising all INPO members, which stimulates sectoral actors to comply 
with standards to the fullest extent. The review material is, however, confidential, 
not even the members can have access to them. Studies examining the operation of 
the INPO consider the organisation as a good practice for self-regulation and add 
that it may be a further success factor if the self-regulatory organisation operates 
in a sector that is made up of closely cooperating members that are few in numbers 
and relatively homogeneous (Coglianese–Mendelson [2010] pp. 155–156.).
In the empirical analyses summarised by Ogus–Carbonara [2011], the adver-
tising industry is frequently mentioned as a good example of self-regulation. It was 
quickly realised in this industry that the credibility of services can be increased by 
an emphasis on professional responsibility. In spite of this, their self-regulatory or-
ganisations only took a strong line against non-complying organisations, when the 
threat of governmental regulation increased. Similar conclusion were drawn about 
the operation of commodity exchanges.
For a long time, the cyber space (online communication systems) was considered 
to be a typical example of self-regulation. In the 1990s this area was characterised 
by self-regulation and in the past decade co-regulation has increasingly become 
prominent, primarily in those fields where regulatory principles needed to be co-
ordinated with existing governmental regulatory organisations (for example, in the 
case of offensive content). The security of cyber space is, in general, considered to 
be an area where, due to the free-rider problem, market solutions are less effective. 
There is a need for some sort of regulation, but the global nature of the network 
makes it difficult to develop any feasible arrangement. There is a need for a joint 
application of self-regulation and international cooperation.
Empirical studies of self-regulation in various occupations have found rent-seek-
ing opportunities in a wide range of professions such as opticians, dry cleaners, 
lawyers or dentists. Standards developed by self-regulatory professional organ-
isations  – for example tariffs or advertising restrictions or rules of professional 
ethics – often protected the interests of regulators rather than those of consumers, 
and prevented the use of cost reduction measures. According to Kleiner’s [2006] 
calculations, in professions subject to licencing the social costs of maintenance of 
licencing significantly exceed expected benefits. He believes that the introduction 
of professional certificates demonstrating compliance would create higher compe-
tition and lower barriers to entry than licencing.
Typical areas of co-regulation are financial services, management of hazard-
ous materials, food safety, or for example, pollution. Co-regulation aimed at the 
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reduction of toxic waste in certain states of the United States provide adequate 
empirical data for the analyses of co-regulation (Coglianese–Mendelson [2010] pp. 
157–158.). First, it was the state of Massachusetts that imposed a law to limit waste 
pollution by 50 per cent. In order to meet this requirement, the state compelled 
respective companies to prepare a waste reduction plan, but only planning was 
obligatory, the content could be decided by the company and the implementation 
was not verified. The commitment merely consisted of a reduction plan that needed 
to be prepared in every other year. Nevertheless, waste reduction (between 1988 
and 2007) was higher – 90 per cent – than required by the law. A survey conduct-
ed three years after the law had taken force found that 81 per cent of responding 
companies realised at least some, but some companies did so with all measures 
that they had planned. 67 per cent also perceived a cost reduction effect by the 
introduced measures, and 86 per cent declared that they would intend to carry 
on with the planning practice, even if the state did not prescribe it any longer. At 
the same time, studies of the effects of legislation pointed out that in the given 
period, waste emissions were reduced by 81 per cent overall in the United States. 
The practice of Massachusetts, that is, the prescription of planning was followed 
by 13 member states. In these states together the degree of reduction was 30 per 
cent higher than in other states. The benefits of this type of regulation however, 
gradually decreased, and were only significant in the first six years. Overall, the 
above mentioned methods of co-regulation were considered successful, but it is 
assumed that in the long run, they would not remain effective.
Self-regulatory systems, however, are not able to adequately attend to their tasks 
in all cases. The following two examples illuminate inadequacies in self-regulation 
and a need for more direct state control that evolved in the areas of audits and 
credit rating.
The audit market
Audits were characterised by self-regulation for a long time. The professional as-
sociation of audits developed the rules and standards of auditing, and enforced 
compliance. Self-regulation was also justified by the complexity of professional 
knowledge. Auditors detected it much easier if among those performing similar 
tasks, one of the parties went wrong in the client-contractor relationship system, 
or an auditor got excessively under the influence of or was potentially mislead by 
a client. In the case of clients with diverse activities, innovative and often changing 
portfolios, those with daily contact with companies were really in an advantageous 
position. For a while, it was considered as an advantage of self-regulation that the 
costs of regulation were borne by the regulated entities. As a result of regulation, 
the reliability of the profession increases, the service becomes more valuable, and 
the costs of regulation are absorbed and feature as a price increase factor.
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After some time, however, financing was put in a different perspective. The 
financing of a self-regulating organisation within the trade questioned the inde-
pendence of the regulator. In the United States, the behaviour of auditors massively 
undermined the trust in self-regulation when during a dispute on the independence 
of the self-regulatory organisation, the auditing companies considered the reduction 
of funding (Pritchard–Puri [2006]).
Cartel formation is usually also considered among the dangers of self-regulation, 
and many see their concerns justified as the number of largest auditing firms de-
creased to four (Valentiny [2012]). Self-regulation can also encourage the increase 
of professional standards to an extremely high level, which can lead, on the one 
hand, to the exclusion of certain companies, and on the other hand, to the artificial 
stimulation of demand for services. The consistency of use of sanctions, in some 
cases, may raise doubts, but penalties can have negative effects for the whole trade. 
In the regulation of audits the mode of obtaining information is not resolved: while 
member organisations cooperate in this respect, the cooperation of the most im-
portant party, that of the client, is usually not possible due to a conflict of interest.
In the North-American continent two parallel and in many respects different au-
dit regulations have evolved. In the United States the supervision of audits was under 
the stock exchange supervisory authority (Securities and Exchange Commission), 
but in practice it was professional associations that were in charge of carrying out the 
task. In Canada the laws did not directly affect audits. The corporation law entrusted 
self-regulatory bodies with the development of professional standards and rules of 
independence. The committees of professional organisation developed the rules and 
the mechanisms of checks and accountability. The two countries differently reacted 
to the corporate crisis affecting the audits (for example, Enron, Worldcom) as well 
as the 2008 crises. In the United States the functioning of self-regulatory body called 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has received a lot of criticism. They 
reacted slowly to the demand of enforcing technologically driven changes in audits, 
while at the same time, their rules enabled certain companies to disclose false reve-
nue and profit data, thereby artificially increasing their share prices and credit ratings.
A United States law on the reporting and responsibility of companies and audits, 
which is named after the claimants as the Sarbane–Oxley Act [Corporate and Audit-
ing Accountability and Responsibility Act (2002)], was aimed at tightening checks. 
A new organisation called Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
was established to supervise audits. The act stipulated the separation of audits and 
consultancy, the obligation to fully disclose risks, the exchange of auditors, and 
a significant improvement of internal supervision (Romano [2004], Zhang [2005]).
The assessments of PCAOB became regular and the activities of the four large 
auditors in 2010 were summarised in four reports. The mistakes made during audits 
were revealed and recommendations were put forward for their correction. Irreg-
ularities were found in 26 cases out of 57 at Deloitte, in 15 cases out of 62 at Ernst 
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& Young, in 12 cases of out of 54 at KPMG, in 28 cases out of 76 at PwC (PCAOB 
[2011a], [2011b], [2011c], [2011d]). The supervision prepared a separate report on 
the activities of auditors during the crisis, it identified areas with specifically many 
problems and where evaluation standards developed by the supervision were not 
adequately used – for example, fair value accounting, income taxes, stocks, cal-
culation of revenues, accounting off-balance-sheet items, devaluation of goodwill, 
etc. However, in relation to audits as a whole, the reports did not identify serious 
problems that correlated with the crisis (PCAOB [2010]).
Canadian self-regulation reacted sensitively to the series of company failures. 
The professional association established an independent body for the supervision 
of auditors in 2002. Members of the body consisted of famous personalities of the 
business life and the representatives of regulatory organisations. The body oversees 
the standard and rule development process and keeps contact with the public. The 
Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB), a regulatory organisation established 
under the Enterprise Act in 2003, has dealt with the regulation of auditors of publi-
cally listed companies. Apart from the professional auditing association there are two 
other self-regulating audit organisations operating in Canada. After 2004, the legisla-
tion of certain provinces made it possible that following adequate qualification these 
organisations could also audit the publically listed companies, and thereby contrib-
ute to the dilution of high concentration. In line with changes to the enterprise act, 
the regulation of financial reports and auditing committees had also changed, as they 
made steps to increase their independence. The federal government also declared 
the applicability of criminal code in relation to the failures of corporate management. 
The Canadian reforms are less drastic than the ones in the United States, the CPAB is 
not directly under a government body, as opposed to the PCAOB, which is overseen 
by the US Securities and Exchange Comission (SEC). The Canadian oversight  – in 
contrast to the one operating in the United States – does not compile standards, 
and the traits of self-regulation are still very strong in the Canadian regulation.
Studies and recommendations have been made in Europe as well to analyse and 
resolve the problems of audit market. A Green paper published by the European 
Commission in October 2010 summarised the lessons of the crisis and proposed 
solutions. In certain cases, the proposed solutions follow those in the Sarbane–Oxley 
Act, in other cases they are more radical. The primary aim of the recommendations 
of the European Commission is to strengthen the independence of the auditors and 
to “diversify” the auditing market. An important part of the recommendations is 
the strengthening of supervision of auditors on the national and European level.
The internal rules of audit firms are also changing. Regarding property relations, 
the rule which required that partners must constitute more than half of the owners 
is cancelled. In line with the basic principles of audit procedures the draft decree 
emphasises professional scepticism in a separate chapter as basic rule of conduct. 
In order to create a single market for compulsory audits, a European passport is 
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introduced for the audit profession. In order to strengthen audit oversight, the in-
vestigatory rights of national supervisors are increased and their independence from 
professional organisations is required everywhere. The Commission recommends 
that the coordination of supervision matters should be undertaken by the European 
Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) (Staff Working Paper [2011] pp. 256–259.).
Credit rating market
Large and centuries-old credit rating agencies started their activities with collect-
ing and selling information and statistics about business actors. Analysing, rating 
and classification practices have evolved from these activities. Credit rating agen-
cies  – similarly to auditors and insurance companies – occupy a special status in the 
institutional system of business: their findings can be used by regulatory, control 
institutions, or even by courts, which render credit rating agencies part of a regula-
tory process. There was a time when credit rating agencies were described as ideal 
cases of self-regulation, since their products were clearly visible and their ratings 
were well-measurable. For this reason, good reputation is an extremely important 
element of their functioning and mistakes or anti-competitive behaviour can cause 
a lot of harm to their reputation. Their activities can virtually not be overtaken by 
other economic actors, the tasks requiring vast information and lots of experience 
cannot even be assumed – among others, due to lack of impartiality – by the state 
(Sen [2011], Mulligan [2009]).
The extension of the credit rating market was generated by various laws that 
related to banks, insurance companies, pension funds in the 1930s, and this circle 
had increasingly widened by the 1970s, as institutes under state control also became 
increasingly reliant on the services of credit rating agencies (White [2012]). Basically, 
until 1975, the only instrument for the regulation of credit rating agencies was the 
adoption of a handbook that contained rating principles. The American Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) decided in that year to establish a new category – the 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) – for the companies 
that provide information, and among these it immediately acknowledged the three 
biggest credit rating agencies. The control was, in fact, informal and relied chiefly 
on feedback from the market rather than standards.
In the following 25 years only four other agencies became recognised organisa-
tions, but due to mergers and bankruptcies, only three remained again by 2000. The 
exact conditions for inclusion in the recognised club were not disclosed by the SEC. 
The performance of credit agencies during the 2008 crisis was considered worse 
than that of auditors. In the United States the control rights of SEC were significantly 
strengthened by the Dodd–Frank Act intended to improve control over the financial 
system (2010), and in June 2012, an independent body, the Office of Credit Ratings, 
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was established to oversee credit rating agencies. Incompatibility rules were taken 
much more seriously for credit rating agencies than before: those working on the 
ratings have been banned from participation in the selling of ratings, and several 
aspects of the functions of credit rating agencies have been regulated. It must be 
publically disclosed what kind of conditions were used in the ratings, whether the 
rating was a paid or non-paid one. Furthermore, historical data of earlier ratings 
must also be disclosed for the evaluation of rating’s accuracy, and if an employee 
of a credit rating agency becomes later the employee of a rated company, the em-
ployee’s rating activity must subsequently be checked and evaluated. (Dodd–Frank 
[2010] SEC.931–939H).
The European regulation also tried to keep pace with the problems that arose 
during the crisis, and create a framework for regulation by formulating directives 
and decrees. The European regulation on credit rating agencies, which has been 
in force since December 2010 (EPC [2009]) was amended in May 2011, after the 
establishment of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In ef-
fect, the ESMA was entrusted with the oversight of the market and the details of 
implementing supervision have also been developed (EPC [2011]). Conditions for 
registering credit rating agencies, rules of business conduct, quality assurance, and 
incompatibility were also defined. The changes of rating methodology, after they 
are discussed with issuers and investors, must be submitted to the ESMA, which 
supervises implementation according to the principles developed in March 2012.
The cases of self- and co-regulation presented up to this point demonstrate that 
the development of this type of regulation depends on the particular legal system 
and economic environment as well as many other market and professional condi-
tions. The theoretical models attempted to provide a typology for these conditions, 
weigh their respective prevalence, and examine their effect. In the next section we 
review the economic models dealing with self-regulation.
THEORETICAL RESULTS IN RELATION TO SELF-REGULATION
The most important goal of economic regulation is to correct market failures. The 
most frequently cited market failure is deadweight loss caused by market power.3 
Market power and the resultant excessive pricing is usually addressed in the frame-
work of classical regulation, since the “self-regulation” of actors would at best lead to 
the development of cartels and thus, to more significant deadweight loss. Monopoly 
power does not only result in high prices: if the monopoly decides about multiple 
 3 Deadweight loss may arise if a firm prices above marginal cost, hence some consumers with a higher 
marginal utility than marginal cost will not buy the good. This means that some socially optimal 
exchanges do not take place.
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factors simultaneously (for example, about the price and the quality) then – depend-
ing on the elasticity of the demand function with respect to quality – it may find 
optimal to choose a too high or too low level of quality (Spence [1975]). But since 
this also follows from market power, classical regulation in this dimension cannot 
be substituted with self-regulation even under complete information.
Self-regulation can therefore be applied successfully only in those areas where the 
coordination of corporate decisions is in the interest of both the firms and society. 
A simple example for this is standardization. Fundamentally, however, the litera-
ture focuses on information asymmetries between producers and consumers. This 
usually arises in the cases of search goods, experience goods and credence goods 
(Scarpa [1999]). For search goods, consumers can only determine the quality of 
goods after paying some search costs, hence search will be higher than optimal. In 
the case of experience goods, consumers can get to know the quality of the product 
only after purchasing it, while in the case of credence goods, not even after that; this 
last group consists of medical, certain financial and legal services.
Market failure related to asymmetric information can take two forms: adverse 
selection and moral hazard; which is to say, that on the one hand, market failure 
may originate from consumers’ inability to observe the type of individual service 
providers, and on the other hand, it can also stem from inability to observe how 
much effort service providers put into improving service quality. Akerlof ’s [1970] 
model demonstrates that as a result of adverse selection, the better producers are 
crowded out of the market, and, the allocation of products among consumers will 
not be optimal either. This approach is later followed by Leland [1979] and Shaked–
Sutton [1981]. Nonetheless, in the more recent literature, authors primary focus on 
moral hazard rather than adverse selection.
Reducing the problems stemming from quality-related asymmetric informa-
tion  – in contrast with excessively high prices – may be in the common interest of 
all stakeholders, therefore, industry-wide self-regulation in these cases may rep-
resent a viable alternative to classical regulation. In case of a very strong adverse 
selection – when a market cannot even operate – it is clear that it is advantageous 
for both service providers and consumers if industrial self-regulation can control 
quality and thus restore the operation of the market. In the case of a more moderate 
degree of adverse selection, it can be similarly argued that self-regulation preventing 
the crowding out of high quality service providers is beneficial both for consumers 
and producers (Leland [1979]).
Information had a prominent role in the models of the 1990s and 2000s. The 
reputation of the industry (expected quality) is basically a public good into which 
firms invest a suboptimal amount, since the cost of these investments would almost 
exclusively be borne by them, while the benefits could be enjoyed by all companies. 
In these models self-regulation reduces this public good problem, leading to higher 
reputation and total profit at the industry level.
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While these arguments demonstrate that self-regulation leads to better results 
than its absence, another important question is the relation of self-regulation to 
classical regulation. According to the literature, the advantage of self-regulation 
lies in the more efficient use of information, but its disadvantage is an increased 
probability of collusion, which can lead to deadweight loss (OFT [2009]). For a more 
profound understanding of the trade-off between classical and self-regulation one 
should focus more explicitly on the objective functions and constraints different 
actors face, which became a focus in the literature in the 2000s.
Self-regulation receives an increasingly greater role in the area of environmental 
protection. The reduction of pollution is in itself not in the interest of the indus-
try, thus, self-regulation in this area is foremost motivated by preventing classical 
regulatory measures, such as the introduction of pollution quotas. To be able to 
model this, one also needs to model the political mechanisms deciding about the 
introduction of quotas, where the lobby efforts of parties are also influenced by the 
type of alternatives the opportunity of self-regulation represent for them.
In the following, we first present the classical models of self-regulation and then we 
move on to those models that yield a more in-depth analysis of the function of classi-
cal and self-regulations, and their relationship to the institutional system. We review 
the factors that, according to the literature, influence the efficiency of self-regulation.
Causes and models of self-regulation
The model-based literature of self-regulation started by an article of Leland [1979]. 
Its starting point was the problem of adverse selection presented by Akerlof [1970], 
and it examined whether there was any improvement if the regulator or the industry 
defined a quality threshold.
The model itself was also based on the model of Akerlof, which was structured 
in the following way. Consumers value quality, hence better quality pushes the de-
mand curve outwards. The quality of produced goods by certain companies evolves 
exogenously, and higher-quality firms also face higher costs. The model is about an 
experience good, thus consumers are not able to assess the quality of the good or 
service before the purchase. Therefore, they are willing to pay a price corresponding 
to average quality, that is the expected quality of the good in the market. This leads 
to adverse selection: it is not worth for producers creating the best quality to enter 
the market, despite the willingness of consumers – under complete information – 
to pay the costs of a better quality product.
In this framework, Leland [1979] assesses whether it is possible to improve 
efficiency if a certain quality threshold is introduced. This means that only those 
producers can sell their products on the market that exceed a critical value. The 
social value of the threshold is that due to an increase in average quality, producers 
76 Balázs Muraközy–Pál Valentiny
creating better quality goods return to the market; its social cost is that total quality 
exchanged on the market decreases. The welfare effect depends on how consumers 
evaluate better quality in comparison to greater quantity. The results show that it 
pays off to introduce such a threshold if consumers value quality highly in com-
parison to the cost of its production, and the elasticity of demand (with respect to 
quantity) is not too large.
The article analyses what quality standard will be defined by a self-regulatory or-
ganisation (SRO). Such an organisation – similarly to cartels – maximises industrial 
profits. The study of Leland does not address the inner workings of self-regulatory 
organisations: it simply assumes that they operate efficiently from the perspective 
of the collective interests of stakeholders. The study shows that if the unit cost 
function is strictly convex, and consumer demand for quality is linear or convex, 
then the self-regulatory organisation defines a higher than optimal quality thresh-
old. The reason for this is that the self-regulatory organisation – similarly to other 
monopolies – tries to lower supply by all means at its disposal, and thereby generate 
monopoly profit.
Using simple tools, Leland [1979] also writes about the problem of moral hazard. 
He examines what happens when quality is endogenous. In this case, a public good 
problem arises. Since consumers cannot observe the quality of the product before 
purchase, the company investing into the quality of its product cannot access the 
total return on its investment, and thus, the investment will be lower than its so-
cially optimal level. While this approach provides the idea for later models based 
on moral hazard, a precise modelling of moral hazard occurred only later, with the 
work of Shapiro [1986].
The study of Shaked–Sutton [1981] is another classic piece in the literature of 
self-regulation. It expands on Leland’s [1979] model in many ways. On the one hand, 
it addresses consumer preferences pertaining to quality in more general terms: con-
sumers are not only interested in general (expected) quality, but the distribution 
of the quality of those who work in the profession (for example, in health or legal 
counselling). On the other hand, it also models the labour market in detail, where 
the income of professional employees is determined endogenously. To this end, the 
authors use a certain general equilibrium model. The skills of potential workers are 
heterogeneous, and in equilibrium those chose, for example, the medical profes-
sion – as opposed to other professions –, who can provide better service than the 
quality threshold. Thus, the threshold defines the number of workers, that is, the 
size of profession, too.
Given their specific approach, the authors can also analyse some novel questions. 
They analyse all viable sizes of professions that are feasible in equilibrium. At the 
same time, they also examine the effect of the emergence of a new profession that 
provides lower standards than the original one. They find in the case of a single 
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profession – similarly to Leland [1979] – that the threshold maximising the income 
of professionals is higher than the socially optimal one, meaning that if the defini-
tion of quality threshold was left to the profession, there would be fewer lawyers 
or doctors working.
In the case of two professions they examine cases where a new profession can 
appear – for example, paralegals – that allows the entrance of lower quality service 
providers. In the model, the technical condition for this is that paralegals should 
earn more than in their alternative professions.
Two regulatory settings may explain the emergence of a new profession. First, 
a  professional organisation can be freely established. Second, the old profes-
sion  – lawyers, doctors – may define the quality requirements for the new one. This 
is not at all unrealistic: it happens often that the representatives of the highest quality 
profession decide about the quality standards applicable to “lower” level professions, 
for example, doctors define professional requirements that must be met by nurses.
If representatives of the new profession can decide about the quality require-
ments applicable to them, then the new profession may also set the quality threshold 
too high, thus state regulatory authorities may have an interest to intervene and 
to set the quality threshold at the socially optimal level. In such interventions the 
entrance of a new profession clearly increases welfare, thanks to the wider range 
of choice and the lower rents enjoyed by the original profession. If however the re-
quirements applicable to the new profession are chosen by the old profession, and 
financial transfers are possible between the two groups, then the quality threshold 
of the new profession will not be optimal, and the representatives of the original 
profession will take further rents from the generated revenue.
Thus, overall, this more general model of Shaked–Sutton [1981] confirms Le-
land’s [1979] conclusions, according to which a profession functioning as a monop-
oly sets too high quality threshold. An important finding is that the appearance of 
a competing profession may be beneficial in the case of independent professions. If, 
however, the representatives of the old profession decide about the requirements 
of the new profession, then this leads to an increase of rents for the old profession.
Shapiro’s [1986] model is the first important model that interprets quality regula-
tion as a moral hazard problem. Originally, the group of producers is homogeneous, 
and it is up to their members to decide what qualifications they should obtain and 
what quality products they create (high or low). For more qualified producers it 
costs less to create high quality products: higher qualifications and higher-quality 
products therefore complement each other. Another important feature of the moral 
hazard-based model is that the state is not able to directly regulate the quality of the 
product, only one of its inputs: the qualification of the service provider.
It is important that there is opportunity in the model to develop reputation. The 
type of products created by service providers can only be observed after a while: 
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consumers are not able to ascertain the quality of services provided by young service 
providers, but they decide about the use of services offered by providers in their 
second career phase based on the provider’s reputation in the first phase.
Without government intervention two types of efficiency losses arise on the 
market. 1. Due to the initial phase characterised by moral hazard, there is less in-
centive to produce higher quality, than in the case with complete information, which 
reduces average quality. 2. In the initial phase the allocation of higher and lower 
quality products is not optimal: the higher quality products do not necessarily reach 
those consumers who value quality, since the products are indistinguishable prior to 
consumption. This also implies that in comparison to the full information scenario, 
asymmetric information harms the situation of those consumers who value quality, 
and their surplus gets transferred to other consumers.
The state can intervene into market processes in various ways. One option is 
licencing, which means that the performance of an activity is only permitted above 
a certain qualification; this is basically input regulation. In this way, low-quality 
service providers obtain higher qualification than they would otherwise do in the 
absence of intervention. In effect, the marginal cost of higher quality is reduced, and 
supply is increased. Licencing thus increases average quality and decreases type 1 
sources of efficiency loss.
Shapiro [1986] shows that licencing only leads to an increase in welfare if the 
reputation mechanism is not too strong. The introduction of licensing, however, 
does not lead to improvement in the Pareto-sense: due to a reduced marginal cost 
of quality, consumers with a high valuation of quality are the winners of intervention, 
while those with a low valuation of quality become the losers.
The second option of government intervention is issuing certificates by which the 
state – already at the beginning of the career – certifies the qualification of a service 
provider, and thus consumers get information about the properties of the service 
provider already in the first phase. This provides opportunity for signalling: service 
providers can signal their qualifications and through this, indirectly, the quality of 
their service. If there is sufficiently strong correlation between the qualification 
and the quality, then this mechanism can fully re-establish the social optimum. In 
other cases it can happen that high quality service producers need extremely high 
incentives to reveal their type. This excessive signalling can even lead to welfare loss.
The article of Shapiro [1986] is significant because it is the first one to present 
how the quality regulation of inputs can help reduce moral hazard related to quality. 
An important innovative element of the article is an emphasis on the role of repu-
tation. If the reputation mechanism is strong and efficient in a profession, then this 
may in itself be enough to do away with moral hazard. Imperfect reputation implies, 
though, that producers can get only a part of social return from investment into 
a higher quality, and hence investment is suboptimal. In these models this latter 
effect represents the rationale of regulatory or self-regulatory intervention.
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In Shapiro’s model the issue is the individual reputation of the given service 
providers, and it is a problem that this can only be observed after a while. The 
study demonstrates that the quality threshold is advantageous from the perspective 
of society, but it does not deal with the question whether the collective organisa-
tion of the industry enables the creation of efficient self-regulation. This latter can 
also be motivated if the industry possesses a certain type of collective reputation, 
which is the sum of individual reputations, the average quality of the industry. This 
is implicitly included in the article of Shapiro [1986]: the average quality of young 
service providers can be interpreted as the reputation of the industry. But handling 
industrial reputation separately makes the drivers of self-regulation more explicit: 
if industrial reputation is a public good, then it is perfectly conceivable, that the 
contribution of individual service providers, from the perspective of the industry, 
is too low, and the establishment of a self-regulatory organisation could alleviate 
this public good problem.
The Gehrig–Jost [1995] model follows exactly the same line of thought. In their 
model companies operate as local monopolies, and with some probability, after 
a while, consumers move to a district of another service provider. Consumers who 
have moved do not know the service quality in the new district, therefore they can 
only form their expectations based on the quality provided by their previous provid-
er. This is meant by reputation of the industry in the model: in every district, new 
consumers build on their experiences with other service providers. The moving of 
consumers of course also implies that certain companies can enjoy only a part of 
their investment in reputation, and thus, the investment falls behind the optimal 
degree from the perspective of the industry. In the model, the number of sedentary 
(non-moving) consumers are the source of the reputation mechanism. This is the 
reason why profit maximizing self-regulation can improve the quality of the product.
The main question asked by Gehrig–Jost [1995] is: In what cases is it expedient 
to choose self-regulation instead of classical govermental quality and price regula-
tion? An important innovation of the model is that it highlights: the advantage of 
self-regulation is that market actors possess more information than regulators, but 
its disadvantage is increased market power, which can lead to a deadweight loss. 
The analysis demonstrates that if regulators and companies are equally informed, 
then from the perspective of society it is more expedient to use classical price or 
quantity regulation. If, however, the information available to the regulator is overly 
noisy, then self-regulation securing optimal quality leads to greater social welfare.
The research of Tirole [1996] describes a general model of collective reputation by 
modelling the collective reputation of an organisation (or a profession). Collective 
reputation is the sum of individual reputations. Collective reputation becomes an 
interesting question if the reputation of individuals is not only influenced by their 
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own but also by their organisation’s reputation. For example, if costumers conclude 
a contract with a representative (agent) of the industry, they cannot exactly check 
how many times this agent cheated in the past, but can know the general reputation 
of the industry, and with some probability can also find out if the given individual did 
not behave correctly in the past. Thus, individual and collective reputation simulta-
neously affect the expected payoffs of making business with a firm from the industry.
An important conclusion of the model is that it does not pay for individuals to 
behave correctly in companies with a bad reputation. The reason for this is that 
due to bad reputation, consumers are distrustful even toward those who were not 
caught as corrupt in the past. Therefore, members of these organisations can only 
get less profitable jobs even if they have never behaved corruptly. This may also lead 
to a situation that bad reputation prevails in such organisations where individuals 
from many generations work together. If a generation does not behave well, then 
in effect it is worth less to behave correctly for the next generation, thus the bad 
reputation of the organisation prevails.
While the article of Tirole [1996] does not directly address self-regulation, such 
an analysis of collective reputation demonstrates why self-regulation aimed at im-
proving reputation might be important. His argument concerning the importance of 
reputation is particularly important for understanding the conditions under which 
self-regulatory organisations can function efficiently. Although, in subsequent works 
this dynamic question did not receive much attention, it still remains important.
The study of DeMarzo–Fishman–Hagerty [2005] examines more in-depth the 
issue that increased market power is the social cost of self-regulation. Gehrig–Jost 
[1995] also demonstrated this. The main innovation of the study is the considera-
tion that for the efficient functioning of quality regulation, the regulator – be it the 
government or a self-regulating organisation – must perform costly investigations, 
and therefore, investigating every transaction cannot be efficient. For this reason 
the study is based on the Costly State Verification (CSV) framework proposed by 
Townsend’s [1979] article.
DeMarzo et al.’s [2005] logic has been inspired by industries, such as the financial 
market, where consumers can only ascertain the expected return of their investment 
by means of costly assessments. In the model, the self-regulatory organisation clearly 
represents the interests of the industrial stakeholders and behaves as a monopoly in 
the control of service providers. This can be interpreted in a way that the self-reg-
ulatory organisation operates in the common ownership of industrial companies 
and its objective is not to maximize its own profit.
The model shows that service providers competing in prices can function as 
monopolies if the operation of industrial self-regulatory organisation endows the 
industry with monopoly power by regulation. Afterwards, the study examines the 
role of a government regulator as well. The authors show that in equilibrium the 
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government authority does not even perform any investigations, but the threat of 
investigation can push the industry into the direction of perfect competition.
The main features of the classical models of self-regulation discussed here is 
summarised in Table 3.
TABLE 3 • The main features of the classical models of self-regulation
Study Approach Type of regulation Main innovation Efficiency of self-regulation
Leland [1979] adverse 
selection
quality threshold first model of self-regulation too high quality threshold
Shaked–Sutton [1981] adverse 
selection
quality threshold general equilibrium, more 
professions
too high quality threshold 






emergence of moral hazard licensing can be effective, 
certificates may lead to too 
high investment
Gehrig–Jost [1995] industrial 
reputation
quality regulation emergence of industrial 
reputation, the cost and 
benefit of self-regulation in 
comparison to classical 
regulation
if the self-regulatory organisa-
tion is more informed than the 
governmental regulator, 
self-regulation might be 
efficient
DeMarzo et al. [2005] costly controls costly controls modelling of market forces 
created by self-regulatory 
organisations, complementa-
ry nature of self-regulatory 
organisations and authorities
a self-regulatory organisation 
controlling quality leads to 
cartel prices; the inclusion of 
authorities have a positive 
effect
Institutions and the functioning of the regulator
Articles written before the 2000s do not address the incentives that a self-regulatory 
organisation faces. It is generally assumed that enterprises establish such an organ-
isation if they need one, and this will automatically and efficiently maximizes the 
industry’s aims. This, however – similarly to cartels – does not happen automatically 
in the case of self-regulatory organisations, since it might be in the interest of such 
an organisation to diverge from the collective interests of the industry.
Kranton [2003] investigates this issue and points out that in the case of experi-
ence goods and repeated games there might be a need for a certain market power 
which makes it worth for companies to build a reputation that is associated with 
high quality production. To uphold high quality, there might be a need to limit 
entry or reduce price competition. This phenomenon can justify the notion that 
self-regulatory organisations should not only deal with quality control, but to some 
extent should also limit competition. The author demonstrates that the guilds of 
the Middle Ages in Europe and in the Middle East as well as modern American pro-
fessional associations also functioned this way: they defined quality requirements 
toward professionals, and at the same time, limited competition.
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In the models presented in the previous section as well as in the article of Kranton 
[2003], there was an automatic assumption that the self-regulatory organisation, as 
a body established by the companies of the industry, will maximise total industry 
profits. This, however, is not necessarily true. The self-regulatory organisation, as an 
entity recognised by the state and responsible for the realisation of certain social goals, 
can also have another objective function. In the analyses of Javier Núñez, for instance, 
the objective of the self-regulatory organisations is the development of its own rep-
utation (Núñez [2001] and [2007]). In the models the development of reputation in-
dicates that the self-regulatory organisation functions efficiently and can investigate 
firms at a low cost. While it is not clear why such an organisation would follow exact-
ly this objective function, the analyses provide important insights on how results can 
differ if the self-regulatory organisation does not proceed as an agent of the companies.
An important advantage of these analyses is that the examination of self-reg-
ulatory and classical regulatory authority relationships became richer than in the 
approach where the self-regulatory organisation maximises profit, and the authority 
maximises some weighted sum of profit and consumer surplus. If there is substantial 
discrepancy between the objective functions of the two regulatory organisations, 
questions arise whether the functioning of two types of regulatory organisations 
substitute or complement each other.
Núñez [2001] also examines a mixed regulatory environment where there is 
a self-regulatory organisation parallel to a governmental regulatory authority, which 
also oversees quality. Both the self-regulatory organisation and the governmental 
regulator can perform investigations. Three scenarios are possible if a company is 
caught producing at too low quality: 1. the self-regulatory organisation voluntarily 
discloses misconducts, 2. it is the government supervision that discloses them, or 3. 
they will not be disclosed. The presence of the governmental regulator, on the one 
hand, directly reduces the optimal number of misconducts, and on the other hand, 
the threat of government investigation can encourage the self-regulatory organisa-
tion to conduct investigations more frequently, because this improves quality, and 
decreases the likelihood that a governmental investigation will reveal fraud, which 
would worsen the reputation of the self-regulatory organisation. This effect only 
applies to the number of investigations, but not to the disclosure of misconduct.
Núñez [2007] operates only one self-regulatory organisation, and examines what 
the effect is on efficiency if the companies can bribe the self-regulatory organisation. 
In the model, this means that companies producing lower quality and being caught 
during investigations pay money to the regulator, so that the latter does not reveal 
the result of the investigation, and thereby the company does not have to suffer the 
loss of consumer trust or the high cost of external legal sanctions. The self-regula-
tory organisation accepts the corruption offer if the offered amount is higher than 
the value of reputation gained from disclosure.
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The conclusion is that the possibility of corruption – in certain cases – may in-
crease the probability of fraud and decrease the probability of investigations. At the 
same time, even a corrupted self-regulatory organisation can be better than if there 
is no self-regulation at all, because the rent from corruption represents some level 
of motivation for investigating, which reduces misconduct. The effect on welfare 
is not clear, though, for investigations are costly.
While in the model of Núñez, the objective function of the self-regulatory or-
ganisation appears rather arbitrary, these types of objective functions can be better 
understood if there are more self-regulatory organisations competing with each 
other; in these cases it is indeed those self-regulatory organisations that can obtain 
higher shares which can more efficiently investigate the companies belonging to 
them. Caglio–Pescatori [2013] had built such a model that explicitly examined the 
functioning of competing self-regulatory organisations.
Caglio–Pescatori’s [2013] model starts from and earlier model, that of DeMarzo 
et al. [2005] for securities which relies on the costly state verification framework. Their 
study focuses on the question that if there are multiple self-regulatory organisations 
present in an industry, then how competition between self-regulatory organisations 
affect 1. the number of investigations and compliance with contracts, and through 
this, 2. the broker-investor relationship as well as the participation of the investors.
The authors investigate the securities market of the United States, where there is 
a three-tier regulation in force. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
regulates the markets and the self-regulatory organisations (the stock exchanges) too. 
These stock exchanges oversee the broker-investor relationships, where brokers and 
broker companies are members of self-regulatory organisations. The supervision 
rights of self-regulatory organisations are regulated by laws. The self-regulatory 
organisations compete with each other for higher turnover, and therefore, it is ques-
tionable whether the competition reduces the likelihood of investigating.
Thus, the model analyses profit maximising self-regulatory organisations and 
stock exchanges in an explicit way. The main conclusion is that this type of com-
petition hurts welfare, because stock exchanges gain market share with a reduced 
intensity of investigations (race to the bottom). According to the model, this nega-
tive situation would not unfold if one “monopolistic” self-regulatory organisation 
operated in the industry. The results did not change either, if the assumption on 
the heterogeneity of investors was changed, or expert investors with strategic be-
haviour were assumed.
Reiffen–Robe [2011] uses a similar model and examines what the difference is 
between the behaviour of profit-oriented self-regulatory organisations that pursue 
their own interests and others that seek the maximisation of total industry profits 
(that is, when the self-regulatory organisation is the joint property of the stakehold-
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ers of the industry). The self-regulatory organisation in joint property maximises the 
income of agents, while the profit-oriented self-regulatory organisation maximize 
the value of its shares. Since the profit-oriented self-regulatory organisation is less 
interested in the profit of agents, it imposes higher fines and conducts investiga-
tions more frequently to reveal misconducts. For profit-oriented self-regulatory 
organisations – due to more frequent controls – the introduction of innovations 
that reduce the unit-cost of controls also pays off better. The result is based on the 
logic that while a jointly-owned self-regulatory organisation will choose a minimal 
control level in line the participation constraint of consumers, a profit-oriented 
self-regulatory organisation will choose a maximal control level which is still in line 
with consumer participation.
The study also examines the effect of parallel functioning of the governmental 
regulation and the self-regulatory organisation. We have seen that the work of De-
Marzo et al. [2005] pointed out that the frequency of investigations by a joint-prop-
erty self-regulatory organisation is increased by the threat of government controls. 
Nonetheless, Reiffen–Robe [2011] draw attention to the fact that this threat does 
not matter for profit-oriented self-regulatory organisations, because the likelihood 
of them being controlled is already high enough in the absence of threats.
One can understand the functioning of governmental and industrial self-reg-
ulation better if one conceives regulation not as a one-shot decision implement-
ed at a particular moment, but more realistically, as a process in itself. While the 
decision maker can lay down general rules, it is the authorities or self-regulatory 
organisations which have to work out their detailed implementation. Since this is 
about residual rule-making powers, according to Grajzl–Murrell [2007] a natural 
framework is represented by the theory of incomplete contracts elaborated in a study 
by Grossman–Hart [1986].
In the framework of Grajzl–Murrell’s [2007] model one can endogenously 
examine the relationship of the governmental regulator and the self-regulatory 
organisation. The trade-off between the benefits and costs of self-regulation un-
fold similarly to the models based on incentives. The benefit of self-regulation – in 
contrast to central regulation – is that it is amendable with lower cost, and hence, 
is more flexible due to better informed stakeholders of the industry. The cost of 
self-regulation, on the other hand, is that industry stakeholders attach more weight 
to their own interests than what would be socially optimal.
The three main parameters of the model are uncertainty, the divergence between 
the interests of the consumers and the producers (polarisation), and the populism of 
the government which is represented by the weight of consumers in governmental 
decisions. The main results are the following. On the one hand, if uncertainty is 
higher, then self-regulation is more likely to be optimal from a social point of view, 
because in this case, flexibility has a higher value. The higher discrepancy between 
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the interests of consumers and producers calls, however, for central regulation, since 
in this case, the biases associated with self-regulation are accompanied by too high 
social costs. Finally, government regulation is favoured if the government is more 
populist, because the selfishness of producers is evened out by the fact that gov-
ernmental regulation would attach too great a weight to the interests of consumers.
The last point also makes it clear that the regulatory mechanism chosen by the 
government does not necessarily correspond to the socially optimal one. While 
increased uncertainty or higher polarisation affects likewise the choice made by 
the government, its populism increases the probability that central regulation will 
be created.
The authors demonstrate the empirical validity of the model by two case studies. 
The first one examines the difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental 
system. A number of studies confirm that self-regulation is more frequent in the 
Anglo-Saxon legal system.
The authors argue that in the centralised continental system the cost of subse-
quently changing regulations is higher both in the case of central regulation and in 
self-regulation. The benefit of self-regulation (higher flexibility) is, therefore, low-
er in the continental legal system, since given the high costs there would only be 
small changes anyway. On the other hand, the cost of self-regulation – the biases 
of self-regulators – are presumably similar in the two legal systems. Consequent-
ly, self-regulation is a more attractive opportunity in countries with Anglo-Saxon 
legal systems.
The authors also analyse the results with multinomial probit models, using the 
case of alcohol regulation. Their results confirm that there is a higher prevalence 
of self-regulation in countries with Anglo-Saxon legal systems than in continental 
countries of similar size and level of development.
The only exception in the analysis is the block of former socialist countries. Here 
the rate of self-regulation is particularly low, especially if their continental legal 
system is also taken into account. The authors explain this finding by claiming that 
there were strongly populist governments in power during the transition period, 
and inexperience in self-regulation also implied that the information advantage of 
self-regulation would not have been too strong either.
The other empirical example is the comparison of the progressive era of the 
United States and the New Deal. In the progressive era at the end of 19th century, 
the role of centralised regulation was significant, but self-regulatory institutions 
strengthened with the New Deal. The authors argue, this is explained by two factors. 
On the one hand, the progressive era was fundamentally characterised by stability, 
but after the Great Depression, uncertainty had strengthened. On the other hand, 
the perceived conflict between corporations and consumers was greater in the pro-
gressive era than in the New Deal, when exit from the Depression was a common 
goal. Table 4 summarises the studies presented in this section.
86 Balázs Muraközy–Pál Valentiny
Factors influencing the efficiency of self-regulation
In this section, based on the presented literature, we summarise the factors that 
influence the efficiency of self-regulation.
Information asymmetry between the stakeholders of the industry and the regu-
latory authority • Policy materials on self-regulation primarily identify information 
advantage for the industry as the most important advantage of self-regulation (for 
example, OFT [2009]). Interestingly, information advantage is attributed an explic-
it role only in some of the articles dealing with the issue. This argument formally 
appears in the model of Gehrig–Jost [1995], where the self-regulatory organisation 
precisely monitors the companies’ cost function, but the regulatory authority knows 
only the distribution thereof. The model demonstrates that when information is 
asymmetric, self-regulation can result in higher welfare than classical regulation.
In the model of Grajzl-Murrel [2007], the informational advantage of self-regu-
latory organisations arises in a property rights theory framework. Here, information 
advantage means that after the development of general regulations, a self-regulatory 
organisation can fine tune the regulation – in accordance with the changes in the 
environment – with lower expenses. The more fine-tuning is needed, that is, the 
more uncertainties exist concerning the exact parameters of the regulation dur-
ing the creation of the original law, the higher the information advantage for the 
self-regulatory organisation.
TABLE 4 • The self-regulatory and classical models in the context of institutional system
Study Approach
The objective function of  
the regulator Main result
Kranton [2003] dynamic  
game
total profit of the industry In order to achieve high quality equilibrium, restricted 
competition might be needed
Núñez [2001] dynamic  
game
reputation of the self- 
regulatory organisation
The regulator investigates too rarely and does not always 
disclose the results of investigations to the public; it helps if 
there is also a regulatory authority running in parallel




reputation of the self- 
regulatory organisation
If the company can corrupt the self-regulatory organisation 
that can reduce the probability of investigations, but 
a corrupt self-regulatory organisation is still better than no 





profit of the self-regulatory 
organisation
The competition of more profit-oriented self-regulatory 
organisations leads to too few investigations in comparison 





profit of the self-regulatory 
organisation or total profit of  
the industry
The frequency of investigations performed by a profit-





total profit of the industry Higher uncertainty, lower polarisation of interests, and 
stronger populism of the government are in the favour of 
a self-regulatory organisation, in contrast to the 
governmental regulator
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Market power • The potential increase of corporate market power is often con-
sidered as the most important disadvantage of self-regulation. This problem can 
take two forms. One of the dangers can be that the organisation established for the 
cooperation of companies can facilitate collusion in terms of pricing, be it in the 
form of open cartels or tacit collusion. The micromodels examined in the chapter 
however grasp this phenomenon in a sense that if companies can jointly decide 
about a particular dimension of the product, then this decision in itself – without 
collusion on prices – significantly increases the market power of the companies.
This question received a lot of attention in the article of Leland [1979]. Leland 
demonstrates that a self-regulatory organisation maximizes its profits in a way that 
it stipulates a higher than socially optimal quality threshold. The same result is pro-
vided by a more general model of Shaked–Sutton [1981]. Gehrig–Jost [1995] also 
emphasises that the social cost of self-regulation is the increase of market power.
The model of DeMarzo et al. [2005] addresses mostly the problem whether it is 
sufficient for the development of a monopoly if industrial stakeholders, who exist 
within the framework of a single self-regulatory organisation, decide about quali-
ty – that is, they decide about the frequency of investigations for financial service 
providers included in the model.
Kranton’s [2003] study approaches the problem from another perspective and 
points out exactly that a high quality equilibrium cannot even arise if the self-reg-
ulatory organisation founded on voluntary cooperation is not stable, and if the 
companies do not have adequate market power.
Andersson–Skogh [2003] reach a similar conclusion as well, and they draw some 
important policy conclusions. They argue that in the case of strongly experience 
goods such as, for example, insurance markets, the judicial enforcement of contracts 
can be extremely costly. Therefore, authorities do not necessarily have to step up 
against self-regulatory organisations even in cases when they significantly reduce 
competition; often it is enough to ease entry.
The relationship of the self-regulatory organisation and the governmental regu-
lator • Most of the studies dealing with self-regulation in general regard the self-reg-
ulatory organisation and the governmental regulator as substitutes, that is, they 
examine under what condition it is optimal to replace one with the other. More 
recent research however often pose the question: To what extent is the parallel 
functioning of two regulators desirable? Whether, in case of parallel functioning, 
the advantages of both regulators can prevail, that is, the better information of in-
dustrial stakeholders can be harnessed without the increase of market power, or 
quite contrarily, it is the disadvantages of two solutions that prevail?
According to DeMarzo et al. [2005], the two types of regulators complement each 
other. Their model shows that in the financial markets, the threat of control by the 
central regulator increases the investigation activity of a jointly-owned self-regulatory 
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organisation, because in this way, lower operation costs must be paid by the consumer. 
Similar result was reached in the model of DeMarzo et al. [2005], where the parallel 
functioning of regulatory authority motivates the self-regulatory organisation con-
cerned about its reputation to perform investigations more frequently. Reiffen–Robe 
[2011] shows that this effect does not manifest itself in the case of profit-oriented 
self-regulatory organisations, as their frequency of investigations is already too high.
The number and type of self-regulatory organisations • It is evident from the liter-
ature that the number, internal functioning and objective function of self-regulatory 
organisations highly influences the efficiency of self-regulation.
Shaked–Sutton [1981] study first what effect the appearance of two “professions” 
has. According to the results of the study it is important to distinguish between the 
case when the second profession decides about its own quality threshold, and the 
case when the first profession determines the quality threshold for the new pro-
fession as well. In the first case, the new profession may define too high a quality 
threshold, while in the latter case, the quality threshold can be too low because of 
rent-maximisation by the original profession.
In the models of Núñez [2001] and [2007], the goal of a self-regulatory organ-
isation is the improvement of its own reputation. To this end, the self-regulatory 
organisation may perform too few investigations, and might often not disclose the 
result of the investigation so as to protect the reputation of the organisation.
Reiffen–Robe [2011] compared the functioning of profit-oriented self-regulatory 
organisations and the ones in the joint property of service providers. The profit-ori-
ented self-regulatory organisation investigates more frequently and introduces more 
innovations than the jointly-owned self-regulatory organisation, and therefore, is 
close to the social optimum. However, according to the results of Caglio–Pescatori 
[2012], the competition of profit-oriented self-regulatory organisations reduces the 
number of investigations.
SUMMARY
This paper presents a long line of regulatory alternatives, which go beyond straight-
forward government regulation. It demonstrates that the great variety of real-life 
market situations and the numerous available regulatory techniques have resulted 
in all kinds of regulatory solutions, most of which consist of some combination of 
various regulatory regimes. The discussion was restricted to various observed forms 
and variants of self-regulation and co-regulation especially the most prevalent ones, 
and those that incorporate some elements of other regulatory techniques such as 
the use of some market mechanisms, information provision agreements, etc.
Contrasting the use of each type of regulation against the legal systems, we saw 
that legislation based on the continental legal system was characterised more by 
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centralised law-making and central regulation (case law in the Anglo-Saxon legal 
system entailed more uncertainty), and the Anglo-Saxon legal system provided more 
opportunities for the development of decentralised regulatory forms. Besides gov-
ernmental regulation, the widespread use of self- and co-regulation formed an inte-
gral part in the decentralised (also called as “soft law”) framework of Anglo-Saxon 
legal systems. These regulatory forms later served as examples for nations all over 
the world. At the same time, in the Anglo-Saxon countries, one can observe some 
temporal fluctuations in the demand for regulation as well as in the relationship 
between government regulation and self-regulation.
A more substantial review of the quality of regulations enabled a more in-depth 
analysis of regulations in terms of transparency, consultation mechanisms, institu-
tional solutions, monitoring and progress checks. The process, which started in the 
‘70s in the United States, have increasingly spread to other countries since the ‘80s, 
then use of impact assessment has been articulated by OECD recommendations, 
and they have become incorporated into the practice of the European Union as well.
By examining the various practices of self-regulation, we can establish that 
self-regulation often takes place in order to avoid governmental regulation and af-
ter significant shock events. In larger, more heterogeneous sectors, self-regulation is 
harder to apply, as it is easier for companies to evade it. Due to the costs of self-reg-
ulation, often external – economic, social, regulatory – incentives were needed to 
launch a regulation. The analysed cases of co-regulation suggest that regulation can 
be socially beneficial even if regulation defines the aims, but not the steps leading 
to it. For traditional regulations it is required that the aims should be clear, the ef-
fect of used means should be known, and sufficient resources should be available 
for monitoring and enforcement. If, however, the problem to be regulated is overly 
complex, and its details can hardly be known, or the objectives of the regulation are 
too diverse, co-regulation or self-regulation might be an appropriate choice. The 
feasibility of finally selected methods should not be considered in themselves, but 
they should be set against other viable alternatives.
The acceptance of self-regulation has especially weakened as a result of the 
2008 crisis. Stiglitz cites Greenspan, who waivered in his faith in the opportunity of 
self-regulation and the rationalisation of market behaviour (Stiglitz [2009]). None-
theless, others contend that the crisis provides an opportunity for the strengthening 
of self-regulation, especially in that sector which raises the most objections, and 
has triggered the most direct regulatory interventions, namely: the financial sector 
(Omarova [2011], Schwartz [2011]). According to the recommendations, there are 
two things that self-regulation can solve better than governmental regulation. One 
of them is the timely acquisition of market information, and another is the recog-
nition and management of risks. According to Omarova, self-regulation, or specif-
ically, co-regulation are the most appropriate methods to mitigate systemic risks. 
To this end, mutual self-insurance should be made compulsory for companies in 
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the financial sector, so as to promote a sense of “common identity” between them. 
This system could fulfil a missing regulatory function in a complex, innovative and 
quickly changing industry, in accordance with – and as a complement to – existing 
governmental regulations. However, the main current of events following the crisis 
has demonstrably led to the prominence of governmental regulatory tasks, besides 
self-regulation, in certain areas (auditing, credit rating).
The diversity of motivations of self-regulation and the heterogeneity of institu-
tional arrangements have led to the elaboration of various theoretical frameworks. 
The literature has pointed out that self-regulation can primarily function in those are-
as where the interests of corporations and society coincide: in this way self-regulation 
is not efficient in dealing with significant market power, but can help resolve asym-
metric information problems. The literature investigating self-regulation demon-
strates a fundamental conversion, namely, that self-regulation involves information 
advantage in comparison to classical regulation, but at the same time, it also gives an 
opportunity for companies to function in a way that may result in a deadweight loss.
The theoretical literature also makes it clear that the aim of self-regulatory or-
ganisations often diverges from those of the industry overall, and this is heavily in-
fluenced by organisational functioning, namely, by the roles companies play in the 
organisation, whether they are profit-oriented, and what role reputation-building 
takes in their aims. The literature has also examined the question when competition 
is beneficial between self-regulatory organisations, and when self-regulatory organ-
isations and classical regulatory authorities complement or substitute each other.
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EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN 
HUNGARY: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH  
AND APPLICATIONS*
This paper surveys Hungarian applications of Empirical Industrial Organization. The ar-
ticles and methods are grouped primarily based on the complexity of the data used, 
starting with the simplest. The paper also discusses how the results can be applied in 
the main areas of competition policy and economic regulation, in supporting analy-
ses of market definitions, and in evaluating market power and the effects of market 
behaviour.
INTRODUCTION
This paper surveys the Hungarian literature in the area of Empirical Industrial 
Organisation (empirical IO for short), focusing especially on the possible practical 
applications of the results. In this case, “Hungarian” means that I present articles 
analysing Hungarian markets; in practice this also means that I only survey papers 
written by Hungarian authors.1 These articles use empirical IO methods to varying 
degrees, and this is represented in my discussion of them.
A paper is considered to fall under the cateogry of empirical IO if it not only 
describes a market using basic statistics, but also aims to test hypotheses, based on 
economic models, analysing the relationships between various variables (usually, 
but not always via regression analysis). It is of course not possible to exactly define 
the boundaries of empirical IO; based on their broader topics and methods, there 
are many papers that would fit the bill in labour economics (for example, Brown 
et al. [2006]), agricultural economics (e.g. Fertő [2009]), economic geography (e.g. 
Békés and Harasztosi [2013]) or the economics of international trade (e.g. Békés and 
  * I am especially grateful to my previous co-authors Dávid Farkas, Gábor Kézdi and Gábor Koltay, 
who have, over the past years, greatly influenced the ideas presented here. I would also like to thank 
András Kiss, László Kóczy, Balázs Muraközy, Péter Nagy, Zoltán Pápai, and also editors Ferenc Kiss 
and Pál Valentiny for their invaluable comments on a previous version of this paper. The lists of 
references, compiled by Éva Bálint, appearing annually in the book series “Verseny és szabályozás” 
[Competition and Regulation] were very helpful. I have attempted to mention all relevant papers 
since 2005, and apologise for any omissions. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the 
LP-004/2010 “Lendület” [Momentum] programme.
 1 For empirical IO papers by Hungarian authors regarding non-Hungarian markets, see for exam-
ple Paizs [2009] and Koltay [2012a]. I currently have no knowledge of exclusively non-Hungarian 
authors focusing on a Hungarian market.
 EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN HUNGARY 97
Muraközy [2012]). However, these papers are not traditionally classified as empirical 
IO, and are therefore not discussed in this survey.
Empirical IO papers aim to reveal the relationships governing market behaviour, 
using empirical methods within an economic framework. They can thereby confirm 
or refute either various hypotheses arising in everyday or regulatory thinking, or 
the results of theoretical models. It is important to note, however, that the method 
employed by the analyst will always remain arbitrary to some extent, and will rely on 
simplifying assumptions and the choice of theoretical model, which can influence 
the results. It is impossible, even in theory, to find a universally applicable method 
or functional form to test; these must always be determined by the available data 
and the trends apparent in it, as well as the research questions. And finally, we can 
only trust the robustness of the results (and we can never be 100 per cent sure), if 
as many methods as possible point to the same conclusion.
There can be several practical applications of the results of empirical IO, in the 
fields of competition policy and economic regulation among others. These applica-
tions typically concern one or more of the following three main questions.
1. Relevant market definition: the analysis of substitutability between potentially 
competing products and thereby the definition of the (product or geographical) 
market within which firms exert effective competitive pressure on each other.
2. Evaluation of market power: the analysis of whether a given firm is able to maintain 
a price that is above the assumed (so-called effective) competitive price level.
3. Evaluation of the effects of market behaviour: the analysis of how the behaviour 
(for example, an agreement or merger) of certain firms affected or is expected to 
affect market outcomes, competitors and consumers.
There are serious microeconomic considerations behind each of these – both theo-
retically and practically – relevant questions, which are however outside the scope 
of this survey.2
The following chapter provides a short, methodological and historical review of 
empirical IO in general. Then, I survey empirical papers based on the kind of data 
they use, starting with the simplest.3 I do this firstly because the available data greatly 
influences the type and depth of the research questions that can be answered, and 
secondly because the structure of the data essentially provides a grouping of the 
applicable empirical methods as well.
 2 For further details and references, I recommend Bishop and Walker’s [2010] book, which com-
prehensively discusses the theoretical background, the suitable empirical methods and several 
competition policy applications related to these topics. 
 3 From a historical perspective, the models could be presented starting from demand estimation, 
however, in practice the quality of the data is key; and it is especially important to establish the 
limitations of the simpler methods as soon as possible.
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1. Analyses based on price data only: price data is the easiest to access, as it is 
often publicly available or accessible from statistical databases (like the Central 
Statistical Office, KSH). The papers usually apply time series analyses. It is rare 
that these methods alone lead to conclusive results, but they can provide useful 
illustrative evidence for questions relating to market definition or market power.
2. Analyses based on price data and simple statistical indicators: price data can be 
complemented with data concerning the number of firms on the market or other 
aggregate concentration measures, sometimes even from publicly available sources.4 
These analyses typically use reduced form cross-sectional or panel estimation methods. 
It is both an advantage and a disadvantage of such methods that they examine the 
relationship between market performance and market structure directly, without 
deriving it from an underlying economic model in a strict sense. These analyses 
typically concern market power, and especially the evaluation of market behaviour.
3. Analyses based on price data and detailed quantity data: data on demand or 
costs is in most cases only available from firms or public institutions, therefore it 
is rarely used for research purposes only. If such data is available, a multitude of 
regression estimation methods can be used, including structural models. These 
methods typically make it possible to build theoretically grounded models based 
on empirical observations, or at least test hypotheses related to them. They can 
be used to analyse all three types of questions.
I will be very brief in introducing the theoretical models and econometric expres-
sions and methods used in the surveyed papers. The interested reader will find the 
detailed descriptions in the referenced papers themselves.
A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION
Empirical IO aims to analyse the Structure-Conduct-Performance (the so-called SCP) 
paradigm. Research in this field, which began in the 1950s, initially took a rather 
simplified view of these relationships, assuming that market structure, and the 
technological and entry barriers behind it, completely determined price, as well as 
other variables important for consumer welfare. Consequently the first empirical 
papers analysed the causal relationship between some measure of concentration (like 
the number of firms, or an index calculated from market shares), which described 
market structure, and prices; typically across several industries.5 Such analyses led 
 4 Sometimes data is available on margins or similar performance measures (such as profitability or 
innovations), instead of prices. The analyses can be conducted in a similar way and I refer to all 
these measures, for the sake of simplicity, as “prices”. 
 5 These are sometimes called cross-industry analyses.
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to many erronous results, mainly due to the endogeneity between the dependent 
and the independent variables (that is, that causality runs both ways between struc-
ture and performance), and the fact that it is difficult for a competition agency, for 
example, to draw practical (or policy-related) conclusions about markets or market 
behaviour based on comparisons between different industries.6 Analyses took a new 
direction in the second half of the 1980s, and new empirical IO was born.7 These 
empirical investigations are firmly grounded in theoretical models of industrial or-
ganisation, which use modern economic (primarily, but not exclusively game theo-
retical) tools to describe firms’ behaviour. New empirical IO analyses and structural 
empirical IO models are therefore often used as synonyms, but this is misleading: 
new empirical IO is part of a wider family, since many modern empirical IO papers 
estimate reduced form regressions. Over the past years, confidence in the “superior-
ity” of structural models has been shaken in several areas,8 and these is an ongoing 
debate among leading experts about whether, in some cases, it is sufficient or even 
better to use reduced form models.9
New empirical IO focuses primarily on analyses within given markets, and there-
fore leads to clearer and more easily applicable conclusions. More specific ques-
tions also enable the researcher to control for other independent variables, which 
eliminates several econometric problems; this, however, requires a lot of data. The 
specificity of the analysed questions often reverses the usual relationship between 
theory and applications: new methods used in empirical IO and published as re-
search results are often developed because new problems were encountered when 
analysing a given market – for example, when consulting with agencies or firms in 
competition policy or regulatory cases.
ANALYSES BASED ON PRICE DATA
The academic community is often sceptical of empirical analyses based solely on 
price data, since the researcher is usually unable to use and control for the reac-
tions to price changes.10 It would be wrong to completely discount price analyses, 
however, because often price data is all that is available to the researcher, and they 
 6 Schmalensee [1989] provides a comprehensive overview of this.
 7 This was first discussed by Bresnahan [1989], while Berry and Reiss [2007], and Doraszelski and 
Pakes [2007] provide more recent surveys. Davis and Garces [2010] give a detailed discussion of 
empirical methods and competition policy applications, mainly with European examples. 
 8 See Weinberg [2011] and his references about the “errors” made in the popular area of merger 
simulations. 
 9 See Einav and Levin [2010] and Nevo and Whinston [2010] for the debate in the Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectivesben.
10 See Werden and Froeb [1993] for a thorough (though perhaps too strong) critique.
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can be useful, for example, in establishing stylised facts; these can form the basis for 
hypotheses which may be investigated with more advanced methods later.
It is worth mentioning an empirical method which typically relies on price data, 
even though, in itself, it seldom leads to scientifically valuable results: the correlation 
between the prices of two products or firms. If two products belong to the same 
(relevant) market, then the correlation between their prices over time is expected to 
be high; otherwise, an opportunity for arbitrage would arise, the customers would 
take advantage of it, and the relative price would return to the equilibrium.11 The 
stability of the relative price can also be investigated using econometric methods, 
so-called stationarity tests. The analysis of the “closeness of competition” between 
given firms can also be illustrated using correlation analysis.12 The main drawback 
of correlation analyses is that there is no fixed threshold above which correlation 
can be said to be high enough; furthermore, it is important to control for factors 
(such as common costs), which can cause false correlation. This is usually achieved 
by differencing the time series.
The relationship between prices at different levels of a product chain is a well-re-
searched topic. The typical approach is to conduct a so-called price-transmission 
analysis, which determines the pass-through by a downstream vertical level (re-
tail, for example) of the price changes implemented by an upstream vertical level 
(wholesale, to continue the example). The main idea is that in the case of perfect 
competition, the pass-through for costs should stand at 100 per cent, and therefore 
any lower value indicates market power at the lower vertical level. The possible 
asymmetry of price transmission can also be analysed; if there is market power 
present, then the retail price may respond more to an increase in wholesale prices 
than to an identical decrease.
These hypotheses can be tested using regressions on the differenced time series 
of the price changes in the following simplified form:
Δpt = α + β1 × Δwt × D+ + β2 × Δwt × D– + εt,
where pt and wt are the retail and wholesale prices at time t, and D+ and D– are dum-
my variables, taking on a value of 1 if the wholesale price increased or decreased 
in the given period, and 0 otherwise. The β1 and β2 parameters shows the level of 
transmission, and the hypotheses to test are H0: βi = 1 (perfect transmission), and 
H0: β1 = β2 (symmetric transmission).
Farkas et al. [2009] test these hypotheses for the wholesale and retail prices of 
gasonline. The level of price transmission is 0.98 for price increases, and 0.97 for 
11 A stable relative price / sufficiently high correlation is not, in itself, enough evidence of belonging 
to the same relevant market, however. 
12 These methods are demonstrated for gasoline markets in Chapter 5 of Farkas et al. [2009]. 
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decreases; these coefficients do not differ significantly from each other, but they do 
from 1. Based on these results, the hypothesis of asymmetric price transmission can 
definitely be rejected. The hypothesis of complete (100 per cent) price transmission 
can be rejected in a statistical sense, but 98 per cent transmission can effectively be 
considered perfect.13 These results therefore show no market power at the retail level.
The process of price adaptation can also be described using more complex, dy-
namic models, where the lagged dependent and independent variables, as well as 
the so-called error correction factors appear on the right-hand side of the estimated 
equation. Such error correction models provide a more detailed picture of price 
relationships, and enable the speed of transmission to be measured.14
An econometric method is also available to measure which vertical level affects 
which level’s prices. The so-called Granger causality test may be capable of achieving 
this goal, using methods of time series analysis similar to those above. However, it 
is important to handle the results with care when interpreting them as evidence of 
market power, as there is no underlying microeconomic model behind the hypothe-
ses. Popovics and Tóth [2006] use this method in a detailed analysis of the Hungarian 
milk product chain, looking at the prices at the production, processing and retail 
levels, and conclude that the price at the processing level Granger-causes both the 
production and the retail level prices (and the reverse does not hold), which they 
interpret as evidence of market power at the processing level.
ANALYSES BASED ON PRICE DATA AND SIMPLE STATISTICAL 
INDICATORS
There are several motivations for analysing the relationships between price data 
and structural measures. Firstly, they address one of the main issues of the struc-
ture-conduct-performance paradigm directly – namely, how market structure de-
termines various performance indicators. Secondly, it is an important practical 
consideration that such analyses can be relatively easily conducted using publicly 
available databases. And finally, the results of such empirical investigations can 
typically still be understood by a professional audience of non-economists (like 
lawyers and decision-makers), and their results are therefore easier to implement 
than those presented later.
13 Especially considering that the price of gasoline is available at most at a precision of one decimal, 
while the largest weekly wholesale price change is not greater than 15 forints. 
14 The paper by Farkas et al. [2009] conducts a simplified form of this analysis for the case shown 
in the previous paragraph, but the results changed only very slightly. Such so-called vector error 
correction models (also referred to as ECM or VECM models) are especially widespread in agri-
cultural economics, see for example Bakucs and Fertő [2009].
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Price-concentration analyses
A price-concentration analysis is a widely used method, which seeks to establish 
the relationship between prices and the level of concentration in a given industry. 
If there is a significant, positive relationship between price and concentration, then 
the concentration measure used may be a good indicator of market power, that is, 
if the level of concentration in the industry is high or is increasing (due to a merger, 
for example), then the probability of competitive concerns arising is higher.
The simple estimated equation in a price-concentration study is typically the 
following:
price = f(concentration, controls).
The name of the method is somewhat restrictive in that it is not only the price that 
can be explained by concentration, but also the margin or other performance indi-
cators.15 The use of the margin is typically recommended (although of course the 
data does not always allow for this), firstly because the structural behavioural equa-
tions derived from theoretical IO models usually refer to the margin (competitive 
interactions are better represented in the margin), and secondly because certain 
econometric problems, like endogeneity and in the case of time series, stationarity, 
can be better handled.16
Regression analyses are typically conducted on cross-sectional databases, making 
use of the cross-sectional variation in levels of concentration. Therefore, data on 
several separate markets is required; often, geographically separated markets are 
good candidates.17 Of course, if there is variation over time in the concentration 
measures, panel methods can also be employed; this, however, partly overlaps with 
a method I will discuss later in the chapter.
Looking to the explanatory variables, there is no clear-cut answer concerning the 
correct concentration measure to use. C1, C4 and the Herfindahl–Hirschmann-index 
(HHI) are often used in the literature.18 The results are easier to interpret if the num-
ber of competitors on the market is used as a concentration measure:19 the C4 meas-
ure is insensitive to the merger of the second and third largest firm, for example, while 
the change in the HHI is difficult to interpret. We can achieve even more useful re-
15 Halpern and Muraközy analyse in this book the relationship between Hungarian firms’ R&D activity 
and various concentration measures using a regression methodology, and find an upside-down U-curve.
16 A time series of prices is usually non-stationary, while a time series of margins is more often so. 
17 It is important that we observe variation in prices. For example, if supermarkets employ uniform 
prices in their outlets, then it doesn’t help that concentration is different in various regional mar-
kets – the price-concentration analysis cannot be conducted. 
18 The Ci measure is the simple sum of the market shares of the largest i firms, while the HHI is the 
sum of the squares of (some type of ) market shares of all the firms on the market. 
19 In this case the hypothesis to test is a negative relationship: we expect that a decrease in the number 
of competing firms on the market leads to a price increase.
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sults if the presence of the larger competitors is coded using dummy variables, as this 
makes it easier to handle the possible non-linear effects of changes in concentration.20
Control variables are variables that also influence the price or the margin, but 
whose effect we wish to partial out, in order to answer the main question: how 
the level of concentration in itself influences the price. There are two basic types 
of control variables: demand and supply controls. For example, the size of a given 
regional market (the number of inhabitants), or its purchasing power are demand 
controls, while the price of main inputs (like labour or real estate), or the density of 
competitors in the given region are supply controls.21
There are two factors that can bias the estimates: possibly omitted variables, and 
the endogeneity of the relationship between price and concentration. Unfortunately, 
typically neither problem can be eliminated completely (often due to a lack of data), 
but this does not mean that the results are meaningless; it is worth verifying them us-
ing multiple methods, testing their robustness. One way to alleviate the endogeneity 
concern is to use two-step estimation, with the first step investigating the effect of 
demand controls on the density of competitors, and the second step estimating the 
effect of this density on prices or margins, using an instrumental variable approach.22
Farkas et al. [2009] conduct a price-concentration study for regional retail gas-
oline markets, estimating the relationship between the margin and the number of 
firms. Using various specifications, a significant negative relationship is found, how-
ever, it is not significant in an economic sense: the presence of a further competitor 
decreases price by 0.3-0.6 forints, less than 1 per cent of the average retail price.
Price-concentration studies can be combined with the price transmission analy-
ses presented in the previous chapter, to investigate whether the level of concentra-
tion or the composition of firms influenced the level of price transmission.23 Farkas et 
al. [2009], in the analysis of the gasonline market mentioned above, find no such re-
lationship between the level or asymmetry of transmission and the number of firms; 
Koltay [2012b] on the other hand analyses the pricing of each network of stations 
separately and finds a small degree of asymmetric transmission for certain networks.
The price-concentration studies discussed above may give the impression that 
the data limitations can be overcome, this is however often not the case for re-
searchers: the data may be available, but it constitutes a business secret. Typical 
applications in this field are so-called bidding studies, where the markets are the 
20 It is very likely, for example, that if the number of competing firms decreases from three to two, 
there is a larger effect on price than if it decreases from seven to six.
21 The strength of competition may be different, for example, if four competitors in a given area each 
have one, or if they each have five outlets. 
22 This is the method employed by Békés et al. [2011].
23 The hypothesis is that in a market with many participants, competition is close to perfect, and 
therefore pass-through is (close to) 100 per cent, but in two-firm markets, for example, pass-
through may be lower, which could indicate market power.
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separate auctions or tenders, and the final price is compared to the number of firms 
submitting bids, or dummy variables showing their presence. This method is often 
used to measure the strength of competition between competitors and the pressure 
they exert on each other on so-called bidding markets.24
Impact assessments
The other main method measuring the result of changes in stuctural indicators identi-
fies this effect using not the differences between markets, but the actual changes over 
time within a given market. Since these changes typically relate to entries and exits, the 
methods are sometimes called event studies, or shock analyses. However, in a broader 
sense they belong to the family of impact assessments used in many policy areas.25
The estimation strategy most often used for panel data in this area is based on 
the so-called difference-in-differences (or simply “diff-in-diff ” or DID) method. This 
quasi-experimental approach applies when the researcher is able to observe vari-
ous units (like markets and their prices) over time, some of which were exposed to 
some  “treatment” (like an entry or a merger), and some of which were not. There-
fore the effect of the given event (treatment) can be identified from the difference 
between the treated and control group (controlling, of course, for other factors). 
A panel database enables the use of cross-sectional and time fixed effects, which 
diminishes the omitted variable problem as well.
A paper by Csorba et al. [2011] applies a difference-in-differences approach to 
analyse the effects of two 2007 mergers, Agip-Esso and Lukoil-Jet, on retail prices in 
Hungarian local gasoline markets. The paper discusses the predictions of several IO 
models, for example that the prices of the merging companies increase more than 
those of their competitors; or that the price effect is larger on markets where the 
merging parties are each other’s competitors. The fact that the two mergers took 
place almost simultaneously makes the identification of the effects more difficult, 
however, the variance in the companies’ presence on the specific local markets 
enables the separation and estimation of the various effects. The analysis confirms 
several theoretically predicted asymmetric effects, but the ex post price effect of 
the mergers is minimal, although positive (according to the results, the price effect 
of each merger was smaller than 1 per cent).
Such models can be used to evaluate the ex post welfare effects of various policy 
interventions (in the previous example, the merger clearance decisions), and agen-
24 Csorba [2008] discusses such a study in detail for the case of a Hungarian merger. 
25 These methods are especially widespread in labour economics, for example. The “In focus” chap-
ter of the 2012 edition of “The Hungarian Labour Market” concerned this topic only (see Kézdi 
[2012]). Imbens and Wooldridge [2009] provide a thorough methodological survey. 
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cies can use them to assess planned mergers or interventions by analysing events 
from the past.26 The method is also suitable for evaluating smaller scale changes, 
caused by specific market players: Horváth et al. [2013], for example, use a differ-
ence-in-differences method to assess how the prices of flats which participated in 
a large energy efficiency-increasing renovation changed compared to similar flats 
that did not. Their results show a treatment effect of close to 10 per cent in flats 
belonging to the renovated building.
ANALYSES BASED ON PRICE AND QUANTITY DATA
The typical area of empirical analysis between prices and quantities is demand esti-
mation, and especially the estimation of own and cross-price elasticities, since these 
have many applications in competition policy and regulation. The most well-known 
application is the Hypothetical Monopolist Test and its variants (like Critical Loss 
Analysis), used in relevant market definition:27 if the own-price elasticity estimated 
for a product or group of products is not low enough, then a hypothetical monop-
olist of this product group would not be able to profitably raise prices; therefore, 
the relevant market should be wider. Further products should be included in the 
hypothetically monopolised market until the repeated demand estimation yields 
a sufficiently low elasticity.
It is worth noting that due to a lack of data and the difficulties of estimation the 
need may arise to measure consumer behaviour directly, typically using survey meth-
ods. While these methods are not usually considered standard tools of empirical IO, 
their results can be widely used, especially in practical applications.28
26 See, for example, Ashenfelter et al. [2006], which discusses the probably most well-known merger 
(Staples–Office Depot), where these econometric methods were used and seriously debated in 
American courts. 
27 The test is also called the HMT-test, or the SSNIP-test. See Muraközy [2010], which discusses 
hypothesis testing in telecommunication markets, for demand estimation methods used to imple-
ment the HMT and other tests. Bölcskei [2010] also surveys research questions arising in relation 
to telecommunications markets, and presents the empirical methods developed to answer them, 
as well as results for various countries. 
28 Édes et al. [2010] looked at the substitution between fixed and mobile telephone service providers, 
among other methods also using elasticites, pointing out the asymmetry in the direction of substi-
tution. Lőrincz and Nagy [2011] used the results of a consumer survey to analyse the components 
of switching costs for various telecommunications services (fixed and mobile telephony, internet), 
and estimated their size. Pápai et al. [2011] conducted a critical loss analysis to test whether the 
package deals offered by telecommunications companies could be considered a separate relevant 
market. Finally, Szolnoki and Tóth [2008] provide an example for energy markets. The authors 
estimated a function for the switching behaviour of consumers of electricity, based on a household 
survey, and then used it, together with other market data, to calibrate a theoretical model.
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Classic demand estimation
A regression for demand estimation takes the following simplified functional form:
qi = f(pi, p–i, Xi) + εi,
where qi is the quantity demanded of product i, pi is product i’s price, p–i is the price 
charged by potential competitors, and the X matrix contains the necessary control var-
iables (income, or other demand- or supply-side controls, for example). The equation 
can be estimated for several functional forms; the choice between them must be deter-
mined by the data and the assumptions of the model used. A common choice (which 
still, however, needs to be justified to some extent by the analyst) is to use the varia-
bles’ logarithms. In this case, the parameters estimated for pi directly provide the own-
price elasticity. Observations may be available for different consumers or consumer 
groups (or even settlements) in a give time period (cross-sectional form), for the same 
consumers over time (time series form), or for a combination of both (panel form).
As already discussed in the case of price-concentration analyses, the endogeneity 
between the dependent and independent variables can bias the estimates. While this 
problem was slightly less acute for price-concentration analyses where the structural 
indicators on the right-hand side changed quite slowly over time, it is very important 
in the case of demand estimation. One way to tackle this identification problem is 
to use the previously mentioned instrumental variable method. However, it is not 
easy to find good instruments (and good data for them), and there are consequently 
only very few Hungarian demand estimation analyses to be found.
Nagy et al. [2012] use a well-designed stepwise method to estimate the demand 
(elasticity) for fixed-line telephones. The demand estimation method takes advantage 
of the fact that subscribers faced different prices depending on whether they were lo-
cated in Magyar Telekom’s or Invitel’s area of service, and this price difference was ex-
ogenous, since the consumers’ current demand could not have influenced the assign-
ment of concessions 20 years prior. Using this fact, the paper first calculates the differ-
ence in demand in settlements in Magyar Telekom and Invitel areas that are otherwise 
similar, second, estimates the price difference between the two, and finally calculates 
the arc elasticity of demand using the first two results. Using cross-sectional data from 
2011, the estimated elasticity is low for both residential and business customers (be-
tween –0.1 and –0.2), far from the critical elasticity. Their panel estimations yield sim-
ilar results, even though this estimation is better for controlling for unobserved heter-
ogeneity between the regional markets. Based solely on the results of the demand es-
timation, one can draw the conclusion that fixed-line telephone services are a distinct 
relevant market, and the hypothesis of fixed-mobile substitution can be rejected.29
29 The authors also estimated the elasticity of demand based on a consumer survey. They expected 
the calculated elasticity to be a little higher (–0.5 was their best estimate), but even that result is 
enough to reject the hypothesis of fixed-mobile substitutability. 
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Kézdi and Csorba [2012] also estimate the relationship between price and quan-
tity data, investigating consumer lock-in in the Hungarian market for personal loans. 
The applied method is also similar to the difference-in-differences (DID) method 
introduced in the previous chapter: the authors compare the demand reactions of 
new consumers with those of old consumers, based on the assumption that the lat-
ter, who are locked in, can be considered a treated group, while the former can be 
their control group.30 The various estimation results show that the old consumers’ 
reaction to price changes is 70-80 per cent lower than that of the new consumers, 
which means that even the hypothesis of total lock-in (prohibitively high switching 
costs) cannot be rejected.
Demand estimation based on discrete choice models
One of the limitations of classic demand estimation techniques is that they hardly 
make any assumptions on the structure behind the factors influencing demand. 
Therefore, a large number of parameters must be estimated, which severely limits 
the applicability of the method. For example, if one wishes to estimate a complete 
demand system for 10 products, then, even without the control variablies, there 
would be 102 = 100 parameters to estimate, causing serious identification problems.
One solution to this problem is to use a discrete choice model, where the con-
sumers’ main choice is not how much of a given product to purchase, but which 
supplier to choose.31 Such models use a microeconomic model of consumer choice 
to derive linear demand equations. During estimation, their assumptions concern-
ing substitution patterns translate into parameter restrictions, which significantly 
decrease the number of parameters that need to be estimated. The most common 
method is to assign products to groups (high and medium quality domestic and 
import products, for example), and estimate a “common” cross-price elasticity for 
substitution between and within the groups. It is worth noting that demand esti-
mation based on discrete choice models is not the only possibility for estimating 
demand choices based on discrete choices, as demonstrated by the Hungarian pa-
pers discussed in the previous chapter. I will not discuss the further details of the 
approach based on discrete choice models, and refer the interested reader to a good 
survey provided in Muraközy [2010].
In general, the use of structural models, that is, the equations describing both 
demand and supply side behaviour are derived from theoretical models and then 
estimated, is most common in the case of estimation based on discrete choice mod-
30 In this case, for example, it was not possible to use adequate instruments, therefore the authors 
also used lagged price changes to estimate the demand reactions. 
31 The primary, but not only form of a discrete choice is when demand is either zero or one; examples 
include automobiles, or most telecommunications services and public utilities. 
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els,. I have found only one application of this type of method, in Molnár et al. [2007], 
who analyse competition in a market with differentiated products, the market for 
residential financial products.32 The paper estimates the own and cross-price elas-
ticity for various specifications, and uses these to calculate optimal margins using 
the general model of competition for the supply side. The margins observed in the 
market are then compared to the equilibrium outcomes of two specific models 
of competition (Bertrand-competition and collusion). The paper thus effectively 
measures market power on the specific markets, and finds that the level of compe-
tition is quite low in the markets for most financial products; even the hypothesis 
of collusion cannot be rejected.
There are a few more examples for demand estimation beased on discrete choic-
es: Crawford and Molnár [2008] analyse the effects of advertisements on the de-
mand (and its elasticity) for Hungarian mobile telephone services, while Tánczos 
and Török [2007] present an application in the area of transportation economics by 
modelling the flow of traffic between Budapest and Győr.33 Koltay [2012a] studies 
the German market, estimating the effect on consumer choices of the introduc-
tion of an eco-friendly brand in the market for hygiene products. He investigates 
how the results conform to various theoretical models describing the demand for 
common goods.
Analysing the supply side
Although they do not, in a strict sense, concern the relationship between prices (or 
some other performance indicator) and market structure or market behaviour, it is 
still worth discussing studies estimating production and cost functions, as well as 
production efficiences. The empirical methods employed typically seek to explain 
some output variable (production, cost, or productivity indicator) using the level 
of various inputs (or their price). The estimated equation is typically derived from 
the first order conditions of the firm’s (or industry’s) profit maximisation problem. 
There are only a handful of such papers in Hungary: Reiff et al. [2002] estimate 
production functions and various productivity indicators at an industry level, while 
Bisztray et al. [2010] estimate firms’ energy efficiency in the case of water utilities.
32 Paizs [2009] also estimates a structural model, however, he estimates the reaction functions of 
a specific theoretical model of competition, and not the equations for optimal behavioural in 
a discrete choice model. Furthermore, the paper estimates a model for the competition between 
European countries in determining excise taxes, which is a cross-market interaction. 
33 Édes et al. [2011] provide a general survey of the empirical methods for analysing substitutability 
between modes of transport.
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CONCLUSION
This paper set out to survey Hungarian empirical IO analyses from the past decade, 
and also draw attention to the diversity of empirical methods that can be applied. 
The groups into which the methods have been sorted do not represent a ranking of 
quality: while it is true in general that more detailed databases enable the use of more 
complex empirical methods, this does not mean that the results will be more reliable 
(and especially not that they will be more easy to interpret in practice). Therefore 
it is important to be familiar with the various empirical methods, their advantages 
and their limitations, and to interpret the available facts according to several meth-
ods, if possible. This can be considered a type of robustness check.34 I have shown 
several cases where relatively standard (reduced form) econometric methods were 
sufficient to conduct empirical analyses which could effectively assist in rejecting 
or verifying various hypotheses important in competition policy and regulation.
Surveying the Hungarian studies in empirical IO we can also draw the interest-
ing conclusion that the majority of the authors is not or not only an academic. This 
confirms the common supposition that these studies are typically connected to 
practical application, and also that it is in institutions that are not foremost research 
facilities that authors encounter topics and databases which can be used to produce 
scientifically sound results. Four such institutions can be identified: the Regional 
Centre for Energy Policy Research (REKK), Infrapont Economic Consulting, the 
Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH) and the Central Bank of Hungary (MNB). 
We can only hope that these institutions can continue their scientific work, and that 
access to databases will improve so that in the future, research facilities can also 
focus more on modern empirical industrial organisation.
34 As one of the reviewers of this paper aptly commented: “An empirical model is like the Hungarian 
language. It can be used to tell the truth, but also to lie.”
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
COMPETITION AND R&D
Theoretical Approaches and Quantitative Results
This study is an attempt to examine and model the relationship between (the pres-
ence and intensity of ) competition and corporate level R&D expenditures. Hungarian 
firm-level and industry-level data populate the empirical models. A brief summary of 
the history of research on the much-debated competition-innovation relationship is 
also offered. Results from the earliest studies seem to suggest that stronger compe-
tition generally results in lower levels of innovation, while the empirical results that 
were born in the 1990s showed some evidence for the opposite relationship. The 
seminal model of Aghion et al. [2005] indicated an inverted-U shaped relationship 
between the intensity of competition and the level of innovation. A discussion of the 
difficulties of measuring the pertinent variables and the relationship among them is 
followed by an elaborate investigation of the shape of the relationship. Based on our 
extensive empirical results, we conclude that the inverted-U shaped relationship can 
indeed be established in Hungary at the industry-level as well as at the firm-level. We 
also demonstrate that only certain types of indicators of the presence and intensity 
of competition seem to have had a detectable relationship with the innovative in-
vestments of firms.
INTRODUCTION
In economics, an issue of great interest concerns the factors affecting economic 
growth in the long run. Since the appearance of modern growth theory, the relative 
importance of capital accumulation and productivity growth has been continuously 
debated (the latter factor, at least partially, reflecting technological development). 
Since Robert Solow started his research programme in the 1950s1, the key role of 
productivity growth has become evident. As shown by recent results, in the 20th 
century it contributed to annual average economic growth by over 1% (Abramo-
vitz–David [2001]).
The Solow model, however, assumes that technological change depends on “ex-
ogeneous” factors, that is, factors outside the model. This is true inasmuch as the 
development of science and technology depends to a great extent on phenomena 
such as the knowable nature, complexity, or interrelatedness of natural laws.
 1 Romer [1996] in Chapter 1 gives a detailed and up-to-date description of the Solow model.
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Endogeneous growth theory models, however, also take into account the fact 
that social institutions influence technological development (Aghion–Howitt [1998]). 
In market economies, technological development is attributed, above all, to the fact 
that firms decide to introduce new technologies in a decentralized way – in other 
words, they innovate. Therefore, in such economies the impact of social-economic 
institutions on technological development primarily means that institutions influ-
ence the firms’ incentives to perform R&D and introduce innovations. Among the 
features of institutions and economic environment it is most probably competition 
whose impact on innovation and growth has been most thoroughly discussed by 
economists. This was due to the strong economic intuition that monopolies and 
highly competitive firms benefit from the development of production technology 
or the introduction of new products to different degrees.
This study seeks, above all, to describe the nature of this relationship. After 
discussing some dilemmas concerning the definition of innovation, it deals with 
the logic and predictions of the key theoretical models related to the issue. Then 
it offers details of empirical methods and key results on the relationship between 
innovation and competition, followed by the empirical analysis of the relationship 
between competition and the R&D expenditures of Hungarian firms. The study 
closes with a summary of conclusions.
THE CONCEPT OF INNOVATION
The economics literature places great emphasis on differentiating between inno-
vation and research and development. Since Schumpeter’s works were published, 
innovation has been interpreted as the actual implementation of an improvement, 
be it either the market introduction of a new product or the use of a new procedure 
during production. The former is product innovation, the latter is process innovation, 
and research and development may mean the development of either a product or 
a process. In other words, R&D is an input to the innovation process; research itself, 
however, is not innovation until its results appear on the market or in the produc-
tion process (Fagerberg [2006]).
The definition of innovation given in the Community Innovation Survey, CIS of 
the European Union falls in line with the above:
• It follows that research and development (R&D) itself is not innovation but expendi-
ture on innovation. And this is not the only expenditure of this kind. Innovation inputs 
also include when a firm purchases machines to implement its innovations or when 
managers make extra efforts to prepare the introduction of new processes or products. 
What is more, it is possible that the firm itself does not perform R&D activity yet it can 
still introduce new products or services relying, for example, on technology transfer.
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This is especially true for small open economies and for countries which do 
not belong to the technology frontier. For such economies, implementing foreign 
technologies and products is a key to growth, and thus, it must be a focus of in-
novation policy. The significance of the issue is evidenced by the fact that while 
in Hungary approximately 10% of the firms that were included in the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS) performed research and development activity on a con-
tinuous basis between 2004 and 2006, more than 30% of them introduced product 
or process innovation in the same period (Halpern–Muraközy [2010]). These data 
show that in Hungary, in most cases, innovation is performed without any formal 
research and development activity. It is evident, however, that such innovations 
require resources from the managers and employees of a firm. Yet such innova-
tion efforts are not included in the R&D statistics, which means that in follower 
countries R&D statistics may significantly underestimate the actual innovation 
expenditures of firms.
THE THEORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION  
AND INNOVATION
The beginnings of research on the relationship between competition and innovation 
can be traced back, above all, to Josef Schumpeter’s (1883–1950) research. In his 
early works, Schumpeter emphasized that new innovative entrepreneurs can break 
the “inertia” or “laziness” of large companies. The market entry and subsequent 
growth of such small enterprises explain the phenomenon of economic growth. 
Schumpeter termed this process “creative destruction.”
Schumpeter’s later works focused on the economies of scale that are achieva-
ble by big businesses in research and development and innovation. The difference 
between the two approaches can be interpreted in various ways. First, it can be 
regarded as a historical change: the growth of scientific knowledge generated eco-
nomics of scale in research. Another interpretation is that the two Schumpeterian 
models describe different industries. In some industries, small firms carry innovative 
solutions (e.g. the Internet). In others, only large firms are capable of introducing 
innovations (e.g. the pharmaceutical industry), because of the high costs of intro-
ducing each innovation.
In and after the 1960s, based on Schumpeter’s concepts and parallel with the 
appearance of game theory-based industrial organization models, a number of anal-
yses have been published that examine the relationship between market structure 
and innovation with the aid of models of the strategic behaviour of firms. These 
models regard R&D as investment and, practically, do not differentiate between 
decisions on R&D and decisions on innovation. As a rule, the assumed decision 
making consists of two steps. First, a firm decides about the dimensions of its R&D 
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investment; second, it sells the new product (in case of product innovation) or, 
employing a new procedure, produces more efficiently (in case of process innova-
tion). Competition starts playing a role in the second step. The type of the product 
market competition (e.g. Bertrand or Cournot competition) and its strength define 
the revenues of a given firm on the market. Firms make decisions about their R&D 
investment based on the profit they will realize in the second phase; that is, they 
compare the profits achievable with innovation and without innovation. For ex-
ample, when strong competition decreases the amount of profit that is achievable 
by innovation, R&D investments and the innovation performance will be lower in 
competitive industries.
In the “standard” industrial organization model of innovation – regardless of 
the exact structure of the model – weaker competition (e.g. a monopoly) ensures 
higher profits for the innovating firm, and, therefore, the innovation level is expect-
ed to be higher (for a description, see Aghion–Griffith [2005], Chapter 1.1). When 
competition is stronger, the firm reaches fewer consumers, sets lower prices and, as 
a result, it becomes less profitable for it to invest in research. Therefore, the models 
introduced before the 1990s corroborated the existence of the Schumpeterian effect 
inasmuch as they showed that monopolized industries are innovative and thus are 
closer to social optimum.
It follows from these theoretical results that in monopolized industries technol-
ogy develops faster, which means that competition policy has to choose between 
static and dynamic efficiency or, in other words, has to face a difficult trade-off. 
But in the 1990s empirical research came to a different conclusion: the research 
of Geroski [1990], [1995], Nickel [1996], and Blundell et al. [1999] evidenced that 
in a given industry the stronger the competition, the higher the productivity gains, 
that is, the stronger the incentive to innovative.
The seminal study of Aghion et al. [2005] was based on endogenous growth 
theory and worked with a different approach, relying on the heterogeneity of firms 
and on nonlinear relationships. Their model shows that the response of firms to 
competition can take many different forms. When competition intensifies, firms 
on the technology frontier increase their R&D, while firms lagging behind reduce 
their innovative effort. Taking into consideration the resulting industry dynamics, 
the authors highlight that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between the 
strength of competition and innovation at the industry level: in case of weak com-
petition they are positively related, while in case of strong competition the associ-
ation will be negative.
The model presented by Aghion et al. involves multiple time periods. Techno-
logical development takes place step by step. The most developed technology is 
improving to the same degree in every period, independently of the firms modelled. 
Some firms have the most developed technologies, while others are some steps be-
hind. When a firm introduces a successful innovation, it can take one step forward, 
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otherwise it will start lagging behind even more. 2 This firm faces competitors that 
are always one step behind the most developed technology at the given time.
If the firm uses the most developed technology, then – given that the production 
costs of the competitors are necessarily higher – it is in the position to set monopoly 
prices or, rather, prices that correspond to the expenditure level of the other firms. 
In case the firm in question is two steps behind the most developed technology, its 
competitors will be ahead of it, so it will not be able to sell its product. In this model, 
competition is regarded as the profit level of a firm which employs technologies as 
developed as those of its competitors; the stronger the competition, the lower the 
profit of such a firm.
A key concept presented by the authors is that those firms that use the most 
developed technology respond differently to strengthening competition than those 
lagging behind. Innovation incentive is the amount their profit would (is expected 
to) rise if they increased their innovation expenditure. Profit levels achieved with 
and without innovation are to be compared. Non-linearity is caused by the fact that 
competition affects both kinds of profit.
If innovation proves to be successful, firms on the technology frontier will be 
able to produce with the new technology, otherwise other firms catch up to them. 
The stronger the competition, being caught up by competitors will be the more 
painful. Consequently, in response to stronger competition firms that use the most 
developed technology increase their R&D expenditure to escape competition.
The situation is reversed for firms that lag behind. They are assumed to be able 
to make only one step forward in the process technology development. By doing 
so, they can indeed catch up with other firms but have no chance to leave them 
behind. Stronger competition means that it is less attractive to catch up to others, 
and consequently R&D investment is less attractive. The reason for this is that in 
case of successful innovation the firm will realize lower profit when competing with 
other firms which are at the same level of development. This means that the firms 
lagging behind are influenced by the Schumpeterian effect:3 Innovation is a decreas-
ing function of the strength of competition.
Which effect is stronger? The answer depends on the ratio of industries in equi-
librium where firms are close to each other (and, consequently, the competition 
 2 A key sectoral factor is the intensity of competition in the product market, which is measured by 
the authors as the difference between the expenditure of firms that employ the most developed 
technology and that of other firms. It may be caused by various phenomena. Primarily, greater 
intensity is understood as greater substitutability among products produced in the given indus-
try. Where competition (substitution) is stronger, a leader firm has a higher profit than a follower, 
as in such industries prices are more important for consumers. This definition falls in line with 
the logic employed above: the strength of the competition is linked to the profit from innovation 
(relative to profit achieved without innovation), and thus it may affect R&D expenditure.
 3 The term “Schumpeterian” here refers to the second phase of Schumpeter’s scientific activity.
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deterrence effect is strong) to industries where there is a greater difference be-
tween firms (and, therefore, the Schumpeterian effect is stronger). As competition 
strengthens, the level of innovative activity increases at first, and then starts to 
decrease. The relationship between the two phenomena resembles an inverted-U 
shape or a bell curve. The monopolies as well as the industries where competition 
is very strong tend to be less innovative than sectors with a low number of actors.
The model built by Aghion at al. [2009] in this kind of a framework indicates that 
the increased probability of the entry of new actors who use the most developed 
technology also has an inverted-U shaped relationship with innovative activity in 
the industry. In this model, the innovation efforts made by firms at the technological 
frontier intensify as the probability of entry by competitors increases. This entry 
deterrence effect is analogous with the competition escape effect in the previous 
model. Conversely, the innovation efforts of firms that use less developed technology 
decrease as the probability of entry increases. Their expected profit from successful 
innovation is lower if they are more likely to face a competitor which uses a more 
developed technology than theirs. It follows from the way the equilibrium ratio of 
sectors is defined that the relationship between competition (defined as the prob-
ability of entry) and the innovative effort is expected to take an inverted-U shape.4
The models discussed so far (with the exception perhaps of Schumpeter’s mod-
el) are neoclassical models. The firms are assumed to be well informed and, based 
on their knowledge, they make perfectly rational decisions about innovation and 
everything else. In neoclassical models, even though the outcome of innovation 
decisions is uncertain, the firms are perfectly aware of the possible returns on in-
vestment and the probability of their occurrence.
Studies on evolutionary models5 suggest that this kind of neoclassical model 
is not suitable for an adequate modelling of innovative behaviour as the payoff of 
innovation is basically uncertain and the actors are not likely to know the proba-
bility distribution of payoffs. This is Knightian uncertainty (Knight [1921]). Given 
the above, it is not justified to assume that firms make perfectly optimal decisions. 
Instead, they use a heuristic approach or some other, bounded rational decision 
making mechanisms when deciding about research fields and the amount to be in-
vested. Among the firms that use various decision making procedures, those with 
higher profits grow faster, as they are in the position to invest more. In time, poor 
performers go bankrupt.
A key feature of these models is that firms differ from each other in various 
dimensions. As opposed to neoclassical models, they do not postulate that some 
 4 Recently, several other studies have discussed the issue of entry and innovation: Asker–Baccara 
[2010], Creane–Miyagiwa [2009], Grossman–Steger [2007], Kovac–Vinogradov–Zigic [2010], Miller 
[2007].
 5 Nelson–Winter [2002] gives an overview of the main issues concerning evolutionary models. The 
first of the evolutionary models concerning innovation is Nelson–Winter [1982]. 
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firms are one or two steps behind the others, rather, that firms in the market have 
different information and employ different decision making mechanisms. A relat-
ed issue is path dependence: the situation of firms or industries that take different 
directions may differ radically.
Evolutionary logic sheds light on the fact that industry productivity can grow not 
only when a firm introduces new products or processes, but also when the market 
share of firms with good “genes” or expert knowledge grows, while that of worse 
performers decreases. (Some of them leave the market). Motta [2004] (pp. 55–64) 
presents a simple model of this kind.
EMPIRICAL METHODS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Measuring the relationship between competition and innovation
Research on the relationship between competition and innovation raises several 
problems (Aghion–Griffith [2005] Chapter 1.2.2). First, besides the strength of com-
petition there are several other factors that define how much a firm or an industry 
invests in innovation. These variables may easily be correlated with competition 
and, for analytical purposes, they must be taken into account.
Second, the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry 
is not a one-way causal relationship; rather, it is simultaneous, which means that 
innovation also influences market structure. In general, panel data are needed to 
handle simultaneity. When such data are available – and it is assumed that market 
structure is pre-determined (that is, innovation in a given period of time affects 
only future market structure) – the issue of simultaneity can be handled with the 
use of lagged explanatory variables. Weaker assumptions are needed when, for the 
purposes of analysis, exogenous changes of economic policy and regulation (e.g. 
free trade agreements) are used as instrumental variables (e.g. Aghion et al. [2005]).
Third, a major issue is that of measurement errors in explanatory variables. The 
analyst is interested in the impact on innovation of competition. The indicators that 
describe the market structure (number of firms, concentration, etc.) do not measure 
competition directly. This problem is aggravated by the fact that in open economies 
external competition needs also be taken into account in some way. Consequently, 
in theory it is more practical to use an indicator that has a more direct link with 
competitive pressure than market structure does. Such indicators include the Lern-
er-index or some other indicator of the market power of firms.
Fourth, the selection of the dependent variable (a measure of innovation) is not 
an easy task either. As referred to above, R&D activity is an input to innovation, not 
a measure of innovation itself. While for large companies it may have a strong corre-
lation with innovation, smaller firms may introduce important innovations without 
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spending on R&D. As for the outputs of innovation, the number of patents is the 
measure most widely used. The main problem with this is that not every patent is 
of equal significance or entails the same level of innovation. Therefore, researchers 
often decide to weight the number of patents by the number of times it has been 
referred to in another patent (Jaffe [1986]). Theoretically variables showing inno-
vation output (from innovation surveys) are better measures than the numbers of 
patents. This holds especially true for countries which are not at the technology 
frontier, therefore, the majority of innovations do not entail patent registration. In 
practice, however, in most countries these indicators are available only on a relatively 
small sample of firms and, therefore, fail to reflect the total innovative performance 
of the economy. When there are no available indicators that directly show spending 
on and results of innovation, then innovation may be approximated with variables 
indirectly related to innovation. Such variables include, for example, the produc-
tivity of the firm in question (labour productivity or total factor productivity, TFP). 
Nevertheless, productivity gains depend on several other variables beside technol-
ogy. For example, it is often difficult to filter out the effect of the economies of scale.
The nature of the measurement of innovation also affects the appropriate esti-
mation methods. For R&D expenditures, for example, the value is zero for a large 
number of firms; consequently, a tobit model is to be used. When we ask which firm 
introduced innovation, then probit or logit models may be used.
Fifth, as Aghion at al. [2005] state, the relationship between competition and 
innovation is not necessarily linear (Chapter 3.1). According to Aghion–Griffith 
[2005], the results of some early studies contradict each other from time to time, as 
the authors did not consider this possibility and examined only the linear effects of 
the competition variable. Nonlinearity is to be dealt with by using quadratic terms 
or nonparametric models.
Empirical results
Ahn [2002] and Aghion–Griffith [2005] offer a summary of the specialized literature 
on innovation published in the 1990s. These empirical studies failed to corroborate 
the Schumpeterian hypothesis that the presence of large firms or a greater concen-
tration may lead to higher levels of innovation. A number of studies state that there 
is a strong positive relationship between competition in the product market and 
productivity. Further research has shown that the effect of different changes in the 
economic environment – regulatory changes, greater exposure to global competition, 
the introduction of competition for non-profit enterprises – justify that competition 
contributes to productivity, wealth and long-term growth. It is also pointed out that 
it often takes a long time for enterprises and consumers to adjust to a new context 
and for the competition to fully exercise its positive impact on efficiency.
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION AND R&D THEORETICAL APPROACHES 121
Major articles of the 1990s include those by Geroski [1990], [1991], [1994], Blun-
dell et al. [1995], [1999]. These studies examined the firm-level and industry-level 
panel data of the 1970s and 1980s, and revealed that competition has a positive im-
pact on innovation. Pohlmeier [1992], taking into consideration the fact that this is 
a simultaneous relationship, found – instead of the theoretically assumed positive 
relationship – a negative relationship between market concentration and product 
and process innovation in 2,200 German firms by 1984. Crépon at al. [1996] analyz-
ed the 1991 data of approximately 10,000 firms. Results on the relationship between 
market concentration and innovation differed depending on which innovation in-
dicator was used. When the number of patents and other performance indicators 
of innovation were used, a negative relationship was established with market con-
centration, while in the case of the sale of new products a positive relationship was 
found. As for R&D investment, no relationship was established.
As mentioned in the theoretical summary: Aghion et al. [2005] showed that, 
theoretically, an inverted-U shaped relationship is possible between competition 
and innovation. Aghion and his colleagues performed empirical studies which es-
tablished the inverted-U shaped relationship between product market competition 
(measured with the Lerner index) and innovation (measured with the number of 
patents). As it was referred to above, in a later study they described a similar the-
oretical relationship between the probability of entry and the level of innovation 
(Aghion et al. [2009]). Positive relationship was also indicated by panel data on UK 
firms for the period between 1987 and 1993. The effect of market entry analyzed 
at the four-digit industry level (especially foreign market entry) is positive in indus-
tries where the UK is on the technology frontier, and weak or negative in industries 
which lag behind. In line with the theoretical model, the results indicate that the 
relationship between competition and innovation may also be affected by the dis-
tance to the technological frontier.
Later, other studies also corroborated the hypothesis of the inverted-U shaped 
relationship. For example, Tingvall–Polsdahl [2006] quantified such a relationship 
between competition (measured by the Herfindahl index) and innovation on data 
gathered in Sweden between 1990 and 2000; however, no significant results were 
found for the price-cost margin. Brouwer–Van der Wiel [2010] succeeded in estab-
lishing a clear positive relationship between competition and total factor produc-
tivity for Dutch industries. In addition, for the Netherlands – at least for the man-
ufacturing industry – these authors provided evidence for the inverted-U shaped 
relationship between competition and innovation, in other words, for the fact that 
competition (if significantly stronger than observed) has a negative impact on pro-
ductivity because of the lower innovation expenditure. The reverse relationship did 
not show up in the data, which means that the intensity of competition does not 
decrease because of innovation.
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From the models establishing an inverted-U shape, it can be concluded that the 
shape of the relationship is influenced by the distance of the firms of a country to 
the technological frontier. Acemoglu et al. [2006] studied, among others, this issue 
and observed a positive correlation between the cross-sectional productivity and 
R&D expenditure of a country, as well as between the distance to the technolog-
ical frontier and R&D expenditure. The growth rate of countries where – due to 
high barriers to entry – competition is weak falls more sharply when the country 
in question gets closer to the technological frontier than the growth rate of coun-
tries with strong competition. The weakness of competition exercises its adverse 
effects in countries which are close to the technological frontier. Lee [2009] came 
to similar conclusions. Relying on the data of more than 1,000 Canadian, Japanese, 
South-Korean, Taiwanese, Indian and Chinese businesses, he concluded that the 
way firms respond to competitive pressure depends on the level of their techno-
logical expertise: firms at a higher level step up their R&D efforts, while those at 
a lower level reduce them.
To sum up, the empirical results of the last two decades have corroborated that 
competition has a basically positive impact on innovation. Nevertheless, numerous 
problems with the measurement and empirical methodology have not been properly 
solved. The creation of targeted corporate databases on innovation is a huge step for-
ward, yet problems (such as measuring competition in an industry, the management 
of international relations or the adequate consideration of lagged effects) still persist.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPETITION AND INNOVATION 
IN HUNGARY
Data
Our major data source was the database of the Hungarian Tax Authority, more 
specifically, the data from the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of firms 
with double-entry accounting from the period between 1992 and 2006. Table A1 
in the Appendix shows the distribution of the firms contained in the database (by 
industry and size). From 2000 onwards, sampling has been designed to ensure that 
all large companies and exporting firms are included without exception; however, 
numerous smaller firms were omitted. The firms in the sample represent more than 
90% of employees, turnover and export. As only a very low number of micro firms 
perform R&D activities, firms with less than 5 employees were excluded from the 
sample. We perform our analysis in the manufacturing, as the relationship between 
competition and innovation is easier to measure and interpret in this industry than 
in services. As in certain cases we used lagged variables as well, we restricted the 
sample to those firms that were included in the database both in 2003 and 2005. 
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Finally, for the purpose of data cleansing, we excluded from the analysis firms with 
a negative value added.
The database contains four-digit NACE number industry classification of the 
firms, the number of employees and the balance sheet data. Unfortunately, NACE 
industries do not necessarily correspond to markets as interpreted in industrial 
organization or competition policy. An industry may consists of several separate 
markets or a firm may perform productive activity in more than one industry, which 
then may result in a certain bias during the measurement of the effects of competi-
tion. We approximate the innovation efforts of businesses with R&D expenditures 
between 2003 and 2005.
Table A2 of the Annex shows the summary statistics of the explanatory variables. 
R&D intensity measures the firm’s R&D expenditure relative to its turnover. Value 
added is calculated from the balance sheet. Labour productivity is the ratio of cor-
porate value added and the number of employees. Capital intensity is the value of 
tangible assets per employee. Data include information on foreign ownership share. 
We created a binary dummy variable. When its value is 1, it indicates that at least 
10% of the company’s equity is owned by foreigners. Data also give information on 
the firm’s export activity. Again, we created a binary dummy variable. When its 
value is 1, it indicates that the firm performs export activities.
Variables that measure competition can also be defined from the database. We 
calculated the indicator C3 to show the share of the three largest companies from 
the industry’s turnover. The Hirschman–Herfindahl index, calculated on the basis 
of turnover, is an alternative measure for concentration. As mentioned above, the 
concentration variables often fail to measure the market power accurately. There-
fore, we also used the indicator ROA (return on assets) to show the ratio of a firm’s 
pre-tax profit to its assets.
Other indicators in the competition database of the Hungarian Competition 
Authority (Hungarian acronym: GVH) were also used as alternative indicators of 
the strength of competition.6
Models
The question is: What is the impact of competition on the innovation of firms? In 
our basic model, the (firm- or industry-level) R&D activity is the dependent var-
iable, while the explanatory variables include measures of competition as well as 
control variables.
Three models have been estimated. In the first one, industry-level R&D intensity 
was modelled with industry competition variables and other explanatory variables. 
Aghion et al. [2005] employed a similar industry-level analysis.
 6 http://www.gvh.hu/gvh/alpha?do=2&st=1&pg=54&m5_doc=5635&m251_act=4.
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 R&D intensityj, 2005 = α + βcompetitionj, 2005 + γXj, 2005 + εj, 2005 (1)
where j indicates industries; the time index indicates the fact that we used cross-sec-
tional data of the year 2005 for the analysis; R&D intensityj, 2005 is the industry’s 
average R&D intensity; competitionj, 2005 is an indicator of the competition; Xj, 2005 
contains other sectoral-level explanatory variables (labour productivity, capital in-
tensity); and εj, 2005 is random error. In the model, β shows the impact of competition 
on the R&D intensity of the industry.
We run the other two models at the firm level. In the first case, the dependent 
variable indicates whether the firm in question performed R&D activity in 2005. As 
the dependent variable is binary, we used a probit model.
 P(RDi, 2005) = F(α + βcompetitionj, 2005 + γXj, 2005 + δZi, 2005 + εj, 2005) (2)
where i stands for the firm and j for the firm’s industry, as the competition variable 
can be interpreted at the industry level. Xj, 2005 contains industry control variables 
(binary industry dummies based on two-digit codes). Zi, 2005 contains some features 
of the firm (labour productivity, size and capital intensity). As the dependent vari-
able is binary, the model can be interpreted as the probability of R&D activity. The 
function F(x) is the normal distribution function.
In the last model, the dependent variable is the firm-level R&D intensity:
 RDi, 2005 = α + βcompetitionj, 2005 + γXj, 2005 + δZi, 2005 + εj, 2005 (3)
As a large number of firms do not perform R&D activity – and, thus, the dependent 
variable is zero for them – this equation is estimated with a tobit model.
The first question is: How can we take into account the various variables that may 
possibly influence the dependent variable? A major problem may arise when at the 
industry level the nature of technology is such that it is related to the competition 
variable. Industrial technology is approximated by productivity and capital intensity. 
Here, the impact of the competition variable is identified from the comparison of the 
industries which use similar technologies. In the firm-level models, the heterogene-
ity of the industry is depicted with the aid of two-digit industrial codes. We address 
the issue of firm heterogeneity with the introduction of size dummies and variables 
measuring firm productivity, export status, foreign ownership and capital intensity. 
In the firm-level regressions some explanatory variables are industry-level variables, 
which may cause heteroskedasticity. We handle this with clustered standard errors.
The second question pertains to the issue of endogeneity; in other words, the 
fact that innovation in a given year is determined simultaneously with market struc-
ture. They mutually influence each other. To handle this, we ran all regressions with 
lagged explanatory variables (from 2003). Since innovation in year 2005 cannot af-
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fect the market structure variables in year 2003, we hope that the coefficients thus 
derived exhibit a causal relationship.
The third question is that of measuring competition. First, we performed all 
measurements with three competition variables. Two of them approximate the mar-
ket structure, while ROA approximates the profit margin. After that, the firm-level 
regression is run on all variables of the competition statistics database of the Hun-
garian Competition Authority.
The fourth question pertains to the variable that reflects innovation. In this 
respect, the best solution would be to use the definition of innovation given in the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of the European Union. However, as it is avail-
able only for a relatively small sample of firms, we decided to use the R&D value of 
year 2005, which was available for all firms.
Finally, as Aghion et al. [2005] (Chapter 3.1) emphasize this, the relationship 
between competition and innovation is not necessarily linear. To examine this re-
lationship, we also estimated the model using a quadratic specification. The invert-
ed-U shape is corroborated if the coefficient of the linear term is positive and that 
of the quadratic term is negative.
Results
Table A2 of the Annex contains the key summary statistics. It demonstrates that 
out of the 7,575 firms of the sample, only 256 (3.4%) performed R&D activities in 
2005. By international comparison, this rate is very low, but – as mentioned in the 
first section – the true rate of innovative firms was higher. Approximately one-fifth 
of the firms in the sample were in foreign ownership and more than half of them 
performed export activity.
The first glimpse on the relationship between competition and innovation is 
given in Table 1. Based on the strength of the competition, we categorized the 
four-digit industries into four quartiles. In each column, we used a different com-
petition indicator for the purpose of categorization. The numbers indicated in the 
TABLE 1 • Concentration and average R&D intensity, 2005
NACE4 industries Concentration (C3) Herfindahl index ROA
1st quartile 0.096 0.096 0.092
2nd quartile 0.136 0.280 0.138
3rd quartile 0.350 0.196 0.140
4th quartile 0.043 0.053 0.257
F-test 4.24 2.36 1.1
p-value 0.006 0.072 0.348
Note: The Table shows the average R&D intensity in the industry quartiles defined on the basis 
of competition indicators. The F-test examines the hypothesis that these are equal.
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Table show the average R&D intensity of the firms that fall into the given quartile. 
The bottom rows show the results of the F-test whose null hypothesis, that the in-
dustries belonging to each quartile exhibit the same average R&D intensity, could 
not be rejected.
The results shown in the table indicate significant differences between the quar-
tiles for the two concentration indicators. This pattern falls in line with the model 
and empirical results of Aghion et al. [2005]: the relationship is depicted by an invert-
ed-U shaped curve. R&D intensity is the highest in those industries where competi-
tion is of medium strength. However, there is no significant difference between the 
R&D intensity of the sectors in terms of the quartiles defined on the basis of ROA.
The relationship between average R&D intensity of the industries and competi-
tion was also examined with the industry-level regression shown in equation (1). The 
results are presented in Table 2. This Table contains three equations for all the three 
competition indicators. The first equation contains only the competition indicator. 
The second equation contains industry productivity and capital intensity as well, 
and thus takes into consideration the technological features of the industry. In the 
third equation, by including the square of the competition indicator, competition 
is allowed to have a non-linear impact on the dependent variable.
TABLE 2 • Impact of competition on the R&D intensity in the industry



































































Number of observations 231 231 231 231 231 231 231 231 231
R2 0.000 0.007 0.031 0.005 0.015 0.026 0.001 0.008 0.018
Note: The dependent variable is the average R&D intensity of the industry (in percentage). The observation units are four-digit 
industries.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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In line with the descriptive statistics, for C3 and for the Herfindahl index the 
results show an inverted-U shaped relationship between competition and R&D in-
tensity. The results for the ROA indicator are not significant. To examine robustness, 
we ran the same regressions on industry-level data aggregated to three digits, and 
the results were the same. To handle the issue of simultaneity between competition 
and innovation, we performed the calculations with lagged explanatory variables 
as well, and came to the same conclusions.
Overall, it was found that the industry-level data support the hypothesis of the 
inverted-U shaped curve. The low explanatory power of the models, however, in-
dicates that (albeit competition does have an impact on R&D expenditure) tech-
nological and other differences between industries play a much more decisive role.
We now turn to the firm-level regressions. Table 3 shows our estimation results 
for equations (2) and (3). The dependent variable is the probability of a positive 
TABLE 3 • Impact of competition on the R&D of firms








































































































Observations 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575
Pseudo R2 0.342 0.218 0.339 0.216 0.338 0.215
Log Likelihood –726.1 –1267 –728.8 –1271 –729.6 –1272
Note: The dependent variable of the probit models indicates whether the firm in question performed R&D activity in 2005. The 
dependent variable of the tobit models show the firms’ R&D intensity (in %). For the probit models, the table shows the average 
marginal effects at the sample mean. We calculated competition variables for four-digit NACE industries. Regressions also include 
two-digit industry dummies. We clustered standard errors at the industry level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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R&D expenditure in the probit columns, and the firms’ R&D intensity in the tobit 
columns. For the probit model, the table contains the average marginal effect of the 
variables at the sample mean. The equations contain two-digit industry dummies 
as well; however, the table does not show the point estimates for them.
Larger firms with higher capital intensity that perform export activity have 
a higher-level innovative activity. An interesting result is that productivity does 
not affect R&D decisions when size and capital intensity are taken into consider-
ation. Another surprising finding is that foreign-owned firms ceteris paribus per-
form less R&D than those owned by Hungarians. Our study Halpern–Muraközy 
[2010] established neither a negative nor a positive impact on the data taken from 
the Community Innovation Survey of the European Union. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the innovation expenditure of foreign business in Hungary exhibit 
only a weak correlation to the innovations implemented in Hungary.
As for the competition indicators, only the concentration indicator (C3) is sig-
nificant. It is positive, which means that firms in the relatively more concentrated 
industries are more likely to perform R&D, and their R&D intensity is higher. The 
Herfindahl index and ROA are not significant.
As indicated by the industry-level regressions, a possible reason is that the rela-
tionship between competition and innovation is not linear. Table 4 shows the results 
of the estimation which involves a quadratic term in the equation. With regard to the 
competition indicators, an inverted-U shaped relationship was established for the 
concentration indicator (C3) and the Herfindahl index. In this model, no significant 
effect was revealed for ROA. Table A3 of the Appendix shows the results achieved 
with the use of lagged explanatory variables. The results of these specifications are 
similar to those of the previous estimations, but the coefficients of the competition 
variables are not as significant. For the other variables, the results are the same.
It has been mentioned above that concentration indicators are not necessarily 
the best tools to measure the strength of the competition actually affecting the mar-
ket. Therefore, it is of great importance to examine which competition indicators 
are linked to the innovation efforts of firms and to what extent. For this purpose, 
we estimated equation (2) for 70 further competition indicators of the competition 
statistics database of the Hungarian Competition Authority. For the purposes of esti-
mation  – to handle the problem of simultaneity – we used the lagged values (of year 
2003) of the indicators. Table A4 of the Appendix shows the marginal effect of the 
competition indicators and their squares in the sample mean for the R&D binary value.
The results corroborate the conclusion that the concentration variables show-
ing the share of the biggest companies are in an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with the innovation efforts of firms. The results were affected only to a small de-
gree by whether concentration was calculated on the basis of assets or turnover. 
The strength or the direction of the relationship is not affected by whether the 
indicator shows the share of the three, five or ten largest firms. Interestingly, for 
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the concentration indicators that measure domestic consumption, no significant 
impact has been established. Similarly, the Herfindahl index (from the database of 
the Hungarian Competition Authority) does not exhibit a significant relationship 
with innovation expenditure.
Among other indicators, it is the industrial dynamics variable that has a sig-
nificant impact on R&D expenditure: the intensity of entry and exit is in a convex 
TABLE 4 • Non-linear impact of competition on the R&D of firms


















































5.91*** 0.03*** 5.859*** 0.03*** 5.813***























































Observations 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575
Pseudo R2 0.343 0.220 0.340 0.217 0.338 0.215
Log Likelihood –724.4 –1265 –727.6 –1268 –729.6 –1272
Note: The dependent variable of the probit models indicates whether the firm in question performed R&D activity in 2005. The 
dependent variable of the tobit models show the R&D intensity of firms (in %). For the probit models, the table shows the average 
marginal effects at the sample mean. We calculated competition variables for four-digit NACE industries. Regressions also include 
two-digit industry dummies. We clustered standard errors at the industry level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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(U-shaped) relationship with the firms’ R&D probability. These variables can be 
regarded as the measures of the threat of entry. It is in connection with this vari-
able, that the model of Aghion et al. [2009] sets forth a prediction that is contrary 
to our results.7
As for the financial variables, the return on equity (ROE) is in a concave (albeit 
not inverted-U shaped) relationship with innovation efforts. Falling in line with the 
above calculations, the ROA obtained from the competition statistics database of 
the Hungarian Competition Authority is not significant, either. Finally, the presence 
of foreign-owned firms, the indicator is also shown to have an inverted-U shaped 
relationship with competition.
In sum, the empirical results show that in Hungary there is a detectable in-
verted-U shaped relationship between competition and innovation at both the 
industry and firm levels. Competition increases innovation, yet R&D intensity is 
somewhat lower in industries where competition is very strong than in industries 
with medium-strength competition. The result can be interpreted as a causal im-
pact inasmuch as lagged explanatory variables yield the same result. The analysis 
of a wide range of competition indicators evidences the importance of the method 
of measuring competition: the concentration indicators, the industrial dynamics, 
ROE and the ratio of foreigners are in significant relationship with the probability 
of R&D activity in firms.
CONCLUSIONS
This study presents an overview of the key theories and empirical results related 
to the relationship between competition and innovation. Our study contributes to 
the ongoing debates in Hungary by sharing information on empirical results with 
respect to this relationship.
In recent decades, research on innovation has been calling attention to the re-
quirement that the inputs to and the results of innovation need to be distinguished 
and dealt with separately. The difference between the two is important, especially 
in countries which are not among the technologically most advanced ones in the 
world. For instance, the number of Hungarian firms that introduced innovations in 
2006 was three times as high as the number of those that performed R&D activity 
continuously in the preceding years (Halpern–Muraközy [2010]).
Theoretical models explaining the relationship between competition and inno-
vation have a long history. Schumpeter’s theory holds that large firms often perform 
R&D more efficiently and, as a result, some market power is required for a firm to 
implement a large number of innovations. Important new developments were pre-
 7 However, this relationship can be explained by other circumstances. For example, it is possible that 
the entry and exit rates are higher in countries with several, geographically segmented markets.
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sented by Aghion et al. [2005]. Their empirical models yielded inverted-U shaped 
relationships, which suggest that innovative activity is lower in firms that operate 
either in highly concentrated or highly competitive industries than in firms in mod-
erately competitive sectors of the economy.
The measurement of the relationship between competition and innovation raises 
a number of problems. In addition to the difficulties related to measuring the explan-
atory and dependent variables, another grave issue is presented by the simultaneity 
of the relationship between competition and innovation.
As evidenced by research in the 1990s, growing competition, in general, strength-
ens corporate innovation. In the 2000s, some authors came to the conclusion that 
the relationship is non-linear but an inverted-U shaped relationship can be fre-
quently established.
We analyzed an extensive set of data on Hungarian firms, based on methods we 
derived from leading international literary sources. The main conclusion from our 
efforts is that the inverted-U shaped relationship can indeed be established at the 
industry-level as well as at the firm-level. By applying several competition indica-
tors to our models, we also discovered that only certain types of indicators of the 
presence and intensity of competition seem to have had an impact on the innovative 
investments of firms.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 • Sample size
Industries Number of employees in sample
Total1–25 25–50 50–250 250 < 
employees in company
Manufacture of food products and beverages 549 222 279 61 1111
Manufacture of tobacco products 1 0 2 2 5
Manufacture of textiles 137 45 48 10 240
Manufacture of wearing apparel 186 85 115 24 410
Tanning and dressing of leather 50 26 41 9 126
Manufacture of wood and wood products 316 72 47 6 441
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 68 27 33 8 136
Publishing and printing 372 76 63 9 520
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 0 0 0 3 3
Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products 107 34 44 19 204
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 319 107 124 18 568
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 172 55 60 19 306
Manufacture of basic metals 40 17 38 10 105
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 738 246 177 15 1176
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 442 137 167 29 775
Manufacture of office machinery and computers 19 7 7 3 36
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 132 45 66 47 290
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and 
apparatus
79 23 30 25 157
 Manufacture of instruments 192 38 47 7 284
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 51 28 37 37 153
Manufacture of other transport equipment 35 11 11 8 65
Manufacture of furniture 273 81 64 6 424
Recycling 25 7 8 0 40
Total 4,303 1,389 1,508 375 7,575
TABLE A2 • Summary statistics of key variables









Continuous variables Number of 
observations
Average Median Standard 
Deviation
R&D intensity for all firms 7,575 0.001 0.000 0.009
R&D intensity for firms 
that perform R&D
7,575 0.022 0.007 0.044
Labour productivity 7,575 3.419 2.292 4.834
Added value 7,575 498.25 49.56 7265.98
Capital intensity 7,575 4.318 2.182 7.805
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TABLE A3 • Nonlinear impact of competition on the R&D of firms  
(lagged explanatory variables)



















































































































Observations 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575 7,125 7,575
Pseudo R2 0.358 0.223 0.358 0.223 0.358 0.223
Log Likelihood –708.3 –1,259 –708.2 –1,260 –708.5 –1,260
Note: The dependent variable of the probit models indicates whether the firm performed R&D activity in 2005. The dependent 
variable of the tobit models shows the R&D intensity of firms (in %). For the probit models, the Table shows the marginal effects 
for the sample mean. We calculated competition variables for four-digit NACE industries. Regressions also include two-digit 
industry dummies. The explanatory variables are from 2003. We clustered standard errors at the industry level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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TABLE A4 • Non-linear impact of competition indicators on the R&D activity of firms  
(with NACE4 quadratic term)






Number of firms –0.00098 0.00037** 0.00000 0.00000**
Concentration (C3) on the basis of net sales 0.02706*** 0.00780** –0.00022 0.00007***
Concentration (C3) on the basis of total assets 0.02094 0.00739** –0.00015 0.00006**
Concentration (C5) on the basis of net sales turnover 0.02647*** 0.00868*** –0.00019 0.00007**
Concentration (C5) on the basis of total assets 0.02457 0.00862** –0.00017 0.00007**
Concentration (C10) on the basis of net sales 0.02830 0.01130** –0.00018 0.00008**
Concentration (C10) on the basis of total assets 0.02936 0.01237** –0.00018 0.00009*
Relative standard deviation of shares on the basis of net sales 0.02166 0.00848** –0.00020 0.00008**
Relative standard deviation of shares on the basis of total assets 0.01609 0.00798* –0.00012 0.00007
HHI on the basis of net sales 0.00009 0.00007 –0.00000 0.00000
HHI on the basis of total assets 0.00010 0.00007 –0.00000 0.00000
C3 on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 1)# 0.01384 0.0967 –0.00007 0.00008
C3 on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 2)# –0.00436 0.00823 0.00000 0.00011
C5 on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 1)# 0.01687 0.01043 –0.00009 0.00009
C5 on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 2)# –0.00683 0.00774 0.00005 0.00010
HHI on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 1)# 0.00004 0.00007 0.00000 0.00000
HHI on the basis of domestic consumption (hypothesis 2)# –0.00026 0.00015 0.00000 0.00000**
Domestic consumption 0.00000 0.00000** –0.00000 0.00000**
Domestic consumption (% of net sales) 0.00067 0.00040 –0.00000 0.00000
Import categorized on the basis of products (% of domestic 
consumption)
0.00523 0.00782 0.00002 0.00007
Share of large firms in industry sales 0.00804 0.00504 –0.00006 0.00005
Share of medium firms in industry sales –0.00584 0.00628 0.00006 0.00007
Share of small and micro firms in industry sales 0.00155 0.00823 –0.00009 0.0012
Share of large firms in industry total assets 0.00648 0.00497 –0.00004 0.00005
Share of medium firms in industry total assets –0.00785 0.00627 0.00009 0.00007
Share of small and micro firms in industry total assets –0.00710 0.00766 0.00001 0.00011
Ratio of the turnover of small firms to that of large firms –0.04793 0.03223 0.00083 0.00107
Share of import in the industry total supply 0.00075 0.00038 –0.00000 0.00000
Number of firms entering the market in the given year –0.01014 0.00315*** 0.00004 0.00002**
Number of firms exiting the market in the given year –0.01375 0.00485** 0.00009 0.00003**
Ratio of entering firms in year t –0.00792 0.02294 –0.00012 0.00071
Ratio of exiting firms in year t 0.02923 0.02922 –0.00041 0.00119
Drop-out rate in year t 0.01442 0.01448 –0.00019 0.00024
Net turnover of the sale of dissolved firms in year t (% of total industry 
turnover in year t) 
–0.06895 0.04960 0.00286 0.00264
Assets of dissolved firms in year t (% of total industry assets in year t) –0.05556 0.01707*** 0.00143 0.00045***
Net turnover of the sale of new entrants in year t (% of total industry 
turnover in year t)
0.00269 0.05794 –0.00268 0.00576
Assets of new entrants in year t (% of total industry assets in year t) 0.00442 0.03847 –0.00238 0.00272
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Profitability of exiting firms compared to the profitability of those that 
stay in the market
0.00001 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000
Productivity of exiting firms compared to the productivity of those that 
stay in the market
–0.00194 0.00118 0.00000 0.00001
Number of firms not included in the sample –0.00393 0.00141** 0.00001 0.00000*
Industrial output price index –0.26605 0.31791 0.00133 0.00158
Domestic sales price index 0.55400 0.38505 –0.00275 0.00189
Export sales price index 0.00030 0.10754 0.00005 0.00055
EBIT ratio –0.00124 0.01770 0.00043 0.00077
EBITDA ratio 0.00918 0.02381 –0.00007 0.00080
Return on equity before tax (ROE1) –0.00439 0.00153** –0.00000 0.00000**
Return on equity after tax (ROE2) –0.00430 0.00148** –0.00000 0.00000**
Balance sheet earnings on equity (ROE3) –0.00358 0.00165* –0.00000 0.00000**
Return on capital employed (ROCE) 0.01231 0.01209 –0.00059 0.00037
Return on Sales (ROS) –0.00700 0.01690 0.00085 0.00069
Return on Investment (ROI) 0.00353 0.00310 –0.00002 0.00004
Return on Asset (ROA) 0.01141 0.01235 –0.00029 0.00094
Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 0.01106 0.01449 –0.00068 0.00063
Industry loss (% of net turnover) –0.09287 0.03208** 0.00687 0.00207***
Gross added value per capita 0.01702 0.02602 0.00015 0.00071
Gross added value per unit labour cost 0.00142 0.00223 –0.00000 0.00000
Relative standard deviation of gross added value per capita 0.00741 0.01058 0.00003 0.00014
Relative standard deviation of gross added value per unit labour cost –0.00891 0.00967 0.00014 0.00012
Simple arithmetic mean of gross added value per capita 0.24613 0.08342*** –0.01921 0.00641***
Simple arithmetic mean of gross added value per unit labour cost –0.00040 0.00030 0.00000 0.00000***
Total factor productivity (TFP) in industry 0.00926 0.05413 –0.00175 0.00278
Relative standard deviation of total factor productivity –0.00030 0.00997 –0.000003 0.00016
Simple arithmetic mean of total factor productivity of firms in industry 0.01017 0.01809 –0.00006 0.00020
Productivity of smaller firms compared to that of large firms –0.00191 0.00474 –0.00002 0.00007
Numerator of the indicator of the relationship between profitability and 
productivity
0.00260 0.00598 0.000000 0.00005
Denominator of the indicator of the relationship between profitability 
and productivity
–0.00135 0.02207 0.00028 0.00094
Export share in industry total demand 0.00042 0.00067 0.00000 0.00000
Renewal of assets on the basis of implemented investments –0.00570 0.01742 0.00036 0.00036
Rate of foreign ownership in subscribed capital 0.01691 0.00693** –0.00015 0.00007**
Net turnover of sales in industry 0.00000 0.00000 –0.00000 0.00000
Size of industry 0.00081 0.00202 –0.00000 0.00001
Cost disadvantage ratio 0.00470 0.00456 –0.00003 0.00003
Note: For each variable, the probit model referred to in Table A3 was estimated. The table shows the average marginal effect of the 
competition indicator at the sample average. Competition variables were calculated for four-digit NACE industries. Regressions also 
include two-digit industry dummies. The explanatory variables are from 2003. We clustered standard errors at the industry level.
# For the description of the two hypotheses, see: http://www.gvh.hu/gvh/alpha?do=2&st=1&pg=54&m5_doc=5635&m251_act=4.
* Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
• Ferenc László Kiss •
INTER-FIRM COMPARISON AND 
DECOMPOSITION OF PRODUCTIVITY GAINS 
FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES*
In this study, temporal changes in firm-level productivity, referred to as “corporate pro-
ductivity gains” are decomposed into causal factors, such as cost-saving technological 
changes, output growth in the presence of economies of scale, changes in input prices, 
and the effect of input price changes on the firm’s demand for inputs. The decompo-
sition is then applied to inter-firm comparisons of productivity. Inter-firm differences 
in productivity gains are decomposed into the same causal factors as the productivity 
gains themselves. Following a brief description of the economic concepts and varia-
bles that are associated with the concept of productivity, an empirical study – a com-
parative analysis and decomposition of productivity gains in two real-life regulated 
companies – offers an opportunity to assess the practical problems of measurement 
and comparison, and to introduce some useful indexing and econometric tools. The 
empirical study demonstrates that inter-firm productivity comparison and decom-
position can indeed be successfully achieved, and that they can play a useful role 
not only in corporate management, but also in the regulation of imperfect markets.
THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTIVITY
To a considerable extent, the operating conditions of companies that sell their products 
on imperfect, regulated markets are created, influenced and managed by the regula-
tors themselves. This involves tremendous social responsibilities, which include not 
only the task of preventing regulated firms from rent-seeking anti-competitive prac-
tices and various other socially detrimental activities that may arise from their market 
power, privileges, etc., but also the duty of doing everything in their power to facili-
tate the efficient operation of the firms they regulate in order to ensure the supply of 
 
  * I am indebted to three excellent colleagues and dear friends of mine, Bernard J. Lefebvre, Robert 
E. Olley and Shafi A. Shaikh. The present work draws from a major Canadian project, which was 
carried out under Olley’s chairmanship and my technical leadership. At the request of the Canadian 
Ministry of Communications, I investigated productivity comparisons within the framework of 
this project. I worked extensively with Shaikh on turning “dirty” accounting and managerial data 
into meaningful economic variables, and with Lefebvre on building various models of productivity 
decomposition. This article re-visits some of the results of my work. It emphasizes the usefulness of 
productivity comparisons and decomposition, hoping that it would help re-focus attention on the 
all-important but lately somewhat ignored topic of productivity, and introduce more quantitative 
analytical tools into economic analysis in my native Hungary.
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regulated markets with the widest possible selection of products and services of the 
best possible quality at the lowest possible cost. These requirements apply to monop-
olies as well as any kind of imperfectly competitive markets. In order to fulfil their 
task, regulators are expected by society at large to have a thorough knowledge of not 
only the demand but also the supply side of the markets they regulate. The economic 
efficiency and financial well-being of regulated companies must be monitored, an-
alysed, evaluated and corrected if necessary. The regulator cannot possibly accom-
plish this if it is not known – among other things – how productive the regulated 
firms are, how quickly their productivity improves over time, what the causes of their 
productivity gains are and how much improvement can reasonably be attributed to 
each cause. Productivity measurement and analysis are important regulatory tasks.
Managers of both regulated and unregulated companies also show a keen interest 
in productivity as one of the two main endogenous factors that determine corporate 
profits. It was recognised as early as before World War II that the size of, and changes 
in, corporate profit depend rather crucially on management decisions concerning 
changes of productivity and output prices. Productivity studies became one of the 
basic tools of short-term operational planning and budgeting as early as in the late 
1960s. Productivity indices also became ex ante targets in addition to being ex post 
attributes of corporate performance. Budget- or plan-implicit productivity gains 
were derived to show how the fulfilment of the annual corporate budget or plan 
would improve productivity and profits. Assessments of the reality and reasonable-
ness of the budget- or plan-implicit productivity gain resulted in annual productivity 
targets, and budgets or plans were modified if necessary to meet the productivity 
target. Simple measurements of actual annual productivity gains and ad hoc data 
analyses were no longer sufficient. Target setting required more knowledge. Cor-
porate analysts were increasingly turning to sophisticated econometric models to 
understand the causes and consequences of productivity improvements.
Traditional managerial and regulatory knowledge of corporate productivity was 
based on simple index numbers showing annual changes in the relationship between 
the volumes of inputs and the outputs they were producing. Productivity measures 
were compared to each other in various ways. Ad hoc comparisons were made most 
often within the boundaries of a given firm, involving a comparison between its own 
past and present, or past and future, or present and future performance. These are 
the intra-firm comparisons. Comparisons with past performance are indispensably 
useful but may also be misleading. From a regulatory point of view, the greatest risk 
in comparing productivity performances over time is that the comparison may lead 
to an erroneous assessment of the economic performance or productive capability 
of a regulated firm. It has been a common problem throughout the history of reg-
ulation, that the regulator (and/or the management of the regulated firm) simply 
and mechanically assumed that the expected growth rate in the firm’s productivity 
should be equal to some (usually the average) past growth rate. This is tantamount 
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to disregarding changes in operating conditions and their impact on productivity. 
When future conditions differ from past conditions, the productivity growth in the 
future will also differ from that in the past.
Productivity comparisons are often made with other firms. Ad hoc inter-firm com-
parisons can accomplish more than revealing where the productivity growth rate was 
higher, lower or the same in any given period. They may point to various causes and 
consequences of observed inter-firm differences but also carry a considerable risk of 
mistaken conclusions. Superficial comparisons are often built upon an implicit under-
lying assumption; viz., if a comparable other firm has achieved a certain rate of output 
growth then a similar rate of improvement ought to be expected at one’s own firm. This 
assumption may turn out to be correct or incorrect, but it is definitely harmful if the 
analysts carrying out the comparison do not explore in sufficient detail the factors af-
fecting productivity, the differences between them and the effects of those differences.
While ad hoc comparisons may indeed direct the attention of the analyst to-
ward some factors that affect productivity, they do not allow the quantification of 
their effects. Quantitative analyses of the thus identified effects cannot be made. 
For this reason, comparisons should not be made without proper decomposition. 
Decompositions not only identify the causes of improvements in productivity but 
also quantify their effects. Changes in productivity result from the combined effect 
of a number of economic variables such as growth in the output of the firm or cost 
saving technological changes. What makes the analysis particularly revealing and 
useful is that the total effect on productivity of each causal variable can be broken 
down into two components. One component is the magnitude or rate of change in 
the size of the variable. If output growth improves productivity then it will make 
a difference whether the output growth rate is 3 percent or 10 percent. Secondly, the 
variables that affect productivity produce their impact with certain intensity. The 
higher the intensity the greater the effect on productivity. Decompositions distin-
guish changes in the size of an explanatory variable from the intensity with which 
the explanatory (causal) variable influences productivity.
The econometric models that began to emerge in the 1970’s facilitated a major 
new development in productivity analysis. This paper extends the method of analys-
ing corporate productivity performance by using econometric models. It advances 
in two directions. First, a joint multi-firm econometric cost model is constructed for 
two (and possibly more) firms, whose productivity performances are to be compared. 
Second, using the estimated parameters of this joint cost model, a causal decompo-
sition of inter-firm productivity differences is conducted, quantifying the inter-firm 
difference that is due to each causal factor. As we shall see in the next sections, the 
most important causes are cost-saving technological changes and the exploitation 
of economies of scale, when the volume of production increases.1
 1 It is also possible to decompose temporal changes in productivity by consequence.
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Decomposition also plays a key role in forecasting productivity. It is equally im-
portant for the regulator and the regulated firm to have an idea of how much im-
provement in productivity they can reasonably expect as a consequence of expected 
future operating conditions, or some specific forthcoming change in the operation 
of the firm. Mergers and acquisitions, among other things, typically generate var-
ious productivity-altering organisational and other changes in the operations of 
affected firms.
TEMPORAL CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY
We look at changes in corporate total factor productivity. As the name implies, 
this concept recognizes the firm’s output as the result of the combined productive 
services (inputs) of all of the firm’s factors of production. Changes in total factor 
productivity may occur in time or space. Temporal changes refer to progress in 
total factor productivity within a given firm between two points or periods in time. 
Temporal changes are usually referred to as productivity gains. Spatial changes, on 
the other hand, show the difference between the total factor productivities of two 
firms. Both types of changes are measured by proportional volume changes, defined 
as the natural logarithms of input and output volume indices.
Let us first define the variables used in the measurement of productivity!2 The 
temporal proportional change of total factor productivity (the productivity gain) of 
a firm is defined as
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denotes the temporal continuous proportional change in total output, 
and 
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is the temporal continuous proportional change in total input. Temporally 
continuous proportional changes are expressed as Divisia volume indices. For the 
output, the time-continuous Divisia volume index is
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where n outputs exist,
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is total revenue and ri stands for the i-th output’s revenue share.
 2 In addition to total factor productivity, the concept of productivity may be expanded to the so-
called partial productivity measures. These are termed “partial” because they show the relationship 
between the firm’s total output and only one category of its factor inputs. The most frequently 
investigated partial productivity measures are labour and capital productivity, but measures for 
material and sometimes even for other input categories also exist. Inter-firm comparisons and 
decompositions of partial productivity measures are not investigated in this article.
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In practice, the analyst is forced to work with data that show discrete temporal 
changes between two points or periods in time. For this reason, a discrete approxi-
mation must be found for the time-continuous Divisia indices. The Törnqvist index 
is such an approximation. With discrete changes in outputs from a given period 
(t – 1) to period t, the Törnqvist output volume index is
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shows each i-th individual output’s average revenue share, which is the 
simple arithmetic mean of its revenue shares in the two compared periods, that is
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Inputs are treated in the same manner as outputs. The temporally continuous pro-
portional change in total input is expressed by the Divisia volume index
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(5)
where m inputs exist,
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is total cost, and sj denotes the j-th input’s cost share.
Its discrete approximation, the Törnqvist input volume index describes the change 
in total input from period (t – 1) to period t as
 

















      
    
 
  
 ̇  ∑ ̅  
  
  (
   
      
)  
 ̅ 
 ̅  
         
 
  
 ̇  ∑




 ̇ ∑   ̇
 
   
  
 ̇ 




    








   
      
)  
 ̅ 
 ̅   
         
 
  




 ̅  









   
̇ ∑   ̇ 
 




    
      
      
   
 




   
      
)  
 ̅ 
 ̅  





   
 ̇ ∑   ̇ 




    
       
  ∑    
  
 
 ̇  ∑ ̅
 
   
  (
   
      
)  
 ̅ 
 ̅  
         
 
  




 ̅  
 ̇  
 ̂ 
denotes the average cost share of the j-th input, that is3
 




    
 
 
   









       
 ∑    
   
 
 ̇ ∑  ̅ 
 
   
 (
   
      
)  
̅ 
 ̅   
        
  
 ̇ ∑
    
 
   
 ̇ ∑   ̇ 
 
   
  
 ̇




      
 ∑    
 
   
 
 ̇ ∑  ̅ 
 
   
  (
   
      
)  
̅ 
 ̅   
          
 
  








As stated above, proportional volume changes are defined as the natural logarithms 
of input and output volume indices. This offers a choice of representation to the 
analyst. Indeed, some authors use index numbers, and not proportional changes, 
for the measurement of changes in input and output volumes. Expressed with the 
 3 For partial productivity measures, the Divisia and Törnqvist output volume indices remain the 
same as in equations (2) and (3), respectively, but the input volume indices (equations (5) and (6), 
respectively), must be re-defined. The Wj input prices and Xj input volumes (and consequently 
the 
 ̇   ̇   ̇  
( ̇) 
( ̇ )
 ̇  ∑




 ̇ ∑   ̇ 
 
   
  
 ̇  
   
   
       
  ∑  
 
   
 
 ̇  ∑ ̅  
 
   
 (
   
     
)  
 ̅ 
 ̅   
          
  




   
 ̇ ∑   ̇ 
 
   
  





    
  ∑    
 
   
 
 ̇  ∑ ̅  
 
   
  (
   
      
)  
 ̅ 
 ̅   
          
 
  




 ̅  
 ̇  
 ̂ 
cost shares and 
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proportional input changes) refer only to the individual labour, capital, 
or material inputs that are included in the partial measure.
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aid of volume indices, temporal change in the total factor productivity of the firm, 
the productivity index, becomes
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 are the temporal volume indices of total output and total input, re-
spectively. For discrete changes between the consecutive periods (t – 1) and t, the 
Törnqvist volume indices of output and input are
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 (10)
The Törnqvist volume indices of output and input are the weighted geometric means 
of the ratios of volume changes occurring in two consecutive periods in all outputs 
and in all inputs, respectively. The respective weights are the average revenue shares 
of individual outputs, and the average cost shares of individual inputs.
The temporal proportional change in total factor productivity, the productivity 
gain is defined as the natural logarithm of the productivity index; i.e.,
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(11)
INTRA-FIRM DECOMPOSITION
Causal decompositions may be carried out within one firm. The phenomena that cause 
total factor productivity to change are identified and classified, and a certain part of the 
productivity gain is assigned to each cause. Successful identification of the causes re-
quires extensive knowledge of certain basic economic characteristics of the firm’s pro-
duction process. Such knowledge may be derived from econometric production models.
Production functions, various forms of cost functions and profit functions may 
be selected as models. This study works with total cost functions. A cost function 
is a suitable analytical vehicle for estimating and describing the basic economic 
characteristics of the production process that are needed for productivity analysis. 
Production functions are not used here because they do not allow us to analyse the 
economic characteristics of multi-output production processes. Profit functions 
are omitted due to data problems.
For simplicity, and strictly for introductory purposes, intra-firm decomposition 
is attempted first with the aid of single-output cost functions. These are the sim-
plest possible models we can use to demonstrate the essence of the decomposition 
in a transparent manner. Once we gain a basic insight, we switch to multi-output 
cost function specifications to gain a more detailed understanding of the various 
impacts on productivity of different categories of output.
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The single-output case
It is common knowledge that a total cost function is capable of describing the 
production technology of a firm. The simplest general form of a total cost func-
tion assumes that a single output is produced, and that technological changes are 
exogenous; i.e., 
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where C is the total economic cost of production, m inputs are employed by the 
firm, W denotes input prices, and T represents exogenous technological changes, 
whose measurement will be discussed later, when we describe our empirical models.
Technological changes cause increases in productivity by saving costs.4 The 
temporal productivity gain generated by technological changes, 
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, which we shall 
henceforth term the technological effect, is equal in size (but opposite in sign) to the 
temporal shift of the cost function generated by the technological changes,
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 (13)
This effect can be estimated using the elasticity of the total cost with respect to 
technological changes. The estimated cost function yields estimates of this elas-
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(14)
Output causes increases in productivity, when it grows in the presence of econ-
omies of scale.6 The temporal productivity gain generated by output growth, 
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, 
which we shall henceforth term the output effect, therefore depends on the degree 
of economies of scale and the growth rate of output. Economies of scale constitute 
a basic technological property of the firm. Their degree can be derived from the 
estimated total cost function, where it is the inverse of the output elasticity of cost 
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. Increases in the volume of output contribute to increases in produc-
tivity, when 0 < εCQ < 1. The proportional change in output is calculated from the 
firm’s output data. The output effect is therefore
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(15)
where ξCQ = 1 – εCQ, and εCQ = ∂lnC/∂lnQ is the output elasticity of cost.7
 4 The technological effect reflects the immediate and short-term cost-saving effects of technologi-
cal changes. However, technological changes also may have long-term cost-saving effects, which 
gradually emerge over time with or without increases in the scale of production. We shall return 
to these effects when discussing estimation results.
 5 Notice that εCT = –∂lnC/∂lnT. Since the elasticity is always negative, εCT is always positive if tech-
nological changes reduce cost.
 6 Or it decreases in the presence of diseconomies of scale. This case, however, will not be discussed here. 
 7 Notice that ξCQ =1 – ∂lnC/∂lnQ is positive when there are economies of scale; i.e., when 0 < ∂lnC/∂lnQ < 1. 
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Equation (15) shows that the proportional temporal productivity change, the 
productivity gain, of a firm, represented by its total cost function, can be expressed as 
the sum of the products of 1. the temporal proportional change in each independent 
variable affecting productivity (and the cost) and 2. the cost elasticity with respect 
to the same independent variable. If the cost function is in the form of a regression 
equation containing an error variable, decomposition proceeds as follows:
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represents the residual productivity change; i.e., that portion of the ob-
served (actual) productivity change, which is not explained by the first two expres-
sions on the right-hand side of equation (16). This equation decomposes the change 
in productivity into causal components. This is the simplest form of decomposition. 
The productivity gain is caused by three effects: 1. technological effect, 2. output 
effect, and 3. residual effect:
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 (17)
As stated above, in this simplest possible case, the firm’s technology is described by 
a cost function with a single output and a single exogenous technological change. 
When technology is represented in a more elaborate fashion, in more detail and with 
greater precision, the decomposition of the productivity gain also becomes more 
elaborate. When it is recognized in the specification of the cost function, that the 
firm produces more than one output, instead of the single output effect shown in 
equation (17), as many output effects are generated as the number of outputs; i.e.,
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 (18)
where the individual output effects 
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 appear as the product of 1. the proportional 
change in output i and 2. the cost elasticity with respect to the same output i,
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(19)
The explicit inclusion of complex technological changes in the model complicates 
the decomposition of productivity gains in a variety of ways, especially if input-neu-
tral (Hicksian) technological changes appear contemporaneously with changes 
that affect the input structure and/or result in input or output augmentation. Such 
complex models are outside the scope of this study.
The multi-output case
Most firms produce more than one product or service. When there is more than 
one output, changes in the output structure presumably have an effect on produc-
tivity. In order to be able to estimate the effects of output structure in addition to 
the effects discussed above, a multi-output cost model must be introduced into the 
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analysis. The single output in the cost function in equation (12) is now replaced by 
n number of individual output variables:
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 (20)
By taking the total time derivative of this cost function, introducing Shepard’s lemma 
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 expresses the extent of the shift in the cost function that is caused by the 
technological change, and 
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 denotes the elasticity of cost with 
respect to the i-th output.
Comparing equation (21) with the Divisia indices in equations (1), (2) and (5), it 
becomes obvious that the temporal cost shift expresses the productivity gain without 
distortion if 
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          , that is, when the revenue share of each output equals the 
cost elasticity with respect to the same output, resulting in
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 (22)
This equality can materialise only if 1. the price of each output equals its margin-
al cost 
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, and 2. total revenue is equal to total cost (R = C). 
Both conditions are met if the production process is characterised by constant 
returns to scale and if the input and output markets of the firm are perfectly com-
petitive. The output markets of regulated firms cannot, however, be said to be 
perfectly competitive. Furthermore, regulated firms tend to be engaged in net-
work-based production, therefore their technology may well be characterized by 
economies of scale. It is precisely these properties that warrant their regulation. 
For this reason, the productivity gains of regulated firms may differ in size from 
the temporal proportional shifts in their cost. Using equation (22), the difference 
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(23)
The productivity gain can be expressed in a very instructive way from equation (23) 
if we add and subtract (PiQi)/C, and rearrange the right-hand side of the equation.8 
We obtain
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 (24)
 8 The consequences of non-marginal cost pricing were first analysed by Denny, Fuss & Everson [1979].
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For a multi-output model, this is the starting point of the decomposition of pro-
ductivity gains. The equation demonstrates that the productivity gain equals the 
change in cost 
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if the firm has constant returns to scale and marginal cost 
pricing. MCi = 0, but R – C < 0 if the firm has marginal cost pricing but there are 
economies of scale. 
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, but R = C if the firm has some sort of cost-covering 
zero-profit constraint, as in the case of average cost pricing or Ramsey pricing. The 
first and second items on the right-hand side of the equation are activated if there 
are economies of scale and – for this reason or independently from this – prices do 
not equal marginal costs.
The concept of average cost may be meaningful for some firms if the great ma-
jority of their production costs are output specific. If average cost is meaningful then 
useful information can be generated by decomposing the price – marginal cost dif-
ference into a price – average cost and an average cost – marginal cost difference; i.e.,
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 (25)
Substituting equation (25) into equation (24) the following formula is obtained:
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The rather lengthy and complicated structure of this equation may be simplified by 
replacing the three multipliers of 
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on the right-hand side by ZAi, ZMi and ZRi, as in
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SPATIAL CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY
As suggested in the introductory section, there are two kinds of inter-firm produc-
tivity comparisons. On the one hand, the productivity “levels” of two firms may be 
compared by composing spatial volume indices, showing which one is more pro-
ductive and quantifying the difference between their productivity “levels”. On the 
other hand, each of the compared firms has a time series of temporal productivity 
gains, and these can be compared as well by composing temporal volume indices 
for both, showing which one improves productivity faster and quantifying the re-
lationship between their “speeds”. The first case is that of level comparison, and the 
second case is that of speed comparison.
Let us take a quick look at the spatial indices! The spatial index of productivity 
is defined analogously with the definition of the temporal index. The only differ-
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ence is that in a spatial index, the price and volume data for periods (t – 1) and t 
are replaced by the data obtained for Firms A and B. Thus, the spatial proportional 
change (difference) in productivity is
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The measurement of spatial differences in productivity and their inter-firm decom-
position are outside the scope of this study.9 Our task is limited to “speed compari-
sons” and the decomposition of inter-firm differences in temporal productivity gains.
The difference between the productivity gains of two firms (A and B) can be 
expressed as
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 (29)
where t refers to productivity gain in period t, showing change relative to t–1.
INTER-FIRM DECOMPOSITION
Equation (16) demonstrates the simplest decomposition of productivity gains. 
It shows that temporal increases in productivity are generated by three effects: 
1. a technology effect, 2. an output effect and 3. a residual effect. When two firms, 
A and B, are compared, this kind of decomposition can be performed for the tem-
poral productivity gains of both firms. Furthermore, it is also possible to decompose 
the differences in the productivity gains of the two firms as
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 (30)
Temporal productivity gains always refer to specified time periods, such as years. 
In this study we use annual data. The productivity gain of year t is understood as 
the productivity level in year t, expressed as a change over the productivity level in 
the previous year t – 1. The comparison and decomposition are also done annually. 
However, for simplicity, the references to time have been omitted from the following 
lengthy decomposition equations of this section.
Just as the Divisia indices that assume temporally continuous changes were 
approximated for discrete changes by Törnqvist indices, we once again need 
 9 The spatial comparison of productivity “levels” of firms raises many severe practical problems. It is 
very difficult, sometimes impossible, to ensure consistency and comparability for the technology, 
input and output data of different firms. Kiss [1984] discussed some of the problems of measure-
ment and comparison.
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a discrete approximation of the continuous changes assumed in equation (30). 
Kiss [1981], [1983] discussed some issues of discrete approximations. The simplest 
possible solution is recommended in the current study. For differences in techno-
logical effects, the equation becomes
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We approximate the difference in output effects in a similar way; i.e.,
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Changes in input prices also play a role in the productivity performance of firms by 
influencing the firm’s demand for factor inputs. Let us investigate this role! Temporal 
proportional changes in individual inputs (such as labour, capital and materials) can 
be decomposed into causal components in a similar fashion. The decomposition of 
change in the j-th input is
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 (33)
where εjT, εjQ and εji show the elasticity of the j-th input with respect to technolo-
gy, output and the i-th input price, respectively, and 
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denotes the 
proportional change in the i-th input’s price. Simplifying equation (33), we obtain 
equation (34) as
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 (34)
In this case, the spatial decomposition of inter-firm difference becomes
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This equation shows that the difference between the two firms with respect to 
the proportional change in the volume of the j-th input can be decomposed into 
1. a technological effect, 2. an output effect, 3. an input-price effect and 4. a residual 
effect. The input-price effect  ∑ ̇  (∑ ̇   ∑ ̇  ) 
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 can be further divided into 
an own-price effect 
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and (m – 1) number of cross-price effects (when j ≠ i).
Now we return to productivity. It has been shown that if the decomposition of 
temporal proportional changes in productivity as defined by equation (27) can be 
performed for both firms, the two temporal decompositions can be used to iden-
tify the inter-firm differences in causal components. Where there is more than 
one output, the first three additive factors on the right-hand side of equation (27) 
must be repeated for each output. Assuming for simplicity that both companies 
produce two outputs (α and β) and using equation (27) as a point of departure, the 
inter-firm decomposition of the sources of temporal changes takes the following, 
rather lengthy, form:
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Equation (31) is particularly instructive because it shows how the 
 ∑ ̇  (∑ ̇   ∑ ̇  ) 
    ̇  
    
  ̇   ̇   ̇  (     ̇        ̇  )  (     ̇        ̇  )   
(     ̇        ̇  )  (     ̇        ̇  ) 
 (     ̇        ̇  )  (     ̇        ̇  )  ( ̇   ̇ ) 
 ̇   ̇  
 
  ̇ (           ) 
     ̇  
     ̇  
  ̇ (           ) 
     ̇  
     ̇  
     ̇       ̇  
  ̇    
     ̇ 
 
(    ̇  ) 
 
 ̇   ̇  
( ̇   ̇ )
 
(         )  
(         )
 





 ̇   





ence can be decomposed into two causal components: 1. the difference between 
the proportionate changes in the variables and 2. the difference between their cost 
elasticities. The same decomposition can be performed for the remaining differenc-
es. The seven differences contained in equation (36) thus decompose the inter-firm 
difference in productivity gain into a total of nine well-defined and clearly charac-
terised components. The tenth component is the inter-firm difference due to the 
unexplainable residual effect. The categories emerging from the decomposition are 
summarised in Table 1.
Changes in the output structure of Firm A may differ from the changes in the out-
put structure of Firm B. The differences result from the diverging growth rates of 
outputs α and β in the two companies. Their effects are shown in Items 1 and 4 
of the table. We may, however, also give a broader interpretation to the effects of 
changes in output structure. The first three items show the total effect of output α 
on inter-firm differences of productivity gains, while the next three items give the 
same information for output β. Item 7 equals zero if the two firms use cost-cov-
ering average cost pricing. If the prices of one of the outputs exceed its average 
cost and generate surplus revenue beyond the cost while the prices of the other 
output are lower than the average cost and therefore generate a loss, i.e., internal 
cross-subsidisation takes place, the total effect of non-average-cost pricing will be 
the sum of Items 3, 6 and 7. With two outputs, this may be very simple; e.g., one 
output – say β – may generate a profit while the other output – say α – may gen-
erate a loss for both firms. If we look at Firm A or Firm B separately, the loss effect 
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TABLE 1 • Components of inter-firm differences in productivity gains
Explanatory factor Formula
1. An increase in the production of output α  
2. Economies of scale specific to output α  
3. The non-average-cost price of output α 
4. Increase in the production of output β 
5. Economies of scale specific to output β 
6. The non-average-cost price of output β 
7. Profit/loss due to non-cost-covering pricing 
8. Technological changes
9. Technology elasticity of cost 
10. Residual increase in productivity —
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is due to the non-average-cost prices of output α, and the profit effect is due to the 
non-average-cost prices of output β. The definitions used for the decomposition 
can be modified so that they reflect this situation. However, we cannot “allocate” 
the profit-loss effect if more than two outputs exist, unless we obtain more infor-
mation than what can be reasonably assumed to be available, and construct a more 
complex multi-output model.
A REPRESENTATIVE INTER-FIRM COMPARISON10
In the remainder of this article it is demonstrated – with the aid of actual firm-level 
data on output and input prices and volumes as well as technological changes – how 
inter-firm comparisons and decompositions of annual productivity gains can be 
successfully conducted. Two firms have been chosen for the empirical study, mainly 
because their technologies were sufficiently similar, and their data were publicly 
available. Since the purpose of this demonstration is the illustration of the process, 
their names, locations, and the chosen period of observation are not revealed.
Let us introduce the data! The two companies make the same products. The 
output volume of Firm B surpassed that of Firm A by a great deal but A’s growth rate 
(14 percent per annum on average) was substantially higher than B’s (8 percent per 
annum on average). A relatively fast process of catching up is witnessed. The output 
growth rates are displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix. At the start of the observa-
tion period, Output α had a 33 percent revenue share in Firm A, and 57 percent in 
Firm B. During the observation period, this revenue share declined to 30 percent 
in Firm A and to 48 percent in Firm B, while the share of Output β increased from 
62 percent to 66 percent in Firm A, and from 37 percent to 48 percent in Firm B, 
demonstrating that Firm B underwent a faster structural change than Firm A. The 
third Output g had low revenue shares, which did not change significantly over time; 
it decreased from 5 percent to 4 percent in both companies. Most of the output ef-
fects were therefore generated by Outputs β and α. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows 
that very different forces acted upon the markets of the two companies. During the 
12-year period of observation, there were only seven years when the growth of the 
output of the two companies accelerated or decelerated in parallel.
A phenomenon of some importance with respect to productivity performance 
is that the faster growth of Firm A was accompanied by greater annual fluctuations. 
The standard deviation of the former (10.7) is almost twice as large as that of the 
10 In order to maintain focus on the problems and solutions associated with concepts, measurements 
and analytical tools that regulatory and corporate productivity analysts encounter in their normal 
practice, we strive to divert attention from the representative firms themselves. They are just an 
illustration. This paper is not about them; it is about the principles, methods, and the practice of 
productivity analysis. 
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latter (5.8). Large variability in the growth rates of the outputs was accompanied 
by an almost equally large variability in the growth rates of the inputs. The input 
growth rates are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. Their standard deviation was 
10.1 for Firm A and 4.7 for Firm B. The capital inputs of both companies displayed 
a linear increase over time but there was substantial fluctuation in the growth of 
material input and, for Firm A, in the growth of labour input as well. As revealed by 
Figure A2 in the Appendix, not only the output markets but also the input markets 
of the two companies were affected by quite different forces. During the 12-year 
period, there were only four years when the input growth of the two companies 
accelerated or decelerated in parallel.
The high annual fluctuations in outputs and inputs do not lead to high fluctua-
tions in the annual productivity gains if there is a strong correlation between them. 
Figures A3 and A4, however, show a weak correlation for both companies. During 
the 12-year period, the increase in output and input accelerated or decelerated si-
multaneously in Firm A and Firm B in only five of the years. Consequently, as shown 
in Figure A5, the annual productivity growth rates are characterised by a great deal 
of fluctuation. The annual proportional changes in productivity are displayed in 
Table 2 below and in Figure A4 in the Appendix. As an illustration of the degree of 
fluctuations, the table also shows the extent of deviation from the mean.
Technological changes presumably did not influence the annual fluctuations in 
productivity gains to a significant extent. There are two reasons for this: the first one 
applies to Firm B and the second one mainly to Firm A. First, technological changes 
took place at a fast pace but were relatively evenly distributed in time for Firm B (see 
TABLE 2 • Changes in productivity in Firm A and Firm B 
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Annual proportional change Deviation from the mean
A B A – B A B A – B
1 9.39 3.54 5.85 –3.04 0.28 –3.33
2 3.72 4.20 –0.48 2.63 –0.38 3.00
3 3.61 0.47 3.14 2.74 3.35 –0.62
4 8.78 6.07 2.71 –2.43 –2.25 –0.19
5 6.70 5.17 1.53 –0.35 –1.35 0.99
6 12.67 5.65 7.02 –6.32 –1.83 –4.50
7 1.60 8.45 –6.85 4.75 –4.63 9.37
8 –1.42 2.33 –3.75 7.77 1.49 6.27
9 3.77 1.14 2.63 2.58 2.68 –0.11
10 8.61 2.36 6.25 –2.26 1.46 –3.73
11 9.70 3.49 6.21 –3.35 0.33 –3.69
12 9.47 3.93 5.54 –3.12 –0.11 –3.02
13 5.89 2.90 2.99 0.46 0.92 –0.47
Mean 6.35 3.82 2.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table A3 and Figure A10). Their standard deviation has a low value for this firm. The 
same observation however would not apply to Firm A, where the technology variable 
shows high annual fluctuation and a large standard deviation. Second, as Figure A8 
indicates, there is a weak correlation between annual changes in technology and 
productivity for Firm A. This suggests that technological changes did not have sig-
nificant immediate or short-term cost-saving effects. Figure A9 shows a stronger 
correlation pointing to more intensive effects of technological changes in Firm B.
There are two important further observations. First, the introduction new tech-
nologies was completed much faster in Firm A than in Firm B. Faster output growth 
rate and better financial position appear to have played a role in this. Second, al-
though technological progress and output growth show the same cyclic behaviour, 
the technology cycles follow the output cycles with some delay.
SPECIFICATION OF THE EMPIRICAL MODELS
Initially the technologies of the two firms are analysed separately in firm-specific 
production models. Results from the models that are specified and estimated inde-
pendently for Firm A and Firm B are expected to provide guidance for an assessment 
of whether the statistical quality and economic meaningfulness of the parameter 
estimates can be improved by building shared models. If – as in our case – results 
from the estimated firm-specific models suggest that there is a need and room for 
significant improvement, shared models are attempted.
A thorough investigation of technological properties and management behaviour 
suggested that the production processes of both firms could be expressed with the 
aid of either the single-output or the multi-output total cost functions of equations 
(12) and (20), respectively.
As mentioned before, the two companies were producing the same three outputs. 
However, as a first approximation, it was assumed for the sake of simplicity that only 
one output – an aggregate of the three – was produced. The simplicity of the single 
output model makes it especially suitable for illustrating the basic characteristics 
of comparisons and decompositions. This assumption was discarded in our second 
approximation, and a multi-output model was built.
Equations (12) and (20) are capable of describing either a cost minimising or 
a profit maximising firm. The initial set of cost models was based on the assump-
tion of pure cost minimising corporate behaviour. Cost minimisers endogenously 
determine input volumes in order to produce exogenously determined volumes of 
output volumes at minimum cost, subject to exogenous input prices. The exogeneity 
of input prices was a reasonable assumption because both firms purchased their in-
puts on markets which could safely be characterised as perfectly competitive. Their 
output on the other hand was neither purely exogenous nor purely endogenous. 
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On the one hand, regulation imposed on both firms some obligations to satisfy de-
mand generated by prices that had been strongly influenced by regulation, thereby 
de facto defining or at least strongly influencing market size. On the other hand, due 
to their market power and the light-handed nature of regulation, the management 
of both firms could influence output prices and volumes to a considerable degree. 
Recognising the resulting endogeneity of outputs, and as an alternative to pure cost 
minimisation, profit maximising corporate behaviour, subject to endogenous output 
volumes, was also assumed in the second set of cost models.11
Technological changes were assumed exogenous in both sets. The assumption 
of exogeneity seems essentially reasonable. The main driving force of the observed 
technological changes was the digital revolution itself, which left very limited tech-
nological choices for the companies. It was clear to both firms that their business 
success was to a large extent a function of how rapidly and efficiently they managed 
to exploit the constantly emerging new technological possibilities.12
The total cost function is specified as a so-called transcendental function. It is 
generated by the flexible, second-order Taylor series local expansion of the gen-
eral-form neoclassical cost function. The transcendental specification has been 
selected in order to avoid a priori constraints on technological properties. The 
mathematical shape of a transcendental function is determined by the data rather 
than by such constraints.
First we assume a single homogeneous output, include the prices of three ho-
mogeneous inputs (labour, capital and materials), and apply a temporal index series 
of cost-saving exogenous technological changes. The firm-specific transcendental 
cost function relying on these assumptions is
C= α0+ α1w + α2r+ α3m + α4Q + βT + 1/2(γ11w2 + γ22r2  (37)
+ γ33m2 + γ44Q2 + βTT2) + γ12wr + γ13wm + γ23rm + γ14wQ +
+ γ24rQ + γ34mQ + β1wT + β2rT + β3mT + βQQT,
where C denotes the total economic cost of production; w, r and m are the prices 
of labour, capital and material inputs, respectively; Q represents the volume of the 
single output; and T denotes the technological index.
The usual parametric restrictions to impose first-order homogeneity in input 
prices are applied.13 Following the usual practice of econometric cost analyses, un-
der the assumption of cost minimisation the cost function is estimated as part of 
11 The profit maximising cost models have been excluded from this paper.
12 Since certain elements of technological changes are highly dependent on management decisions, 
such elements should be regarded as endogenous. However, due to limitations in size, this study 
is not extended to more complex, detailed treatments of technological changes.
13 The imposition of Sj�j = 1; Sj�ji = Sj�j = 0 (i = 1, …, 4; j = 1, …, 3) results in first-degree homogeneity 
of the cost function in input prices. This common sense requirement ensures that if all input prices 
are raised by the same percentage then production cost undergoes an identical percentage increase. 
 INTER-FIRM COMPARISON AND DECOMPOSITION OF PRODUCTIVITY GAINS 155
a simultaneous equation system in which the application of Shephard’s well-known 
lemma yields two cost share equations.14 The parameters are estimated in a modified 
version of the procedure originally developed by Zellner [1962] for the estimation 
of “seemingly unrelated” regression equations.
The productivity performances of any two companies may be compared to each 
other in order to establish which one has higher or faster improving productivity. 
Firm-specific cost models may also reveal what causes generated how much cost 
saving and improvement in productivity. Inter-firm comparisons can be made. It 
is not required that technological or other similarities exist between the two firms. 
The quality of the estimated parameters can, however, often be improved in a situ-
ation where technological and other similarities between the compared firms allow 
the building of a common technology model. When relatively few observations are 
available, for instance, the use of this model increases the degrees of freedom and 
thus contributes to the “sharpening” of the parameter estimates. Building a common 
technology model often leads to a significant improvement, when the two compa-
nies operate in the same industry.
Common technology is represented by a common or “shared” total cost func-
tion which allows both similarities and differences to exist between the two firms. 
Technological similarities are revealed by forming and testing a set of constraining 
null hypotheses that express various equivalences between their technologies. The 
test results allow us to describe a technology some parts of which are shared by 
the two companies, while other parts are not. The least constrained shared cost 
function allows differences between Firm A and Firm B in each of the parameters 
of the cost function, but assumes that the same variance-covariance matrix applies 
to both companies. Binary dummy variables allow each parameter of the shared 
cost function to be firm-specific. The use of all possible dummies (DA = 1, DB = 0) 
results in the following lengthy specification:
C = α0 + α0ADA + (α1 + α1ADA)w + (α2 + α2ADA)r + (α3 + α3ADA)m + (38)
+ (α4 + α4ADA)Q + (β + βADA)T + 1/2((γ11+γ11ADA)w2 + (γ22 + γ22ADA)r2 + 
+ (γ33 + γ33ADA)m2 + (γ44 + γ44ADA)Q2 + (βT + βTADA)T2 + (γ12 + γ12ADA)wr +
+ (γ13 + γ13ADA)wm + (γ23 + γ23ADA)rm + (γ14 + γ14ADA)wQ +
+ (γ24 + γ24ADA)rQ + (γ34 + γ34ADA)mQ + (β1 + β1ADA)wT +
+ (β2 + β2ADA)rT + (β3 + β3ADA)mT + (βQ + βQADA)QT.
The firm-specific models of equation (37) are estimated first. The next two sections 
discuss the results for Firm A and Firm B, respectively.
14 In order to preserve the non-singularity of the variance-covariance matrix, one equation – here the 
material cost share – was omitted. Under the assumption of profit maximisation, revenue share 
equations would also appear in the system of simultaneous equations.
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ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR FIRM A
Annual observations are available for both companies, but for Firm A we had to 
use relatively short, 15-year time series because the company’s productivity reports 
covered only a decade and a half. In line with our expectations and with the results 
of studies performed by other analysts before us, the estimation of equation (37) 
failed due to insufficient degrees of freedom. For the most general form, the uncon-
strained equation (37), we obtained non-significant estimates for several necessarily 
non-zero parameters, while the estimates were unreasonably high for some of the 
basic economic characteristics. A lengthy exploration of the various constraining 
null-hypotheses, however, provided some useful results. A likelihood ratio tests 
showed that three hypotheses, namely γ44 = βQ = βT = 0, could not be rejected. Some 
estimation problems (incorrect curvatures and signs) remained, however, even after 
introducing the constraints. Our further analyses revealed that the input structure 
of Firm A was quite stable throughout the period. This phenomenon suggested that 
the observed small changes in the input structure were probably a consequence of 
the changes in input prices, i.e., the production technology was homothetic and 
the technological changes were input-neutral. These conclusions led to the test-
ing of hypotheses βj = 0 and γj4 = 0, which gave noteworthy results. Although the 
hypotheses were rejected, their inclusion resulted in a statistically acceptable and 
economically meaningful model, which offered useful information for the specifi-
cation of the shared A-B model. The following parameter estimates were obtained 
(t-values are given in brackets underneath the coefficients):
  (39)
where Ds is a binary dummy variable showing the effect of major structural changes 
in one of the years of the observation period.
Every variable is logarithmically transformed in our model because hypotheses 
on the linear and Box-Cox transformations were rejected for every variable. We 
furthermore used the usual parameter constraints ensuring input price homoge-
neity of degree 1 of the cost function because our test results did not allow us to 
reject the hypothesis.
The first-order technological parameter was non-significant. This result sur-
faced in most models for Firm A, suggesting that technological changes did not 
have a substantial direct (immediate) cost-saving effect, that is, they did not play 
a recognisable role in explaining changes in the company’s inputs, costs and produc-
tivity. The degree of economies of scale was high and constant. The output elasticity 
of cost was estimated at εCQ = 0.61, and thus the derived input elasticity of output, 
C – m = 0.87 – 0.081Ds + 0.335(w–m) + 0.530(r–m) + 0.615Q – 0.141T + (10.9) (–3.8) (94) (178) (22) (–1.15) + 0.144(1/2w2+1/2m2 –wm) – 0.076(wr–wm–rm+m2) + 0.103(1/2r2+1/2m2– rm), (1.99) (–2.64) (3.9)
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the scale elasticity was εQX = 1.63. The input price elasticities of cost showed little 
change over time. Production costs were most sensitive to capital prices and least 
sensitive to material prices. Demand for all three inputs was price-inelastic. For the 
relationships between inputs, the estimates suggested complementary between la-
bour and material, while labour-capital as well as capital-material substitution was 
indicated. As this brief summary of results shows, the cost function satisfied the 
theoretical requirements of economic rationality, and contained no unreasonable 
economic properties. Various further null-hypotheses were applied to the model, 
but all of them were rejected. The model as shown in equation (39) can therefore 
be regarded as the final outcome of our explorations.
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR FIRM B
The time series provided by the productivity report of Firm B go back all the way to 
the end of World War II. The oldest data had to be disregarded, however, because the 
technology used during the early years was fundamentally different from the one in 
use during the 15-year period we considered for Firm A. First we determined where 
to cut the time series. An investigation into past technological changes revealed that 
in one rather short time period, technological changes of so fundamental a nature 
occurred that it seemed reasonable to separate the long time series into periods of 
“old” and “new” technologies. Several cost models were estimated for various periods 
of observation. Based on test results, years of the “old” technologies were cut out. 
After discarding the observations of the years that preceded the great technology 
change, we still managed to lengthen the 15-year period shared with Firm A by 12 
more years. The cost functions were then estimated with both the 27-year and the 
15-year-long data sample. The parameter estimates and the economic characteris-
tics gained from them differed only to a negligible extent but the estimates of the 
longer period were more efficient in a statistical sense and we decided to work with 
them. Tests conducted to determine variable transformations in all specifications, 
including the unconstrained translog cost function shown in equation (37) yielded 
the following final conclusions for Firm B:
 • Linear transformation was rejected for every variable.
 • Logarithmic transformation could not be rejected for the output variable and the 
technology index.
 • Box-Cox transformation was applied to all other variables. Variable transformation 
parameters were obtained in the 0 < λ < 1 interval.
 • The hypothesis of a homothetic production process could not be rejected.
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Estimation results:
  (40)
The statistical properties of the cost function satisfy the requirements set by eco-
nomic theory and reasonable expectations. The economic characteristics are ra-
tional and reasonable. The annual estimates of scale elasticity are generally high. 
They increased slightly at the beginning of the period then stayed at the elevated 
level for several years, after which a slight decline was observed, and finally their 
value remained constant for the last few years of the period. During the last ten 
years, the scale elasticity of A was slightly higher than the scale elasticity of B but 
the difference is not statistically significant.
The technology elasticity of cost was negative. The estimated annual values 
appeared reasonable and corresponded roughly to results from engineering type 
investigations. Another interesting result that also matches engineering type esti-
mates is that in the last two thirds of the period, technological changes (involving 
primarily the digitisation and computerisation of increasingly network-based pro-
duction processes) increased the technology elasticity of cost. In other words, the 
direct cost-saving effect of technological changes seems to have increased.
The estimates of input price elasticities of cost were essentially the same as 
those obtained for Firm A for all three inputs. Once again, production costs were 
most sensitive to capital prices and least sensitive to material prices. As in Firm A, 
demand for all three inputs was insensitive to input prices; the price elasticity of 
capital input was somewhat lower here than in Firm A, the price elasticity of mate-
rial somewhat higher, while the price elasticity of labour was the same. Inputs were 
shown as substitutes to each other, except in the second part of the period, when 
labour and capital were complementary. Null-hypotheses of numerous further pos-
sible relationships were tested but we always rejected the constraints they implied. 
The model described in equation (40) can therefore be considered to be the final 
outcome of our exploration.
The cost models estimated separately for the two firms show some profound 
technological similarities. This warrants the testing of common technological hy-
potheses in estimated shared cost function.
C – m = 0.009 + 0.297(w – m) + 0.542(r – m) + 0.576Q – 0.588T +  (2.26) (145) (253) (26) –4.1) + 0.130(1/2w2 + 1/2m2 – wm) – 0.16 (wr – wm – rm + m2) + (11) (–14) + 0.241(1/2r2 + 1/2m2–rm) – 0.302(w – m)T + 0.34(r – m)T +  (14) (–20) (22) 
 + 0.141(1/2Q2) + 1.43(1/2T2) – 0.734QT (2.11) (2.45) (–2.94)  
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ESTIMATION RESULTS FROM THE SHARED (A + B) MODEL
For each parameter, we tested the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
the two firms, i.e., that the parameter estimate of the binary variable DA does not 
significantly differ from zero. It was obvious, however, that not even the increased 
number of observation points of the shared cost function can provide sufficient de-
grees of freedom for the simultaneous estimation of the large number of parameters 
that appear in equation (38) even in the simplified case where the cost function is 
restricted to being homogeneous of degree 1 in input prices. Testing the equality 
of parameters for A and B required a large number of hypotheses which had to be 
tested in several steps.
Four constraints offered themselves as a point of departure. First, since the cost 
share of capital input was the same for the two firms in the year around which the 
Taylor-series expansion of the function was done, it seemed sensible to use the 
constraint α2A = 0, i.e., to test the hypothesis that the two companies had the same 
first-order capital parameters. Second, as the parameters of the cost functions esti-
mated separately suggested that the first-order output parameters were also equal, 
we also tested the constraint α4A = 0. The results of the cost functions estimated 
separately for A and B suggested the third and fourth constraints: γ14A = γ24A = 0. 
The constraints were applied individually and also in combination. The results 
were discouraging. Some parameters proved to be of poor statistical quality and 
unacceptable from an economic point of view (incorrect sign and unreasonable 
magnitude) indicating that the specification was far from being able to provide 
a reasonable representation of the firms’ technologies.
An examination of the results revealed that most of the estimation problems 
were rooted in three parameters (γ44, βQ and βT). The realisation of this led to a re-
assessment and some correction of the output and technology data and prompted 
an investigation of the behaviour of the three parameters in the presence of various 
constraints. We returned to the results of the firm-specific models once again and 
established that none of the three parameters was significantly different from zero 
for Firm A. After introducing constraints in the forms of γ44A = –γ44, βQA = –βQ and 
βTA = –βT, there was a dramatic improvement in the estimates.15
Further constraints could also be implemented because the second-order pa-
rameters were not statistically significant allowing us to introduce zero-constraints. 
Indeed, the hypotheses of equality between the corresponding second-order pa-
rameters of the two firms γ11A = γ12A = γ22A = 0 could not be rejected based on the 
15 The results of the tests were somewhat contradictory because the likelihood ratio test indicated 
that the hypotheses could be rejected while the t-statistic suggested that they could not. However, 
the results improved to such an extent that we elected to retain the hypotheses and use the con-
strained cost function as the starting point for further investigation.
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likelihood ratio test. When the constraints were applied, all of the parameters of 
the cost function became highly significant.
The results also indicated that even more constraints could be introduced. Since 
the second-order parameter estimates of the input-technology interaction were close 
to zero for Firm A, the hypotheses β1A = β1 and β2A = β2 were tested. Neither could 
be rejected. At this point, we reached the limit of constraining the cost function. 
All further constraints were rejected. The model shown in equation (41) can there-
fore be considered to be the final outcome of our exploration of the single-output 
shared cost function
  (41)
where all variables, with the exception of the dummies, appear in a logarithmically 
transformed form.
Equation (41) describes the greatest possible extent of similarities between the 
production technologies of the two companies. We built these similarities into the 
shared cost function in a statistically and economically justifiable way and learned 
a great deal more from the shared models than what we knew having estimated 
only single-firms models. The structural information thus gained can be used to 
complete the decomposition and forecasting of changes in the two companies’ input 
volumes and productivity. Before doing that, let us sum up what we have learned!
For both companies and for each year, the cost function satisfies the behavioural 
requirements that neoclassical production theory poses for production costs. Rea-
sonable estimates were obtained for input demand and the relationships between 
the three input categories. The own-price elasticities of input demand have a priori 
correct negative signs. Demand for each of the three inputs is inelastic with respect 
to its own price. The inputs substitute for each other with the exception of comple-
mentary relationship between capital input and material input in Firm A.
There is a high degree of economies of scale for both companies. For Firm A, 
the annual estimates vary within the narrow range of εQX = 1.65 – 1.67. The reason-
ableness of this estimate can be tested by looking at the relationship between the 
annual output growth rates and the annual productivity growth rates. As can be 
C – m = 0.004 – 1.899DA – 0.082Ds + (0.296 + 0.029DA)(w–m) + (0.74) (–249) (–5.4) (149) (10.8) + 0.542(r – m) + 0.600Q – (0.650 + 0.556DA)T +  (360) (32.6) (–4.47) (5.33)
 + 0.122(1/2w2 + 1/2m2 – wm) – 0.129(wr – wm – rm + m2) + (8.9) (–10.1) + 0.214(1/2r2+1/2m2 – rm) – (0.325 – 0.325DA)(w–m)T + (12.5) (–16.7) + (0.373 – 0.373DA)(r – m)T + 0.010(w – m)Q– 0.022(r – m)Q +  (20.9) (2.44) (–5.83) + (0.300 – 0.300DA) 1/2Q2 – (1.153 – 1.153DA)QT + (2.566 – 2.566DA) 1/2T2. (2.67) (–3.04) (2.36)
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seen in Figure A6 in the Appendix, this relationship is relatively stable for Firm A; 
i.e., the scale elasticity is approximately constant. For Firm B, the annual estimates 
of scale elasticity follow the same characteristic path as the estimates derived from 
the firm-specific model and available previous estimates by other analysts. The rel-
atively stable degree of economies of scale is explained for both companies by the 
opposite forces of the scale-economies-exhausting effects of output growth on the 
one hand, and the scale-economies-increasing effects of technological changes on 
the other hand. It seems that the two forces roughly counterbalanced each other. An 
increase in production normally reduces the degree of economies of scale if technol-
ogy remains unchanged.16 However, those technological changes whose cost saving 
effects expand as the volume of output increases lead to increases in the degree of 
economies of scale. The rapid growth and the rapid technological progress appeared 
to be more or less in balance during the observation period for Firm A. For Firm B, 
however, we may argue that the effects of rapid technological progress exceeded the 
effects of the gradually decelerating growth of the firm during the observation period.
The annual estimates of the technology elasticity of cost are not completely sat-
isfactory. For Firm A, the annual estimates remain constant over time at the value 
of εCT = –1. This is considered reasonable. For Firm B, however, the absolute values 
of the a priori correctly negative estimates are slightly higher than what we could 
accept as reasonable. Finally, when the annual estimates are based on the longer 
27-year sample period, they show a trend. A weaker impact on costs during the first 
12 years is followed by a temporally increasing trend. If, however, the model overes-
timates the technology elasticity of costs, it will also underestimate its counterpoint, 
the degree of economies of scale. A comparison with the results of the firm-specific 
model indeed appears to support the suspicion that the shared model somewhat 
underestimated the scale elasticity of Firm B (while somewhat overestimating it for 
the years preceding the shared period.)
The shared cost function described in equation (38) and the estimation results 
shown in equation (41) rely on the assumption that the products of both companies 
can be aggregated into a single output. The single-output model gave statistically 
valid and economically reasonable results, which are often perfectly suitable for 
cost analysis and the decomposition of temporal changes in productivity and of 
inter-firm differences in those temporal changes. But there are two hidden dan-
gers in using single-output models. First, the estimates may be biased if the output 
aggregate does not exist. Second, information with respect to individual output 
categories may be needed for both regulatory and management purposes. Impacts 
16 This phenomenon tends to exist for established firms that have been operating for a long time. 
With new or young firms, however, the opposite phenomenon may also occur, i.e., an increase in 
the size of production may be accompanied by an increase in the degree of economies of scale. 
Our firms A and B are old, established, large enterprises.
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by the output aggregate need to be decomposed into individual output effects. This 
can be achieved by estimating multi-output shared cost functions. A multi-output 
model offers valuable information: its estimates show the roles of individual out-
puts in productivity growth, and reveal similarities and differences in the inter-
actions between technological changes and individual outputs. When faced with 
output-augmenting technological progress, it is an especially useful feature that we 
can assign output-specific effects.
Both companies have three main output categories (α, β and γ, see Table A1, 
where their temporal proportional changes are shown). With these inserted into 
equation (38), the number of first- and second-order parameters waiting to be 
estimated increases to such an extent that it exceeds the number of observations, 
therefore the parameters of the three-output model cannot be estimated. In our 
case the number of observations is insufficient to gain efficient estimates even for 
two-output models. Decomposition of productivity growth rates and inter-firm 
differences in productivity growth rates are accomplished using the single-output 
model. To overcome the difficulty caused by the insufficient number of observa-
tions, it is advisable to base the productivity measurement and analysis on at least 
quarterly, and preferably on monthly, data.
DECOMPOSITION OF PRODUCTIVITY GAINS
During the 13-year observation period,17 the average annual productivity gain (pro-
portional change in productivity) in Firm A was 2.52 percentage points higher than 
the corresponding rate in Firm B. We now attempt to find out why. The inter-firm 
difference is decomposed into several causal components displayed in Table 3. The 
component which is generated by economies of scale can be further decomposed 
according to the following formula:
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The firm-specific and the shared models show strong similarities with respect to 
our most important empirical result: the fairly large – 2.52 percentage point – dif-
ference between the two firms’ productivity growth rates was almost entirely (in 
95-96 percent) the consequence of Firm A growing more rapidly than Firm B. The 
remaining effects were individually negligibly small, even if combined. As they 
showed very small values, we did not deem it necessary to further decompose the 
technology effects.
17 For a period of 13 years a total of 12 growth rates can be computed, since growth in the first year 
is not known. 
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In Firm A, 86–89 percent of productivity growth is due to the rapid increase in the 
volume of the firm’s output in the presence of substantial degrees of economies of 
scale. The direct cost saving due to technological changes is responsible for only 
7–11 percent of the actual productivity gain. We mentioned the possibility of such 
a result when we showed that there was a strong correlation between the annual 
growth rates of Firm A’s output and productivity, while the technological changes 
correlated rather weakly with changes in productivity during the observation period. 
We then surmised that the main reason for the introduction of the new technolo-
gies was probably not the immediate and short-term cost saving. We later added 
that technological progress was more likely driven by the expected positive effects 
of new technologies on economies of scale. It was expected that cost savings due 
to the introduction of new technologies would gradually emerge and increase over 
time as the volume of output increased over a longer period of time.
The estimates seem to support this reasoning. It is an interesting result that 
the technology of Firm A had a weaker effect on productivity growth (i.e., caused 
a smaller immediate cost reduction) than the technology of Firm B even though 
technological progress was faster in A than in B. The explanation may be that Firm 
A’s markets, and hence its output and revenues grew at a very high rate. Fast out-
put growth forced – and rapidly increasing revenues allowed – the introduction of 
new technologies at an ambitious pace, which – precisely because of its ambitious 
nature – resulted in extra costs and thus curbed the extent of immediate and short-
term cost savings.
TABLE 3 • The decomposition of average proportional productivity change 
Effects









Productivity growth 6.34 100 3.82 100 2.52 100
Technological effect 0.69 11 0.75 20 –0.07 –3
Growth effect 5.45 86 3.49 91 1.98 79
Due to economies of scale – – – – –0.45 –17
Due to output increase  – – – – 2.43 96
Residual effect 0.20 3 –0.42 –11 0.61 24
Shared model
Productivity growth 6.34 100 3.82 100 2.52 100
Technological effect 0.45 7 0.84 22 –0.39 –15
Growth effect 5.66 89 3.30 86 2.36 94
Due to economies of scale – – – – –0.04 –1
Due to output increase  – – – – 2.40 95
Residual effect 0.23 4 –0.32 –8 0.55 22
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Turning to Firm B, 86–91 percent of productivity growth is due to the increase 
in output in the presence of economies of scale. The immediate and short-term 
cost-saving effects of technological changes are responsible for 21–22 percent of 
the average productivity gain. This finding is consistent with previous estimates 
available from the company.
The residual effect left unexplained by the model is fairly high, especially for Firm 
B, where it represents 8–11 percent of productivity growth. This phenomenon is due 
to the high variability of annual productivity gains. In a small sample – a 13-year pe-
riod in our case – highly variable individual residuals can have a strong effect on the 
mean residual. High temporal variability of productivity gains is a widely observed 
phenomenon. Corporate reports show that productivity growth – with, it is safe to 
claim, few exceptions – tends to proceed at an uneven pace over time. There are 
several reasons for this. An especially important reason is that temporarily unused 
capacities are necessarily created during investments, since capital input exhibits 
high degrees of indivisibility. Unused capacities temporarily decrease the annual 
productivity growth rate, and when the unused capacities are finally utilised, their 
presence accelerates the annual growth in productivity.
DECOMPOSITION OF INPUT GROWTH RATES
Input growth rates are one of the two components of productivity gains. Table 4 
offers their decomposition in firm-specific and combined A + B models. Average 
annual growth rates are broken down to a technology effect, an output growth 
effect, and as many input price effects as the number of inputs. We work with 
three input categories: labour, capital and material. Output growth exerts the most 
important effect on the volumes of inputs. In fact, its effect is so important that 
it exceeds that of the growth rate in productivity. This is possible only if the com-
bined other effects are negative in the sense that they make input volumes to de-
cline. As can be seen in Table 4, this is what happens for all three inputs.18 This is 
not surprising, given that the majority of input prices increased and the majority 
of technological changes had an input-reducing effect. The input-saving effect 
of technological changes shows substantial annual fluctuation. For Firm B, there 
was a year when the annual capital-saving effect was as low as zero, but in another 
year a saving as high as 2.19 percentage points was achieved. The latter is a quite 
exceptional figure, but our examination of the events of that year convinced us 
that it was a valid estimate.
18 For all inputs in Firm A and for labour input in Firm B. 
 INTER-FIRM COMPARISON AND DECOMPOSITION OF PRODUCTIVITY GAINS 165
Increases in input prices substantially reduced the growth rates of inputs, especial-
ly those of labour, because labour was the most price sensitive input. Increases in 
labour prices generated an average annual decline of 2.28 percentage points in the 
use of labour in Firm A, and 3.16 percentage points in Firm B. Material input also 
showed high degrees of price sensitivity: 2.25 and 2.44 percentage points annually on 
average for Firms A and B, respectively. Cross-price elasticities tended to be smaller 
than own-price elasticities. One exception was the price of labour input, which had 
a substantial effect on the use of material inputs in both companies.
Averaging the annual rates over the 13-year observation period, Firm A increased 
the volume of labour input 6 percent faster, capital input 2.6 percent faster and mate-
rial input 1.7 percent faster than Firm B. The differences between input growth rates 
are due mainly to the faster increase of output volumes in Firm A than in Firm B. Rel-
ative to Firm B, the input-saving effect of technological progress in Firm A acceler-
ated the increase in labour and material inputs but decelerated the growth of capital.
TABLE 4 • Decomposition of the average growth rates of inputs 
Effects








Labour input 8.73 100 2.69 100 6.04 100
Technological effect –0.45 –5 –2.19 –81 1.74 29
Growth effect 8.93 102 5.16 192 3.77 62
Labour price effect –2.28 –26 –3.16 –117 0.88 15
Capital price effect 1.36 16 0.73 27 0.63 10
Material price effect 1.22 14 1.28 48 –0.06 –1
Residual effect –0.05 –1 0.87 32 –0.92 –15
Capital Input 7.30 100 4.69 100 2.61 100
Technological effect –0.45 –6 0.00 0 –0.45 –17
Growth effect 7.93 109 4.57 97 3.36 129
Labour price effect 0.69 9 0.64 14 0.05 2
Capital price effect –0.62 –8 –0.44 –9 –0.18 –7
Material price effect –0.19 –3 0.03 1 –0.22 –8
Residual effect –0.06 –1 –0.11 –2 0.05 2
Material input 8.01 100 6.31 100 1.70 100
Technological effect –0.45 –6 –1.20 –19 0.75 44
Growth effect 9.86 123 5.55 88 4.31 254
Labour price effect 2.92 36 3.68 58 –0.76 –45
Capital price effect –0.92 –11 0.09 1 –1.01 –59
Material price effect –2.25 –28 –2.44 –39 0.19 11
Residual effect –1.15 –14 0.63 10 –1.78 –105
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Inter-firm differences in input prices had only a mild effect on the differences 
in input growth rates in the case of labour, an especially mild effect with respect to 
capital, but an outstandingly strong effect on material. Owing to faster increases 
in input prices and higher price elasticities of demand for inputs, overall the input 
price effect caused the average annual growth rate of productivity of Firm A to be 
1.5 percentage points lower than the corresponding indicator of Firm B.
The unexplained residual effect is very high for material input. This is caused 
mostly by the high annual fluctuation in the material input of Firm A that is also 
apparent in Table A2. In contrast, since the capital input increased relatively steadily 
over time for both companies, the residual effect is negligibly low for capital. Five 
causal factors are shown in Table 4. They could be further decomposed into size 
effects and intensity effects. Such decomposition, however, would fall beyond the 
scope of the present study.
CONCLUSION
As noted in the introduction, doing everything in their power to facilitate the ef-
ficient operation of the firms they regulate is one of the most important duties of 
socially responsible regulators. They cannot carry out their duty, unless they under-
stand productivity. They must measure, compare and analyse corporate productivity 
in various ways, using an arsenal of economic and econometric analytical tools.
Historically, productivity studies were developed first by regulated monopolies 
for their own use as well as for regulatory purposes. Beginning in the 1960’s, reg-
ulators of monopolies made extensive use of them for several decades, especially 
following the world-wide spread of price cap regulation. However, with the advent 
of the competitive era; i.e., the introduction of competition into formerly monopoly 
markets, productivity studies were forced into the background by not more impor-
tant but more urgent problems of imperfectly competitive markets. However, it is 
easy to see the reasons why productivity is even more important for competitive 
companies and regulators of imperfectly competitive markets than it used to be for 
monopolies and their regulators.
Productivity analysis is also an important and useful tool in the hands of corpo-
rate management. The competitiveness and market position of regulated as well as 
unregulated companies, the price and quality of their products and services, and 
ultimately their profitability all depend on how rapidly they may be able to improve 
their productivity. They also must study and understand productivity.
From a corporate as well as a regulatory point of view, a renaissance of produc-
tivity studies in the not so distant future would be very much in order. This paper 
is a small contribution showing how certain useful productivity analyses, particu-
larly those that involve inter-firm comparisons and causal decompositions, could 
be conducted for management and regulatory purposes.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 • Annual proportional changes* in the output volumes of Firms A and B 
 ̇ 
 ̇  
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(     ̇  ) 
(     ̇  ) 
     ̇  
 
Year
Output α Output β Output γ Total output
A B A – B A B A – B A B A –+ B A B A – B
1 10.8 7.5 3.4 15.2 13.9 1.3 –3.2 7.7 –10.9 12.9 9.9 3.0
2 9.2 6.7 2.5 12.7 8.5 4.2 14.6 8.2 6.3 11.7 7.5 4.1
3 9.3 6.4 2.9 10.8 4.4 6.3 7.1 7.0 0.1 10.1 5.7 4.5
4 11.2 7.5 3.7 16.5 12.1 4.4 3.6 9.8 –6.2 14.3 9.5 4.8
5 9.0 7.6 1.5 15.5 15.0 0.5 9.3 –18.4 27.7 13.3 10.0 3.3
6 14.3 8.3 6.0 21.0 12.8 8.2 11.9 12.5 –0.6 18.7 10.3 8.4
7 15.2 7.8 7.4 19.0 13.0 6.0 –0.9 18.9 –19.7 17.2 10.4 6.8
8 13.9 6.0 7.9 7.9 8.5 –0.6 8.5 18.6 –10.1 9.6 7.5 2.1
9 11.3 5.1 6.2 11.6 8.3 3.4 10.3 12.5 –2.3 11.5 6.7 4.7
10 12.7 4.2 8.4 17.4 11.3 6.1 14.7 29.2 –14.5 15.8 8.3 7.6
11 15.1 3.2 11.9 18.6 8.3 10.3 10.0 10.5 –0.4 17.2 5.8 11.4
12 17.2 4.9 12.3 19.0 10.4 8.7 19.2 13.6 5.5 18.5 7.9 10.7
13 16.1 3.4 12.7 12.5 10.7 1.8 18.1 11.4 6.8 13.8 7.2 6.6
 Mean 12.7 6.0 6.7 15.2 10.5 4.7 9.5 10.9 –1.4 14.2 8.2 6.0
* The proportional changes in output are defined by equation (3).
Table A2 • Annual proportional changes* in the input volumes of Firms A and B 
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(     ̇  ) 
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Year
Labour Capital Materials Total input
A B A – B A B A – B A B A – B A B A – B
1 2.4 1.7 0.7 6.7 5.7 1.0 –5.0 17.5 –22.5 3.5 6.4 –2.9
2 13.1 2.1 11.0 6.1 4.9 1.2 2.4 0.0 2.4 8.0 3.3 4.6
3 8.0 –1.0 8.9 6.6 4.8 1.8 2.6 17.2 –14.6 6.5 5.2 1.3
4 2.4 0.1 2.3 6.8 5.5 1.3 9.0 2.3 6.7 5.5 3.5 2.1
5 10.7 4.6 6.1 4.5 4.7 –0.2 4.2 5.7 –1.5 6.6 4.9 1.7
6 8.3 4.1 4.2 3.5 4.8 –1.4 10.8 5.2 5.6 6.0 4.7 1.4
7 21.8 –2.7 24.4 10.7 5.8 5.0 18.0 –2.5 20.5 15.6 1.9 13.7
8 3.2 4.0 –0.8 14.1 5.2 8.8 19.7 7.1 12.6 11.0 5.1 5.9
9 11.6 4.1 7.5 8.6 5.5 3.1 –5.9 8.8 –14.7 7.7 5.6 2.1
10 5.0 7.4 –2.4 5.3 3.8 1.5 20.7 9.2 11.4 7.2 5.9 1.3
11 3.7 2.6 1.1 6.9 2.7 4.2 18.2 1.0 17.2 7.5 2.4 5.2
12 17.6 1.8 15.8 7.4 3.7 3.7 –3.2 8.6 –11.8 9.0 3.9 5.1
13 5.7 6.1 –0.4 7.8 3.8 4.0 12.9 2.0 10.9 7.9 4.3 3.6
Mean 8.7 2.7 6.0 7.3 4.7 2.6 8.0 6.3 1.7 7.8 4.4 3.5
* The proportional changes in input are defined by equation (6).















































































TABLE A3 • Indices of technological change for Firms A and B 
 Year
Year 0 = 1,0 Year 5 = 1,0 Previous year = 1,0
 ̇ 
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇ 
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇ 
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 ̇  
 
(     ̇  ) 
(     ̇  ) 
     ̇  
 A B A B A B A B
0 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.58 – – – –
1 1.05 1.12 0.39 0.64 1.05 1.12 4.88 11.10
2 1.27 1.27 0.47 0.73 1.21 1.13 19.20 12.55
3 1.31 1.37 0.48 0.79 1.03 1.08 2.59 7.83
4 2.23 1.54 0.83 0.89 1.71 1.13 53.44 11.98
5 2.69 1.74 1.00 1.00 1.21 1.12 19.02 11.73
6 2.97 2.07 1.10 1.19 1.10 1.19 9.62 17.44
7 3.94 2.34 1.46 1.35 1.33 1.13 28.49 12.29
8 4.94 2.67 1.83 1.54 1.25 1.14 22.48 13.24
9 6.90 2.94 2.56 1.69 1.40 1.10 33.44 9.77
10 8.12 3.16 3.01 1.82 1.18 1.07 16.31 7.23
11 9.47 3.43 3.51 1.98 1.17 1.09 15.32 8.20
12 10.04 3.55 3.73 2.04 1.06 1.03 5.92 3.26
13 13.24 4.17 4.92 2.40 1.32 1.17 27.66 16.09
FIGURE A1 • Annual proportional changes in 
output in Firms A and B
FIGURE A2 • Annual proportional changes in 
input in Firms A and B
FIGURE A3 • Annual proportional changes in 
output and input in Firm A
FIGURE A4 • Annual proportional changes in 
output and input in Firm B
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FIGURE F10 • The technology indices of 
Firms A and B
FIGURE A5 • Annual productivity gains  
in Firms A and B
FIGURE A6 • Annual changes in the output  
and productivity of Firm A
FIGURE F7 • Annual changes in the output  
and productivity of Firm B
FIGURE F8 • Annual changes in the technology 
index and productivity of Firm A
FIGURE 9 • Annual changes in the technology 
index and productivity of Firm B
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THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL  
PRICE REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON 
LIBERALIZED MARKETS*
The paper analyses the requirements erected by EU competition rules, free movement 
(internal market) law and market liberalization rules against national price regulation. 
The paper summarizes the main EU law requirements against national price regulation 
in liberalized markets and assesses, from a critical perspective, the ECJ’s jurisprudence.
EU COMPETITION RULES AND NATIONAL PRICE REGULATION – 
REGULATED PRICES AS RESTRICTIONS OF FREE COMPETITION
EU competition rules surprisingly do not contain provision on national price regu-
lation. EU competition law does not interdict national rules distorting competition 
in the market, these are, in general and in themselves, not prohibited; EU law only 
contains specific bans in this regard. EU law prohibits only particular distorting 
measures but contains no general prohibition.
EU law contains specific regimes on state action: state aid law, sectoral regu-
lation (market liberalization), as well as a certain immunity for services of general 
economic interest (Nagy [2010] pp. 32–34); from these, sectoral regulation will 
be addressed in detail. The concept of services of general economic interest (as 
embedded in Article 106 TFEU) provides an exception (immunity) to an existing 
legal obligation. The applicability of state aid rules (Articles 107–109 TFEU) may 
be considered as a theoretical possibility with respect to national price regulation. 
However, the ECJ established, very early, in van Tiggele1 that state aid rules do not 
apply to national price regulation, taking into account that the benefit is not con-
ferred by the Member State, and cannot be traced back to public resources.
Article 107(1) TFEU prohibits “any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort com-
petition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, 
in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
  * This paper is based on research carried out in the frame of OTKA PD-101612 research program 
(Hungarian National Scientific Research Fund).
 1 Case 82/77 van Tiggele (1978) ECR 25.
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market.” Accordingly, a subsidy may qualify as illegal if it is “granted by a Member 
State or through State resources”.
In van Tiggele, the ECJ held that national price regulation cannot qualify as a state 
aid as the benefit accruing from the regulated prices is not related (directly or in-
directly) to the state budget (paras 24–25). The price floor established for distilled 
spirits in the Netherlands, in essence, protected traders to the cost of consumers. 
It could be argued that if, in the absence of regulated prices, the distilled spirits 
had been sold at a lower price, the regulated prices conferred a monetary benefit 
on traders in value of the difference between the minimum price and the market 
price (provided, of course, that the former would have been higher than the latter).
The ECJ established that it does not qualify as a benefit “granted by a Member 
State or through State resources”, if a Member State sets out minimum retail pric-
es to the detriment of the consumers. Although in van Tiggele the ECJ dealt with 
minimum prices protecting traders, the ruling may be, mutatis mutandis, applicable 
also to price caps protecting purchasers as the benefit is (similarly) not “granted by 
a Member State or through State resources”.
The backbone of EU competition rules comprises of provisions applicable to 
enterprises. These, in themselves, should not be applicable to Member States, since 
their addressees are undertakings (save the state or a public entity engages in market 
conduct). This proposition has to be confined. Notably, if reading competition rules 
governing market conduct in conjunction with the loyalty clause encapsulated in 
Article 4(3) TEU2 and the attached jurisprudence of the ECJ, it can be established 
that these antitrust rules, through the intermediation of the loyalty clause, do erect 
requirements against national governments.
On the basis of the loyalty clause, Member States must refrain from adopting or 
maintaining measures that may make the competition rules (applicable to under-
takings) ineffective. It goes counter to this principle, if a Member State prescribes or 
supports acts that fall foul of EU competition law or reinforces the effects of these, 
or deprives its own law of its official character through conferring rule-making or 
legislative power on market operators. A Member State may not force or encourage 
(assist) an enterprise to violate EU competition rules (Nagy [2008] pp. 25–26). Thus, 
Articles 101–102 TFEU, indirectly though, do establish limits as to state action.
The ECJ condemned numerous Member States for being disloyal, because they 
encouraged or backed undertakings to conclude agreements restricting competition 
or reinforced the effects of such agreements or they compelled dominant undertak-
 2 “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full 
mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member 
States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obli-
gations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The 
Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.”
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ings to abuse their dominant position.3 It has to be stressed, however, that the ECJ, in 
Cullet v Centre Leclerc, established very early that national price regulation, in itself, 
does not breach Article 101 TFEU applied in conjunction with the loyalty clause 
(para 18). Furthermore, Article 106 TFEU establishes an exception to this indirect 
duty in respect of services of general economic interest. Undertakings providing 
such services “shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular 
to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not ob-
struct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.”
In Höfner v Macrotron,4 Macrotron hired two employment agents to find a suit-
able sales manager. However, Macrotron did not engage the person selected by 
the agents and, as a consequence, refused to pay agents’ fee (paras 2 & 11). At the 
relevant time, according to German law, employment intermediation came under 
the exclusive competence of the federal employment office (paras 3–6). Notwith-
standing this regulation, numerous enterprises operated in this market, providing 
consultancy and agency services concerning the recruitment of corporate executives 
and managers. Though the federal employment office tolerated this ‘grey market’, 
these agency contracts were invalid as they violated the federal employment office’s 
legal monopoly and, thus, German law. This should also have been the fate of the 
above agreements (paras 8–10).
The ECJ, after establishing that the federal employment office was an under-
taking as it pursued market activities, examined whether Germany breached the 
loyalty clause through conferring a legal monopoly on the federal employment of-
fice. It established that national law is incompatible with EU law, if it creates a plight 
where the enterprise cannot avoid violating Article 102 TFEU. The mere fact that 
a Member State creates a dominant position i.e. it confers a legal monopoly on an 
enterprise, does not fall foul of Article 102 TFEU, unless the enterprise is under the 
necessity of abusing its dominance. According to Article 102(b) TFEU, the limitation 
of production, markets or technical development qualifies as an abuse if it occurs 
to the prejudice of consumers The ECJ established that Germany pushed the fed-
eral employment office, which qualified as an undertaking from the perspective of 
competition rules, into violating of Article 102(b) TFEU. Germany conferred a legal 
monopoly on the office but the latter was not capable of satisfying the demand, while 
market operators were, due to the legal prohibition, prevented from providing the 
service concerned (paras 27 and 29–31). The same reasoning was used, in essence, 
by the Court in Job Centre II.5
 3 The ECJ pronounced this principle very early, in Case G.B.-INNO-B.M. See Case 13/77 NV GB-
INNO-BM (1977) ECR 2115. As to judicial practice see Nagy [2008] 110–131.
 4 Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH (1991) ECR I-1979.
 5 Case C-55/96 Job Centre coop. arl (1997) ECR I-7119, paras 29–35.
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In Ambulanz Glöckner,6 the ECJ condemned Germany for forcing and encour-
aging an undertaking to reserve an ancillary market through preventing market 
entry. According to German law, patient transport services (both emergency and 
non-emergency) came under the responsibility of the Länder, the administrative 
districts of each region (Land) and municipalities, which, however, could provide 
these public services through licensed non-profit medical aid organizations (San-
itätsorganisationen). These organizations were supervised by the Länder and the 
administrative districts, which gave directions and bore the costs (para 4). According 
to the rules, other organizations could also be authorized in addition to the medical 
aid organizations. As a matter of practice, this could take place only if the medical 
aid organizations’ capacities were fully utilized and accordingly, this statutory re-
quirement created a de facto monopoly position (paras 6–8).
The dispute emerged after the license of Ambulanz Glöckner was not prolonged 
because the local medical aid organizations had surplus capacities and were making 
losses (para 13).7
The ECJ reiterated the holding of Höfner v Macrotron. Although a dominant po-
sition conferred by national special or exclusive rights is, in itself, not incompatible 
with EU competition rules, a Member State violates these rules, if the exercise of 
these special or exclusive rights incites the enterprise to abuse its dominant posi-
tion or creates a situation like this (para 39). It qualifies as an abuse, if a dominant 
undertaking, without any objective reason, reserves for itself an ancillary activity. It 
may infringe competition rules, if the extension of the dominance of an undertak-
ing disposing of special or exclusive rights is the result of a state measure (para 40). 
This is the case, if there is a sufficiently high probability that taking into account 
the economic characteristics of the market in question, this prevents enterprises 
from other Member States from providing ambulance transportation services or 
from establishing themselves there (operative part of the judgment). Such conduct 
is regarded as a restriction under Article 102(b) TFEU (para 43).
These cases may provide guidance as to price regulation although they only dealt 
with the creation of a legal monopoly. Price controls are acts of public authority and, 
as such, immune from the competition rules enshrined in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
(which apply to undertakings). However, the Member State infringes the principle of 
loyalty if national price regulation compels firms to breach EU competition law, by 
way of example through abusing their dominant position, Though regulated prices 
 
 6 Case C-475/99 Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz (2001) ECR I-8089.
 7 The earlier regulation permitted the involvement of for-profit organizations as regards non-emer-
gency patient transportation services, and Ambulanz Glöckner was authorized to provide such 
services. Subsequently, the relevant rules were amended and both emergency and non-emergency 
services were brought under the scope of the same regulatory regime, which initially applied to 
emergency patient transportation services.
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do not bring about special or exclusive rights, by way of example, excessively low 
prices, in extreme cases, may result in the restriction of output or the deterioration 
of quality or may lead to sales at loss.
In summary, EU competition rules (aside from the rules on market liberaliza-
tion, which will be addressed below) do not contain substantial limits as to national 
price regulation. Regulated prices are not regarded as state aid as they cannot be 
traced back to budgetary resources. Theoretically regulated prices may compel an 
enterprise to violate EU competition rules (e.g. restriction of output, sales below 
costs) but this scenario may occur only in extreme cases.
NATIONAL PRICE REGULATION AND THE LAW OF THE INTERNAL 
MARKET: REGULATED PRICES AS BARRIERS TO FREE MOVEMENT
EU law interdicts national customs duties and measures having equivalent effect 
and creates a customs union (Articles 28–31 TFEU). Likewise, EU law prohibits 
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effects to quantitative re-
strictions (Articles 34–35 TFEU), though Member States may adopt such measures 
with reference to local legitimate ends (Article 36 TFEU).
The jurisprudence of the ECJ defines measures having equivalent effects to quan-
titative restrictions (MEQR) extremely widely. The judicial practice distinguishes 
between product-bound measures and state acts regulating selling arrangements. 
The former relate to the physical composition and appearance of the product (such 
as content, packaging), while the latter refer to the way products are marketed 
(e.g. Sunday trading rules, licensing requirements).
The treatment of product-bound measures is very strict and was established 
in Dassonville, even non-discriminatory measures are prohibited, if they restrict 
market access: “[a]ll trading rules enacted by member states which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade are to 
be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.”8
This extremely wide, all-embracing notion was confined in Keck et Mithouard9 
(which emerged from the French rules prohibiting sales at loss), where the ECJ 
introduced the concept of ‘selling arrangements’, holding that, as opposed to prod-
uct-bound measures, rules on selling arrangements are considered to be measures 
having equivalent effects to quantitative restrictions only if they are, in law or in 
effect, discriminatory.
 8 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1975) ECR 837, para 5.
 9 Joined Case C-267 and 268/91 Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097.
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• “the application to products from other Member States of national provisions restrict-
ing or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder directly or in-
directly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the meaning of 
the Dassonville judgment (…), so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders 
operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, 
in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Mem-
ber States.” (Para 16.)
Member States may maintain restrictions with reference to local legitimate ends 
under two doctrines. In Cassis de Dijon,10 the ECJ created an exception within the 
concept of MEQR, holding that non-discriminatory measures justified by the local 
public interest are not MEQR.
• “Obstacles to movement within the community resulting from disparities between the 
national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be accepted 
in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy 
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, 
the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence 
of the consumer.” (Para 8.)
Second, Article 36 TFEU contains a statutory exception to the prohibition of MEQR.
• “The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions 
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; 
the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; 
or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restric-
tions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States.”
One of the major differences between the doctrine of mandatory requirements and 
Article 36 TFEU is that the former only applies to indistinctly applicable (i.e non-dis-
criminatory) measures, while under Article 36 TFEU even discriminatory measures 
can be justified. Furthermore, under Cassis de Dijon, any local legitimate end may 
justify a restriction while Article 36 TFEU enumerates the public interest goals that 
may be used for this purpose.
Accordingly, national price regulation qualifies, in principle, as a measure on 
selling arrangements and is, hence, prohibited if (directly or indirectly; actually 
10 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG and Bundesmonopolverwaltung Für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
(1979) ECR 649.
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or potentially) restricts inter-state trade and is (in law or in effect) discriminative. 
In short, national price regulation entails concerns under the law of the internal 
market, if it thwarts the market access of foreign products or enterprises and fails 
to comply with the requirement of equal treatment. As a matter of terminology, it 
has to be noted that the ECJ’s judgment in Keck et Mithouard, where the distinc-
tion between product-bound measures and rules on selling arrangements was es-
tablished, was rendered on 24 November 1993 and beforehand, the ECJ used the 
Dassonville formula.
In Tasca,11 Italy set a cap on the consumer prices of certain sugar varieties. The 
ECJ held that this, in itself, did not qualify as a MEQR, However, it might have had 
such an effect if the price-cap made the sale of foreign products more difficult or 
impossible. This is the case if the maximum price is so low that it makes the sale of 
import products unprofitable (para 13). This proposition was endorsed in SADAM12 
and GB-Inno-BM.13
In van Tiggele,14 the ECJ dealt with price floors. The Netherlands established 
minimum prices for distilled spirits. The ECJ considered that while price regulation 
normally does not go counter to free movement, in certain cases it may.
• “[I]mports may be impeded in particular when a national authority fixes prices or profit 
margins at such a level that imported products are placed at a disadvantage in relation 
to identical domestic products either because they cannot profitably be marketed in 
the conditions laid down or because the competitive advantage conferred by lower 
cost prices is cancelled out.” (Para 14.)
The prohibition of sale at loss places equal burdens on imported and domestic 
products and thus may not qualify as a MEQR (para 16.).
If a Member State sets a maximum margin as a particular amount (and not as 
a price-cost ratio), it may entail no detrimental effects as to the potentially cheaper 
import products, as in the case at stake where the retail margin made up only a rel-
atively insignificant part of the final retail price (para 17.).
Contrary to the above, the setting of a price floor as a particular amount, which 
applies indistinctly both to imported and domestic products, may have a negative 
impact on the former, “in so far as it prevents their lower cost price from being re-
flected in the retail selling price” (para 18).
If different price-setting methods are used as to imported and domestic products, 
this may qualify as a MEQR. In Roussel Laboratoria15 the ECJ established that it is 
11 Case 65/76 Tasca (1976) ECR 291.
12 Joined Cases 88–90/75 SADAM (1976) ECR 323, para 15.
13 Case 13/77 NV GB-INNO-BM (1977) ECR 2115, para 52.
14 Case 82/77 van Tiggele (1978) ECR 25.
15 Case 181/82 Roussel Laboratoria (1983) ECR 3849.
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contrary to Article 34 TFEU if a Member State fixes prices of import products on 
the basis of the price charged by the producer of the pharmaceutical products in 
the country of origin, while the price is frozen for domestic products on the level 
at a given reference date (para 25).
In Cullet v Centre Leclerc,16 French law established minimum retail prices for fuels 
exclusively with reference to the prices of French refineries. The latter were covered 
by a price limit although this was, in principle, set in accord with European prices, if 
the latter were more than 8% higher or lower than these prices, the price limit was 
determined by the cost prices of the French refineries. As a matter of practice, French 
refineries sold at the highest prices permitted by the law (para 5). The ECJ found that 
this price-setting methodology is adverse to foreign products as it deprives them of the 
competitive advantage they may enjoy due to their potentially lower prices (para 29).
In Roelstraete,17 Belgian law regulated the retail margin of meat. It was deter-
mined, as a fixed sum, the margin a butcher could include in the price per kilogram. 
Retail prices consisted of the average weighted purchase price calculated on the 
basis of the receipts of the preceding four weeks, the maximum gross profit margin 
(determined as a fixed sum) and the value-added tax (para 2).
The ECJ considered that the Belgian legislation, through fixing the sum of the 
margin applicable to both domestic and imported products, discouraged traders 
from importing meat from other Member States. Traders had to cover the import 
expenses from this margin, that is, the extra costs attached to importation decreased 
the profitability of import products in comparison to domestic products (paras 
21–22). The same line of interpretation was followed by the Court in Lefèvre,18 as 
to a similar French regime (para 13).
In Vocarex,19 Belgian law prohibited sales at a low margin (sales at loss were 
prohibited and excessively low margins were considered to be sales at loss) (para 3). 
The ECJ found that this price regulation was not a MEQR.
In summary, national price regulation violates the rules of the internal market 
(free movement), if it distinctively restricts the entry of foreign products into the 
market of another Member State. Accordingly, a price cap is incompatible with the 
internal market, if it prevents or thwarts the importation of more expensive foreign 
products (which may be more expensive due to the importation costs). A price floor 
is counter to the law of the internal market if it restricts the importation of foreign 
products through depriving them of their competitive advantage consisting in lower 
prices. The prohibition of sale at loss (or at a negligible margin), in principle, does 
not infringe the law of the internal market.
16 Case 231/83 Cullet v Centre Leclerc (1985) ECR 305.
17 Case 116/84 Henri Roelstraete (1985) ECR 1705.
18 Case 188/86 Lefèvre (1987) ECR 2963.
19 Case C-63/94 Vocarex (1995) ECR I-2467.
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The ECJ’s jurisprudence on retail minimum prices can be criticized on the 
ground that price floors do not make traders disinterested in purchasing cheaper 
foreign products. From an economic perspective, retail price floors do not make 
the trader interested in purchasing and reselling the more expensive local products. 
Instead, the trader’s interest is to keep on purchasing the cheaper foreign merchan-
dise and to resell it at a higher margin. Though the minimum price is secured by the 
law, the trader will try to cut input costs to a minimum to maximize his profit. The 
trader is obviously not interested in sharing the guaranteed margin with domestic 
producers through purchasing the more expensive local brand. However, the ECJ’s 
concerns are valid from a consumer perspective. The Court very probably had in 
mind the situation where both the foreign and the domestic product is on the shelves 
of the local convenience store and the final consumer has to choose one. If they are 
of the same or similar price, the consumer would very likely opt for the local (well-
known) brand as opposed to the plight where the price of the imported product is 
significantly lower than that of the domestic merchandise. In this case, the lower 
price may be a reason to overcome the loyalty to the local brand.
MARKET LIBERALIZATION RULES AND PRICE REGULATION: 
REGULATED PRICE AS THE HINDRANCES TO MARKET OPENING
The ECJ’s jurisprudence (in particular Federutility and Enel)20 suggests that in in-
dustries covered by market liberalization regimes (electronic communications, elec-
tricity, natural gas, railway, postal services), Member States may not introduce or 
maintain price regulation, unless they are specifically authorized or obliged. Al-
though these regimes permit states to adopt and maintain such regulatory meas-
ures with reference to public services, this price-control is confined both in terms 
of scope and time.
Natural gas
Directive 2009/73/EC governing the internal natural gas market treats network ser-
vices (access to the network) as natural monopoly and, accordingly, subjects them 
to regulated prices which are to be set by the national regulatory authority. On the 
contrary, the energy product itself is not subject to price control, the production and 
trade of natural gas are regarded as activities prone to competition. The only pro-
vision that, in respect of the latter, makes mention, in the context of public services, 
of regulated prices is Article 3(2) of the Directive. The Directive on internal natural 
gas market (in line with its predecessor, Directive 2003/55/EC) does not pronounce 
20 Case C-242/10 Enel.
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natural gas to be universal service which is very probably due to the circumstance 
that the majority of European consumers do not use it (see Cremer et al. [1998] p. 
7.). Nonetheless, the Directive establishes public service obligations in Article 3(2) 
and consumer protection requirements in Article 3(3). These provisions enable 
Member States to introduce universal service also in respect of natural gas, albeit 
the national playing field was confined by the ECJ in Federutility.21
In this case, Italy set regulated prices on the basis of reference prices, justified 
by the absence of workable competition and the interests of final consumers. The 
ECJ established that this can be maintained only under certain conditions although 
Member States may regulate retail prices after the opening of the market (that is, 
1 July 2007) (paras 17–24).
The ECJ examined the legality of price regulation by investigating whether the 
liberalization of the market implies the exclusion of regulated prices. Namely, the 
Directive on the internal natural gas market contains no specific prohibition on 
price regulation. The ECJ also considered whether the purpose of assuring public 
services may justify the exceptional regulation of prices (in case the first question 
is answered in the affirmative). It is to be noted (again) that the Directive on the 
internal natural gas market does not contain the concept of universal service (con-
trary to the Directive on the internal electricity market), hence, natural gas universal 
service has no independent legal basis and can be deduced only from the Directive’s 
provision on public services and the doctrine of services of general economic inter-
est (as included in the TFEU).
Directive 2009/73/EC provides for the regulation for certain tariffs (e.g. network 
fees) and apart from these, it contains no express provision as regards national 
price controls. It neither allows nor prohibits regulated prices. The ECJ, however, 
deduced this prohibition from the Directive’s purpose (market liberalization and 
the competitive natural gas market – para 19) and the consumers’ right to freely 
choose the service provider.22
• “Although it is not explicitly stated in that provision [Article 23(1)(c) of Directive 
2003/55], or indeed in any other provisions of that directive, that the price for the supply 
of natural gas must, as from 1 July 2007, be determined solely by the operation of supply 
and demand, that requirement follows from the very purpose and the general scheme 
of that directive, which, as its 3rd, 4th and 18th recitals state, is designed progressively 
to achieve a total liberalisation of the market for national gas in the context of which, 
in particular, all suppliers may freely deliver their products to all consumers.” (Para 18.)
21 Although in this case the ECJ interpreted the previous natural gas directive, there is no difference 
between the two directives as to the provisions concerned. For the sake of simplicity, if possible, 
the references in this paper are made to Directive 2009/73/EC, although the ECJ’s judgment refers 
to Directive 2003/55/EC.
22 Articles 2 and 23 of Directive 2003/55/EC and para 17 of the judgment.
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Afterwards, the ECJ addressed the Directive’s provision on public service23 to ascer-
tain the conditions of derogating from the above general prohibition. It held that “it 
follows from the wording of Article 3(2) that measures adopted on the basis thereof 
must be adopted in the general economic interest, be clearly defined, transparent, 
non discriminatory and verifiable, and guarantee equality of access for EU gas com-
panies to national consumers” (para 22). Member States have no automatic right to 
regulate prices with reference to public services and this can be done only in case of 
necessity and the regulatory intervention has to be restricted both in terms of scope 
and time. Article 3(2) of the Directive permits state intervention only by reason of 
general economic interest and makes an express reference to TFEU 106.
Member States have a very wide margin of appreciation as to the definition of 
the general economic interest, and local peculiarities and policy considerations 
may legitimately gain ground in the frame of this. “In that context, Member States 
are entitled, while complying with the law of the Union, to define the scope and 
the organisation of their services in the general economic interest”; “[i]n particular, 
they may take account of objectives pertaining to their national policy”. (Para 29.) 
EU law follows a minimalist approach as to the definition of services of general 
economic interest, “requirements concerning the public service must be capable of 
being interpreted, subject to the observance of the law of the Union, ‘on a national 
basis’, and ‘taking into account national circumstances’.” (Para 30.)
• “It follows from the above that Directive 2003/55 allows Member States to assess wheth-
er, in the general economic interest, after 1 July 2007, it is necessary to impose on un-
dertakings operating in the gas sector public service obligations in order, in particular, 
to ensure that the price of the supply of natural gas to final consumers is maintained 
at a reasonable level having regard to the reconciliation which Member States must 
make, taking account of the situation in the natural gas sector, between the objective of 
liberalisation and that of the necessary protection of final consumers pursued, as men-
tioned in paragraphs 18 and 20 of this judgment, by the Union legislature.” (Para 32.)
It is to be noted that though Member States have, indeed, a wide give as to the defi-
nition of services of general economic interest, the ECJ’s judgment implies that the 
power to regulate prices is not automatic, can be exercised only in case regulatory 
intervention is justified and, if they do, they have to set out their reasons, in particu-
lar because under Article 3(11) of the Directive on the internal natural gas market 
Member States are obliged to inform the Commission about all measures adopted 
for the provision of public services and about their potential impact on domestic 
and international competition.
23 Article 3(2) of Directive 2003/55/EC.
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In the case at stake, the ECJ considered the protection of final users against the 
market power of service providers to be a legitimate general economic interest and 
sanctioned the endeavor to pursue “a general economic interest consisting in main-
taining the price of the supply of natural gas to final consumers at a reasonable level 
having regard to the reconciliation which Member States must make, taking account 
of the situation in the natural gas sector, between the objective of liberalisation and 
that of the necessary protection of final consumers pursued by [the] Directive.”24
Regulatory intervention, taking the form of price regulation, shall be propor-
tionate. It follows from the requirement of proportionality that its ambit has to be 
limited to the domain where it is necessary (material scope); may be maintained 
only for a limited period of time (temporal scope) and may cover only users who 
truly need protection (personal scope). Public service obligations set out by the 
Member State “may compromise the freedom to determine the price for the supply 
of natural gas only in so far as is necessary to achieve the objective in the general 
economic interest which they pursue and, consequently, for a period that is neces-
sarily limited in time.” (Para 33.)
• “First, such an intervention must be limited in duration to what is strictly necessary in 
order to achieve its objective, in order, in particular, not to render permanent a measure 
which, by its very nature, constitutes an obstacle to the realisation of an operational 
internal market in gas. (…)” (Para 35.)
“Secondly, the method of intervention used must not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objective which is being pursued in the general economic interest.” (Para 36.)
“If, following those verifications, it were to be shown that such an intervention is 
capable of being justified in that way, the requirement of proportionality would imply 
in particular that it be limited in principle to the price component directly influenced 
upwards by those specific circumstances” (Para 38.)
“Thirdly, the requirement of proportionality must also be assessed with regard to 
the scope ratione personae of the measure, and, more particularly, its beneficiaries.” 
(Para 39.)
In the context of limits in terms of time, the ECJ highlighted that a mere reference 
to the national legislation’s provisory nature is not sufficient.
• “[T]he referring court should examine whether and to what extent the relevant national 
law requires the administration to make a periodic re-examination, at close intervals, 
of the need for it to intervene in the gas sector and the manner of its doing so, having 
regard to the development of that sector.” (Para 35.)
24 Operative part of the judgment.
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The ECJ made a very important remark regarding the possible beneficiaries 
of price regulation. While the Court recognized enterprises as well as consumers 
may benefit from the regulatory intervention, it also stated that the public service 
obligations, in principle, do not fulfil the requirement of proportionality. On the 
other hand, not only vulnerable but all consumers may be sheltered through price 
regulation.
• “In that regard, it should be emphasised that that requirement does not prevent ‘refer-
ence prices’ for the supply of natural gas, such as those at issue in the main proceed-
ings, from being applied to all customers whose consumption of natural gas is above 
a certain threshold rather than being limited to the circle of those, expressly referred 
to in Article 3(3) of Directive 2003/55, who must necessarily be protected on account 
of their vulnerability.’ (Para 40.)
“If, as some of the applicants in the main proceedings maintain before the Court, 
the definition of ‘reference prices’ for the supply of natural gas, such as those at issue 
in the main proceedings, applies also to undertakings irrespective of their size, which 
it is for the referring court to verify, it should be noted that Directive 2003/55 does 
not in principle exclude the possibility that the latter may also benefit, as final con-
sumers of gas, from the public service obligations which Member States may adopt in 
the context of Article 3(2) of that directive. The 26th recital of that directive states in 
particular that measures taken by the Member States to protect final consumers may 
differ according to whether they are addressed to households or to small- and medi-
um-sized undertakings.” (Para 41.)
“ In that case, however, it would be necessary to take account, in assessing the pro-
portionality of the national measure in question, of the fact that the situation of un-
dertakings is different from that of domestic consumers, the objectives pursued and 
the interests present being not necessarily the same and also of objective differences 
between the undertakings themselves, according to their size.” (Para 42.)
• “In those circumstances, apart from the specific case, referred to at the hearing, of man-
agement companies of apartment blocks, the requirement of proportionality referred 
to above would not, in principle, be complied with if the definition of ‘reference prices’ 
for the supply of natural gas, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, were to 
benefit individuals and undertakings in an identical manner, in their capacity as final 
consumers of gas.” (Para 43.)
The public service obligations have to be clearly defined, transparent, non-discrim-
inatory and verifiable, and shall guarantee equal access for European gas companies 
to consumers (para 44). In respect of equal treatment, it has to be inquired
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• “…whether, having regard to the whole of the measures which may have been taken in 
that area by the Member State concerned, the definition of ‘reference prices’ for the 
supply of natural gas, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which applies in 
an identical manner to all undertakings supplying natural gas, must nevertheless be 
regarded as discriminatory.” (Para 45.)
It would be so if such intervention were to lead in reality to imposing the finan-
cial burden arising “from the intervention mainly on some of those undertakings, in 
this case those not also carrying on the business of producing/importing natural gas.” 
(Para 46.)
It has to be noted that in Federutility, the ECJ faced a general, industry-wide price 
regulation, which covered one subgroup of market operators. However, this does 
not qualify as strictu sensu universal service price regulation where the Member 
State appoints a universal service provider (supplier of last resort, default supplier, 
public service operator etc.) whose prices are fixed.
Para 33 of the ECJ’s judgment refers to “the freedom to determine the price for 
the supply of natural gas” and makes no mention of cases where a Member State 
ensures the availability of natural gas at a given price through appointing a universal 
service provider. It is dubious whether the holding of Federutility encompasses only 
general industry-wide price regulation or it extends also to prices secured through 
a universal service provider. This is a pivotal question: although natural gas is not 
considered to be an EU universal service, quite a few Member States characterize 
it as such. In Hungary, Act XL of 2008 on the supply of natural gas, in Section 
34(1), repeats the corresponding provisions of electricity universal service, with 
the difference that in the natural gas sector universal services extends only to those 
users who are already connected to the infrastructure. In Spain, natural gas equally 
qualifies as universal service and reasonable prices are secured. Spain terminated 
the regulation of retail prices and provides cost-based prices to small consumers 
in the form of supplier of last resort prices (IEA [2009] p. 64 and p. 70, CNE [2010] 
pp. 12–13, CNE [2011] pp. 124–126).
Finally, it is to be noted that this Italian regime survived, with strings attached, 
the ECJ’s preliminary ruling procedure and remained in force (Cavasola–Ciminelli 
[2012] 114.).
Electricity market
The regulatory and statutory pattern of Directive 2009/72/EC on the internal elec-
tricity market is, in essence, in line with the Directive on the internal natural gas 
market, with the significant difference that electricity is considered to be an EU 
universal service. Accordingly, the Directive on the internal electricity market treats 
network services (access to the network) as a natural monopoly and subjects them 
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to regulated prices, which are to be set by the national regulatory authority, while 
the energy product itself is not subject to price control. The production and trade 
of electricity are regarded as activities prone to competition. The possibility of price 
regulation is mentioned both in the provision on public services, in Article 3(2), 
and in the provision on universal service, in Article 3(3); the latter embraces  “the 
right to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality within their territory 
at reasonable, easily and clearly comparable, transparent and nondiscriminatory 
prices.” The institution of universal service enshrined in Article 3(3) implies the 
automatic right and duty of Member States to intervene (contrary to public service 
obligations embedded in Article 3(2) which tie regulatory intervention to condi-
tions). The legal basis of the regulatory intervention is given, though the method 
and extent – notwithstanding the wide margin of appreciation of Member States – 
is subject to EU law restraints.
Due to this conceptual difference, the ECJ’s jurisprudence on natural gas can be 
extrapolated to the electricity market only outside the ambit of universal service 
and raises the question “does the ECJ’s ruling in Federutility provide guidance as to 
the electricity market?” The system and structure of the natural gas and electricity 
directives are very similar and the goal of market liberalization may be deduced in 
both schemes and the provisions on public services are, in essence, identical. This 
general parallelism was approved also by the ECJ in Enel,25 where it referred to Fed-
erutility as guidance; AG Cruz Villalón, in his opinion in Enel, mentions Federutility 
as the “the first case-law concerning those rules on public service obligations in the 
energy sector – provides a direct precedent for the interpretation of Article 3(2) of 
Directive 2003/54” (para 2). Accordingly, the analysis of Enel, in essence, follows the 
structure and pattern established in Federutility (paras 32, 39 & 50).
It must be stressed that the ruling in Federutility provides no guidance as to the 
construction of the electricity universal service, though it is good law outside this 
domain. It is important to emphasize this again, since the above regulatory differ-
ences between the two directives are quite often disregarded and not infrequently 
the position emerges in the scholarship that Federutility is directly applicable to the 
electricity sector (Energy Community [2012] pp. 5–6.).
As regards the electricity market, it was the Enel judgment that pronounced 
that, in the absence of a specific authorization to regulate prices, regulatory price 
controls are, in principle, prohibited but may be justified with reference to general 
economic interests. In this case, Italy obliged, as regards dispatching and balancing 
services, electricity companies disposing of installations essential to the operation 
and security of the electricity system to make supplies to the distribution system 
operators at fixed prices.
25 Case C-242/10 Enel Produzione SpA v Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas (2011) ECR I-13665.
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When analyzing the case, the ECJ simply skipped the detailed examination of 
whether, in the absence of express authorization, national price regulation is con-
trary to the Directive on the internal electricity market. The Court took this prohi-
bition as given, and moved to analyze the exception to this prohibition, that is the 
pre-conditions of regulatory intervention. Accordingly, the Court examined the 
existence of three requirements:
• “Legislation providing for such intervention must pursue an objective in the general 
economic interest and be consistent with the principle of proportionality”, as well as 
“[s]uch obligations must also be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and 
verifiable, and must guarantee those undertakings equality of access to national con-
sumers.” (Para 48.)
According to the ECJ, “the electricity dispatching service is a public service designed 
to ensure that, within the national transmission system, the supply of electricity 
matches demand, thereby guaranteeing security and continuity in the energy supply)” 
(para 51). Accordingly, the ECJ considered that “rules governing essential installa-
tions pursue a general economic interest objective” (para 54). The requirement of 
proportionality is met, if regulation is “appropriate for securing the objective which 
it pursues” and does not “go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it” (para 
55). As to suitability, the Court noted that the national regulation “applies solely 
in cases where there is only one generating unit which, owing to its technical fea-
tures and the speed with which it can vary its power output, is capable of supply-
ing the resources needed to meet the dispatching requirements” (para 57), “these 
are generating installations which are strictly necessary and vital in order to meet 
dispatching service requirements” (para 62). As to whether the intervention went 
beyond what was necessary (para 63), it established that the regime appeared to 
secure fair remuneration for operators owning such installations (para 68). Finally, 
the ECJ established that the intervention was limited in terms of time, because “the 
list of essential installations is annually reviewed and updated, it would appear that 
installations are not kept on it for more than a limited period” (para 75).
In electricity reasonable prices are part of the universal service package. The 
Directive on the internal electricity market gives no guidance as to when can prices 
be regarded as reasonable, conferring a wide margin of appreciation on Member 
States.26 In 2010, 16 out of 27 Member States had in force some form of price regu-
lation in the house-hold segment.27 The usual mechanism was to appoint a universal 
service provider (supplier of last resort, public service provider) and to cap prices.
26 Cameron [2005] p. 25.
27 ERCEG [2010]. As to the determination of end-user regulated price see ERCEG [2010] p. 11.
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SUMMARY
This paper analysed Member States’ give as to price regulation from the perspective 
of the EU internal market and competition rules.
National price control is incompatible with the internal market, if it thwarts free 
movement (that is, the market access of foreign products, services or the freedom 
of establishment). National price regulation, as a set of rules relating to selling ar-
rangements, goes counter to the law of the internal market, if it entails differential 
treatment as to foreign and domestic products. Accordingly, a price-cap falls foul of 
the law of free movement, if it prevents the importation of more expensive foreign 
products (which may be more expensive because of the importation costs). Likewise, 
a price floor infringes the law of the internal market, if it deprives foreign products 
of their competitive advantage consisting in lower prices. On the other hand, the 
prohibition of sale at loss, at cost-price or at minuscule margin, in principle, does 
not violate the law of the internal market.
Only the rules of market liberalization, in essence, can be regarded as substantial 
restrictions as to national price regulation from EU competition rules. This implies 
that the industries not covered by sectoral (market opening) regimes are free from 
these restraints. Price regulation may not be considered to be state aid as it does not 
concern the public budget. Although there is a theoretical possibility that through 
determining regulated prices a Member State incites or compels an enterprise to 
infringe competition rules (e.g. restricting output, selling at loss), as a matter of 
practice, this can be established only in extreme cases.
The ECJ established, in the context of energy market liberalization, that, as 
a general principle, if the applicable sectoral regime does not specifically author-
ize a Member State to regulate prices, national price control is, in principle, illegal, 
and can be maintained only with reference to the general economic interest. As 
a corollary, national price regulation may be introduced and maintained only if it 
is justified, and has to be proportionate in terms of scope and time. This doctrine 
may be extrapolated to other liberalized markets.
The ECJ established in Federutility that market opening excludes price regulation 
in itself, that is, in liberalized markets it is irreconcilable with EU law’s command 
of market opening to regulate prices. This implies the proposition that in case of 
public services (services of general economic interest) price controls may be, tough 
exceptionally, maintained, however, certain requirements apply. Member States 
have no subjective right to regulate prices as this would go counter to the con-
cept of liberalized market. Furthermore, no matter how long the road to workable 
competition, price regulation – at least a general application – must be provisory.
The prohibition established in Federutility is very interesting if put in the light 
of the industries that have remained intact from the liberalization waves of the 
preceding decades (that is, most part of the EU’s economy). In liberalized markets, 
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price regulation, in the absence of specific authorization, is considered to be pro-
hibited, if it restricts competition. Outside this domain, national price regulation 
is prohibited, if it restricts importation in addition to the restriction of competi-
tion. Here, national price control is regarded as unlawful, if it restricts imports (or 
export) thus restricting free movement. This is the case, if it makes the market 
entry of foreign products impossible or less attractive. This bifurcation may lead 
to self-contradiction. In liberalized markets price controls may not be maintained 
once competition becomes workable. In sectors where no liberalization rules were 
introduced, presumably because these were not needed, as they were liberalized 
and competitive markets, the regulation of prices cannot be challenged on the basis 
of EU law, unless it is an obstacle to free movement.
It is also important to note that the limits set in Federutility do not apply to 
services qualifying as universal service. This concept was not analysed by the ECJ 
in Federutility, as this case was based on the Directive on the internal natural gas 
market which does not contain this concept (contrary to the Directive on the in-
ternal electricity market). In case of universal service, if it is codified in the market 
liberalization regime at stake, there is an express EU law requirement to secure the 
fairness (affordability, reasonableness) of prices. Regulatory intervention motivated 
by the purpose of universal service is ‘self-justifying’.
In Federutility, the ECJ established that, since there is no universal service as 
to natural gas, price regulation has to be justified with reference to public services. 
The status of electricity is, however, different, due to the presence of the regulatory 
concept of universal service. The electricity universal service encompasses the right 
to be supplied with electricity of a particular quality at “reasonable, easily and clearly 
comparable, transparent and nondiscriminatory prices”28 and the right to reasonable 
prices creates an automatic possibility and duty to regulate prices, without a demand 
for justification. Accordingly, the regulatory intervention carried out for the purpose 
of universal service demands no such justification, it is automatically legitimate, 
provided it does not transgress the EU regulatory framework. EU law demands 
the provision of universal service, including the requirement of reasonable prices.
Another very important point is that while in Federutility Italy introduced indus-
try-wide price regulation, the customary mechanism of providing universal service 
is the appointment of a universal service provider, which is subject to universal ser-
vice requirements, including the requirement of reasonable prices. In this scheme, 
formally, there may be no regulated price. It is another question that the economic 
effects of the general industry-wide price-cap and those of the universal service 
price (which is applied solely to the appointed universal service provider(s) but not 
enforced on all market operators) are similar (in fact, the same). In the latter case, 
though alternative service providers may, from a legal perspective, charge higher 
28 Article 3(3).
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prices, due to the presence of the universal service price (capped by the regulator), 
they very probably would not be able to sell these products.
It is to be noted though that the foregoing is only half-true and a  little bit 
over-simplified. Service providers compete along various parameters, not only with 
price, but with quality. This includes the quality of the physical product but also the 
quality of the customer service, billing and customer-relations. Regulated-prices 
have straight-jacketing effects on alternative market operators. Still, it has to be 
noted that notwithstanding the above economic equivalence between industry-wide 
price regulation and the universal service provider’s prices, the ECJ may easily come 
to the conclusion that the prices enforced on the universal service provider (which 
are some sort of a social transfer) may not share the fate of the regulated prices con-
demned in Federutility. The pricing freedom of alternative (non-universal) service 
providers is, at least from a legal perspective, not subject to restriction.
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INTERCONNECTION AND INCENTIVE 
REGULATION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES
The price regulation of network industries has changed tremendously all over the 
world recently. Theoretical contributions specifically advocate and telecommunica-
tions, energy and other market regulators in various parts of the world practice cost-
based pricing for inter-firm network access services. Cost-based pricing is performed 
under the assumption that the regulator has perfect information regarding the costs 
of producing the services. We show that – under fairly general conditions – cost-based 
pricing creates incentives for regulated firms not to improve their efficiency. Allowing 
for information asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated firms, we find 
that incentive regulation will eliminate the adverse effect of cost-based pricing on 
the firms’ efficiency and on social welfare.
INTRODUCTION
The regulation of network industries has received ever greater attention during the 
current financial and economic crisis than before. This paper addresses the regula-
tion of interconnection prices for firms with interconnected networks with perfect, 
and with imperfect and asymmetric information. It unites two separate lines of 
previous analyses. On the one hand, important works by Armstrong–Doyle–Vickers 
[1996], Laffont–Rey–Tirole [1998a,b); Carter–Wright [1999, 2003] and Armstrong 
[2002], as well as studies by De Bilj–Peitz [2002], Peitz [2005] and numerous others 
address the issue of interconnection and termination charges under the assump-
tion that the regulator has perfect information about the true costs of providing 
inter-firm network access services. On the other hand, the literature is equally ex-
tensive on the nature and consequences of asymmetric cost information between 
the regulator and the regulated firm. The seminal work on regulating a firm with 
unknown costs was written by Baron–Myerson [1982]. Important contributions 
were made, among others, by Laffont – Tirole [2000] and Laffont–Martimort [2002].1 
However, we are aware of only a few studies that combined these two lines of inves-
tigation.2 Some authors did not see the need for doing so. For example, Armstrong 
[2002] noted that “While it is clear that imperfect regulatory knowledge of costs and 
 1 Armstrong–Sappington [2007] offer an overview of the issues of imperfect information in regulated 
industries.
 2 See, for instance, Sappington [1980], Stefos [1990] and Blackmon [1994].
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the potential for cost reduction has an important impact on regulatory policy, the 
interaction of these features with the access pricing problem does not often seem to 
generate many new insights” (p. 380). Believing that perfect regulatory knowledge 
was an adequate assumption, Armstrong then went on to propose that the regulator 
should base inter-firm network access prices on “estimated efficient costs,” or costs 
computed from engineering models, or benchmarking.
The principle of cost-based pricing has long dominated the regulatory approach-
es to pricing end user services. In addition to the major carriers’ own cost models, 
North American regulators required the construction of elaborate service cost 
simulation models for various levels of service aggregation as early as the 1970s. 
When, after opening up the market to competition in telecommunications and 
other utilities markets, the regulation of inter-firm network access prices became 
a regulatory task of critical importance, cost-based pricing quickly found these 
industries as a new field of application. Regulators began to demand that network 
operators provide access to their network for other service companies for charges 
that were based on long run incremental costs.
Many difficulties are inherent in this approach.3 We show in this paper that cost-
based pricing may signal incentives to firms not to improve the efficiency level of 
interconnection. The adverse effects of cost-based price regulation work through 
two channels. First, even if the regulator had perfect information about the service 
providers’ call termination costs and based termination charges on those costs, 
service providers would not be induced to attain high efficiency because a higher 
efficiency in network interconnection would not result in higher profits for them. 
This is a direct consequence of the complex cross-price effects in inter-firm services.4 
Second, the adverse effect of cost-based pricing on service providers’ efficiency is 
exacerbated if the regulator’s information about the firms’ cost is imperfect.
In reality, regulators can never perfectly know the true costs of network access 
services. More is involved than the informed party’s unwillingness to disclose pri-
vate information, or biases due to the unavoidable arbitrariness of some elements 
of cost allocation. The firm and the regulator may have some misperceptions about 
what the other party knows or infers from the information they both possess. For 
instance, a firm may assume, albeit mistakenly, that the regulator is also aware of 
some specific information about efficient operation that the firm previously acquired. 
Consequently, the firm would expect the regulator to incorporate this piece of in-
formation into his regulatory decision, although this will not, in fact, occur. Thus, 
the firm would adjust its output decision to a false assumption. Madarász [2007] 
 3 Laffont–Tirole [2000] briefly mention the shortcomings of cost-based pricing.
 4 Hansen [2005] addresses a similar issue that he labels “tariff mediated network externalities.” He 
shows that a low-cost firm will attain a smaller, while a high-cost firm will have a larger market 
share in equilibrium than would be rational from an efficiency point of view.
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labelled this kind of assumption “information projection.” The opposite may also 
happen. The firm may ignore important portions of cost accounting information 
and assume that the regulator is equally ignorant. According to Madarász, this is 
“ignorance projection.” Cost-based pricing may give rise to simultaneous cases of 
“information projection” and “ignorance projection”. As a result, cost-based pricing 
may do more harm than good.
Regulatory agencies have recently also recognised some of the weaknesses of 
a cost-based regulatory design and they started applying “bottom-up” benchmark 
models in their effort to find efficient prices. Bottom-up models establish the low-
est feasible level of costs for each element of the network and then aggregate these 
cost components up to the level of end user services. We show in this paper that 
bottom-up benchmarking is not a solution for regulatory games if the firms op-
erate with different marginal costs. In addition, bottom-up cost models may also 
fare poorly if one of the parties has private information. The more informed par-
ty – usually the service provider – can rightfully claim that its actual conditions of 
business operation differ widely from what the regulator assumes when it constructs 
an efficiency model of a hypothetical company. These disputes between the firm 
and the regulator usually end up in the courts where the regulator can rarely win 
his case. We use the example of the telecommunications industry, but our findings 
can be easily generalised for other network industries such as energy distribution, 
transportation, water supply, and postal services, where there is two-way network 
interconnection between firms.
Our point of departure is a model of customers’ choice between service pro-
viders, similar to the one presented by Laffont et al. [1998a], [1998b]. We diverge 
from their model on one important point: we assume that a customer’s valuation 
of network size and each customer’s demand for calls are additively separated. Our 
assumption is supported by empirical observations that indicate that customers 
may assign a greater value to a service provider with a larger network than to 
a service provider with a smaller network, but each customer’s actual demand for 
calls will depend on the calling price rather than on the firms’ size. In our model, 
the firms’ market share will also be a function of customers’ demand for intranet 
and for off-net calls, but our approach renders it feasible to derive analytical re-
sults and conclusions. In addition, we relax the assumption of Laffont et al. about 
perfect information in the later part of the paper, and develop a different model 
in which asymmetric information between service providers and regulators is 
assumed. We shall show that incentive regulation with imperfect information is 
not merely a more realistic assumption than assuming perfect information of the 
regulator, but that it also eliminates the adverse effects of cost-based pricing on 
the firms’ efficiency.
The regulatory model of interconnection with imperfect information conveys 
important policy implications. We demonstrate that incentive regulation extends the 
proper incentives to firms to improve efficiency and that it results in a smaller social 
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welfare loss than cost-based pricing or bottom-up cost accounting. Principal-agent 
models of price regulation are more “knowledge intensive” but less time consum-
ing with regard to monitoring the costs of different services than cost accounting. 
Most importantly, a regulatory mechanism that takes into account the existence 
of asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated firm induces 
cooperation between the contracting parties, while cost-based pricing inevitably 
brings about conflict between the regulator and the regulated firm.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The assumptions are outlined in section 2. 
The benchmark case of regulation with perfect information and cost-based pricing is 
presented in section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the description of a model of incentive 
regulation with two different efficiency types of the regulated firms. We solve the 
model in section 5. The results are compared to those of other pricing policies, and 
the main conclusions are drawn in section 6.
ASSUMPTIONS
Two firms (denoted by subscripts 1 and 2) are assumed to operate in a market of 
telecommunications services. They offer differentiated services to subscribing end 
users and in doing so, they compete in prices. For simplicity’s sake, we shall work 
with a one period model where end users do not migrate between service providers, 
that is, we do not deal with the issue of switching costs. Subscribers initiate and 
receive intra-firm and inter-firm calls. Intra-firm calls are initiated and terminated 
in the same network, while inter-firm calls are terminated in the other network. 
There are three kinds of prices: subscription fees f1 and f2 that customers must pay 
in order to gain access to the network of firms 1 and 2, respectively; usage sensitive 
intra-firm calling prices p1 and p2; and usage sensitive inter-firm calling prices 
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.5 Inter-firm calling prices 
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include termination charges a1 and 
a2, respectively. These are paid by each firm to the other firm for using the other 
firm’s network in order to terminate inter-firm calls. There are no separate transit 
charges since there are only two networks. All subscription and calling prices are 
unregulated. Termination charges are subject to regulation.
Subscribers have an identical valuation 0 < V(si) < si for belonging to network i 
of size si, where si is the number (mass) of subscribers who subscribe to network i. 
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 is normalised to one and it also denotes the market share of firm i. Hence, for 
two firms, s1 + s2 = 1. For simplicity’s sake, subscriber valuation is given by V(si) = siV.
A customer chooses between the two networks based on his valuation of net-
work size and on the monetary utility, 
 ̂ 
 ̂  




 (   ̂  ) 
 ̂( ̂) 
 ̂( ̂) 
 ̂    ̂( ̂) 
[   ] 
            (  )   ̂ ( ̂ )           
     (   )   (  )   ̂ ( ̂ )     (   ) 
     (  )   ̂ ( ̂ )       (    )    (  )    ( ̂ )     (   
 ) 
 (  )  ̂ ( ̂ )       (   )    (  )  ̂ ( ̂ )    (    )(   ) 
   
(  )   (  )   ̂ ( ̂ ) ̂ ( ̂ )       




     
        
  (  )    (  )   ̂ ( ̂ )   ̂ ( ̂ )       





     








   ((   
   
 )  (  )  ( ̂    
    ) ̂ ( ̂ )      
 )    (     
 ) ̂ ( ̂ ) 
          ((     
    )  (  )  ( ̂   
    ) ̂ ( ̂ )       
 )   
   ((     
    
 )  (  )  ( ̂    
    
 ) ̂ ( ̂ )       
 ) 
   
      
     
      
{             } 
 ̂  
 ̂  
, he can gain from using the services 
of each network. We assume that the customer’s valuation of network size and his 
 5 The total price a customer pays for subscribing to a network then for using its services is similar 
to the two-part tariff introduced in Carter–Wright [2003] and in Valletti–Cambini [2005].
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monetary utility from using the network are additive in his total utility. The intuition 
behind this assumption is that a customer’s decision of how many calls he will make 
depends only on the price of placing calls. Network size matters when a customer 
chooses a service provider because the size of the network will affect his utility 
through the intranet and off-net calling prices he expects to pay. Market shares will 
be functions of customers’ total utility and may be derived from a simple, slightly 
modified price competition model of consumer choice à la Hotelling.
The representative customer’s demand for intranet calls is given by d(p), while 
the mass of a customer’s inter-firm calls is 
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. A subscriber’s consumer surplus 
from a mass of d(p) intranet calls is denoted by v(p). It is assumed that v’(p) ≡ –d(p) 
Similarly, a subscriber’s consumer surplus from a mass of 
 ̂ 
 ̂  




 (   ̂  ) 
 ̂( ̂) 
 ̂( ̂) 
 ̂    ̂( ̂) 
  [   ] 
            (  )   ̂ ( ̂ )           
     (    )    (  )  ̂ ( ̂ )    (  ) 
      (  )   ̂ ( ̂ )      
 (    )    (  )    ( ̂ )     (   
 ) 
  (  )   ̂ ( ̂ )      (   )   ( )   ̂ ( ̂ )     (    )(   ) 
  
  (  )    (  )   ̂ ( ̂ )   ̂ ( ̂ )       




      
        
  (  )    (  )   ̂ ( ̂ )   ̂ ( ̂ )       





     








    ((    
   ) (  )  ( ̂   
    ) ̂ ( ̂ )      
 )    (     
 ) ̂ ( ̂ ) 
       ((    
   ) (  )  ( ̂    
    
 ) ̂ ( ̂ )       
 )   
 ((   
    
 )  (  )  ( ̂    
    
 ) ̂ ( ̂ )       
 ) 
   
      
     
      
{             } 
 ̂  
 ̂  
inter-firm calls is 
denoted 
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, and 
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by assumption. We assume that subscribers’ choice 
between networks is also influenced by their non-price preferences for service pro-
viders. A customer’s “distance” from his most preferred network will be denoted θ. 
We assume that θ is uniformly distributed on the unit interval between firm 1 and 
firm 2: 
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 ̂  
 may be understood as the factor of substitution between network 
1 and network 2. Thus, a subscriber’s total utility – or total consumer surplus, de-
noted CS – from choosing network 1 or network 2 becomes
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 (1)
The marginal subscriber between networks 1 and 2 will be the person for whom
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 ̂  
, (3
where θ*denotes the marginal customer’s distance from firm 1. (With uniform dis-
tribution, θ* = s1 will also hold.)
The indifference condition in (2) gives
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 (4)
Service providers operate with constant, but different marginal costs in each seg-
ment of the service. This assumption implies that it is in a society’s interest to pur-
chase and use the services of the less efficient company, too, for it still increases 
social welfare. Consequently, uniform regulated prices would not be feasible in the 
short run because the less efficient company would incur losses and it would cease 
to provide a socially useful service. Fixed costs are disregarded because they do not 
affect the optimal level of service.
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denotes the marginal (unit) cost of connecting a new subscriber to network i.6 
Firm i (i = 1, 2) incurs a total marginal cost of 
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 ̂  
by providing on-net 
(intranet) calls to its own subscribers – where 
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denotes the marginal cost of call 
origination, while 
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labels the marginal cost of call termination – but the firm 
incurs only the unit cost 
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by terminating the off-net calls for subscribers of the 
other firm, respectively.
Firm i’s total profit from serving a mass of si customers with on-net calls and 
a mass of sj customers with inter-firm calls can be written as 
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profit from internal subscribers profit from call termination for external customers  
. (5)
The total profit for the whole industry thus becomes
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REGULATING INTERCONNECTION WITH PERFECT INFORMATION: 
COST-BASED PRICING FOR CALL TERMINATION
It is assumed to be in a society’s interest to control the firms’ monopoly power over 
interconnection in order to foster competition in end user services. In fact, such 
regulation exists in numerous countries, where the regulator sets an upper limit 
on the call termination charge a. We assume that the regulator wants to maximise 
social welfare (W) – measured as total consumer surplus plus total industry profit – 
in the regulated segment of the market, subject to some constraints. The regulator’s 
valuation over gross economic surplus is concave with the usual properties: W’ > 0, 
W” ≤ 0. Thus, the regulator’s objective function can be written as
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, (7)
where Π is total industry profit as described in (6) and CSi is the net consumer sur-
plus enjoyed by a subscriber to network i.
When firms find their optimal calling prices (pi, 
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) and subscription fee (fi) by 
maximising profits, they take into account the termination fee ai that will be set 
by the regulator. The first order conditions of the companies’ profit maximum in 
equation (5) are as follows:
 6 By this, we implicitly assume that service providers cannot extract all consumer surplus from new 
subscribers accessing their network.
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is firm i’s profit from one of 
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Substituting equation (13) into equation (4) yields the following market shares:
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. (14)
Since the regulator knows how firms solve their optimisation problem, he will use 
the firms’ profit maximising prices to obtain optimal termination fees that will max-
imise total social welfare.7 Substituting equations (11) and (12) into the regulator’s 
objective function in (7) gives
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 (15a)
are economic surpluses at the firms’ profit maximising prices per each subscriber 
in networks 1and 2, respectively.
Note that w1 = w2 must hold, otherwise the regulator would alter the termination 
charges in a way that would direct customers away from the network that yields 
lower economic surplus and toward the other network that offers a higher economic 
surplus per customer. For instance, if w1 > w2, then the regulator should reduce a2, 
 7 Our results would not change if the regulator established the cost-based termination fee at 
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the termination fee he had set to firm 2 (and/or he should increase a1) in order to 
direct customers away from network 2 and toward network 1. However, a reduction 
of a2 will reduce economic surplus at network 1. The adjustment of termination 
fees continues until w1 = w2. From this result and from s1 + s2 = 1 it follows that ai 
will maximise total social welfare in equation (15) if total net surplus per consum-
er, 
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. The first 
order condition of social welfare maximum is
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Based on the above results we can formulate our first proposition.
PROPOSITION 1 • Regulated cost-based pricing of call termination cannot be rec-
onciled with competitive (unregulated) calling prices and subscription fees if com-
panies operate with different marginal costs. Cost-based call termination prices will 
punish the efficient firm for its market share and its subscription fee will be smaller, 
consequently, its profit will be lower than if this firm remained less efficient. Thus, 
cost-based pricing of call termination will extend a “perverse” incentive to service 
providers that they should not offer call termination at efficient costs.
Proof • It is easy to see from equation (14) that describes the market shares of the 
firms, that firm i’s market share increases in its own termination charge ai, but its 
market share is a decreasing function of the other firm’s termination charge aj:
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Equation (17) above shows the profit maximising call termination charges. Since 
ai < aj because 
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In addition, it can be seen from equations (11), (12) and (13) that give the profit 
maximising calling charges and subscription fees, that firms will earn positive profits 
only on subscription. It is obvious from equation (13) that firm i’s profit maximising 
subscription fee 
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Consequently, if ai < aj because 
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 in the profit 
equation (5), it follows from 
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Proposition 1 shows that the efficient firm will lose, while the inefficient firm will 
gain in terms of market share and profits with cost-based pricing of call termination. 
Consequently, it is not in a firm’s interest to invest in efficiency improvements. In 
case the regulator does not know the companies’ true costs of providing intercon-
nection, or cost information is “noisy” – that is, the regulator can know the firms’ 
true costs only with some probability – the lack of the regulator’s perfect information 
will exacerbate the effects of “perverse” incentives under cost-based pricing as we 
shall show in the next sections.
REGULATION IN THE PRESENCE OF MORAL HAZARD  
AND ADVERSE SELECTION
Firms do not have the incentive to improve their cost efficiency if regulators of tele-
communications companies exercise cost-based pricing of network interconnection 
(call termination) as we have shown above. In addition, cost-based pricing requires 
that regulators possess perfect (noiseless) information of each firm’s termination 
costs. However, information about the companies’ effort level to increase their ef-
ficiency and about the true cost of service provision is the firms’ valuable private 
information that the firms are not willing to disclose voluntarily. If the regulator in-
curs large expenses with collecting detailed firm level information and he cannot be 
certain that the information he acquired is reliable, the adverse effects of cost-based 
pricing are exacerbated. We shall show that the regulator can induce effort from the 
companies to improve their cost efficiency and attain true information revelation of 
the firms if he accepts the fact that his information on the firms’ costs is limited. In 
other words, society will be better off if the regulator implements a regulatory regime 
that we call “incentive regulation” than what can be attained under cost-based pricing.
In the second part of the paper, we discuss the regulatory design for network 
interconnection (call termination), when the companies’ effort to improve efficiency 
as well as the efficiency level of their termination service, 
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, constitute the firms’ 
private information. We would obtain similar results if we assumed that the regulator 
obtains information about the firms’ true termination costs with some probabili-
ty, while it has positive probability that the firms’ cost information is “noisy”. That 
is, a company’s true cost of call termination may be 
 
        
 
, but the regulator may also 
obtain cost information of 
 
        
 
, where ω denotes the term of random error 
with a given probability distribution. Note that cost-based pricing assumes that firms’ 
termination cost is either 
 




        
 
, each with probability 1. The regulator and the 
regulated firms play a static game in our model. Companies can improve their cost 
efficiency by additional effort costs.8 The regulator has the right to offer a contract 
 8 A thorough analysis of moral hazard followed by adverse selection can be found in Laffont–Mar-
timort [2002] pp. 269–294.
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menu to the firms.9 This “regulation game” has a unique Nash equilibrium in each 
case presented below. The firms themselves play another pricing game within the 
regulation game that also has a unique equilibrium, as will be shown below.
We assume that two companies offer telecommunications services in the market. 
Each firm’s efficiency level of call termination may have two different values: it may 
be “high,” 
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, where the lower bar and the upper bar indicate low mar-
ginal cost (high efficiency) and high marginal cost (low efficiency), respectively. It 
follows from the definition of efficiency that 
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. The distance between 
firm i’s two efficiency levels is 
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.
The regulator does not know the true value of 
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perience that the firms’ efficiency may be high or low. The firms can improve their 
efficiency level with effort. Assuming that the firms’ effort (e) can be “high” or “low,” 
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,10 we denote the firm’s effort costs 
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respectively.
The regulator can observe the volume (and quality) of service by each firm, but 
he has only probabilistic knowledge about the companies’ effort and efficiency lev-
el. These conditional probabilities are based on past experience. The conditional 
probability of high efficiency if the firm exerted a high effort is given as 
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The probability of low efficiency with high effort then becomes 1 – νh. Similarly, the 
conditional probability of high efficiency with low effort is 
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, hence the conditional 
probability of low efficiency with low effort becomes 
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). We assume that the 
company is always capable of improving its efficiency level by exerting effort. How-
ever, the actual realisation of the efficiency level is a stochastic variable. When the 
company decides on effort – it may, for instance, invest in an efficiency enhancing 
technology – it cannot be certain that the effort will reap the expected efficiency 
level. We assume that the conditional probability of high efficiency is strictly in-
creasing with effort: 
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. The difference between the conditional probabilities 
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. We also assume 
that high effort is always socially optimal, i.e.
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where Wh and 
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 are the total economic surpluses from interconnection (inter-firm 
call termination) with the firms’ high and low effort, respectively. Before elaborating 
the model of incentive regulation, we briefly present the regulatory contract with 
perfect regulatory information as a benchmark case.
 9 It could be the other way around: the firms may design and offer the contract menu and the reg-
ulator may accept or reject their offer.
10 We could have assumed a continuous level of effort as we could have had a continuum of types, 
but it would have rendered the analysis technically more complex without adding to the important 
results. (See, for instance, Laffont–Martimort [2002] pp. 185–186.
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We assume that the firms are risk neutral, but they are protected by limited li-
ability. Under such assumptions, it is not in the firms’ interest to reveal their true 
type and exert high effort. Nevertheless, firms may be induced to reveal their type 
and exert high effort by the creation of an “information rent,” which is allocated by 
the regulator between the regulated firms. Such an information rent can be financed 
from a “service provision fund.” Firms may pay to or receive payment from this fund. 
If firm i receives a transfer payment τ per customer in addition to the termination 
fee it obtains from the other service provider for terminating inter-firm calls, then 
the firm’s net utility per customer becomes
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. (21)
The schedule of contracting between the firm and the regulator is as follows:
1. “Nature” sets the probability distributions of the efficiency types conditional on 
effort. The regulator and the firms learn these probability distributions.
2. The regulator offers a contract menu 
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for each combination 
of effort level and efficiency type for each firm i (i = 1, 2). The lower and upper 
bar variables stand for efficient outcomes and inefficient outcomes, respectively.
3. The firm decides on its effort level without revealing the decision, which thus 
remains private information.
4. Having selected an effort level, its efficiency type is set as a stochastic function 
of the firm’s effort. (Note that even the firm is unable to know its efficiency type 
for certain.)
5. The firm delivers the interconnection (call termination) service, customers pay 
the termination charge as a fraction of the inter-firm calling price, and firms settle 
the net balance of mutual interconnection charges among themselves according 
to the rule that has been specified by the regulator.
Additional contracting conditions are set for a firm by its participation constraint, 
limited liability constraints, and the adverse selection and moral hazard incentive 
constraints. We assume that the reservation utility of the firms, 
   
   
   
  (  
 )    (  
 ) 
   
         
  
  
   
  
    
         
   
    
    
  
  {     } 
 ( ) 
 (  )    
(  )    
    (   |  )  
 (    )
 (  )
 
   
     
      
       
  (      )    
  (     )     (  
    ) ̂  
{(       ̂ )  (       ̂ )} 
  
 (     )    
 (     ) 
     (   
 )     
     
     
, 
equals zero for all efficiency types. The constraints are introduced below.
Participation constraint • Since the regulator intends to induce high effort by the firm 
by assumption, the participation constraint is associated only with high effort. It is
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.11 (22)
11 Note that u does not have a superscript index. We assume that the regulator prefers high to low 
effort; consequently, participation must be ensured only for firms exerting high effort. When the 
superscript index is omitted, the variable or probability always refers to high effort.
 INTERCONNECTION AND INCENTIVE REGULATION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES 201
Limited liability constraints • We assume that the firm does not possess dispos-
able assets to finance any loss. This is not as strong an assumption as it appears to 
be. We could allow a loss, say L, which would affect our equations with a constant 
term, but it would not have any substantial effect on the model. The limited liability 
constraint of the firm with high efficiency is
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, (23a)
and the limited liability constraint of the firm with low efficiency is
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Adverse selection incentive compatibility constraints • These constraints ensure 
that the firm does not mimic another type of efficiency, which is different from its 
true type, because its utility cannot be higher with lying than with revealing the 
truth (its true efficiency level). (One may call these “Do not lie!” constraints.) The 
incentive constraints of the highly efficient firm are
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, (24a)
while the incentive constraints for the firm with low efficiency become
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 denotes the difference between high and low marginal 
costs of call termination.
Moral hazard incentive compatibility constraint • The moral hazard incentive con-
straint induces the firm to exert high effort provided that high effort is desirable for 
society. (One may call these “Do not cheat!” constraints.) In other words, the moral 
hazard incentive constraint ensures that the expected utility of the firm cannot be 
lower with high than with low effort. The incentive constraint is
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The regulator’s objective function • Since the regulator does not possess perfect 
information about the firms, he must give up some of his benefits in order to induce 
effort and true revelation. The regulator’s lost benefit becomes the firm’s information 
rent. The information rent has two parts. The first part is the firm’s limited liability 
rent, for the firms must be able to charge a higher interconnection fee than what the 
regulator would otherwise accept because of the firms’ limited liability constraint. 
The second part is the “adverse selection” rent, which acts to induce true revelation 
of the firms’ efficiency type. The regulator’s objective function becomes
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(26)
with constraints (22)–(25), where W is the social welfare function as given by equa-
tion (15).
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The relevant constraints •The analysis of constraints reveals that we need to deal 
only with the limited liability constraints of the less efficient firm (23b), the ad-
verse selection constraints of the efficient firm (24a), the moral hazard constraint 
(25), and the following monotonicity constraint (derived from the adverse selection 
constraints):
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The wider the gap between the regulated interconnection fee ai, i = 1, 2, and its 
first best optimum, the larger the lost economic surplus will be. Consequently, the 
information rent of the inefficient type must be kept at minimum by the regulator. 
It then follows from the limited liability constraint of the inefficient firm that
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 must hold. (28)
The information rent of the efficient type will be affected by the relative strength 
of the effect of adverse selection and moral hazard. Different constraints may be 
binding depending on the probability distribution of efficiency types and effort level, 
and on the magnitude of the effort cost. The regulator faces a trade-off between 
the information rent, resulting from the adverse selection and limited liability con-
straints, and the allocative efficiency of the firm with different efficiency types. In 
certain cases, it makes sense for the regulator to distort the output level of the firm 
downwards (i.e., away from the first best level of output) in order to save a portion 
compensation for the information rent of the more efficient type. We show that 
the downward distortion of output becomes smaller and smaller as the problem of 
moral hazard is exacerbated.
OPTIMAL CONTRACT MENUS WITH DIFFERENT BINDING 
CONSTRAINTS
We need to discuss three different cases that are distinguished by the relative mag-
nitude of the information rent and the effort cost. Notably, it will depend on the rel-
ative magnitude of the information rent and effort cost which constraints of the dif-
ferent efficiency types will be binding. We only present the first case in detail, when 
the information rent exceeds the effort cost. Then we outline only the final results of 
the other two cases, for the technical analysis goes along the same lines in all cases.
Case (a) • It is assumed that the information rent that a firm can extract with high 
efficiency is not less than the cost of inducing effort, that is, comparing (24a) and 
(25) we obtain
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, (29)
where the second best outcome of interconnection services is denoted by 
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.
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The following result is obtained from (29):
If the cost of inducing effort of the efficient firm is smaller than the firm’s information 
rent, then the adverse selection incentive constraint of the efficient firm (24a) is binding:
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The first order conditions of the regulator’s welfare maximisation problem yield 
optimal charges of call termination with different efficiency types. Substituting (28) 
and (30) into the regulator’s objective function in (26) we get
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. (31)
The first order conditions of call termination charges yield
 
         
  ̂  
         
  ̂  
   
    
    
          
     (   
 )      
    (   
 )    (     )    
 ( )    (       )  (   
 )(       ) 
 ̂   ̂  
    
   
  ̂ 





   
     
  ̂  
 ( )    (     
  ̂   
 ̂
 )  (   
 )( ) 
  ( )
   
   (    
 )
  ̂ 
   
   
  ( )
   
      
 
  ̂ 
   
 (  ) (    
 )
  ̂ 
 
   
     
            
 
 
    
   
  
   
  ̂ 
   
 
  
     ̂ 
  
 ̂ 
   
      
  ̂  




     
  ̂      
 ( )    (     
  ̂     
  ̂ )  (   
 )( )   (     
  ̂       
  ̂   ) 
         
  ̂  
         
  ̂  
   
    
    
          
     (   
 )      
    (   
 )      (     )    
 ( )    (       )  (   
 )(       ) 
 ̂   ̂  
     
   
  ̂ 





   
      
  ̂  
 ( )    (     
 ̂
     
  ̂ )  (  
 )( ) 
  ( )
   
   (     
 )
 ̂ 
   
 
  ( )
   
      
 
  ̂ 
   
 (    ) (     
 )
  ̂ 
   
  
     
            
  
  
    
   
  
   
  ̂ 
   
 
  
    
  ̂ 
   
 ̂ 
   
      
  ̂  




     
  ̂      
 ( )    (     
  ̂     
  ̂ )  (   
 )( )   (     
  ̂       
  ̂   ) 
 (32)
which sets the following termination fees:
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Our conclusion is that the different information rents that must be paid to high and 
to low types, respectively, differ to the extent that is sufficiently large to induce the 
high effort of all firms. In such cases, the optimal contract menu looks the same as 
the contract that the regulator would offer in case of pure adverse selection.
Case (b) • It is assumed that the cost of inducing effort is higher than the informa-
tion rent of the efficient type, but is lower than this information rent would be if 
the output of the less efficient firm were not reduced below its first best level, i.e.,
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where 
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 is the first best level of optimum output.
 The adverse selection incentive constraint (24a) and the moral hazard incen-
tive constraint (25) will equally bind in case of the high efficient firm:
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so that equation (35) can be re-written as
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and the regulator’s objective function becomes
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The first order conditions yield
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where λ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of equation (36).
The results indicate that exacerbated moral hazard results in a larger information 
rent of the efficient firm in Case (b) than in Case (a). The regulator cannot sub-
stantially reduce the information rent by deteriorating allocative efficiency, i.e., by 
reducing the level of service of the low efficiency type. Consequently, it is sensible 
to cut back the output of the less efficient firm to a lesser extent. As the first order 
conditions show, the efficient firm will produce at its first best optimum level. The 
regulator will distort the output level of the inefficient company downward as in 
Case (a), but it follows from (38) that this distortion will now be smaller. Conse-
quently, 
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 is now smaller than in Case (a), and the information rent of the efficient 
firm under Case (b) will exceed the information rent of the same firm under Case (a). 
The regulator must pay higher information rent for the gain in allocative efficiency.
Case (c) • It is assumed that the cost of inducing effort is larger than the information 
rent accrued by the efficient type:
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The problem of moral hazard is so pervasive – the cost of inducing effort is so 
high – that it renders the reduction of the information rent of the more efficient 
type unfeasible by distorting the output level of the less efficient type downwards. 
Consequently, each type will produce at its first best level. The regulator’s objective 
function in (26) becomes
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Solving the first order conditions obtains
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Substituting the results of the three cases into the firm’s profit functions in (6), our 
second proposition is formulated.
PROPOSITION 2 • Cost-based pricing rewards low efficiency in call termination 
services in terms of profits, while incentive regulation provides the proper incentives 
to firms: the companies’ higher effort to increase efficiency reaps larger profits.
 INTERCONNECTION AND INCENTIVE REGULATION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES 205
Proof • Efficient types can charge lower, while inefficient types can charge higher 
termination fees with incentive regulation. But the adverse effect of termination 
charges will be compensated for the efficient type through the information rent it 
obtains. The source of this information rent is a direct transfer of revenues from the 
inefficient to the efficient firm. 
As the analysis demonstrates, incentive regulation does not come without a cost. 
The cost of inducing effort is inversely related to the allocative inefficiency of the 
firms with different efficiency types in mixed models if moral hazard precedes ad-
verse selection.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our most important conclusion is that incentive regulation does not have a perverse 
effect on the regulated firms’ profit and efficiency, while cost-based regulation does 
have such an effect. Cost-based pricing of call termination ultimately rewards the 
less efficient types of regulated firms. In contrast, when the regulator offers the 
regulated firm an incentive-based contract menu, the efficient firm will earn higher 
profits, while the less efficient firm’s profit will be zero. These results suggest that 
incentive regulation puts an additional burden on the regulator, for he must real-
locate a fraction of the termination charge between the less efficient and the most 
efficient firm. However, this difficulty may not materialise, since firms normally pay 
each other only the net balance of interconnection charges.
The regulator needs to compare and contrast three possible cases if adverse se-
lection and moral hazard are both present. Regulated firms of both efficiency types 
provide their service at the first best, Pareto-efficient level in Case (c). The efficient 
type produces the first best level of output in all other cases as well, but the output 
level of the less efficient type is downward biased in Cases (a) and (b). In these cases, 
the regulator is forced to distort allocative efficiency in order to induce information 
revelation and high effort from any type of regulated firm.
The cost of inducing effort is larger relative to the information rent in Case (b) 
than in Case (a), and the regulator distorts the output level of the less efficient type 
downward to a lesser extent in Case (b) than in Case (a). As the cost of inducing ef-
fort keeps increasing, as in Cases (b) and (c), the downward distortion of the output 
level of the less efficient type becomes smaller and smaller. The service levels of firms 
of different efficiency types come closer and closer to their Pareto-efficient level as 
the benefit (what the firm can acquire in return for revealing private information) 
becomes smaller and smaller relative to the effort cost. Consequently, it is less and 
less necessary and sensible for the regulator to offer an information rent to the firm 
for information revelation. As the distortion of allocative efficiency becomes smaller, 
the interconnection charge is also reduced.
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Firms are induced to remain inefficient if termination charges are cost-based. In 
incentive regulation, the regulator transfers a certain amount of information rent 
from total economic surplus in order to induce effort for efficiency improvement. 
As a result of true cost revelation, allocative efficiency among firms improves and 
consumer surplus increases.
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• László Paizs •
INCENTIVE PROBLEMS  
IN THE HUNGARIAN ENERGY-BALANCING 
MECHANISM
This paper examines the functioning of the balancing market of the electricity sector 
in Hungary. Balancing energy is an ancillary service, which is used by the transmission 
system operator (TSO) to guarantee the continuous supply of electricity. The TSO 
resolves unforeseen imbalances by calling on power plants in real time to increase 
or decrease their production (called upward and downward regulation). In order to 
comply with the balancing mechanism and settlement process, market participants 
organize into so-called balancing groups led by the balancing responsible party (usu-
ally a trader or supplier). Based on the forecast of the balancing group’s day-ahead 
production and consumption, the balancing responsible party (BRP) prepares the 
schedule of the balancing group, forwards it to the TSO, and then settles the imbal-
ances with the TSO resulting from any deviation from the announced schedule. In 
our study we examine the question of how current balancing energy and imbalance 
prices affect the incentives on suppliers to keep their portfolio balanced. Taking only 
the price difference between negative and positive imbalance prices into consider-
ation, we can say that the incentive on suppliers to avoid imbalances is very strong 
in the Hungarian market. However, we also show that because of the asymmetrical 
penalties for being long versus short, suppliers are inclined to under-contract energy 
on the wholesale market. Finally, our analyses also reveal that the current structure 
of the purchase and settlement price of balancing energy motivates the public utility 
wholesaler (the BRP for the public utility balancing group) to nominate more than 
its expected load.
INTRODUCTION
Since the liberalization of the Hungarian electricity market in 2003, it has been 
functioning as a dual market: there is an open market for authorized consumers, 
and a public utility market with prices set by the authorities. The market was lib-
eralized gradually, in several phases. Beginning in January 2003 all consumers with 
electricity consumption higher than 6.5 GWh, and as of July 2004 all industrial 
consumers  – together representing 70 percent of all consumers – have had the 
opportunity to choose their supplier freely.
The first phase of liberalization was characterized by great consumer activity. By 
the end of 2004 the consumption of consumers opting for an open market reached 
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20 percent of the total domestic consumption. The import competition resulting 
from the liberalization of external trade played the main role in the fast-paced 
expansion of this competitive market segment. The import share of open market 
consumers in the electricity supply was over 60 percent of the total in 2004. After 
the opportunities brought by import-based growth ran out, the competitive market 
slowed down significantly. While the share of open market consumption reached 
25 percent by the end of 2005 and it was as high as 30 percent by the end of 2006, 
there was a sharp drop to 20 percent at the beginning of 2007, when open market 
consumers returned en masse to public utilities.
In spite of the strong activity on the demand side and the savings realized by 
large consumers – which were very significant at the beginning – the competition 
in Hungary is characterized by severely distorted market conditions. The long-term 
power purchase agreements between MVM (Hungarian Electricity Ltd.) and power 
generators present the biggest problem. Based on these agreements 65 percent of 
domestic power generation and 80 percent of domestic electricity sales are con-
trolled by MVM. This means that although the ownership structure of the Hun-
garian power generation market is fragmented, the market itself is overwhelmingly 
dominated by MVM. We have to add that due to the restrictions on international 
competition, domestic conditions play a more important role in the development 
of power market competition than in other markets.
This paper examines the functioning of the balancing market of the electricity sec-
tor in Hungary. It is necessary to have a balancing energy market in order to control 
and financially settle unforeseen imbalances in the electricity market. The company 
responsible for the reliability of the electric power system called Hungarian Transmis-
sion System Operator, or MAVIR for short, is in charge of the purchase and settlement 
of balancing energy. MAVIR prepares the system schedule from the schedules that 
have been submitted by BRPs. This schedule contains the planned generation-con-
sumption balance of the country for every 15 minute. If there is any deficiency in the 
system balance – for instance, because the actual generation by plants is less than the 
agreed amount – the TSO can restore the balance by drawing on reserves, and then 
charge the costs of balancing to those participants who failed to meet their schedule.
THE PROCUREMENT OF BALANCING ENERGY
In 2006, the Hungarian TSO purchased around 1300 MW reserve capacity from 
domestic power plants, which is approximately 20 percent of the annual peak con-
sumption (approximately 6300 MW). The reserves have varying levels of response 
time, i.e. how fast they can be made available. Deficits are typically balanced out 
by calling upon the reserve that can be made available at the shortest notice, and if 
the deficit is very big and/or lasts for a longer period, cheaper and larger reserves 
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with slower response times gradually replace the fast ones. The total cost of reserves 
utilized by MAVIR is approximately HUF 25bn, which increases the cost of every 
KWh supplied by about 0.7 Hungarian forints.
Just like the energy market, the procurement of balancing power can also be 
organised as a competitive market. One of the most frequently used methods is 
when the TSO holds auctions at regular intervals (once a year, daily, or every hour) 
to procure reserves of the required quantity and composition for upward and down-
ward regulation.
In the current model MAVIR procures control reserves at daily auctions. Within 
each reserve type participants submit two-part bids – containing capacity fee and 
energy price – for both upward and downward regulation. Settlement is based on 
the offer price: winning bidders get the capacity fee they bid for, and if activated 
they receive the energy fee contained in the bid submitted.
The main obstacle to competition on the balancing energy market (among oth-
ers) is the long-term purchase agreement system. The dominance of MVM is made 
even more obvious on this market due to import competition being excluded (very 
restricted). MAVIR covers its regulation reserve needs almost exclusively from 
MVM: in 2005 MVM’s share was as high as 95 percent. The regulatory authority cur-
rently addresses this problem by requiring MVM to submit bids to the balancing en-
ergy market that do not exceed the settlement prices of its contracts with generators.
THE SETTLEMENT OF BALANCING POWER
Market participants organize into so-called balancing groups, and the TSO settles 
the real-time imbalances financially with the balancing responsible parties (BRPs). 
The BRPs calculate what the members (power plants, traders, consumers) of their 
respective balancing group inject into the system as well as what they take out, and 
forward the balanced schedule to the system operator one day in advance. The 
settlement of balancing energy is based on the difference between the scheduled 
amount and the actual amount generated (loaded into the system) and consumed 
(withdrawn). The cost or revenue of balancing for the balancing group splits between 
the members of the balancing group.
The settlement price of balancing energy
The settlement of balancing energy, with those participants who require settle-
ment, can be done in two ways. In the so called single-price system, the same 
price  – though with the opposite sign – is applied for both the negative and positive 
imbalances. In the so called double price accounting system negative and positive 
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imbalance prices are different; the former is higher than the latter. To settle balanc-
es in the United States they tend to use the single price system, while in European 
countries they prefer the double price system (Glachant–Saguan [2007]).
Double imbalance prices provide a strong incentive for market participants to 
keep their own position in balance. Since the energy price charged for negative 
imbalances is typically higher than the day-ahead price, and the energy price paid 
for positive imbalances is typically lower, the system penalizes both taking more 
or taking less. The measure of “penalty” for both negative and positive imbalances 
(Bnegative and Bpositive) can be expressed as the following:
Bnegative = NIP – P
Bpositive = P – PIP,
where P is the market price (for example the relevant power exchange price), NIP 
(negative imbalance price) is the settlement price of negative imbalances, and PIP 
(positive imbalance price) is the settlement price of positive imbalances. The cost 
of being short can therefore be measured as the difference in costs between buying 
energy on the balancing market and the wholesale market. The cost of any devia-
tion from the submitted schedule can be reduced by keeping to the schedule more 
accurately, i.e. reducing the standard deviation of imbalances.
An additional feature of the double-pricing system is that often the price charged 
for imbalances does not only depend on the market player’s own balance (be it posi-
tive or negative), but also on the direction of its balance relative to the overall status 
of the system (same direction/opposite direction). In countries that have their own 
electricity exchanges, the settlement of imbalances that are in the same direction as 
that of the system are based on the cost of balancing services, while the settlement 
of imbalances that are in the opposite direction are based on day-ahead power ex-
change prices. By using day-ahead prices the exposure of market parties to balancing 
risks is lower, as normally the price of the day-ahead market is lower (higher) than 
price of negative imbalance (positive imbalance) of the balancing market. Using less 
“penalizing” settlement prices in the case of imbalances in the opposite directions 
is justifiable, as participants with opposite direction balances actually decrease the 
real-time costs of the balancing of the whole system.
In the absence of an organized market in Hungary we have no reference price, 
which we could refer to when settling imbalances that are in the opposite direction 







negative (short) negative imbalance price 
negative imbalance price, if there was 
upward regulation, otherwise 0
positive (long)
positive imbalance price, if there was 
downward regulation, otherwise 0
positive imbalance price
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as the system balance. Currently the way the settlement price is set does not depend 
on whether the direction of individual deviation is the same as that of the system 
deviation. A player with a negative balance will be charged the price of negative im-
balance (NIP) even if the system has a net surplus, provided that in the settlement 
period the system operator performed both downward and upward regulation. If 
there was no regulation in the opposite direction to the net system balance, then 
the settlement price will be equal to zero.
The rules of setting imbalance prices recently changed in Hungary. Earlier the 
unit price of balancing energy was fixed, the settlement prices of positive and neg-
ative deviations were determined by multiplying the public utility wholesale prices 
with fixed factors.1 In order for balancing energy to correspond more to the costs 
of regulation performed by the TSO, as of July 1, 2006 the fixed price system was 
replaced by cost-based pricing. Under the new scheme the settlement price of im-
balances is based on the average procurement cost of balancing services.
TABLE 2 • The settlement price of imbalances in Hungary in 2006 (HUF/KWh)
Period The settlement price of negative imbalances The settlement price of positive imbalances
January 2006–June 2006
 Peak period* 22.65 0.88
 Off-peak period* 11.23 0.00
 Average** 13.47 0.26
July 2006
 Average*** 15.28 0.00
  * Unit price imposed by the authorities.
  ** Fifteen-minute settlement price average, assuming that in 90 percent of the settlement periods there was some downward 
or upward regulation.
 *** Fifteen-minute settlement price average.
An assessment of the Hungarian imbalance price system
The Hungarian balancing mechanism will be assessed against the requirements 
considered necessary to achieve healthy operation of the balancing energy market. 
We examine how much the current system of imbalance prices encourage suppliers 
to avoid imbalances, how big is the risk it poses to market participants, whether it 
helps minimise overall balancing costs, and how much room it leaves for arbitrage 
or other undesirable gaming.
 1 The peak and off-peak period unit prices of negative imbalances were respectively 1.3 times the peak 
and off-peak period public utility wholesale prices set out in the regulation. The price of positive im-
balances in peak and off-peak periods were equal to the pro-rata average of peak and off-peak peri-
od public utility wholesale prices, while in peak periods they were equal to 0 (Network Code [2006]).
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As the costs of system-level balancing are usually considerable (see below in the 
study), market participants need to be encouraged to cover their generation and 
consumption as accurately as possible. For example, the more accurate forecast of 
generation and load and better incentive mechanisms within the balancing group 
can help to meet individual schedules more accurately.
However, it is important to see that the measures taken by BRPs to avoid imbal-
ances are costly, even if these costs are borne not at the level of centralised system 
control, but by the market participants themselves. Therefore, the minimisation of 
system balancing costs cannot be considered the ultimate goal. If this happened, it 
would lead to a very high degree of individual balancing, which in turn would in-
crease the cost of individual balancing too much. Theoretically, the pricing system 
of the balancing energy market can be considered optimal if it provides incentives 
for individual balancing of market participants to such an extent that its marginal 
cost is exactly the same as the marginal cost of system level balancing.
IMBALANCE PRICE SPREAD
The economic cost of being short or long depends very much on the difference 
between the negative and positive imbalance prices. To demonstrate the potential 
impact of the spread between negative and positive imbalance prices, let us consid-
er a BRP owning only load (i.e. a supplier). Assuming that the supplier’s real-time 
deviation from its schedule is a random variable following normal distribution, 
and that the opportunity cost of buying or selling balancing energy are identical 
(NIP – P = P – PIP = B). The average value of the imbalance costs of the supplier 
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where σ is the standard deviation of imbalances, and 2B is the difference between 
the negative and positive imbalance prices (see Appendix 1 for a detailed description 
of the calculation). So if a supplier can predict the consumption of its clients with 
a five percent margin of error, and the difference between imbalance prices is EUR 
50/MWh, then the average cost of balancing for the supplier will be approximately 
EUR 1/MWh. If this price difference increases, then the projected balancing cost 
will increase, and so will the incentive to keep their portfolio balanced.
The difference between imbalance prices in Hungary has been EUR 50–60/
MWh in the past 18 months, which is very high, compared to price differences 
abroad (see Table 3 and Figure 1). The price system of Hungarian balancing energy 
can therefore be considered very penalizing. We have to add that expensive balanc-
ing energy may act to stunt the development of competition especially in the early 
phases of liberalization.
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FIGURE 1 • Average imbalance and day-ahead prices on the Hungarian, French  
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www.mavir.hu.
a) Average imbalance 
and day-ahead prices 
in Hungary
b) Average imbalance 












































c) Average imbalance 

































Source: www.elexon.co.uk and 
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Suppliers that have recently entered the market naturally have a smaller clientele 
than their more established competitors. Due to the fact that it is much harder to 
plan the schedule, service to smaller consumer portfolios can only be provided if we 
make greater use of balancing energy. Balancing is consequently a greater burden 
to smaller suppliers than to big ones. Hence, the high exposure to balancing risk 
may act to prevent new players from entering the market.
Asymmetrical penalties
Figure 1 illustrates yet another peculiar aspect of balancing energy pricing in Hun-
gary. While in England and France the position of negative and positive imbalance 
prices with respect to the wholesale price can be said to be symmetrical, in Hungary 
the position of imbalance prices compared to wholesale price are asymmetric. The 
tendency that the difference between the wholesale price and the positive imbal-
ance price significantly exceed the difference between negative imbalance price and 
wholesale price can be observed since January 2006.
In the price structure of Hungary, the cost of settling a long position is signifi-
cantly higher than that of a short positions (P – PIP > NIP – P). It is easy to see how 
TABLE 3 • Imbalance prices in European countries, 2005 (EUR/MWh)
Country
The average price of negative 
imbalances 
The average price of positive 
imbalances Price difference
Austria 51 24 27
Belgium 56 12 44
Czech Republic 21 0 21
Denmark 36 27 9
United Kingdom 55 39 16
Finland 32 27 5
France 50 45 5
Greece 44 44 0
Netherlands 69 28 41
Ireland 69 60 9
Poland 37 24 13
Hungary 40 0 40
Germany 70 2 68
Norway 29 29 0
Italy 102 23 79
Portugal 58 23 35
Sweden 32 28 4
Source: EC [2005]: Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market, COM(2005) 568 final, Commission of the 
European Communities p. 67.
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this encourages suppliers to under contract energy on the wholesale market and 
thus avoiding long positions.
Let us look at the behaviour of a supplier when P – PIP > NIP – P. When making 
decision on the wholesale purchase of energy, the supplier is faced with the following 
problem. If he cuts the wholesale purchase of energy by one unit, he gains the sav-
ing of the power exchange price, lessens his exposure to the PIP (i.e. the likelihood 
that he ultimately goes long and needs to sell the surplus at PIP), while raising its 
exposure to the NIP (i.e. the risk that it subsequently goes short and needs to make 
up the shortfall at the PIP). Defining ps = the probability that the position of the 
supplier is ultimately short, this can be expressed as
 Gain = P – psNIP – (1 – ps)PIP. (2
To minimize the cost of his wholesale energy purchase plus the expected costs of 
balancing, the supplier will reduce his purchasing of energy down to the point where 
there is no further gain from cutting down on trading, i.e.
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If we put the averages of wholesale and balancing energy prices for the first six 
months of 2006 into the equation (P = 9.85 HUF/KWh, NIP = 13.47 HUF/KWh, 
PIP = 0.28 HUF/KWh), we get the following: the optimal probability of a supplier 
going short in the given period was approximately 0.73. Therefore, a supplier can 
minimize his expected costs in the period studied by purchasing only so much en-
ergy as to result in a short position for 73 percent of the settlement periods.
In Appendix 1 we provide a detailed assessment of the optimal degree of suppli-
ers under-contracting. Our calculations show that in the first six months of 2006 
the optimum degree of under-contracting for a supplier was on average equal to 
0.6 times the standard deviation of the consumption forecast error σ.2 So assuming 
for example that the supplier has a demand forecast error standard deviation of 5 
percent, then according to our estimation he must have contracted only 97 percent 
of its projected consumption. If all participants are inclined to under contract, then 
of course the whole system will also tend to be “under-contracted”. On the basis of 
this example, and assuming that there are altogether four suppliers on the market, all 
having equal shares, the system imbalance has a mean of –3 percent, and a standard 
deviation of 2.5 percent (= 5% /   4) (see Figure 2).
 2 In addition to trying to minimize the costs there are of course other factors (for example arbitrage) 
that can drive the behaviour of market participants. Naturally, when calculating the optimal degree 
of under-contracting we did not take these factors into consideration.
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The current balancing mechanism with unequal NIP – P and P – PIP spreads im-
poses high system balancing costs compared to the costs that would be incurred 
by a symmetrical spread around the day-ahead price (assuming that the difference 
between NIP and PIP is the same under the two pricing regimes). Since the frequency 
and the maximum value of negative imbalances increases, the system operator has 
to keep larger generation capacities in reserve for upward regulation.
In order to quantify this latter effect, let us compare the amount of upward 
regulation capacity needed to achieve a LOLP3 of 0.1 percent under the exist-
ing pricing scheme as well as under a pricing scheme with equal NIP – P and 
P – PIP spreads (NIPs = 16.445 HUF/KWh and PIPs = 3.255 HUF/KWh, that is 
NIPs – P = P – PIPs = 6.595 HUF/KWh and NIPs – PIPs = 2 × 6.595 HUF/KWh). As 
shown in the close-up view in Figure 2, under the current pricing scheme the need 
of the system for upward regulation reserve reaches 10.5 percent of load, while with 
symmetrical spread around P it would only reach 7.5 percent.
Market dominance and “gaming”
Table 4 shows the developments in regulating and balancing energy prices in the 
past 18 months.
 3 LOLP = Loss of Load Probability
FIGURE 2 • Density function of system imbalance when the NIP–P and P–PIP spreads  
are equal and when they are not
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One of the most striking features of the Hungarian balancing energy market is the 
extremely low price of positive imbalances. Even considering that the key feature 
of the double pricing system is to incentivise more accurate planning, the size of 
penalty imposed on long positions seems to be unwarranted. The main reason for 
the low positive imbalance price is the fact that the Hungarian TSO receives a very 
low price for the surplus energy from the providers of downward regulation. In other 
words, the price of decremantal energy is very low (0 HUF/KWh) in the regulating 
market. This is due to the monopolistic structure of the regulating market, i.e. the 
fact that only MVM offers bids for decremental energy to the TSO.4 Besides having 
the ability to influence the prices of regulating services, MVM are also capable of 
manipulating the overall system balance. This is due to the large size of the public 
utility balancing group managed by MVM. The latter’s consumption accounts for 
65-70 percent of the total domestic consumption. This enables MVM to shift the 
system balance in a direction that is favourable to the company’s own interest.
Next we show that in the present pricing system MVM is encouraged to nom-
inate more than its expected load (i.e. declare a larger than-anticipated load). Let 
us assume that MVM nominates more than its expected load and this brings the 
market into surplus. What happens in such situations? First, MVM as the single 
provider of regulating services will be called upon by the TSO to decrease output 
from its generators. The zero price of decremantal energy means that MVM pays 
nothing to the TSO for reducing its output. Second, MVM as the balance responsi-
ble party of the public utility balancing group will have a positive imbalance volume, 
which will be settled at the positive imbalance price of 0.24 HUF/kWh. Hence the 
net profit for MVM from pushing the system into a surplus is 0.24 HUF/kWh times 
the positive imbalance volume of the public utility balancing group. This arbitrage 
between the two markets could only be prevented if the positive imbalance prices 
were lower than the prices for decremental energy.
 4 Under sufficiently competitive conditions, the price for decremantal energy would come close to 
the variable cost of the least efficient operating plant (i.e. the plant with highest marginal cost).
TABLE 4 • Regulating and balancing energy prices in Hungary (HUF/KWh)
Period









January 2005–January 2005 8.2 0 13.90 0.23
February 2005–December 2005 8.8 0 15.50 0.25
January 2006–June 2006 12.9 0 14.40 0.24
July 2006–August 2006 14.3 0 14.30 0.00 ??
September 2006 20.48 0.90 ??
Note: the figures indicate the weighted average of the peak and off-peak prices values. Following the terminology of the Network 
Code we refer to the procurement side of the balancing energy market as “regulating market”, and the settlement side of it as 
“balancing market”.
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Although we have no data about the development of the position of the public utility 
balancing group, the available aggregate data on the system imbalance are in line 
with the prediction that MVM continuously nominates more than its expected 
load. In 2005, the total volume of upward regulation was 384 GWh, while that of 
downward regulation was 545 GWh, meaning that in the course of the past year 
the system balance was more often in surplus than in deficit. This, in combination 
with the predicted under-contracting behaviour of suppliers other than MVM (i.e. 
ones serving the free segment of the market), suggests that MVM indeed keeps 
nominating more than the expected load of the public utility balancing group.
The 15 minute increment data on system balance pertaining to July and August of 
2006 that were on the Hungarian TSO’s webpage also suggest over-nomination by the 
MVM. As seen in Figure 3, in each hour of the day in August the TSO purchased on 
average more downward regulation than upward regulation. In contrast, in July the 
direction of regulation was predominantly upward. In Figure 3 we also show for each 
hour of the day the estimated average spread between negative imbalance price and 
day-ahead price5. We can observe that in July the market price in the peak hours signif-
icantly exceeded the settlement price for negative imbalances, creating a huge incen-
tive for arbitrage between the two markets. We suspect that in this period suppliers 
serving the free segment of the market generated large deficits in their scheduled port-
folio, thereby making it impossible for MVM to push the system balance into surplus.
 5 This latter was calculated on the basis of the EEX day-ahead prices.
FIGURE 3 • Direction of regulation versus the NIP – P spread in the Hungarian electricity 
market in July and August 2006
MW EUR/MWh
Hours
Average net amount of regulation (August)
Average net amount of regulation (July)
EEX day-ahead price – Hungarian NIP (August)
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CONCLUSIONS
The balancing mechanism plays a central role in the wholesale electricity market. 
On the one hand, it is crucial in maintaining network stability and, on the other, 
it allows for a market-based settlement of imbalances between network users and 
the TSO. However, designing a balancing mechanism is a very complex task. The 
price system needs to incentivise the BRP to stay in balance, needs to minimize the 
social costs of balancing and at the same time needs to be robust against activities 
that threaten the functioning of the market.
In our study we examined the incentive properties of the current Hungarian 
energy balancing mechanism. We showed that the large spread between the NIP 
and the PIP creates a strong incentive for BRPs to reduce their imbalances resulting 
from inaccurate forecasts. On the other hand, we also show that, due to the exist-
ence of asymmetric penalties in the price system, BRPs have an incentive to under 
contract in the wholesale market as a hedge against real-time long positions and 
the associated higher imbalance costs. Finally, we demonstrated that MVM, who 
is responsible for the balancing of the public utility balancing group, has a strong 
incentive to nominate more that its expected load. This is due to the inconsistency 
in the pricing of decremantal energy versus positive imbalances, which is allowing 
for a positive spread between the negative imbalance price and the decremantal 
energy price. As a monopoly provider of downward regulation and the leader of the 
largest balancing group, MVM can push the system balance into surplus and then 
earn a positive profit from selling energy in real time to the TSO.
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APPENDIX
1. The imbalance cost of a free market supplier
The aim of this appendix is to provide an estimate of the imbalance cost of a free 
market supplier under the assumption that NIP – P = P – PIP; i.e. its cost exposure to 
negative and positive imbalances are the same. (Note that under such prices a sup-
plier has no incentive to nominate differently from its expected load.) Let B = NIP – P (= P – PIP) and x a random variable denoting the supplier’s imbalance position. Then 
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where f(x) is the probability density function of x. If x follows a normal distribution 
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So if for example a supplier has a demand forecast error standard deviation of 5 per-
cent and the difference between the negative and positive imbalance prices 2B is EUR 
50/MWh, then the imbalance cost of the supplier will be approximately EUR 1/MWh.
2. The optimal degree of under-contracting for a free market supplier
The aim of this appendix is to provide an estimate of the degree of under-contract-
ing by a supplier in the Hungarian electricity market. Q denotes the supplier’s cus-
tomers’ consumption. Real-time consumption then equals the expected amount of 
consumption plus the forecast error, θ, which is distributed according to F(θ). To 
meet its customers’ demands, the supplier purchases (1 + u)Q amount of energy on 
the wholesale market, where u stands for the degree of under-contracting.
If the real-time consumption is less than the contracted energy, i.e. θ < u, then 
the surplus energy is sold at the PIP (positive imbalance price). The supplier’s loss 
can be expressed as the following:
K = (u – θ)(P – PIP)
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If the real-time consumption is greater than the contracted energy, i.e. θ > u, then 
the missing energy has to be covered in the balancing market at the NIP (negative 
imbalance price). The loss made by the supplier will be
K = (u – θ)(NIP – P).
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where f is the probability density function of the forecast error. The optimal degree 
of under-contracting is then u that minimizes K: 
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where F is the probability distribution of the forecast error θ. Given F, the optimal 
degree of under-contracting u can be solved. Assume that F is normal with mean 
0 and standard variation σ. In the first six months of 2006, the average day-ahead 
price P was 9.85 HUF/KWh, the average NIP 13.47 HUF/KWh and the average PIP 
0.28 HUF/KWh. Using these values we get
F(u) = 0.2737.
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 Our calculation shows that a supplier should on average be 0.6σ under-contracted 
in the first half of 2006. Assuming that the supplier had a consumption forecast 
error standard deviation of 5 percent, he should optimally cover only 97 percent of 
its expected consumption on the wholesale market.
• András Kiss •
THE EFFECT OF THE REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION OF ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
ON THE MARKET POWER OF POWER 
PLANTS*
The purpose of this paper is to construct a short-term economic model for the whole-
sale electricity market in the Central and Eastern European region – assuming condi-
tions after a complete opening-up of the market. Among the inputs we provide an 
estimate for the generating capacities available and the cost of generation, demand 
as well as the transmission network data. The advantage of our modelling approach is 
that we simultaneously take into consideration the spatial structure of the electricity 
market and the capability of dominant companies to control prices. Our main conclu-
sions: 1. at the current stage of market integration, major electricity generators are very 
powerful market players; 2. tighter market integration reduces the chances of abuse of 
market dominance and prices; however 3. even complete market integration cannot 
sufficiently limit the power of electricity generators. However, the practical importance 
of our modelling results cannot be assessed appropriately without determining how 
realistic they are.
INTRODUCTION
One of the key issues of the liberalisation of the electricity market in our region is 
Can real competitive markets develop with the current ownership structure? and 
What threat does the market dominance of certain players pose? The supply side of 
the electricity sectors in Central and Eastern European countries is quite concen-
trated: the overwhelming majority of generating capacities is concentrated in the 
hands of one or just a few players. This is one of the reasons why it is often argued 
that effective competitive markets are less likely to develop within a country. So in 
order to take advantage of the competition between electricity generators we need 
some kind of regional integration.
  * The first, more detailed version of this paper was produced in the Central and Eastern European 
Energy Market (C3EM) Research Project conducted by the Regional Centre for Energy Policy 
Research (REKK) in 2005–2006 (Kiss et al. [2006]). The numerical model applied in the origi-
nal version was constructed by the co-authors Julián Barquín and Miguel Vázquez (Universidad 
Pontificia Comillas, Madrid), and the author would like to express his deep gratitude to them. 
The author would also like to thank the following individuals: Zoltán Sulyok (MAVIR Hungarian 
Independent Transmission Operator Company Ltd) and REKK staff for their contribution and 
valuable suggestions in the course of the study.
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In our paper we look at this issue using a numerical model. We have studied 
seven neighbouring countries in the region: Austria (AT), the Czech Republic (CZ), 
Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK) and Slovenia (SI).1 After 
the description of: the structure and the workings of the model, generating capacities 
and costs, demand, and cross-border capacities, we try to find the equilibrium of 
the model in a competitive market environment and an environment characterized 
by strategic behaviour. After this we look at what changes can be expected from 
tighter integration regarding key variables, primarily: prices. At the end of the study 
we draw some conclusions from the numerical modelling exercise.
REGIONAL MARKET MODEL
We can look at the applied market model from four aspects: market demand, gen-
erating technology, spatial structure and corporate behaviour. We look at all four 
of these issues in detail below. We present not only the theoretical background but 
the data and estimates used for the numerical simulation.
Market demand
The demand for electricity is represented by an aggregate demand curve for each 
of the seven countries. It is a well-known fact that the electricity consumption of 
a country changes by the minute. However, we are not concerned with such tem-
poral fluctuations, as our model is static by nature. Instead we have to record how 
demand changes at a specific point in time – which is typically the winter peak pe-
riod – in relation to the market price of electricity. Figure 1 shows the winter peak 
load of the various countries in the region.
As we do not have appropriate data to estimate the demand curve, we have to 
make various assumptions regarding the shape and position of the curve. To make 
things simple we chose a linear function, which can be described perfectly using 
three (easy-to-understand) data items.
The first is the demanded quantity, which has been described above, the second 
is the corresponding market price, which for the sake of simplicity we assume to be 
30 EUR/MWh on every market.
By this we have defined a point on the demand curve. The steepness of the 
curve (the third data item) can be described by the elasticity of demand. Generally, 
the elasticity of demand for electricity is quite low: it is hard for consumers to find 
a substitute for the product.
 1 In brackets we use the abbreviations of the UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission 
of Electricity). These abbreviations are used in the figures for the different countries.
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As no hard data are available we are forced to fall back on assumptions: we assume 
the elasticity of the demand to be –0.1 in every country (at specified demand points). 
Based on this, for example, a ten percent increase in price (short term) decreases 
consumption by one percent.2
Generating technology
There are numerous primary energy sources available for generating electricity, the 
most important ones being coal, natural gas, hydropower and nuclear power. As 
we are modelling short-term competition, we will concentrate on only production 
marginal costs.
As a good approximation, it can be assumed that, with regard to any given tech-
nology, the marginal cost of electricity generation at different production levels 
fluctuates within a very small range; therefore we assume the marginal cost to be 
constant.3
 2 Due to the nature of the linear function form, demand elasticity continuously changes along the de-
mand function (higher prices mean higher demand elasticity). In the 20–50 EUR/MWh price range, 
which is interesting for modelling purposes, actual price elasticity is somewhere between  –0.06 
and –0.18. (However, we must consider that we have no reason to prefer constant price elasticity 
to the linear function form.)
 3 The average cost of generation is of course not constant because of fixed costs. However, since we 
are concerned with short-term supply decisions, we treat fix costs (e.g. labour costs and capital 


















Source: UCTE, own calculations.
CZ SK HU RO SI HR
FIGURE 1 • Estimated winter peak demand (maximum system load) in the countries studied
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In order to estimate the marginal costs, first we need to determine the cost of fuel 
required to generate 1 MWh of electricity. Here we can set out in two different direc-
tions. We can take the observed total fuel-consumption (and related costs) of power 
plants and can project it on the quantity of electricity generated, or we can estimate 
the technology-based marginal cost of electricity generation from the energy con-
version efficiency of generators and the fuel prices observed in the specific regions.
Although the first approach (using actual cost data) may seem more tempting 
theoretically, this method cannot be applied in practice – to the level of consist-
ency required by the modelling example – due to the fact that such data is consid-
ered sensitive from a business perspective. On the other hand the advantage of the 
technology-based estimation is not only that significantly less data is required but 
also that there is a higher level of consistency inherent in the procedure: even if we 
are mistaken about the actual level of costs, the marginal costs of power plants in 
relation to one another remain consistent.4
We have aggregated the marginal cost curves resulting from technology estima-
tion by country, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 shows the available generating capacities and their costs as well as the 
load in peak periods. The bubbles with country codes indicate the point on the 
supply curve where the domestic demand can be met within the specific country 
(price elasticity has been ignored here). This way we can see the “international 
competitiveness” of the electricity sector of each country. The lower the bubble 
of a country is positioned, and the flatter the supply curve continues towards the 
right, the more the country’s power plants are able to export cheaply to the regional 
market. In this regard the Czech and Romanian power plants are at an advantage.
Spatial structure
Since we are modelling quite a large regional market, the question arises whether 
the spatial structure has any significant effect on market equilibrium, and if so, how 
to take it into consideration.
Electricity is transmitted over long distances through high voltage transmission 
grids. The actual cost of transmission (the heat loss resulting from the resistance of 
power lines) are insignificant for the purposes of the model. However, the capacity 
 4 In the case of hydropower we need to take a somewhat different approach, as the potential energy 
of water has no price as such. Of course it is true that we cannot generate electricity tomorrow 
with the water we use today, so we may not realise tomorrow’s revenues this way. However, to es-
timate alternative costs we would need to have a fully dynamic market model, which is far beyond 
the scope of our study. As the second best solution we assume the marginal cost of hydro power 
to be zero; however, we reduce the amount of electricity that can be generated to the level of the 
annual average capacity utilization.
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constraints of power lines cannot be ignored: if the load exceeds the capacity limit, the 
lines simply burn (which the transmission system operators do not allow to happen).
The structure of transmission networks had to be simplified for the purposes of 
the model. In our model all parts of the transmission network, within each country, 
were simplified to a single node, and between two neighbouring nodes (countries) 
there are no more than one cross-border link drawn. Every consumption and gen-
eration takes place at the nodes and the transmission of electricity (trade) occurs 
through the limited capacity lines connecting them. By marking countries with 
a single node, we assume that congestion can only occur on the interconnectors.5 
Figure 3 shows a stylized drawing of the modelled region. We will concentrate on 
the interconnectors denoted by solid lines (and the countries located at the end of 
these lines) explicitly.
Our capacity constrained electricity transmission model is further „complicated” 
by the laws of physics pertaining to current: Kirchhoff ’s junction and loop rules. The 
former is interpreted in a relatively intuitive way from an economic aspect in our 
model: the sum of all electricity flowing to a node (generation + import) is equiva-
lent to the electricity flowing from the node (consumption + export). However, the 
loop rule is not in compliance with the general view on transportation of goods: 
free route choice does not apply to electricity!
 5 In the case of Austria for instance this assumption is not always true; therefore it cannot be con-
sidered a perfect approximation of the real situation.

























Source: Kiss et al. [2006].
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On a network with parallel paths between two nodes, electricity flows along all 
parallel paths between the two nodes. Furthermore, the amount of electricity flow-
ing through the specific network lines is distributed (roughly) in inverse proportion 
to the resistance of each path.
Let us take the transaction of 100 MW from Hungary to Austria as an example. 
If we want to consider its actual physical effect on the specific cross-border lines, we 
find that only one third of the 100 MW actually flows through that line from Hun-
gary to Austria, the rest takes parallel routes through Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
Croatia and Slovenia before reaching Austria – but if we look at the map we can 
see that the transaction also effects the Polish-German, or the Swiss-Italian borders 
as well. Of course the further the route is the less electricity flows through there.
The effect that electricity transmission between two nodes has on a line can 
be described using so called PTDF matrices, which are used on a regular basis by 
transmission system operators.6 The current European cross-border capacity dis-
 6 PTDF stands for Power Transfer Distribution Factor. It shows the size and direction of physical 
flows generated by the transfer of one unit of electricity between two control zones connected 
directly and indirectly.
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tribution mechanisms do not take into consideration the effect of non-direct (loop) 
flows, which has an adverse consequence: the bilateral transmission agreements 
generate negative external effects on lines that connect nodes indirectly. (They re-
duce available capacities elsewhere, which are not paid for.)
The existing continental capacity distribution mechanism (bilateral or coordinated 
auctions) „solves” the issues caused by externalities by reducing the actually available 
cross-border capacities by the amount of loop flows. This solves the problem of sys-
tem security, but does not eliminate the basic welfare losses caused by external factors.
In tightly integrated systems, the effect of loop flows is explicitly taken into 
consideration during capacity allocation, and so called nodal pricing is applied.7 In 
our model – in order to simplify the modelling of strategic behaviour – we assumed 
such an effective capacity allocation mechanism. However, we are aware that for the 
region under study this is far from the current practice. As a matter of fact, tighter 
regional integration could be interpreted as a shift to a more effective capacity al-
location system. However, our model cannot be used to evaluate such a measure.
Figure 4 shows the size of cross-border capacities taken into account. As a start-
ing point we can assume that the values of the so called NTC (net transfer capacity),8 
 7 See for example, the PJM market on the Eastern coast of the United States (www.pjm.com).
 8 NTC, or Net Transfer Capacity is the maximum capacity for exchange of power between two 
control zones.
FIGURE 4 • Estimated network capacity values available with regional nodal pricing  













AT—SI AT—CZ AT—HU AT—SK HU—SK HU—RO HR—HU HR—SI
Source: UCTE, ETSO, own calculations.
Estimated available physical 
capacity
NTC
NTC in opposite direction
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known from the bilateral capacity allocation system, determine the maximum 
amount of electricity that can be transmitted between two nodes (countries). Since 
we use nodal pricing in the model, this is only a rough estimate. Therefore we also 
present an “integration” scenario in our model as well, where we determine the size 
of cross-border capacities available by subtracting the effect of average loop flows 
(and a 20 percent reserve margin) coming from countries that are outside the region 
from the physically available network capacity.9
As one can see, the available capacities estimated by us (based on the simplified 
network model) in each and every case exceed the NTC values actually published. 
The average difference is almost double.
Corporate behaviour
During the running of the model we distinguish two behavioural patterns by (the 
owners of) generators. The more basic assumption is price-taking behaviour (perfect 
competition). Every power plant assumes that their decision to generate electricity 
has no effect on market prices or the usage of cross-border capacities (and conse-
quently their prices).
As a result, companies will keep increasing their electricity generation until the 
local market price exceeds their marginal costs (of course within the specific gen-
erating capacity constraints).
The first welfare theorem of economics states that perfect competition leads to 
efficient allocation in the market: competition maximises complete welfare attain-
able on the regional market given the existing constraints (including generating and 
transmission constraints). Of course, if we loosen these constraints  – for instance, 
by assuming tighter integration, implying larger cross-border capacities – we can 
achieve a higher welfare level in the new equilibrium than previously.
The second possible assumption is that companies with large generating ca-
pacities recognize what effects their own decisions on their electricity output have 
on market prices. In extreme cases they may know perfectly well the demand 
curves as well as the reaction of the price-taking corporate sector (the „competi-
tive fringe”) and strategic competitors. To solve the model we are applying the so 
called Cournot-assumptions, meaning that when making their output decisions 
strategic companies assume that other large, strategic players do not react to the 
output changes of competitors, but the competitive fringe adapts to the new market 
price in a price-taking manner. In addition, strategic companies need to be able to 
forecast, which interconnectors will be congested. Equilibrium will occur where all 
 9 It should be kept in mind that this calculation method ignores the effect the flows within a country 
have on cross-border lines.
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these assumptions are in line with the generating decisions companies have made 
based on their forecasts.10
The ability to decide who the strategic players are, provides some decisive free-
dom in the course of modelling. Having examined several variations, we selected 
(non-state-owned) companies, which have strategic generating capacities that are 
significant both regionally and at a national level, but do not have full coverage of 
the sector. We have identified three such companies: CEZ (the Czech Republic), SE 
(Slovakia) and Verbund (Austria). Including such companies as MVM (Hungarian 
Electricity Ltd), AES-Tisza Power Plant Ltd, Electrabel Hungary Ltd or RWE Energy 
Hungary Ltd. which are regionally small (although significant in Hungary) in our 
study does not affect our findings greatly. Such a great part of the Romanian, Slove-
nian and Croatian generating capacities was state-owned at the time of modelling 
(and still are) that it would be more reasonable to expect a price-taking (or from 
a different perspective: optimally regulated) market behaviour from them than to 
think they would go for profit-maximisation.
OUTCOMES OF PERFECT COMPETITION
Having presented the model and input data, let us now look at the results. Figure 
5 shows the main scenario characterized by perfect competition and low level of 
regional integration.
There are two values corresponding to each country in the figure. The top box 
shows the equilibrium market price (EUR/MWh), while the box at the bottom dis-
plays the net export position of the country. A positive value in a white field means 
that the country is a net exporter (in MWh); while a negative value in a black field 
means that the country is a net importer.
Arrows crossing the borders indicate the direction and the strength of electricity 
flows (the stronger the flow the thicker the arrow). The tone of the arrow indicates 
whether the interconnector is congested (i.e. if the capacity of interconnectors is an 
effective constraint on further trade). Lines using 100 percent of their capacity are 
marked in black, while those marked in grey are not used to the full.
10 For a detailed, formalized description of the model and the solution concept, see the paper of 
Barquín–Vázquez [2005]. Numerous studies have been conducted about the strategic modelling 
of electricity market competition, which for the most part differ in their assumed market mecha-
nisms, the type of strategic game, the degree, to which they cling to the physical characteristics of 
electricity flow, or their equilibrium calculation methods (see Cardell et al. 1997], Smeers [1997], 
Wei–Smeers [1999], Hobbs et al. [2000], Joskow–Tirole [2000], Day et al. [2002], and Metzler et al. 
[2003]) A great overview of electricity market strategic competition modelling literature is given 
by Neuhoff et al. [2005] and Ventosa et al. [2005].
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We can make the following observations about the diagram. There are large 
price differences between equilibrium prices in the countries as a result of severe 
congestion on three interconnectors (from the Czech Republic to Austria, from 
Austria to Hungary, from Romania to Hungary).
The lowest priced country is the Czech Republic, followed by Slovakia and Roma-
nia. The prices in Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia are higher, and they are relatively 
close to each other. The quite high price observed in Austria is probably the result 
of two effects: firstly, the limited import capacity existing from the direction of the 
Czech Republic, and secondly, the limitation of the capacity of storage power plants 
to average available capacity. (With less careful assumptions we would probably 
allow much a higher level of capacity usage for storage plants, which would lead to 
significant inexpensive extra capacity – and lower prices.)
Only the Czech Republic and Romania are in net exporting position. The most 
severe power deficit occurs in Croatia and Hungary.
Figure 6 shows what happens in a model assuming perfect competition, if, by 
increasing cross-border capacities, a tighter regional integration is achieved (for 
the degree of capacity increase see Figure 4).
The striking difference between Figure 5 and Figure 6 is the dramatic increase 
in the Czech export position towards both Austria and Hungary. The net exporting 
position of Romania has slightly decreased, but it is still very positive. Both Austria 
and Hungary have greatly increased their dependence on imports, while the ex-
port-import balance of all other countries has only slightly worsened.
The effect of tighter market integration is clearly visible in the equilibrium pric-
es: market prices have converged considerably. In the case of the Czech Republic, 
this implies a two-fold increase in the system price; nevertheless, the Czech market 
remains the lowest priced country in the region. Slovakia comes in second place, 
followed by Romania, Hungary,
FIGURE 5 • Competitive market, moderate integration
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Croatia and Slovenia. Austria still has the highest electricity price, but propor-
tionately it has had by far the largest price decrease of all countries.
Correspondingly, congestion still exists between the Czech Republic and Austria, 
but line limits from Austria to Hungary and Romania to Hungary are no longer binding.
THE EFFECT OF MARKET DOMINANCE IN THE REGION
We already covered the assumptions and effects that lie behind strategic behaviour, 
so now we will simply present and interpret the modelling results. Figure 7 shows 























FIGURE 6 • Competitive market, tight integration
(cross-border capacity = estimated available physical capacity)
FIGURE 7 • Oligopolistic market, moderate integration























To understand the effects of market dominance, compare Figures 5 and 7. Re-
garding the net export positions, the most striking is how much production in the 
Czech Republic was cut back. Numerical results show that as an oligopolistic com-
pany CEZ decreased generation by almost 3,400 MW (44 percent), which is only 
partly substituted by the 525 MW (14 percent) increase in Czech fringe production. 
There is also a sizeable decrease in power generation by Verbund (–1,019 MW) and 
SE (–809 MW). As a result, prices have gone up considerably throughout the whole 
region (except Romania, where competitive companies prevail).
Some countries (most notably Croatia and Slovenia) have turned from net im-
porters to net exporters. Generally, the destination of electricity trade is still Hungary 
and Austria, but the Czech Republic is no longer the main source. Consequently, 
the direction of the flow of electricity has also changed at some interconnectors. 
The line from the Czech Republic to Austria is no longer congested, and the Austri-
an-Hungarian line is now congested in the other direction, towards Austria. Assumed 
price-taking behaviour in the Romanian power sector ensures that Romania remains 
a strong net exporter, as a result of which the flow on the Romania → Hungary in-
terconnector has not decreased.
Finally, let us examine what effect tighter regional integration has in a market 
dominant position on the equilibrium (Figure 8).
Relative to the corresponding scenario under the competitive setting (Figure 6), 
we can make the following observations.
 • Capacity withholding has decreased trade in the region and taken the load off the 
interconnectors. All congestions have been eliminated (although Romania-Hun-
gary is still very close to being congested, using almost 100 percent of its capacity).
 • As a result, all prices have converged to 41.23 EUR/MWh, which is much higher 
than any of the market prices under the perfect competitive market setting with 
tight integration.
FIGURE 8 • Oligopolistic market, tight integration
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 • Slovakia has taken over the role of main regional exporter from the Czech Republic. 
Romania exports almost twice as much as in the competitive environment.
 • If one takes advantage of market dominance, the average regional price level will still be 
higher under tight integration than with price-taking behaviour without integration.
Finally, let us see what effect regional market integration has on market dominance 
(Figures 7 and 8).
 • With the exception of Romania, prices in all of the countries dropped by an approx. 
average of 20 percent after the integration.
 • The direction of flows remained the same.
 • The Czech Republic, Croatia and Slovenia have turned from net exporters to net 
importers. The export-import balance of Austria has slightly worsened, while that 
of Hungary and Slovakia got better.
 • The “missing” energy is provided by price-taking firms in Romania, which increas-
es the local price there to regional levels as well.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Of the input data of our model – not taking into consideration structural assumptions – 
the information about the demand function are the most ad hoc. As a result, we have 
looked at some other scenarios regarding the level of demand and its price elasticity.
Looking at the results, we can say that the characteristics of the changes in de-
mand and under competitive and strategic behaviour were qualitatively alike. So we 
only present the results about the oligopolistic market structure.
Figure 9 shows what happens if we reduce the demand to different extents on 
regional markets The specific cases (10–50 percent drop in demand) can be inter-
preted in two ways.
As we know, the demand for electricity fluctuates according to the time of the 
day, from week to week and seasonally. With the changes in the level of demand 
according to the first interpretation, we are examining how sensitive our results are 
to normal fluctuations in demand. (The ratio of peak period and off-peak period 
consumption can be as much as 2:1.)
In the second interpretation, sensitivity to changes in demand also affects one 
of our structural assumptions: the insularity of the region towards cheap and com-
petitive import coming from outside (e.g. Poland or Ukraine). If some inexpensive 
and price-taking import electricity comes from over the borders of the region, we 
expect residual demand to drop. However, taking import capacities into consider-
ation this decline in demand can be no more than 10-20 percent.
No matter which interpretation we chose, it becomes obvious that the decline 
in demand will result in lower equilibrium prices. The degree of price decrease is 
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significant (it can drop to half of the market price); however it corresponds to the 
difference between peak and off-peak prices of power exchanges.
Figure 10 shows the effect the increase of demand elasticity has on equilibrium 
prices. Here our expectations inspired by economic theory are met: greater demand 
elasticity reduces price raising by strategic companies, since with the price increase 
FIGURE 9 • The effect decline in demand relative to peak demand (100 percent) has on 























FIGURE 10 • The effect greater demand elasticity has on equilibrium prices under oligopolistic 
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companies can expect a sharper drop in demand, which makes the increasing of 
prices less profitable. However, the Figure also shows that even major changes in 
demand elasticity do not have such a strong reducing effect on prices as the daily 
fluctuation of consumption does.
CONCLUSIONS
We have now seen that large electricity generators have considerable market power 
in the modelled regional market environment, which raises market prices above 
competitive levels across the region. Using current NTC values as available cross-bor-
der capacity, this mark-up can range from 2 EUR/MWh (Austria) to 44 EUR/MWh 
(Czech Republic), with a typical value around 12-14 EUR/MWh. In percentages, the 
margin averages between 25-40 percent.
At the same time, two interconnectors are very heavily used. Congestion on the 
lines from Romania to Hungary and from Hungary to Austria reflects the effect of 
the competitive electricity supply coming from the Eastern end of the region and 
trying to reach the Western part of the region, where capacity withholding creates 
a shortage of supply.
We can observe that the modelled tighter regional integration does indeed reduce 
the price increasing power of dominant market players. The primary reason for this 
is also that the competitive supply coming from Romania is allowed to compete with 
strategic supply in Western markets. This result is of course not independent from 
the assumption (exogenous in our model) that electricity generators in Romania 
behave in a price-taking way.
On the other hand we have to note that large regional electricity generators 
have significant dominance even in a tightly integrated market. (Figure 8 shows 
the tightest integration that can be achieved, as there are no congestions at any 
borders in the region, and the same price applies to every market.) Even if we con-
sider the effect of competitive supply coming from the east, we find that short-term 
equilibrium prices will be around 1.5-2 times the prices observed in the integrated 
competitive scenario.
Thus, it is fair to say that closer integration mitigates market power relative to 
a more segmented market structure, but it is not nearly sufficient to eliminate it 
altogether or to realize the potential welfare gains of market competition. (Indeed, 
the price mark-up of strategic players is barely dented by integration.) To draw our 
main conclusions we should not forget the original assumptions we worked with 
and their limitations.
The most important ones are: the static nature of the model, the idealized na-
ture of the capacity allocation mechanism used, somewhat arbitrary drawing of the 
borders of the region under study, the isolation of the region, and the optimistic 
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assumptions about the motivations of state controlled market players. It is hard 
to evaluate the practical importance of our modelling results until these limiting 
simplifications have been overcome.
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• Péter Kaderják–András Kiss–László Paizs–Adrienn Selei– 
Pálma Szolnoki–Borbála Tóth •
NATURAL GAS MARKET INTEGRATION  
IN THE DANUBE REGION: THE ROLE OF 
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
The paper introduces the Danube Region Gas Market Model, a network and contract 
constrained multi-country competitive equilibrium model and applies it to estimate 
the impacts of new gas infrastructure investments on market integration, social wel-
fare and supply security in the countries of Central and South East Europe. Individual 
projects, project packages (e.g. the North-South gas corridor for Central and Eastern 
Europe) and international pipeline projects (like Nabucco West) are evaluated accord-
ing to the Regional Cost Convergence Index. Estimates on price spill-over effects of 
new infrastructures are also presented. The model can support cost benefit analyses 
foreseen by the proposed European Infrastructure Package to identify EU projects 
of common interest.
INTRODUCTION
New EU member states and the wider Central and Southeast European region (in 
the following: the Danube Region or DR1) suffer from specific gas industry prob-
lems. The most serious one is the lack of sufficient interconnectivity of the region’s 
countries prohibiting gas supply source diversification for the DR comparable to 
that of old member states.2 The lack of interconnectivity also reduces the scope 
for gas market integration and supply security improvements at the regional level.
Since the shock of the 2009 January gas crisis, European energy policy has been 
seeking ways to address the above mentioned gas industry problems of the new 
EU member states, with consideration towards the Energy Community countries. 
A prominent example is EU gas supply security regulation 994/2010. More recently, 
the new European Infrastructure Package (EIP)3 intends to identify and provide Un-
ion level support for gas infrastructure projects that might impact interconnectivity 
 1 The 14 Danube Region countries are: Austria (AT), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BA), Bulgaria (BG), 
Croatia (HR), the Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Moldova (MD), Monte-
negro (MNE), Romania (RO), Serbia (SB), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SL) and Ukraine (UA). 
 2 The price, supply security and political risks of a lock-in situation with dominant Russian import 
dependence for the DR are thoroughly discussed by Kaderják [2011a] and [2011b]. 
 3 COM(2011) 658 (in the followings: proposed Regulation), SEC(2011) 1233 and COM(2011) 665. 
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and market integration4 in a positive way in this EU region. The EIP identifies certain 
priority corridors, which in the case of gas includes linking the Baltic, Black, Adriatic 
and Aegean Seas. The development of north-south interconnections in Central and 
Eastern Europe and Southeast Europe forms an important element of this corridor. 
In 2011 the EC commissioned a “High Level Group”5 with the mandate to devise 
an action plan for the development of interconnections in gas, electricity and oil 
by the end of 2011. The High Level Group published its action plan in December 
2011. In 2012 this work continues with a similar High Level Group activity for the 
Energy Community countries.
Finally, in October 2011, the EU approved the European Union Strategy for the 
DR that foresees a strengthened cooperation for the countries of the DR in a wide 
range of areas, including energy policy. Its Action Plan6 states that for a secure and 
well-functioning natural gas market in the DR:
•  “…the interconnections between national markets have to be improved and countries 
in the region need to gain access to new external sources. Reinforcing gas transmis-
sion infrastructure will be key for preventing potential supply disruption in the future. 
Well-functioning networks, interconnections and interoperability are needed for energy 
security, diversification and effective energy operation.” (EC [2011] p. 18).
While an agreement seems to emerge that gas infrastructure development is the key 
to improving gas market integration and supply security for the DR, no solid meth-
odology has yet been developed to assess the impacts of the proposed projects or 
project packages on regional gas market integration, security of supply, competition 
and sustainability. Moreover, while the proposed Regulation foresees the application 
of energy system-wide cost-benefit analysis for the evaluation of promoted projects, 
such a methodology is still to be developed – in the case of gas by the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G).
While, with the objective of supporting the work of the North-South gas working 
group, the study by Kantoor Management Consultants [2012] develops a method-
ology to set priorities for regional gas infrastructure developments, the proposed 
methodology still leaves many problems unsolved. Its basis is a physical flow model, 
 4 Article 4 of the proposed infrastructure Regulation defines four criteria that will apply for the eval-
uation of gas projects of common interest. These are their impact on market integration, security 
of supply, competition and sustainability. 
 5 The High Level Group on north-south interconnections is chaired by the EC and includes Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia as members, and Croatia as 
an observer. Austria, Germany and Slovenia also became members of this group. The High Level 
Group also established a “working group on natural gas” (GWG) consisting of representatives of 
the relevant ministries, regulatory authorities and transmission system operators (TSOs) in the 
participating countries, except for Austria and Germany.
 6 Com(2010) 715 and SEC(2010) 1489, respectively. 
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with country-level analysis, focusing mostly on security of supply issues. The gas 
market representation is rather simple, price formation modelling is neglected, 
therefore the understanding of how new infrastructures will impact market inte-
gration is incomplete. On the whole, the Kantoor study provides important insights 
on how changes in infrastructures affect the security of supply status of individual 
countries. However, the analyses do not answer what affects new infrastructures 
may have on prices, costs and benefits or social welfare.
This paper reports on an alternative approach to the evaluation and ranking of 
new gas infrastructure projects in a regional gas market context. We introduce the 
Danube Region Gas Market Model (DRGMM) and illustrate how model simulations 
can be used to assess the impacts of new infrastructures or infrastructure packages 
on regional gas market integration and for system-wide cost-benefit and security of 
supply analyses. If extended to include all the EU27 gas markets, the model could 
help the implementation process of the proposed infrastructure Regulation. First, 
it could serve as a potential component of the cost-benefit methodology envisioned 
by the proposed Regulation.7 Second, model estimates on the distribution of con-
sumer and producer benefits from new infrastructures across impacted countries 
could also support the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
in elaborating its decisions on cross border cost allocation for Projects of Common 
Interest (PCI) when national regulatory authorities did not reach agreement on 
those matters.8
The structure of the paper is as follows. After a brief literature review on gas 
market modelling, we summarize the basic assumptions and characteristics of the 
DRGMM. Next we present several simulation results to illustrate the variety of anal-
yses the model allows for, including market integration, cost-benefit and security of 
supply analyses. Finally, we reflect on the limitations of the model’s present version 
and suggest areas for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the following, we give a short review of the most important complex, large-scale 
computational gas market models, which have been applied to analyze the security 
of gas supply and the impact of infrastructure developments in Europe.
The main focus of the EUGAS model (Perner–Seeliger [2004]) is to analyze the 
prospects of gas supplies to the European market in the coming decades. It assumes 
perfect competition among market players and contains an extensive infrastructure 
representation. The objective function and the constraints of this model are linear. 
 7 See e.g. Article 12 of the proposed Regulation. 
 8 See Article 13(6) on this matter.
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The time periods include five years, and the annual gas consumption is split sea-
sonally into three different load periods.
Contrary to the EUGAS model, most of the gas simulation models depict the 
strategic interaction between players. The GASTALE model (Boots [2004]) was the 
first attempt to apply successive oligopoly in natural gas production and trading in 
a large-scale simulation model. The model has a two-level structure, in which pro-
ducers engage in competition a la Cournot, and each producer is a Stackelberg lead-
er with respect to traders, who may be Cournot oligopolists or perfect competitors.
The extended, dynamic versions of the GASTALE model (Lise–Hobbs [2008], 
[2009]) include investments in scarce infrastructures (such as pipelines, storages and 
LNG infrastructure). However, this version assumes market power only for producers.
GASMOD (Holz et al. [2008] is similar in spirit to GASTALE. It also structures the 
European natural gas market as a two-stage-game of successive oligopolies: imports 
to Europe (first stage, upstream) and trade within Europe (second stage, downstream). 
As the model’s main focus is to examine the possible effects of liberalization on trade, 
the geographical coverage of the model is wide. On the demand side it includes all 
European markets, and on the supply side it includes major exporters to Europe.
Egging et al. [2008] presented a more detailed complementary model of the Euro-
pean natural gas market which accounts for the issues of market power of exporters 
and of globalizing natural gas markets with LNG trade. The market structure that 
their model implements is different from that of GASMOD and the static GAST-
ALE model as they assumed that only traders can exert market power by playing 
the Cournot game against each other. Other players are assumed to be price takers.
Based on their previous work (Gabriel et al. [2005a], [2005b]) Egging et al. [2010] 
presented the World Gas Model. It is a multi-period mixed complementarity mod-
el for the global natural gas market, which contains more than 80 countries and 
regions and covers 98% of worldwide natural gas production and consumption. It 
also includes a detailed representation of cross-border pipelines and constraints 
imposed by long-term contracts in the LNG market. The model operates with five 
year periods as well as two seasons (peak and off-peak). Similar to the previous 
models it includes market power in the upstream market, which lies with the traders, 
both representing pipelines and LNG deliveries. It allows for endogenous capacity 
expansions and seasonal arbitrage by storage operators.
The NATGAS model (Mulder–Zwart [2006]) assumes an oligopolistic producer 
market where a small number of strategic natural gas producers are facing price-tak-
ing traders in the downstream market. The main focus of the model is to compute 
long-term effects of policy measures on future gas production and gas prices in 
Europe. It contains long-run projections of supply, transport, storage and consump-
tion patterns in the model region, aggregated in 5-year periods, distinguishing two 
seasons (winter and summer).
Abada et al. [2012] developed a dynamic Generalized Nash–Cournot gas market 
model (GaMMES model). In the applied oligopolistic market structure they take 
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into account long-term contracts in an endogenous way, which makes the model 
a Generalized Nash Equilibrium problem. Their demand representation is specific 
because it captures the possible fuel substitution that can be made between the 
consumption of oil, coal, and natural gas in the overall fossil energy consumption.
THE DANUBE REGION GAS MARKET MODEL
The Danube Region Gas Market Model was developed by REKK to simulate the oper-
ation of an international wholesale natural gas market in the Central and South-East 
European (CSEE) region.9 Figure 1 shows the geographical scope of the model. Coun-
try codes denote the countries, for which we have explicitly included the demand and 
supply side of the local market, as well as gas storages. Large external markets, such as 
Germany, Italy or (indirectly) Russia, are represented by exogenously assumed mar-
ket prices, long-term supply contracts and physical connections to the CSEE region.
 9 For a first description and application of REKK’s Regional Gas Market Model see Kaderják [2011a] 
pp. 121–147. 
All map outlines are based on the maps of 
Daniel Dalet, source: http://d-maps.com/m/
europemax/europemax09.svg.
FIGURE 1 • The geographical 
scope of the Danube Region  
Gas Market Model
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Given the input data, the model calculates a dynamic competitive market equi-
librium, subject to constraints represented by the physical gas infrastructure and 
contractual arrangements specific to the region, for fifteen countries in the CSEE 
region, and returns the market clearing prices, along with the production, con-
sumption and trading quantities, storage utilization decisions and long-term con-
tract deliveries.
Model calculations refer to 12 consecutive months, with a default setting of 
April to March.10 Dynamic connections between months are introduced by the 
operation of gas storages (“you can only withdraw what you have injected pre-
viously”) and long-term take-or-pay (TOP) contract constraints (minimum and 
maximum deliveries are calculated over the entire 12-month period, enabling 
contractual “make-up”).
The Danube Region Gas Market Model consists of the following building blocks: 
(1) local demand; (2) local supply; (3) gas storages; (4) external markets and supply 
sources; (5) cross-border pipeline connections; (6) TOP contracts; and (7) spot 
trading. We will describe each of them in detail below.
Local demand • We derive a set of local demand functions, each representing the 
aggregate demand of each modelled country for each month. Local demand func-
tions are downward sloping, meaning that higher prices decrease the amount of 
gas that consumers want to use in a given period. For simplicity, we use a linear 
functional form, the consequence of which is that every time the market price in-
creases by 0.1 €/MWh, local monthly consumption is reduced by an equal quantity 
(as opposed to equal percentages, for example).11
The linearity and price responsiveness of local demand ensures that market 
clearing prices will always exist in the model. Regardless of how little supply there 
is in a local market, there will be a high enough price so that the quantity demanded 
will fall back to the level of quantity supplied, achieving market equilibrium.
Local supply • Local supply shows the relationship between the local market price 
and the amount of gas that local producers are willing to pump into the system at 
that price.
In the model, each supply unit (company, field, or even well) has a constant 
marginal cost of production (measured in €/MWh). Supply units operate between 
minimum and maximum production constraints in each month, with the constraints 
10 The start of the modelling year can be set to any other month.
11 For the construction of the demand functions we use 2011 consumption data taken from the Eu-
rostat and EnC database. Given the lack of reliable data, the reference price is uniformly assumed 
to be 28 EUR/MWh across all countries and periods. We assume average retail price elasticity of 
-0.1 for gas consumers, to calibrate the linear demand curves on each local market. 
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being independent across months.12 Therefore, production decisions in October, 
for example, have no direct effect on production possibilities in any other month.
Any number of supply units can be defined for each month and each local mar-
ket. As a result, local supply will be represented by an increasing step-function, for 
which the number and size of steps can be chosen freely.
Gas storages • Gas storages are capable of storing natural gas from one period to 
another, arbitraging away large market price differences across periods. Their effect 
on the system’s supply-demand balance can be positive or negative, depending on 
whether gas is withdrawn from, or injected into, the storage. Each local market can 
contain any number of storage units (companies or fields).
Storage units have a constant marginal cost of injection and (separately) of with-
drawal. In each month, there are upper limits on total injections and total with-
drawals. There is no specific working gas fee, but the model contains a real interest 
rate for discounting the periods, which automatically ensures that foregone interest 
costs on working gas inventories are taken into account.
There are three additional constraints on storage operation: (1) working gas 
capacity; (2) starting inventory level; and (3) year-end inventory level. Injections 
and withdrawals must be such during the year that the working gas capacity is 
never exceeded, intra-year inventory levels never drop below zero, and year-end 
inventory levels are met.
External markets and supply sources • Explicitly modelled local markets are lim-
ited to the countries of the CSEE region (including the DR), but their gas sectors 
are by no means closed to the outside world. There are comparatively large external 
markets and supply sources neighbouring the region, which can serve as import 
sources (e.g. Russia, LNG markets), export destinations, or both (e.g. Germany, Italy).
Prices for external markets and supply sources are set exogenously (i.e. as input 
data) for each month, and they are not assumed to be influenced by any supply-de-
mand development in the local markets. As a consequence, the price levels set for 
outside markets are important determinants of their trading direction with the 
CSEE region. When prices are set relatively low, CSEE countries are more likely to 
import from the outside markets, and vice versa.
Cross-border pipeline connections • Any two markets (local or outside) can be con-
nected by any number of pipelines, which allow the transportation of natural gas from 
one market to the other. Connections between geographically non-neighbouring coun-
tries are also possible, which corresponds to the presence of dedicated transit pipelines.
12 Minimum production levels can be set to zero. If minimum levels are set too high, a market clearing 
equilibrium may require negative prices, but this practically never happens with realistic input data.
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Cross-border pipelines are unidirectional, but physical reverse flow can easily 
be allowed for by adding a parallel connection that “points” in the other direction. 
Each pipeline has a minimum and a maximum monthly transmission capacity, as 
well as a proportional transmission fee.
Virtual reverse flow (“backhaul”) on unidirectional pipelines can also be allowed, 
or forbidden, separately for each connection and each month. The rationale for 
virtual reverse flow is the possibility to trade “against” the delivery of long-term 
TOP contracts, by exploiting the fact that reducing a pre-arranged gas flow in the 
physical direction is the same commercial transaction as selling gas in the reverse 
direction.
We disregard from modelling the internal gas transmission systems of local and 
external markets.
Long-term take-or-pay (TOP) contracts • A TOP contract is an agreement between 
an outside supply source and a local market concerning the delivery of natural gas 
into the latter. The structure of a TOP contract is the following.
Each contract has monthly and annual minimum and maximum quantities, a de-
livery price, and a monthly proportional TOP-violation penalty. Maximum quanti-
ties (monthly or annual) cannot be breached, and neither can the annual minimum 
quantity. Deliveries can be reduced below the monthly minimum, in which case 
the monthly proportional TOP-violation penalty must be paid for the gas that was 
not delivered.
Any number of TOP-contracts can be in force between any two source and des-
tination markets. Monthly TOP-limits, prices, and penalties can be changed from 
one month to the next.
The delivery routes (the set of pipelines from source to destination) must be 
specified as input data for each contract. It is possible to divide the delivered quan-
tities among several parallel routes in pre-determined proportions, and routes can 
also be changed from one month to the next.
Spot trading • The final building block, spot trade, serves to arbitrage price differ-
ences across markets that are connected with a pipeline. Typically, if the price on 
the source-side of the pipeline exceeds the price on the destination-side by more 
than the proportional transmission fee, then spot trading will occur towards the 
high-priced market. Spot trading continues until either (1) the price difference 
drops to the level of the transmission fee, or (2) the physical capacity of the pipe-
line is reached.
Physical flows on a pipeline equal the sum of long-term deliveries and spot 
trading. When virtual reverse flow is allowed, spot trading can become “negative” 
(backhaul), meaning that transactions go against the predominant contractual flow. 
Of course, backhaul can never exceed the contractual flow on a pipeline.
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Equilibrium
The DRGMM algorithm reads the input data and searches for the simultaneous 
supply-demand equilibrium (including storage stock changes and net imports) of 
all fifteen local markets in all months, respecting all the constraints detailed above.
In short, the equilibrium state (the “result”) of the model can be described by 
a simple no-arbitrage condition across space and time. However, it is instructive to 
spell out this condition in terms of the behaviour of market participants: consumers, 
producers and traders.13
Local consumers decide about gas utilization based on the market price. This 
decision is governed entirely by the local demand functions we introduced earlier.
Local producers decide about their gas production level in the following way: if 
market prices in their country of operation are higher than unit production costs, 
then they produce gas at full capacity. If prices fall below costs, then production is 
cut back to the minimum level (possibly zero). Finally, if prices and costs are exactly 
equal, then producers choose some amount between the minimum and maximum 
levels, which is actually determined in a way to match the local demand for gas in 
that month.
Traders in the model are the ones performing the most complex optimization 
procedures. First, they decide about long-term contract deliveries in each month, 
based on contractual constraints (prices, TOP quantities, penalties) and local sup-
ply-demand conditions.
Second, traders also utilize storages to arbitrage price differences across months. 
For example, if market prices in January are relatively high, then they withdraw 
gas from storage in January and inject it back in a later month in such a way as to 
maximize the difference between the selling and the buying price. As long as there 
is available withdrawal, injection and working gas capacity, as well as price differ-
ences between months exceeding the sum of injection costs, withdrawal costs, and 
the foregone interest, the arbitrage opportunity will be present and traders will 
exploit it.14,15
Finally, traders also perform spot transactions, based on prices in each local 
and outside market and the available cross-border transmission capacities to and 
from those markets, including countries such as Russia, Germany, Italy, Turkey, or 
LNG markets, which are not explicitly included in the supply-demand equalization.
13 When assessing welfare effects, we omit storage operators, since injection and withdrawal fees are 
set exogenously, and stock changes are determined by traders.
14 Traders also have to make sure that storages are filled up to their pre-specified closing level at the 
end of the year, since we do not allow for year-to-year stock changes in the model.
15 A similar inter-temporal arbitrage can also be performed in markets without available storage 
capacity, as long as there are direct or indirect cross-border links to countries with gas storage 
capability. In this sense, flexibility services are truly international in the simulation.
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SIMULATION RESULTS
This chapter presents an application of the DRGMM to assess the likely impact of 
all known gas infrastructure development project proposals on regional gas market 
integration in the DR. The types of projects we analyse are within-region pipelines 
(interconnectors, including reverse flow projects), underground storage sites, LNG 
terminals and new international long distance pipelines providing new sources of 
gas supply for the DR.
For this purpose we create and run a reference scenario with 2011 input data 
and additional assumptions discussed below. Next we add, one by one, the proposed 
projects to the reference case infrastructure ceteris paribus and compare model 
outcomes to the reference case. By this we ask how the outcome of regional gas 
trading and infrastructure operations would differ from the 2011 reference case if 
that piece of infrastructure was already in place. When adding new infrastructures 
to the reference case, we disregard from the cost and timing of infrastructure in-
vestment, so they get into the model ‘overnight’ and do not change the tariffs paid 
by infrastructure users for transmission, storage or LNG terminal services. However, 
for the purpose of the cost-benefit analysis we collected available project related 
investment cost data.
After analysing individual projects one by one, we repeat the same procedure 
for project packages like the proposed project list of the north-south gas working 
group. Finally, the likely impact of new long distance pipelines on the regional gas 
market is assessed in the context of a 2020 reference scenario.
Input data
Table 1 contains the dimension and sources of technical input data used for the sim-
ulations. In order to create the 2011 reference scenario, we used estimated data when 
2011 data was still not available (e.g. consumption data due to delayed publication).
For the 2020 annual consumption and production forecast we rely on a critical 
review of the forecasts of institutions listed in Table 1. The monthly distribution 
of gas consumption for the analysed countries was estimated using historic data 
(see Figure 2).
The pipeline infrastructure of the region for the 2011 reference scenario is de-
picted on Figure 3.
Finally, in order to run the model, we also have to assume TOP and spot prices 
for external markets and tariffs paid by infrastructure users for transmission and 
storage (injection and withdrawal).
Table 2 contains external gas product prices we use for simulation purposes in 
this paper. With regard to TOP contracts we assume a mixed pricing regime with 
a 20% weight for spot and 80% weight for oil indexed pricing. This is to reflect the 
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TABLE 1 • Summary of input data structure and sources
Data Source
Category Unit Actual data Forecast / Planned
Consumption Annual Quantity (bcm)
Monthly distribution (% of annual quantity)
Eurostat,  
EnC data
N-S study, EnC data, Eurostat, 
ENTSO-G, own estimation
Production Minimum and maximum production (mcm/day) EUROSTAT,  
EnC data
N-S countries: N-S study, EnC data, 
ENTSO-G GRIPs, TYNDP
Infrastructure
Pipeline daily maximum flow ENTSO-G,  
EnC
TSOs, N-S action plan, TYNDP,  
GRIPs, EnC
Storage Injection (mcm/day), withdrawal (mcm/day),
working gas capacity (mcm)
GSE
LNG Capacity (mcm/day) GLE
TOP contracts Yearly minimum maximum quantity (mcm/year) 
Seasonal minimum and maximum quantity (mcm/day),
Gazprom, National Regulators Annual reports, Platts
EnC: Energy Community Regional Energy Strategy Task Force data; N-S Study: Kantor Management Consultants [2012].
FIGURE 2 • Estimated monthly distribution of consumption in the modelled countries


















































































European gas industry experience of a significant renegotiation of e.g. Russian TOP 
contracts in recent years of economic crisis.16 The assumed tolerance for TOP annual 
contracted quantity is ±15%. For the simulations with the 2020 reference scenario, 
we assume the renewal of the long term contracts expiring between 2011 and 2020, 
but also assume a 20% decrease in their annual contracted quantity.
16 Note however that we assume no active pricing behaviour on external markets.
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Arrows show the possible physical flow direction and the daily maximum capacity
FIGURE 3 • Interconnector topology used for the 2011 reference scenario
(mcm/day)
TABLE 2 • External market price assumptions (€/MWh)
Market Price in €/MWh
Western Europe (TTF spot) 24.2
Russia 34.2
Italy (PSV spot) 28.0
Turkey 31.6
LNG 24.2
LNG (Bulgaria, Romania) 31.6
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Transit contracts are taken into consideration only if they use the infrastructure 
of the DR. In the case of Germany and France we assume 50% of their Russian im-
ports will come through Nord Stream from 2013 on, thus 2020 flows are reduced 
accordingly. Furthermore, in case of Germany we assume that 50% of the transit 
requirements pass through the Yamal pipeline. For Turkey, we take into account only 
those Russian import contracts that are transmitted through Romania and Bulgaria. 
For Italy, Russian contracts go through Slovakia and Austria.
We do not have a realistic representation of local market transmission tariffs for 
the DRGMM, so we set them close to zero in this paper. We think that disregarding 
the transmission tariffs will not distort our conclusions because the unit transmis-
sion cost for a MWh of gas is negligible compared to its product price.17 Another 
argument is that although significant differences in transmission tariffs across the 
region might distort cross-border arbitrage opportunities, including the utilization 
of gas storage assets, with the advancement of an EU wide gas market regulation 
and integration transmission tariffs are expected to level out for the region. Never-
theless, this is a point for further model development.
Data on gas storage tariffs (injection and withdrawal fees) were gathered from 
storage owners or national energy regulators. Besides direct storage costs, we also 
account for the foregone interest costs on holding working gas inventories. The real 
interest rate for calculating the interest costs of gas inventories is set at 5 percent.
Market integration measures
The first set of our project related analyses deals with the impact of having new 
interconnectors or LNG stations in the region on regional gas market integration.18 
Since market integration is a multi-dimension concept and difficult to measure per 
se, we have developed variations of a simple measure of market integration. Our Re-
gional Cost Convergence Index (RCCI) is based on the assumption that an advance in 
market integration results in price convergence across the countries concerned and 
towards cheaper gas supply sources. In the ‘Danube Region 2011’ reference context 
this means that a new piece of gas infrastructure improves market integration when 
it results in reduced regional gas purchase costs through driving close-to-oil-indexed 
local prices down, closer to continental spot price levels.
17 REKK has recently carried out a survey of gas transmission tariffs for a 80 MW gas fired power 
plant for 10 of the modelled countries and found a € 1.87/MWh average value for this group. This 
is 5.5% of the oil indexed and 7.7% of the German spot price we use in this study. 
18 A positive impact on gas market integration is the number one criteria a PCI should meet accord-
ing to Article 4 of the proposed infrastructure Regulation. 
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Formally,
     
∑     
       
   
 
, where
i  is an index for the DR countries, i = 1, …, k;
pi is the annual weighted average gas price on local market i, calculated by the 
model;
qi is the annual gas consumption on local market i, calculated by the model;
Q is the amount of DR gas consumption (sum of qi over k), calculated by the 
model;
pspot is the continental spot price (TTF price).
The meaning of RCCI is the excess gas purchase cost (in per cent) the DR pays for 
its gas consumption over the case when it purchased the same amount at a con-
tinental spot price. The value of this excess cost for the 2011 reference scenario, 

























FIGURE 4 • Reference scenario: 2011 current infrastructure  
(RCCIref = 21.5%)
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local prices (€/MWh), and trade flows (arrows), assuming external market prices 
(included in the white boxes). White arrows stand for non-congested and grey for 
congested interconnections.
Analysis of individual projects case by case
First we added to the 2011 reference scenario all the proposed gas infrastructure 
projects (and then removed them) one by one (everything else unchanged) and 
calculated the RCCI for these simulations. No single gas storage project had a sig-
nificant regional market integration impact. Table 3 contains the investigated pipe-
line and Table 4 the LNG projects in the order of increasing RCCI values. Those 
projects with lower RCCI save more gas purchase cost for the region – and not 
necessarily only for the countries directly involved in the project – than those with 
higher values. In the 2011 reference scenario, consumers of the Danube Region pay 
4700 million € more than what they would pay for their consumption on a Western 
European spot market price.
TABLE 4 • Individual LNG project 








TABLE 3 • Individual pipeline project  
ranking by RCCI (RCCIref = 21.51%)
Pipeline RCCI Pipeline RCCI
CZ–PL2 17.10 PL–SK 21.51
SK–HU 18.35 BG–RO 21.51
GR–BG 21.13 PL–CZ 21.51
TR–BG 21.29 HR–IT 21.51
RS–BG 21.39 MK–GR 21.51
RS–RO 21.42 HR–HU2 21.51
RO–MD 21.47 RS–MK 21.51
BA–RS 21.50 RS–HR 21.52
MK–AL 21.51 BA–HR 21.52
HR–RS 21.51 MK–RS 21.55
HR–BA 21.51 RO–HU 21.56
HU–SK 21.51 BG–RS 21.56
MK–XK 21.51 RO–RS 21.56
AT–CZ 21.51 MK–BG 21.56
HR–SI 21.51 MD–RO 21.57
RS–BA2 21.51 SI–HU 21.67
HU–SI 21.51
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We could identify seven pipeline and five LNG projects which, by themselves 
only, can have a significant and advantageous regional impact on gas prices and 
purchase costs. While the rest of the pipeline projects do not have a significant 
regional impact individually, we found some that result in increased RCCI values 
(that is, increasing gas purchase cost for the region). The latter results might seem 
counter-intuitive at first sight, but they are actually consistent with the workings of 
the market. The market equilibrium maximizes total welfare, i.e. the sum of welfare 
of all groups of market players (i.e. consumers, producers, storage and intercon-
nector operators etc). Therefore while the addition of a new infrastructure element 
will never decrease short-term social welfare, it may well result in a welfare loss for 
one or more groups of market players.
According to RCCI, the best ranking pipeline project for the region is an upgrade 
of the Czech-Polish interconnector from its present 0.4 mcm/day to 8.6 mcm/day 
capacity. A new Slovak-Hungarian interconnector ranks second. Then come three 
projects helping to decrease very high Bulgarian prices and finally an interconnec-
tion from Romania to Moldova. The best ranking LNG projects are the Polish and 
the Croatian ones.
However, project ranking by RCCI alone might be misleading from a regional 
perspective, since it is neutral with regard to the distribution of price changes and 
cost savings across the countries. Impacts of some projects might be limited to the 
involved countries alone while others might provide a regionally more widespread 
effect. Our Regional Spill-over Index (RSoI) measures by how much the addition 
of a new piece of infrastructure will change the 2011 reference RCCI when we ex-
clude the countries directly affected by the new project19 from the RCCI calculation. 
Table 5 contains the results for those interconnector projects that produce part of 
their cost reduction effects beyond the borders of the project countries.






We can see that the impacts of two of the top ranking projects by RCCI, the 
Czech-Poland and the Serbia-Romania interconnectors (see Table 3) are strictly 
limited to the involved countries. In contrast, the majority of benefits are generat-
ed beyond the borders of the project countries in the case of the Slovakia-Hungary 
and Greece-Bulgaria projects. We can identify similar differences in the case of 
19 One country in the case of LNG and two in the case of a new interconnection
TABLE 5 • The reduction of regional gas purchase costs  
by individual pipeline projects in countries beyond  
the borders of the project countries (%)
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LNG projects. The impact of a Polish LNG receiving terminal, without additional 
cross border pipelines put in place, is strictly limited to Poland itself by bringing 
gas wholesale prices sharply down at home. At the same time a Croatian LNG 
project could bring decreasing prices and purchase costs not only for Croatia but 
for Slovenia, Hungary, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina without any additional 
infrastructure to be built.
Analysis of project packages: the North-South gas corridor
The DRGMM model can also be used to carry out similar analysis for project pack-
age impacts – instead of individual projects – on regional gas market integration. 
In recent years a number of proposals have been put forward to develop a set of 
infrastructure projects to improve gas market interconnectivity of the DR. The 
two prominent ones were the New Europe Transmission System (NETS) project (a 
European priority project under the EU’s TEN-E program) and the recently devel-
oped North-South gas corridor for Central and Southeast Europe. Since the present 
status of the NETS project does not allow for tracking it down to a specific set of 
infrastructure projects, we remained with the North-South corridor project list that 
was published by the Commission in December 2011 (EC [2011).
Adding the 17 projects of the North-South corridor to the 2011 reference case 
brings down the RCCI index to 6.8% from the 25.1% reference number. This trans-
lates into an annual gas purchase cost saving of €2827 million for the DR (see 
Figure 5).
A few notes are worth to make here. First, all countries except for the Czech 
Republic seem to enjoy a significant drop in wholesale gas prices in the modelled 
countries. The implementation of the entire project seems to bring the Western 
part of the region very close to the German / Italian markets and the South-Eastern 
part to the Greek one. Four LNG terminals provide significant new supply sources 
for the region.
Second, the empty black circles on Figure 5 stand for projects that are built but 
not utilized by market participants, according to the model. An interesting issue for 
future investigation is how the package could be reduced so that we preserve the 
rest of its benefits for the region. This needs a careful analysis since regional trading 
exhibits fairly strange patterns under the presence of significant TOP obligations 
and abundant spot trading opportunities supported by a robust infrastructure and 
new LNG supply sources. We can observe several trade flows from high to low 
priced countries (e.g. Bulgaria exporting to Greece or Hungary exporting to Serbia) 
or a lack of trade between countries with a meaningful price differential (e.g. an 
empty pipeline between Austria and the Czech Republic).
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The impacts of new international gas pipelines entering the region
Up to now we have investigated the impacts of intra-regional projects and project 
packages on market integration. However, in recent years discussions about how to 
increase the gas supply source diversification of the DR have centred on the South 
Corridor gas pipeline project alternatives (Nabucco, Nabucco West, South Stream, 
TAP, etc). Now we have a look at the way we can analyse the potential impacts of 
new pipeline supply sources entering the DR by the model.
For this analysis we first create a 2020 reference scenario. Compared to the 2011 
reference case, three major changes are made to the model. First, those – and only 
those – new infrastructures that are under construction in 2011 are added to the 
reference case. Second, load data is modified according to best available 2020 fore-
casts. Third, we assume that those TOP contracts expiring between 2011 and 2020 
will all be signed again but at a reduced rate of annual contracted capacity (80% of 
the former contract). External price assumptions are unchanged compared to the 
2011 reference scenario. The RCCI index for the 2020 reference case is up at 29.9%
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New pipelines are represented in a schematic way. We assume new gas entering 
the region under a TOP regime. TOP is priced at Russian price minus 5%, the Rus-
sian TOP price being a mix of 20% spot and 80% oil indexed regime. We compare 
the impacts of two pipeline business models under two different intra-regional net-
work configuration alternatives (four cases). The first pipeline brings 10 Bcm to the 
Turkish-Bulgarian border and then ships all of it to the Austrian hub of Baumgarten 
through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. Spot trading of this gas is then allowed 
(Project 1). This pipeline business model considers the DR as primarily a transit area. 
Alternatively, Project 2 brings 10 BCM to the Turkish-Bulgarian border again but 
then part of the gas is distributed along its paths more evenly: 1 Bcm for the Bulgari-
an and Romanian markets each, 2 Bcm for the Hungarian market and the remaining 
6 Bcm ends up at Baumgarten. Sufficient additional pipeline capacities are assumed 
to bring these amounts to the affected markets. We estimate the impacts of Projects 
1 and 2 on RCCI assuming either that the North-South corridor projects are com-
pleted or not completed. The corresponding RCCI figures are summarised in Table 6.
TABLE 6 • The impacts of alternative 10 Bcm South Corridor projects on RCCI under 
alternative intra-regional network topology
With North-South package Without North-South package
2020 base scenario 19.16% 29.86%
V1 (10 bcm TOP to AT) 16.89% 29.54%
V2 (10 bcm distributed along the route) 16.73% 27.38%
The conclusion of our analyses on this issue is that the bulk of the improvement in 
RCCI is due to improving intra-regional interconnectivity and adding LNG sources 
to the DR – that is implementing the North-South corridor projects. While a re-
gionally more diversified pipeline business model performs slightly better for the 
region compared to the transit-like model, the positive impact due to the pipeline 
is of secondary importance.
Allowing virtual reverse flow (backhaul) transactions  
on EU–EU borders of major transit pipelines
Because of the apparent counter-incentives of transit pipeline owners, we have so 
far disregarded backhaul transactions on all transit pipelines, shipping Russian gas 
to Western and South Europe crossing the DR. However, one could with good rea-
son argue20 that, instead of building new infrastructures, a better and bi-directional 
commercial utilisation of major existing physical infrastructures could significantly 
help the integration of the DR and West European gas markets.
20 The authors thank Pierre Noel for raising their attention to this point. 
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In order to estimate the potential impact of backhaul transactions on the Re-
gion’s gas purchase costs we allowed for virtual reverse flow transactions to happen 
at all EU-EU borders – including Croatia21 – along the transit pipelines. However, 
no backhaul transaction is allowed at EU-third country borders (EU–RU, EU–TR 
and EU–EnC22).
Table 7 contains the results of our simulations.
TABLE 7 • The impacts of virtual reverse flow options on RCCI
Backhaul option Not allowed (base case) Allowed on all EU–EU borders Annual savings on regions gas bill 
compared to base case
2011 21.51% 17.20% 823 million €
2020 base scenario 29.86% 25.13% 1181 million €
We can translate the figures in Table 7 so that allowing for the indicated backhaul 
transactions could help to save € 823 – 1181 million annually in gas purchase cost 
for the region with only changing the rules of commercial transactions along major 
transit pipelines.
Using the model for cost-benefit analysis: an illustration
Up to this point we have disregarded project related costs and concentrated merely 
on market integration and price impacts of projects and project packages. However, 
the combination of project related investment cost data and the various according 
benefit figures that the model produces allows us to develop more economically 
meaningful measures to evaluate and rank projects than the RCCI or the RSoI. 
Since the availability of investment cost data for future natural gas infrastructure 
projects are very limited,23 we often used international benchmarks for this pur-
pose. In this regard the following analyses can only be regarded as preliminary 
and illustrative.
First we calculate a regional payback period for the projects by dividing the 
project related investment cost with the estimated annual purchase cost decrease 
a project brings for the entire region. Table 8 contains the results of the calculations 
and also compares project rankings by RCCI versus the payback period.
21 Croatia will be a member of the EU from 01.07.2013
22 Allowing backhaul transactions on the EU–EnC borders does not change the picture much, RCCI 
would be 25,01%
23 Investment costs are from the project home pages and investors in case of pipelines, and are 
benchmarked in case of LNG.
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The results indicate that four of the best pipeline projects could break even for the 
region within just 3 years, with the two best (CZ–PL2 and SK–HU) in just a few 
months. The regional payback period for the Polish and Croatian LNG projects is 
also below one year. Interestingly, the ranking by regional payback period changes 
the RCCI ranking only slightly: the TR-BG project takes over the GR–BG pipeline.
The apparent question arises why these projects are not built – or proceed only 
very slowly – if their economics is so extremely good? Part of the answer to this 
question relates to the non-internalized positive network externalities of new in-
terconnectors that are built and operated under the present regulated third party 
access remuneration scheme. The revenue of such a new interconnector is based on 
regulated transmission tariffs based on the investment and operation costs of the 
pipeline company. These costs are typically shared and paid by the consumers of 
those member states directly involved in the project through regulated transmission 
tariffs. However, a new pipeline might imply more dispersed additional costs and 
benefits for producers and consumers across a wider geographic area.24
We can illustrate this point by simulating the likely impacts of building one of 
the top ranking projects, the Greece-Bulgaria interconnector. This project ranks 
third by RCCI and its estimated cost is € 160 million. By adding this interconnector 
to the 2011 reference case, we can identify ten countries where the new line implies 
a measurable change in annual weighted average wholesale gas prices and thus in-
duces changes in social welfare. Table 9 summarizes the results of this simulation.
24 Part of the benefits could be captured by tendering pipeline capacity through e.g. an open season 
procedure.











CZ–PL2 17.10% 841.75 28 0.03
SK–HU 18.35% 598.51 150 0.25
GR–BG 21.13% 73.49 160 2.18
TR–BG 21.29% 41.77 75 1.80
RS–BG 21.39% 22.98 95 4.13
RO–MD 21.47% 7.73 50 6.46
LNG
LNG–PL 16.94% 872.30 470 0.54
LNG–HR 20.03% 281.39 240 0.85
LNG2–RO 20.40% 205.51 470 2.29
LNG2–BG 21.29% 41.77 470 11.25
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Aggregate welfare improvement is up at €190 million annually, Greece and Bulgaria 
being the most significant beneficiaries. In the meantime, Romania and Hungary 
suffer sizeable welfare losses. With regard to market players, TSOs and consumers 
are the beneficiaries of the project while, on aggregate, DR gas producers and TOP 
contract holders suffer losses from it. This is due to excess demand for the new pipe-
line capacity, resulting in significant congestion revenues for the participating TSOs 
and the gas price decrease that the pipeline investment carries for Bulgaria, Romania 
and Macedonia, respectively. Gas price decrease is, on the other hand, bad news for 
local producers and TOP gas holders. Clearly, TOP gas is crowded out by cheaper 
Greek LNG sources leaving TOP holders with a significant loss in all countries ex-
cept for Greece. Since gas prices are to increase in Greece compared to the reference 
case (cheaper LNG flowing now to the North), consumers are suffering a significant 
welfare loss in this country, while producers and TOP traders are on the winning side.
We think that model simulations of this kind might help structure the disputes 
around new gas infrastructure projects for the DR by identifying the distributional 
impacts of them. Within the context of the EU, ACER could potentially make use of 
such results in preparing for its decisions on cross border investment cost allocation 
(see Article 13 of the proposed infrastructure Regulation).
Using the model for supply security analysis: another illustration
The DRGMM model can also support sophisticated gas supply security analyses 
at the regional level. In this section, we will outline the mechanisms behind such 
analyses with the help of a short exercise.
As we have noted before, the DRGMM model uses a fully dynamic solution algo-
rithm over 12 consecutive months, in which we assume that traders optimizing the 











Total social  
welfare
GR –76.8 41.0 0.0 43.9 114.9 122.9
BG 60.3 –8.2 0.0 –46.7 103.8 109.2
RO 94.8 –98.8 0.0 –24.5 –7.5 –35.9
HU 1.7 –0.4 0.0 –1.2 –7.6 –7.5
MK 3.2 0.0 0.0 –2.6 0.0 0.6
SI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.1
AT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.1
HR 0.6 –0.4 0.0 –0.2 –0.1 0.0
RS 0.3 –0.1 0.0 –0.2 0.0 0.0
BA 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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use of storage assets and the requested delivery of TOP contracts act with perfect 
foresight regarding the gas year. As a result, the model produces monthly forward 
prices for the entire year, which are “right on the spot” in the sense that if there are 
no subsequent changes in the input data, then all the outcomes (including prices) 
will turn out as predicted as the year unfolds.
Of course, in reality, supply and demand conditions do deviate from forecasts 
throughout the year. To capture this fact, the model allows for the possibility of in-
tra-year runs, in which any input variable pertaining to the upcoming months can 
be changed. The following example might be illuminating.
Suppose that the gas year runs from April to March. In the initial model run, we 
have to include forecasts for supply-demand conditions in each of the 12 months, 
otherwise it would be impossible to take optimal storage and contract delivery 
decisions in the beginning of the year.25 Taking the forecast as given, we can then 
calculate how each of the 12 months will “play out”.
Now let us suppose that a supply disruption occurs in January. For the sake of 
the example, let it be another gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine, the conse-
quence of which is zero transits through the latter for the whole of January. In the 
model, we would represent this incident by setting the maximum transport capacity 
of the pipelines through Ukraine (to Romania, Moldova, Hungary, and Slovakia) 
to zero for a month.
An important question is, in which month do market participants know that in-
terconnectors crossing Ukraine will be unavailable in January? If they already know 
it in April, they will likely have enough time to stock up gas to weather the crisis 
better. But if it takes them by surprise, the price effects will be much more severe.26 
One can therefore imagine that the actual effects will be highly dependent on the 
length of time that is available for preparation.
Fortunately, the DRGMM model allows for a full exploration of these issues. 
Taking the start-of-year run as a reference of how market events occur naturally, it 
is possible to “stop” the year in any month (e.g. just before January), re-set the input 
parameters of the model for the rest of the year (e.g. interconnector capacities in 
January, and probably also the yearly TOP minimum constraints), and re-run the 
optimization procedure taking the outcomes of the past months (storage utilization 
from April to December, for example) as already given. The model results will then 
reflect the consequences of regional market-based responses to the supply shock, 
including the spillover effects on countries not directly affected by the shut-down 
of the pipeline (e.g. Serbia or Bulgaria, in this case).
25 The key decision variables here are those with inter-temporal consequences.
26 Since the model employs market mechanisms only, negative supply shocks will present themselves 
as price jumps in the affected areas.
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Figure 6 shows the results of the crisis situation that we outlined above. The col-
oring of the markets indicates the extent of the price rise in January, or equivalently, 
the seriousness of the supply disruption if the market equilibrium is restored via 
mandatory consumption cuts.
Light grey colored markets experience a price rise of about 5-10 €/MWh for the 
crisis month, whereas the dark grey colors indicate a price rise beyond 100 €/MWh. 
As the actual numbers show, the supply disruption is quite severe in the Eastern part 
of the Balkans, whereas it seems to be more manageable in Hungary, Serbia, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Interestingly, the Czech Republic is also affected through 
the decrease in SK → CZ pipeline flows.27
27 The same crisis situation turns out to be almost fully manageable (except in Moldova) when market 






























FIGURE 6 • The effect of an unexpected supply disruption of all pipelines  
through Ukraine in January (prices in €/MWh)
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As a final point, we note that the regional (and country-level) supply security 
effects of various policies and new infrastructure elements can also be assessed 
using this methodology. One would simply carry out the supply shock analysis, 
such as the one above, with and without the policy or the new infrastructure, and 
compare the outcomes.
MODEL LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The DRGMM is a unique analytical tool that represents the natural gas industries of 
Central and South East Europe in a detailed and consistent manner. In this paper we 
have described the assumptions and operation of the model and presented several 
simulation cases to illustrate the variety of analyses the model allows for, including 
market integration, cost-benefit and security of supply analyses. However, the model 
needs further development to cope with its present limitations.
The first of these limitations is the model geography. At present only those 15 
countries indicated in Figure 1 are represented in detail as ‘local’ markets in the mod-
el, while part of the EU has to be represented as ‘external’ markets. An extension of 
the model to present ‘external’ EU markets could result in a detailed representation 
of the entire interconnected EU natural gas wholesale market.
Second, the model lacks a sensible representation of the EU’s outside suppliers’ 
pricing behaviour. In its present form, the pricing of external markets to supply the 
DR is static: a static mix of oil product price and spot price indexation by Russia, 
related pricing by Turkey, spot pricing by Germany, Italy and LNG. Reality has pro-
vided several examples in the last four years when demand and supply shocks and 
the development of spot markets motivated a significant shift away from traditional 
oil indexation in natural gas pricing in Europe (Stern–Rogers [2011]). TOP contract 
pricing and quantitative characteristics have prohibited a remarkable flexibility 
under the pressure of market forces. We can also assume that a stronger internal 
and East-West integration of DR gas markets, promoted by a significant change 
in network topology in the DR could create a basis for more dynamic and market 
based gas pricing in the region compared to a present, very rigid oil indexation. Thus, 
developing a more realistic representation of outside supplier pricing behaviour is 
a key future model development task.
Third, the representation of gas transmission and storage access prices and pricing 
in the model requires refinement. This is made difficult by the lack of a consistent da-
tabase and well-documented benchmarking of gas infrastructure access costs across 
Europe. Nevertheless, since the magnitude of transmission and storage access tariffs 
in comparison to product prices is marginal, we can argue that a more accurate and 
detailed representation of infrastructure access tariffs and rules are not likely to sig-
nificantly change model results while they could overly complicate model algorithms.
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Finally, one could argue that the representation of the DR gas market as being 
perfect competition under network and TOP contractual constraints is an unre-
alistic and, from the consumers’ point of view, a too optimistic one. Beyond TOP 
constraints, national gas wholesale markets are often dominated by players with 
significant market power. The assumption of efficient utilization of cross border 
pipeline capacities can also be criticized on the basis of existing capacity alloca-
tion rules being fairly distant from market based mechanisms (see REKK [2011 on 
a Hungarian example). Nevertheless, the world represented by the model is the 
vision the European Union, including its south-eastern region, is following when 
restructuring its gas industry. The model thus provides for a normative reference 
case in a European spirit and allows for evaluating the impacts of changes as well 
as distortions of a different sort to this baseline.
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SUBSTITUTABILITY BETWEEN  
FIXED AND MOBILE TELEPHONE SERVICES
The present paper discusses the results of an empirical study on substitution between 
fixed and mobile telephone services in the Hungarian retail market, carried out in 2008 
and 2009. The study used a survey designed for examining fixed-mobile substitution; 
it was carried out using the stated preference method on a sample of 1000 people in 
September 2008. The effects of price changes were studied both with regard to access 
(telephone subscription) and usage substitution (the respondent’s last five calls). In 
addition to prices, the effects of lifestyle and demographic factors on demand were 
also studied, as were alternative substitution options and the “telecommunications 
budget” hypothesis. The results indicate that mobile telephone access demand has 
a rather low price elasticity (a value of less than –0.3 for a hypothetical price raise). 
Fixed-line demand, on the other hand, is elastic (–1.4). The rate of usage substitution 
is significantly lower in the short term (in the presence of existing subscriptions) than 
it is for longer-term access decisions.
INTRODUCTION
The present paper discusses the results of a study on substitution between fixed 
and mobile telephone services, carried out in 2008 and 2009. In this period, the 
share and importance of mobile data services was significantly lower in Hungary 
than after 2010; the effects of the arrival of smartphones emerged only after the 
research was completed. Therefore, the data collected on voice service substitution 
are only valid with regard to the time period and market conditions in question; 
as a result, the results cannot be directly transferred to a smartphone dominated 
market environment. Nevertheless, the study was carried out at a time that was 
very interesting with regard to the development of telecommunications markets, 
and the effects of the events of this period are still felt to a significant extent today. 
Therefore, we feel that this analysis provides useful information regarding the de-
velopment of markets and helps to understand the interactions of fixed-line and 
mobile services.
In September 2008 there were 3,145,000 fixed telephony connections on the 
Hungarian market. 91.4% of these were traditional PSTN or ISDN lines, while the 
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remaining 8.6% were IP on broadband lines provided by cable operators. At the 
same time, there were 11,771,000 mobile phone connections in the country, 61.4% 
of which were prepaid SIM cards. According to market research commissioned by 
the National Communication Authority of Hungary and carried out in fall 2008, 
55.8% of households had a fixed phone, and 81.7% of families had at least one mo-
bile phone. The use of fixed phones was already declining by this stage: the share of 
households with a phone had fallen by 17 percentage points compared to the 73% 
in 2002. Up to this period, mobile phone penetration was increasing, although the 
rate of growth was gradually slowing down.
The number and minute volume of fixed telephone calls had essentially fallen 
by half. The number of mobile calls increased by 76% in the same period, and their 
aggregate length tripled.
These trends, indicative of changes in the consumption of communication ser-
vices, clearly show that substitution is taking place to some extent, but in them-
selves they do not prove that this process constitutes substitution in the technical 
economic sense.
An analysis of fixed-mobile telephone service substitution is of great importance 
for understanding market changes and with a view to regulation. It also influences 
the definition1 of the market of fixed telephone services, which is being carried out 
based on EU recommendations. Whether fixed and mobile telephone services are 
part of the same market depends, among other things, on the extent of demand 
substitution between the two services. Defining the market is the first step in any 
regulatory process based on the analysis of the market in question. Whether a regu-
lator identifies market power in the affected markets defined by the regulator greatly 
depends on the definition of the market.
In the Hungarian regulatory framework, fixed and mobile services were not 
treated as part of the same market before 2009. The separation of these markets was 
not based on a market definition and analysis procedure carried out on economic 
grounds; it was primarily based on the differing characteristics of the products, and 
associated empirical studies also primarily targeted the characteristics of the servic-
es. Studies had previously been published on the issue, using theoretical-method-
ological approaches (e.g. Infrapont [2006]) or empirical research (e.g. Tárki [2004]) 
based on a subjective assessment of substitution, where respondents were asked if 
they felt that the services were substituted.
There are numerous theoretical and practical issues associated with measuring 
substitution between fixed and mobile telephone services. Our research attempted 
 1 Commission Recommendation 2003/311/EC of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and services 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accord-
ance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services.
268 Balázs Édes–Vanda Bölcskei–László Lőrincz–Péter Nagy–Zoltán Pápai
to find a solution to these problems and to allow fixed-mobile substitution to be 
measured in practice and analyzed. The relevant data were subsequently collected.
The following section provides a short overview of the general economic frame-
work of substitution between the two service types. After this section, we will briefly 
discuss the special characteristics of telephony services that need to be taken into 
account when analyzing substitution. Afterwards, we provide a very brief analysis 
of the methods and results reported in the international literature on fixed-mobile 
substitution, and then we discuss in detail the methodology of our research, the 
operational solutions for measuring substitution and the questions included in the 
questionnaire. When discussing the study results, we present the statistical distribu-
tions of the use of telecommunications services, consumers’ views on such services 
and their subjective opinions on demand and substitutions. We also provide a brief 
analysis of the effects of demographic factors on the demand for such services. The 
next section presents our findings on the extent of substitution, also calculated as 
elasticity indicators. At the end of the paper, an interpretation of the elasticity in-
dicators is offered, and conclusions are drawn.
MEASURING SUBSTITUTION
The simplest case of demand (consumption) substitution is substitution between 
two different goods (products or services). The present study examines a situation 
of this type: substitution in demand between fixed and mobile telephone services. 
Demand substitution between two goods exists when some external factor causes 
consumers to change their demand for both goods, and there is a causal relationship 
between the changes in demand. In such situations, some factor affecting demand 
for one product or service also affects demand for the other; therefore, changes in 
the demand for either of the goods cannot be separated from changes in the de-
mand for the other.
Substitution is measured using the demand function. The demand function 
shows how much of a product or service a consumer consumes (how much their 
demand is) as a function of price (the price of the product or service in question and 
those of other goods that affect demand), the consumer’s income and other relevant 
factors. The demand function used in demand analysis includes independent vari-
ables the changes of which can provoke substitution. However, the most important 
factor is the price change. The effects of price changes on demand are described 
by the price elasticity of demand. With regard to demand substitution between 
two goods, a positive cross-price elasticity indicates substitutability, and the value 
shows how extensive the substitution is. However, demand for telephone services 
differs from demand for other goods in many ways; the next chapter provides an 
overview of its characteristics.
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Characteristics of the demand for telephone services
One of the unique characteristics of the demand for telecommunications services 
is that it is made up of two components. One is the demand for individual, specific 
calls. This is called usage demand. Demand for telephone subscriptions or access de-
rives from the fact that the possibility (the option) of making phone calls is valuable 
to consumers. Probabilities of initiating or receiving individual calls with available 
subscribers vary between 0 and 1. These probabilities and the usefulness of the 
calls (instances of communication) determine the user’s demand for a subscription. 
Therefore access demand depends on usage demand, i.e. the derived demand arising 
from expected usage (Taylor [1994]).
In the case of telephone services, the value of a connection to the network for 
a consumer also depends on how many other users have joined the network, i.e. the 
size of the network. How many people a consumer can reach through the telephone 
network and how many people can reach them affects how much they are willing 
to spend on the service. The larger the network – ceteris paribus – the more attrac-
tive it is to consumers.2 This is called the network effect. Liebowitz–Margolis [2002] 
provided a good overview of the network effect in telecommunications services. 
Subsequently, numerous studies have examined the issue with regard to mobile 
telecommunications; the findings of Kim–Kwon [2003], Fu [2004], Huang [2006] 
and Grajek [2007] confirm the existence of a network effect.
This network effect has an impact on the substitution or complementarity of the 
two services under examination. As the utility of a service depends on the number 
of users on the network, the interconnection of fixed and mobile networks meant 
that the number of mobile phone subscribers also provided a utility increase to 
fixed subscribers and vice versa, creating a complementary relationship. According 
to Liebowitz–Margolis [2002], as long as the number of mobile subscribers is low, 
there is a positive externality influence, and the two services are complementary. As 
prices fall and the number of subscribers increases, however, substitution becomes 
the dominant phenomenon.
Due to the fact that telecommunications demand can be split up into two sepa-
rate elements, consumer decisions are often modeled as a two-phase decision process. 
In this framework, the consumer first decides whether to subscribe to the service 
 2 If the subscribers of all networks become accessible to users of all other networks due to the uni-
versal interconnection obligation, then the network size is the same for every user, but the price 
of access and accessibility still differs between networks. In such situations, rational consumers 
make decisions based on the average price, which is determined by the cost of calling the people 
they wish to communicate with, i.e. their community of interest. This in turn depends on which 
network the people in question are using. Therefore, when there are several networks, deciding 
which one to subscribe to requires solving a coordination problem in addition to taking external-
ities into account. 
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(this is a one-time discretionary decision). If the consumer has chosen to subscribe, 
they decide how much to use the service (this is a continuous decision).3 This deci-
sion can be modeled as two successive decisions, or it can be seen as a simultane-
ous decision situation.4 The model used in Train–McFadden–Ben-Akiva [1987] is 
based on a simultaneous approach, while the findings of Miravete [2002], Miravete 
–Narayanan–Chintagunta [2007] and Iyengar [2004] underline the importance of 
the temporal separation of the subscription decision and the usage decision.
Empirical analyses carried out over the last few years (Lambrecht–Seim–Skiera 
[2005], Huang [2006], Goettler–Clay [2006]) indicate that structural models must 
include the uncertainty of future usage, as the faulty expectations of consumers 
must also be taken into account when modeling demand.
Using telephone services requires the joint consumption decision of two parties, 
the calling party and the called party, which is to say that the call has utility not only 
for the calling party, who generates the demand, but also for the called party, who 
does not pay for the utility thus obtained (the incoming call). This is called call ex-
ternality. Numerous studies examined call externality (see for instance Littlechild 
[1975]), but its impact is presumably not particularly great, and there is a high 
likelihood of a type of reciprocity emerging between parties that call each other 
regularly, exchanging roles as the calling party and the called party. As a result of 
this, call externality is generally internalized.5
Another particular feature of telephony demand is that it can self-generate, in 
the sense that a call may cause further communication to become necessary later 
on, thus generating further calls (e.g. calling back the original calling party).
Over the last few decades, numerous new communication services have emerged, 
such as e-mail, chat, or voice calls via the Internet (VoIP, of which Skype is a good exam-
ple). These can replace telephone calls, as they can help people exchange information.
There are also package offers on the market, in which telephone subscriptions 
are sold at a discount bundled with television or Internet subscriptions. The system 
of discounts makes modeling more difficult, as it creates a sort of complementary 
relationship between the elements of the package.
Demand for residential and business services should be analyzed separately, as 
further special factors need to be taken into account when examining the latter. The 
present study is not concerned with the business market, focusing exclusively on 
demand on the residential market.
 3 Essentially, the concept of derived demand is also based on this characteristic.
 4 It should also be mentioned that the decision on access is a long-term decision (and there is 
a switching cost associated with it), while, once access exists, the other decision can change dy-
namically without switching cost in accordance with the consumer’s current needs and external 
factors (such as pricing). 
 5 As call externality emerges between a low number of parties (and is usually bilateral), it is likely 
to be internalized.
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Fixed-mobile substitution
With regard to the modeling of fixed-mobile substitution, the fact that there are sep-
arate demands for access and for usage means that there are two types of substitution 
when it comes to telecommunications services. With regard to fixed and mobile tele-
phone services, access substitution means that, when certain factors are present, con-
sumers cancel their fixed telephone subscription and purchase a mobile subscription 
(or vice versa, but this is less interesting from a practical perspective). Usage substitu-
tion or traffic substitution refers to changes in the quantity of fixed and mobile calls.
The empirical literature contains the results of numerous measurements of usage 
substitution. Most of the models examining access substitution6 and usage substitu-
tion7 confirmed that substitution is taking place between mobile and fixed telephone 
services. However, a comparison of the models also shows that both the questions 
posed by various research projects and the methods employed in them varied con-
siderably: there is no standard procedure for studying fixed-mobile substitution.
With regard to usage substitution, for instance, Sung [2003] examined fixed-mo-
bile usage substitution in Korea by modeling point-to-point demand, in which the 
calls on the incumbent’s network from region A to region B are affected by the price of 
long-distance calls and mobile calls from A to B. Ahn–Lee–Kim [2004] estimated the 
ratio of fixed and mobile call minutes, also in Korea. The model’s explanatory factors 
include relative prices and the number of fixed and mobile subscribers. Ward–Woroch 
[2004] measured the effects of fixed and mobile prices on fixed and mobile call minutes. 
The authors used a special data collection method for their research: they asked house-
holds to submit their telecommunications bills for ten quarters (TNS “bill harvest”).
With regard to access substitution, Sung–Kim [2002] did not model the number 
of fixed telephone connections, but rather the number of new subscriptions and 
cancellations. Rodini–Ward–Woroch [2003] also relied on telecommunications bills 
(TNS “bill harvest”) for data. In this model, the authors measured the effects of fixed 
prices on mobile subscriptions. Garbacz–Thompson [2007] undertook the task of 
estimating the demand for residential fixed and mobile services (and penetration) 
in 53 developing countries in the period between 1996 and 2003.
There are various models designed to examine product consumption that separate 
one particular product group from other products. Demand for this product group is 
modeled using a conditional/limited demand function, where a separate budget is es-
tablished within the consumer’s income, designated by the consumer for this group 
of products (see for instance: Eales–Unnevehr [1988], Baker–Blundell–Micklewright 
[1989], Hayes–Wahl–Williams [1990], Sellen–Goddard [1997], Edgerton [1997]).
 6 Sung–Lee [2002], Rodini–Ward–Woroch [2003], Horváth–Maldoom [2002], Garbacz–Thompson 
[2007].
 7 Sung [2003], Ahn–Lee–Kim [2004], Ward–Woroch [2004], Okada–Hatta [1999].
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This approach is based on the assumption that consumers make sequential 
decisions about how to spend their income. As a first step, the consumer divides 
their income between multiple product categories, and then proceeds to divide each 
sub-budget between the products of each category.
Hereinafter, the use of this two-step budgeting concept when analyzing the de-
mand for telecommunications services will be referred to as the telecommunications 
budget hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, there is a sum that people devote 
to telecommunication, and if the price of one telecommunications service changes, 
they reallocate their consumption (spending) within this budget. When examining 
telecommunications service substitution, it is important to determine whether con-
sumers apply the thinking posited by the telecommunications budget hypothesis, 
i.e. whether they tend to subscribe to new services if one of the services they use 
becomes cheaper.
RESEARCH METHODS
The goal of our research, funded by the Competition Culture Centre of the Hun-
garian Competition Authority and the National Communication Authority, was to 
measure economic substitution between fixed and mobile telephone services using 
a questionnaire-based survey. Demand for mobile and fixed telephone services is 
affected by price as well as by numerous lifestyle-related, sociological and psycho-
logical factors. Therefore, substitution was examined using demand models. Our 
research attempts to separate the effects of these two types of factors – prices on 
the one hand and other factors on the other. The effects of pricing were studied 
using a special type of preference analysis model that examines both revealed and 
stated preferences, while non-price factors were studied using a set of questions 
about facts and opinions. As the stated preference methodology is not commonly 
used in economics studies for measuring the effects of pricing, we first discuss this 
method and the specific subtype chosen for this study, the combined model. This 
is followed by a discussion of the survey questions regarding access substitution, 
usage substitution and non-price factors.
The stated preference methodology
The stated preference methodology has frequently been employed in certain areas 
of demand analysis, for example in the evaluation of environmental resources (see 
the overview by Boxall et al. [1996]), and certain tourism-related studies (see the 
overview by Louviére–Timmermans [1990]). The methodology is rarely employed 
for modeling telecommunications services, although there are precedents for such 
use (Tseng–Tsiu [2005], Lee–Kim–Ahn [2006]).
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The methodology is built on Lancaster’s [1966] and [1971] consumer decision 
models, conceptualizing goods as a linear combination of their main characteris-
tics or attributes. This allows for the creation of a demand function that describes 
demand as dependent on the characteristics of the goods.
As part of the method, researchers compile a questionnaire in which respond-
ents evaluate alternatives with differing features (in tourism surveys, for instance, 
features include distance, the type of activities available, accommodation and price). 
The method often relies on conjoint analysis when it comes to arranging and choos-
ing alternatives and rankings to be included in the questionnaire. The next step is 
establishing utility levels (estimating the utility function) based on consumers’ as-
sessments, which is most often done using the ordinary least square (OLS) method. 
Then decisions are predicted based on a comparison of utility levels. Subsequently, 
expected market shares can be estimated on the basis of the distribution of indi-
vidual decisions (Louviére–Timmermans [1990]).
A special kind of stated preference model is one that combines revealed prefer-
ence and stated preference. This model takes into account the respondent’s previous 
decisions when choosing the alternatives to be offered to them. First, respondents 
are asked about their previous experiences (e.g. where they spent their holidays the 
previous year), then they are asked to compare these with a hypothetical product, 
which is a modified version of their previous choice. Compared to the traditional 
(conjoint) analysis of stated preferences, this questioning method makes the deci-
sion more realistic for the respondent, as it is tied to a real experience, which may 
theoretically help to increase the reliability of responses. As an added benefit, the 
method allows researchers to offer more relevant choices. The method’s drawback 
is that the proposed options are not independent of previous decisions, which in 
turn may depend on factors that are not being observed. This causes problems when 
it comes to estimating regression models; however, these econometrical issues can 
be managed by using mixed logit models (Train–Wilson [2008]).
The questionnaire
The objective when measuring substitution is to examine how changes in the pric-
ing of fixed and mobile phone calls affect demand for the two services. Numerous 
other factors may also have an impact on demand and substitution. First, we present 
the method used for examining the effects of pricing, then we briefly discuss other 
factors. We start the examination of pricing effects by taking a closer look at con-
sumers’ decisions on subscription (access substitution), then we move on to issues 
associated with telephone usage (usage substitution).
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Access substitution • By purchasing a telephone subscription, consumers purchase 
the option to make calls at the per-minute rate of the tariff plan in question, and they 
purchase accessibility (other people can call them). Accordingly, the choice between 
a fixed and a mobile phone is determined by the fixed monthly fee and the price of calls. 
Decisions also depend on what subscriptions (fixed, mobile or neither) the consumer 
already has. This information was used when generating alternatives to choose from.
People with only one type of subscription were asked about the effects of two 
price changes (for those who have only a fixed phone and those who have only a mo-
bile phone, the questionnaire is perfectly symmetrical). 1. First the effects of raising 
the price of the consumer’s existing subscription were tested (fixed phone becoming 
more expensive). In this case, there are two possible reactions: simply purchasing 
the other subscription without making any other changes, and purchasing the other 
subscription while canceling the present one (i.e. either getting a mobile subscription 
in addition to the fixed phone, or getting a mobile subscription to replace the fixed 
subscription). 2. The other scenario for those who only have one subscription is the 
reduction of the price of the other service (in our example, the mobile becoming 
cheaper), with the two possible reactions being purchasing the now cheaper other 
subscription in addition to the existing subscription or replacing it (either getting 
a mobile subscription in addition to the fixed phone, or getting a mobile subscrip-
tion and canceling the fixed subscription).
For those respondents who have both types of subscription, obviously the only 
possible action with regard to access is the cancellation of services. Own price effects 
and cross-effects were included in the questionnaire in this case; that is, canceling 
mobile subscriptions in case of mobile price increases, and canceling fixed phones 
in case of mobile price decreases. Similarly, the cancellation of mobile subscriptions 
in case of the reduction of fixed tariffs was examined, as was the cancellation of the 
fixed phone in case of raised fixed tariffs.
The situation is simpler for households that have neither type of access. In their 
case, the possible reaction to mobile phone service price reductions is to get a mo-
bile subscription, and the possible reaction to fixed phone service price reductions 
is to get a fixed subscription.
Thus, the alternatives offered include questions regarding own-price and cross-
price elasticity, with regard both to price increases and to price reductions.
Questions designed to test the telecommunications budget hypothesis can also 
be asked, determining whether a reduction in the price of one service leads to an 
increase in the demand for the other as more money is left in the telecommuni-
cations budget (and vice versa). Estimating the effects of the telecommunications 
budget was not one of the principal aims of the research, but two options related 
to this issue were included in the questionnaire. These covered households with 
both types of subscription, using the above-described options (canceling the fixed 
phone if mobile prices rise and vice versa).
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Access decisions merit a more detailed examination. Various types of subscrip-
tion are available to consumers, and a price increase will not necessarily motivate 
them to cancel their subscription right away; they might only change tariff plans – 
or stick with the plan they have and use the phone less or more. The questionnaire 
included questions about these possibilities.
When framing the questions, we had to consider how much consumers know 
about their options and the associated prices. If we assume that they have a rea-
sonably clear idea of the situation, the phrasing of the question may be based on 
price changes, such as: “Would you buy a fixed phone subscription if the prices 
were lowered by 20%?” On the other hand, if we assume that consumers lack this 
knowledge, we need to present hypothetical plans, such as: “Would you buy a fixed 
phone subscription if the monthly fee was 3200 HUF, half of which was usable as 
call credit and you could call fixed numbers for 10 HUF and mobile numbers for 60 
HUF at any time of day?”. The drawback of presenting hypothetical packages is that 
there is significant variation in multiple dimensions (call prices to various networks, 
monthly fee, crediting the monthly fee towards calls, free calls at certain times of 
day). Therefore, the following solution was chosen:
 • Basing the questionnaire item on the current fee if the respondent has a subscrip-
tion of the type in question;
 • Presenting a hypothetical call plan if the respondent does not have a subscription 
of the type in question.
The advantage of the first option is that no detailed information is needed on the 
type of plan the respondent has (which the respondent might not be able to pro-
vide) in order to ask about the hypothetical plan they would find suitable. However, 
it presumes that the respondent has a reasonably good grasp of their call patterns 
and their total telephone bill, based on which they can decide what they would do 
in case of a price increase or a price decrease. Price changes were framed as an iden-
tical change to all elements of the bill; therefore, the price change does not depend 
on the call patterns of the respondent.
The advantage of the second option is that it does not presume that the respondent 
knows the price of services they do not currently use. Furthermore, in order to simplify 
things, we presumed that substitution is probably continuous, and therefore we proposed 
low-price retail phone plans similar to those that exist on the market to people who did 
not have a subscription. However, this may cause price elasticity to be somewhat under-
estimated. Presumably, there is a relatively small group of people who would buy a larg-
er subscription right away when signing a fixed or mobile contract, or buy a small-val-
ue plan but choose a plan that is different in some way from the one we proposed.
Two questions were asked in order to examine the effects of insufficient informa-
tion. First, respondents were asked about a plan costing the same as plans on the mar-
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ket at the time, then they were asked about a plan with a different price. Theoretically, 
this allows us to separate effects caused by a lack of information on prices (which we 
will call the information effect from now on) from those caused by price changes. By de-
fault, only the second, ‘cleaned’ effect was taken into account for calculating elasticities.
Usage substitution • Usage substitution may be defined as follows: presuming an 
existing subscription, how would changes to the cost of call minutes change con-
sumption habits? This definition complements the previously discussed concept of 
access substitution, which is about the decision to change one’s subscription. In this 
framework, usage substitution is only available to consumers who have both types of 
subscription. Access at the workplace (via fixed or mobile phone) plays a special role 
in this regard. On the one hand, the research covers the residential telephony market, 
and thus the examination focused on private telephone conversations, and only sub-
jects with a private subscription were taken into account. Subscriptions belonging to 
the respondent’s own business were considered private in this regard (and with regard 
to access substitution as well), as they can be considered private from the economic 
standpoint. However, use of a telephone at the workplace often exists as an option 
for people, and therefore it was included among the options offered to respondents.
When it comes to studying usage substitution, the fact that consumers are unsure 
about the volume of their usage constitutes an additional difficulty compared to 
studying access substitution. As the majority of consumers presumably do not know 
the various types of call traffic listed on their telephone bill (even if they receive 
such a list), it is difficult for them to tell what percentage of their calls they would 
transfer to the fixed network if the fixed call prices were reduced by 10 percent. In 
this situation, using the stated preference method involves drawing up hypothetical 
scenarios – as was done in a previous similar study by Tárki-NHH (Tárki [2004]). 
The primary drawback of this approach is that we do not know how often these hy-
pothetical situations arise in the respondent’s life, as respondents can probably only 
supply very imprecise estimates in this regard. Therefore, we used a method that 
combines stated and revealed preference in such situations. We asked respondents 
to think back to the last five calls they made and we asked them how they would 
have handled them if call costs had been different.
Decision options:
 • no change,
 • different call length,
 • initiating the call from a different network,
 • initiating the call from a workplace phone,
 • making the call at a cheaper time of day,
 • forgoing the call,
 • using a different means of communication (e-mail, chat, sms).
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Unfortunately, we can only study substitution from one angle: we can find out 
if the respondent would still have initiated a call they made even if the prices were 
higher, but we cannot find out if they would have called somebody they did not call 
if the prices were lower.
Information collected on various call characteristics was also useful for analy-
sis. This information includes the following: call length, call type (family, friends or 
business), how urgent it was and where the respondent was when the call took place.
In addition to price, numerous social and lifestyle factors affect fixed-mobile sub-
stitution, and the impact of these factors may be greater than that of price. Our work 
also involved analyzing these factors. Although the primary purpose is to examine 
residential consumption, subscriptions at the workplace are an important factor, as 
work telephones are often used for private calls, which makes them function essen-
tially as a substitute for residential consumption. Discounted tariff plans available 
to employees of a company – which are often cheaper than regular plans available 
to the public – can encourage people to use their corporate phone.8 In such cases, 
we need to determine who actually pays the bill (the employee or the company) 
and whether there is a formal or informal limit to the use of the corporate phone. 
Software tools enabling voice calls or instant messaging over the Internet can offer 
another possible substitute for the private telephone. Additionally, mobile phone 
service providers offer options that can, to a certain extent, serve as an alternative 
to cheap fixed calls. One of these is a call plan option allowing the subscriber to call 
a limited set of numbers for free.
Complementary services may also affect demand. For fixed phone subscriptions, 
ADSL Internet subscriptions are one such complementary service; at the time of 
our research project, ADSL Internet was significantly cheaper for subscribers who 
also had a telephone subscription.
There is also the aspect of the economies of scale when we consider a fixed 
phone subscription: a larger household can use it more, lowering the per-call cost 
of the fixed monthly fee.
Examining elasticities
Substitution is generally measured in economic terms with the use of elasticity as 
a metric. The extent of substitution between two products is often measured by 
calculating the cross-price elasticity. Cross-price elasticity shows how much more 
is bought of one product when the other becomes more expensive, and how much 
less is bought of one when the other becomes cheaper.
 8 Market research indicates that this feature is clearly a relevant one in the Hungarian market.
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In the hypothetical monopolistic test applied to market determinations for the 
purposes of competition law and telecommunications regulation, one product is 
considered to substitute another when both of the following conditions are met:
1. if the price of the product sold by the presumed monopoly is raised by a small but 
significant amount for a long period of time, its demand falls to such an extent 
that the price rise does not generate a profit, i.e. the own-price elasticity is high;
2. in the test carried out with the inclusion of an alternative product, which is func-
tionally at least somewhat substitutive, and which is chosen based on cross-price 
elasticities, a price rise would be profitable.
The demand data collected using the survey method allowed us to estimate the 
own price and cross-price elasticities of the demand for various services. For our 
purposes, cross-product effects were most important, so estimating these was the 
main priority.
When drawing up the questionnaire, the primary goal was to investigate the 
background of substitution as deeply as possible, which also had a significant effect 
on elasticity estimations in many regards. A 20% price change was used in the 
survey to examine the effects of price changes. This rather substantial change was 
used on the assumption that significant and genuine reactions can only be expect-
ed from consumers if they are presented with a decision that really merits consid-
eration.
When calculating elasticity based on such larger changes, the baseline chosen 
for examining reactions becomes an important factor. Therefore, we did not study 
one point on the demand curve (point-price elasticity) but a longer section (arc 
elasticity). The extent of change was calculated based on the arithmetic mean of the 
values before and after the change, i.e. a mean-based arc elasticity was calculated.
Sample
The questionnaire-based data collection was carried out by Szonda-Ipsos in Sep-
tember 2008. The target population included people over the age of 18 living in 
Hungary, and respondents were chosen on the basis of a sampling method that 
takes into account locality sizes. Responses were collected in person within the 
framework of an “omnibus” survey, in which various unrelated surveys are carried 
out at the same time by the same interviewers. The sample consisted of 952 people.
Differences between the sample and the target population were corrected by 
Szonda-Ipsos using four-dimensional weighting based on age, sex, residence (vil-
lage, town, city etc.) and educational qualifications. All analyses were carried out 
on the weighted sample.
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RESULTS
Telephone penetration
Our data indicates that 73.3% of the Hungarian population had at least one personal 
or corporate mobile phone subscription at the time of data collection, the share of 
fixed private subscriptions was 41.5% and a total of 51% of the population had access 
to some kind of fixed telephone network at home or at their workplace (see Table 1).








Telephone at home (mobile or fixed)
Mobile only 44.8
















Taking into account all devices available at the consumer’s home, only 13.6% of 
the population lacked a home telephone subscription, and the proportion of those 
without a telephone connection at work was essentially the same. The only cause 
for any difference between the two is that a significant number of people who only 
use a mobile phone had access to a fixed phone at their workplace.
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Main characteristics of telephone use
The data collected using the questionnaire provide a good overview of how frequently 
people use the services available to them through various channels for their personal 
calls (Table 2). With regard to telephone access at the workplace or through corpo-
rate means, our analysis only examines private calls, as these are the calls regarding 
which consumers make independent decisions based on pricing and non-price fac-
tors. Generally, using fixed phones at the workplace is the rarest usage scenario. Only 
6.5% of respondents use a fixed phone at their workplace more than five times a day.
TABLE 2 • Main characteristics of private telephone usage (percentages)
Usage frequency
Private mobile Corporate mobile Home fixed Workplace fixed
Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing Incoming
More than 5 calls a day 20.4 25.4 33.6 34.8 5.9 7.8 6.5 6.1
1 to 5 calls a day 54.1 55.9 22.3 30.2 45.5 50.4 15.4 14.1
Weekly 15.7 14.2 9.8 7.5 28.0 25.5 11.2 6.2
Very rarely/never 9.7 4.4 34.2 27.5 20.6 16.3 66.8 73.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 681 92 395 177
A significant number, about one third of those with a corporate mobile phone, use 
their phone for making private calls; at the same time, a similar number of people 
use their corporate phone for private calls only very rarely or never. The frequency 
of usage is by far the highest for private mobile phones. Private mobile phones are 
the most frequently used means of communication both for outgoing and incoming 
calls. Irrespective of whether a phone is private or corporate, consumers use mobile 
phones much more often than fixed phones.
Nevertheless, the ratio of very rare usage is surprisingly high for both private 
mobile and private fixed phones. 20% of people with a home fixed phone use it very 
rarely or not at all (either for outgoing, or for incoming calls). The lack of outgoing 
calls is explained by the fact that many consumers declared that they only have 
a fixed phone for receiving calls. However, the rarity of incoming calls still requires 
further explanation. One possible reason is that the fixed phone was only kept be-
cause it was bundled with an Internet subscription, or for security (many people feel 
that a fixed phone is worth having because of its reliability in emergency situations), 
or perhaps consumers simply did not get around to canceling it.
In the case of mobile subscriptions, the cause of the relatively large number of 
responses indicating rare or inexistent use (outgoing: 9.7 percent, incoming: 4.4 
percent among those possessing a subscription) is likely to be security and aversion.
The monthly bill of most private consumers was between HUF 2000 and HUF 
4000 for both types of telephone subscription; on average, mobile phone costs are 
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not significantly higher than fixed telephone costs. It should be noted that these 
are not individual but household data, as home fixed phones are generally used by 
all members of the household (Table 3).
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the use of corporate fixed phones does 
not involve costs (and takes place at the workplace); even if there is a cost to the 
user, it is low (less than HUF 2000 per month). Corporate mobile phones are much 
more costly; 54.1% of users contribute to the costs, and 15% pay more than HUF 
10,000 per month.
The goal of the questions regarding work-related issues was to identify the ex-
tent to which work-related situations occur that make it difficult or impossible to 
replace mobile connections with fixed connections (Table 4).
22.4% indicated working at home as a typical situation, 20% travel a lot and anoth-
er 20% work at frequently changing locations; the latter two situations naturally make 
it impossible to rely on fixed phones. The most frequently indicated cause – marked 
by 47.8% of respondents – was that accessibility is important for work purposes.
TABLE 3 • Costs of private telephone use paid for by the user, listed by access type (percent)
Monthly expenditure (HUF)*
Mobile Fixed
Private Corporate Private Corporate
0 1.7 45.9 1.0 79.2
1–1,999 17.3 15.6 9.0 18.7
2,000–3,999 38.3 3.2 45.2 1.8
4,000–5,999 19.5 12.4 30.3 0.3
6,000–7,999 11.6 8.8 10.3 0.0
8,000–9,999 3.4 2.3 2.4 0.0
10,000–15,000 7.3 7.9 1.3 0.0
15,000–20,000 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
20,000+ 1.1 3.1 0.4 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average (HUF) 4104 2053 3530 111
N 693 95 406 191
* At the time of data collection cca. 275 HUF = 1 EUR
TABLE 4 • Work characteristics (percent, N = 481)
Statement Yes No Total
Works at home often 22.43 77.57 100.00
It is important that colleagues or clients can reach them by phone at any time, 
and that they can reach colleagues or clients at any time.
47.82 52.18 100.00
Travels a lot for work 21.11 78.89 100.00
The location where they work changes often 20.57 79.43 100.00
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Consumer attitudes and habits
In the section on attitudes, respondents were given statements related to the choice 
between fixed and mobile phones and asked to indicate to what extent they identify 
with the statements. Scores ranged from 1 to 4 (4 = fully agree). The penultimate 
column of Table 5 shows the average of the scores.
According to the responses to the question on new technologies, only 4 percent 
of people are early adopters, while 51.3 percent do not see this as characteristic of 
them, with the average score being 1.7. However, most of the data indicate that this 
question has limited relevance to mobile phones, which cannot really be considered 
a new technology any longer.
Numerous questions were addressed to respondents who do not use a mobile 
phone. In many cases, the complicated nature of such phones caused a problem: 
for more than half of the respondents, difficulty of use was the reason for not using 
a mobile phone. The fear of adverse health effects – which have not been scientif-









at all Average 
of scores 
(1–4) NPercentage
I tend to use new technologies much earlier than most people do 4.1 16.1 27.7 52.1 1.7 952
A fixed phone is important for me because it is always available in 
emergencies in case I can’t use my mobile phone for some reason
12.7 16.6 15.0 55.7 1.9 406
It is important to have a shared fixed telephone in  
the household/family
33.2 39.7 14.1 13.0 2.9 103
I know the fixed number of many of my friends and 
acquaintances (perhaps in addition to their mobile number)
11.5 22.6 20.1 45.8 2.0 952
I prefer to call friends and acquaintances on their mobile phone 
because then I know it will not be someone else who answers 
the phone
34.6 26.4 12.6 26.3 2.7 952
It is important for me to be reachable at all times, wherever I am 33.3 28.1 17.4 21.2 2.7 952
Mobile phones are more complicated to use, so I use the fixed 
phone whenever I can
4.5 8.2 22.2 65.1 1.5 952
Mobile phone use causes damage to health, and therefore I often 
consider using the fixed phone instead
2.7 13.7 26.2 57.4 1.6 381
I have a fixed phone because it is important that my 
acquaintances and relatives can reach me at a cheap rate
34.8 38.4 11.6 15.2 2.9 381
I only have a fixed phone because of my Internet access (ADSL) 20.4 26.0 28.2 25.4 2.4 406
I don’t use a mobile phone because they are complicated to use 34.7 16.9 15.8 32.5 2.5 243
I don’t use a mobile phone because they cause damage to health 9.9 12.0 24.5 53.7 1.8 243
I don’t use a mobile phone because I don’t need one 57.2 16.0 10.0 16.8 3.1 243
I don’t use a mobile phone because they are expensive 42.9 20.7 16.5 19.9 2.9 243
I don’t use a fixed phone at home because I don’t need one 58.8 17.6 8.4 15.2 3.2 546
I don’t use a fixed phone at home because it is expensive 46.2 20.6 16.0 17.2 3.0 546
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ically proven but are regularly discussed – received a score of 1.8. 55.1 percent of 
non-users firmly state that they do not need a mobile phone, and close to 40 per-
cent clearly deem mobile phones too expensive. 43.3 percent of respondents who 
do not use a fixed phone say the same thing about the price of fixed subscriptions, 
and more than 50 percent state that they do not need one.
Interestingly, the statement about maintaining a fixed phone subscription for 
ADSL alone received an average score of 2.4 (strong agreement: 20.2%). The reason 
for maintaining a fixed connection may be that it allows friends and relatives to 
call the consumer cheaply (2.9 points), providing a common telephone number for 
the household/family (2.9 points), reliable access in case of emergency (1.9 points) 
and the fact that the respondent considers mobile phones complicated to use (1.5 
points). Generally, only one-third of respondents know the fixed phone number of 
their friends (average: 2.0 points) and only 15.5 percent prefer to initiate calls from 
their fixed phone due to concerns about health risks.
For a rather high number of respondents (cca. 60%), two-way “immediate” ac-
cessibility (anyone can reach them and they can reach anyone) is important, which 
indicates the clear superiority of mobile phones. These are presumably the respond-
ents who have a mobile phone in order to ensure accessibility (mobility).
Thus, those who use mobile phones mostly call mobile numbers and the primary 
consideration for them is to be accessible by phone at any time, anywhere (whatever 
the cost). Those who prefer fixed phones do so because of cheap rates and security.
Consumption characteristics affecting substitution
Whether a consumer replaces their fixed phone with a mobile phone depends – in 
addition to the price – on their habits and characteristics. This chapter examines 
the effects of three possible factors, first one by one, then as part of a unified model. 
These factors are: substitution options, household size and Internet subscription.
Fixed-mobile substitution can also be studied by examining whether a household 
is equipped with a fixed phone, or the respondent only uses a mobile phone at home. 
As previously shown, these are the two most typical arrangements. Accordingly, we 
compare these two groups, trying to identify the differences between mobile users 
who do not use a fixed phone and those who do. Among possible substitutes for a fixed 
phone, we consider Internet telephony and use of a corporate mobile phone (Table 6).
The data show that respondents with a corporate mobile phone are more likely 
to have a fixed phone as well, which indicates that for them, substitution is less likely. 
In all probability, canceling the fixed phone is not important, as the two services do 
not significantly compete for a share of the family budget.
The role of Internet telephony was only studied among people with Internet 
access in order to eliminate any effect arising from the availability or absence of 
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an Internet connection. That examination showed no difference: no significant 
substitution between calls over the Internet and calls over fixed phones was de-
tected. The observation of any such effect is made more difficult by the behavior 
of service providers, who often offer discounted fixed phone services along with 
Internet subscriptions.
Next, the effects of Internet access were analyzed. In principle, as ADSL In-
ternet subscriptions are cheaper for users who have a fixed phone, interest in an 
Internet connection in itself should increase the likelihood that the consumer will 
purchase a fixed phone connection. Similarly, Internet service providers often offer 
discounted telephone services for their Internet subscribers (Table 7). The figures 
show that the proportion of respondents with a fixed phone is significantly higher 
among those who have an Internet connection. This indicates that the two services 
are complementary.
Finally, the impact of household size was studied. As all members of the house-
hold may use a fixed phone subscription, but the monthly fee is fixed, larger house-
holds in principle have lower per capita costs. To examine this issue, single-person 
households and multi-person households were compared. The results show that 
people who live alone are less likely to have a fixed phone subscription if they already 
have a mobile phone subscription (Table 8).
TABLE 6 • The effects of substitute services on fixed phone subscriptions (percentages)
Has
Use of corporate mobile phone Calls over the Internet
does not have has 
Total
does does not
Totala corporate mobile phone use the Internet for chatting and calls 
Only a mobile phone 61.8 56.8 61.1 48.6 50.5 50.0
Mobile + fixed 38.2 43.2 38.9 51.4 49.5 50.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
TABLE 7 • The effects of having an Internet connection on fixed phone subscriptions 
(percentages)
Has Does not have an Internet connection Has an Internet connection Total
Only a mobile phone 72.1 50.0 61.1
Mobile + fixed 27.9 50.0 38.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
TABLE 8 • The effects of household size on fixed phone subscriptions (percentages)
Has Single-person household Household with multiple people Total
Mobile only 70.5 59.8 61.1
Mobile + fixed 29.5 40.2 38.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Next, the combined effects of these three factors on respondent’s decisions about 
whether or not to buy a fixed phone subscription will be examined (Table 9). Age 
can affect both household size and Internet subscription status, so it was included 
in the analysis as well. Additionally, having an Internet connection correlates with 
educational qualifications, so educational qualifications were also included as a con-
trol variable. Due to the nature of the issue, a logistic regression model was used.




Does not live alone 0.000*** 0.561
Has a company-issued mobile phone 0.324 0.785
Has an Internet subscription 0.000* 2.140
Higher education qualifications (compared to secondary) 0.582 1.141
Secondary educational qualifications (compared to lower) 0.020. 1.533
Age below 40 (compared to ages 40 to 60) 0.000*** 0.377
Age below 30 (compared to age below 40) 0.962 1.012
Age below 60 (compared to ages 40 to 60) 0.333 1.242
 * Significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
When the three factors are examined together, and the effects of age and educational 
qualifications are controlled for, two factors remain significant: Internet access and the 
size of the household. The marginal effect of these factors is rather significant. Having 
an Internet connection in itself more than doubles the chance of a respondent having 
a fixed phone line. Interestingly, people who live alone are more likely to have a fixed 
phone in addition to their mobile phone than people with a family. These effects are 
independent of age. An analysis of age distributions indicates that 40 years is a clear 
demarcation line with respect to fixed phone subscription. People above 40 are almost 
three times as likely to have a fixed phone as those under 40. There are no other major 
dividing lines, though: there is little difference between people above 60 and those be-
tween 40 and 60, or between those under 30 and those between 30 and 40. Addition-
ally, people with secondary or higher level educational qualifications are 50 percent 
more likely to have a fixed phone than those with lower educational qualifications.
Among the examined hypotheses, the one that was confirmed was that having an 
Internet subscription increases the likelihood of also having a fixed phone subscription, 
and to a rather significant extent. The use of alternative technologies (Internet calls, 
corporate mobile phone) does not significantly reduce the likelihood of having a fixed 
phone subscription. The hypothesis about household size was not confirmed: among 
respondents with the same age and educational qualifications: single respondents were 
more likely to have a fixed phone in addition to their mobile phone. We also identified 
a cultural demarcation line at the age of 40, and found a smaller difference between re-
spondents who had obtained a secondary school leaving certificate and those who had not.
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Access substitution
Access substitution was examined by studying the responses of four consumer 
groups to different offers and price changes. The four groups of respondents were 
the following:
 • has own mobile phone, but not fixed;
 • has own fixed phone, but not mobile;
 • has both own fixed and own mobile phone;
 • has neither of the two.
The different groups were presented with different offers. The main types are the 
following:
 • offer regarding a service type not currently used by the respondent at the current 
market price;
 • offer regarding a service type not currently used by the respondent at 20% below 
the current market price;
 • raising the price of a service currently used by the respondent by 20%.
We also asked respondents about other issues based on their responses whenever 
applicable. For instance, if a respondent said that they would buy a service they were 
not yet using, the next question covered effects on their preexisting other subscrip-
tion, with the following options:
 • cancellation;
 • reduced usage;
 • reduced usage and switching to a different tariff plan;
 • continued usage without change.
Similarly, if the questions proposed a change in the price of the existing subscription 
(price increase), we asked respondents for their reactions regarding both technolo-
gies in order to map crosswise influences as well.
Responses are presented in figures showing the entire decision tree. The figures 
indicate the number of people who provided a response to each question. In case 
of very low numbers, where showing the distribution would have been pointless, 
it was omitted. There were always three offers: one at the market price, one 20% 
lower and one 20% higher than the market price. Market prices were determined 
based on September 2008 pricing. Entry-level mobile or fixed call plan prices were 
chosen as the market price, assuming that if a respondent has no existing plan, they 
would most probably be interested in smaller plans. For fixed phones, this meant 
a hypothetical plan that largely matches the “Felező” plan offered by Magyar Tele-
com, and for mobile phones, the plan was the cheapest prepaid plan where pricing 
is not dependent on the time of day and the network called.
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In addition to the responses on substitution, the results of estimates on the elas-
ticity of telecommunications demand also allow us to draw conclusions regarding 
the relationship between fixed and mobile technologies.
When processing this part of the questionnaire, we did not follow the established 
procedure for analyzing opinion surveys: we included “do not know” responses 
among the percentage of valid responses. As this response is closer to “no” when the 
question is whether the respondent would buy a proposed service, these respondents 
were included in the “no” category. This was done in order to counteract the ten-
dency of respondents to overestimate their willingness to make changes compared 
to their subsequent real behavior.
Figure 1 shows the results of the four offers proposed to those who have neither 
a mobile phone nor a fixed phone of their own. Only 0.9 percent would take the 
market-price fixed phone offer, while the rate is 10.7 percent for the market-price 
mobile phone offer. Of the remaining respondents, 0 percent would subscribe for 
a fixed phone line at the reduced price, and 2.6 percent would do so for a mobile 
phone connection. These data lead to two conclusions. First, demand for fixed phone 
connections is completely inelastic in this consumer group. Although the proportion 
is very low for mobile phones as well, there is a highly significant difference between 
the two. Second, compared to the effect of the price change, a comparatively large 
number of respondents said that they would subscribe at the market price. This is 
presumably (partly) due to the fact that people do not keep up with market prices.
Source: Infrapont.
FIGURE 1 • Responses of people with no mobile or fixed phone of their own
People with no mobile or xed phone
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The next group under examination is that of people with a mobile phone con-
nection of their own and no fixed phone line of their own (Figure 2). For them, the 
new offer was for a fixed phone line at the market price, which 1.7 percent of re-
spondents would accept.
3.2 percent of the remaining respondents would subscribe for the fixed offers 
at a 20% price reduction. The crosswise effect is similar, i.e. if mobile telephony be-
came significantly more expensive, 3.8 percent would purchase a fixed connection. 
The relatively low values indicate that the overwhelming majority of those with 
only a mobile phone would not wish to have a fixed phone even if the price was 
significantly lower.
Further responses by people who gave a positive response regarding the sub-
scription were omitted from the figure due to the very low sample size.
The third group under examination is that of people who do not have a mobile 
phone connection of their own but do have a fixed phone line of their own (Figure 3). 
For this group, the structure of the questions was the same as for the previous group. 
The proportion of respondents who would accept market price mobile phone sub-
scriptions is clearly higher than the number of those who would accept a fixed phone 
FIGURE 2 • Responses of people  
with a mobile phone of their own and no fixed phone of their own
People with a mobile phone of  their own
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subscription in the previous group. Still, the sample size for the second response 
(“What would you do if you subscribed…”) was still too low, as the size of the whole 
group is significantly lower than in the case of Figure 2. The reaction to the market 
price mobile subscription was 5.5% (information effect), and 3.6% of the remaining 
respondents stated that they would take the 20% cheaper offer. If fixed prices in-
creased by 20%, 4.3% would buy a mobile phone subscription.
Overall, the results were similar to those of the second group: mobile phone 
price reductions did not lead to large amounts of substitution; at the same time, 
the willingness to make the change was almost twice as high as among those with 
a mobile phone only. This indicates that mobile phones are more of a substitute for 
fixed phones than the other way around.
With regard to substitution, the most interesting group is perhaps the one where 
both connection types are present (Figure 4 and Figure 5). Here, crosswise relation-
ships are more clearly observable, and the difference between the reactions to fixed 
and mobile price changes is easier to see as well. Additionally, the effect of price 
changes on the shift of usage between the two networks (usage substitution) can 
also be studied in this group. In Figure 4 and Figure 5, consumers’ reactions to price 
changes in the two services in the same direction (up or down) are summarized.
FIGURE 3 • Responses of respondents  
with a home fixed phone and no mobile phone of their own
People with a home xed phone
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FIGURE 4 • Responses of respondents 
with both subscription types to raising prices
People with both subscription types, responses to















































Impact on the xed
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Source: Infrapont.
Although price rises are contrary to the dominant pricing trends, this hypotheti-
cal scenario tells us a great deal about how consumers value their two types of access: 
which of the two they consider more important. A significant group of consumers 
(about 35 percent) would not change their consumption if either service became 20 
percent more expensive. However, while respondents tended to reduce their usage in 
response to rising mobile service prices, with only 4.8% canceling their contract, the 
same price increase would cause 24.1% to cancel their fixed phone contract. Thus, 
as opposed to the elastic reaction seen with fixed price rises, mobile access appears 
much more indispensable to consumers, making it less price sensitive.
The differences observed in cross-price influences are also worth noting. If 
fixed subscriptions became more expensive, only 3.3% would cancel their mobile 
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People with both subscription types, responses to











































20% decrease in mobile
phone price
subscription. On the other hand, however, 12% of consumers would cancel their 
fixed line if mobile access became more expensive, which, in accordance with the 
presented results, indicates a rather significant difference between consumers’ as-
sessment of the two access types.
The examination of price increases also shows a non-negligible amount of usage 
substitution between the two services. If fixed prices were to rise by 20 percent, 13 
percent of respondents would increase their mobile usage, while if mobile prices 
rose by 20 percent, 10 percent of respondents would use their fixed phone more. In 
other words, if a service becomes more expensive, a significant subset of consumers 
will reduce their usage (perhaps even cancel their subscription) and substitute it by 
using the other type of service more.
FIGURE 5 • The responses to price reductions 
of users with both access types
Source: Infrapont.
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Among users who have both types of access, the number of consumers who, 
if faced with one service raising prices, would reduce their demand for the other 
service, the price of which is unchanged (by canceling the service or reducing their 
usage) is exceptionally high. This supports the previously discussed hypothesis of 
the telecommunications budget.
Only 0.8 percent of respondents would cancel their mobile subscription as a result 
of a reduction of fixed prices. On the other hand, 5.9 percent would cancel their fixed 
subscription as a result of a reduction of mobile prices. This indicates that there is 
a group of consumers who use a fixed phone as a secondary telephone in order to take 
advantage of cheaper rates, and members of this group would cancel their fixed service 
if mobile prices fell far enough. In the opposite direction, any such effect is negligible.
Canceling a service due to the reduction of the price of the other service is not 
widespread for either type of service, but adaptation by reducing usage is signifi-
cant in both cases (30.4% and 20.8%). This clearly indicates usage substitution, i.e. 
if a consumer has both types of subscription and reduces their use of one service 
with an unchanged price when the price of the other service falls, the explanation 
is that the consumer is using the now cheaper service instead.
The difference between the strength of the phenomenon in the two directions is 
worthy of note. When mobile prices fall, consumers re-route their traffic from fixed 
to mobile less than in the opposite direction when fixed prices fall. The reason for 
this is that the demand for fixed telephone services is more elastic (more affected 
by price changes) than the demand for mobile services.
The telecommunications budget hypothesis
We need to examine to what extent the data support the telecommunications budget 
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, changes to the price of one service should 
cause a similar response affecting both services. That is, if either fixed or mobile 
access becomes more expensive, we would expect both fixed and mobile demand 
to fall, and we would expect demand for both services to increase in response to 
price reductions. Data on this are presented in Table 10.
TABLE 10 • Data on the telecommunications budget hypothesis (percentages)
Fixed Mobile
Response (reduction of use + cancellation)
Price increase
Fixed – 30.7 + 3.3
Mobile 26.7 + 12 –
Response (increase)
Price reduction Fixed – 5.4
Mobile 4.9 –
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Table 10 shows that the proportion of people whose responses match the tele-
communications budget hypothesis is higher – about 35% in both directions – in 
case of price increases. In case of price reductions, the effect is much smaller, but 
there is still a non-negligible proportion of 5% (i.e. when one service type becomes 
cheaper, about 5% of consumers increase their use of the other service).
This basically confirms that the effect outlined in the telecommunications budget 
hypothesis does exist, but it is present alongside other effects and is definitely not 
the only factor affecting behavior. In other words: the money lost or gained due 
to price changes is partly but not exclusively compensated (redirected) within the 
envelope of telecommunications expenses.
Usage substitution
Regarding the study of usage substitution, we previously discussed how many peo-
ple stated that they would use a given service less or more as a result of changes 
in fixed or mobile pricing. In the next section, we examine the same issue using 
a different method. We asked respondents about the last five calls they initiated, 
inquiring about what they would have done if prices had been different. We also 
asked respondents about various characteristics of the calls (Table 11).
The results indicate that people use their own mobile phones most of the time 
(72.07%), with home fixed phones accounting for 23.47%, which means that when it 
comes to private calls, mobile phones are used more than three times as frequently 
as fixed phones. Telephones at work are used very rarely (4.5% in total).
Table 12 indicates that users generally call mobile phones from mobile phones 
and they call fixed phones from fixed phones: only 10.2% of calls crossed from one 
network type to the other.
Examining the phenomenon in greater detail, Table 13 indicates that this char-
acteristic is more powerful in the case of calls from mobile phones and to mobile 
phones (93.8 percent and 92.4 percent compared to 77.9 percent and 81.4 percent, 
respectively).
The data on the location of the calling party show that 91.4% of people use 
a fixed network call, unsurprisingly, from their homes. However, at close to 50%, 
the proportion of people calling from home is high even for mobile phone users 
(Table 14). Two-thirds of calls initiated from a fixed phone reach the called party 
at their home, 22% at their workplace or school; these proportions are lower for 
mobile phones as well.
With regard to the called parties, no significant differences were found between 
the two technologies: respondents called family members the most, 55.0% of the 
time, followed by friends and acquaintances (28.4%). The remaining calls were dis-
tributed fairly evenly between official and work-related calls (Table 15).
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TABLE 11 • Distribution of call initiation by 
connection type (percentages)






Home fixed phone 23.47 35.2
Workplace fixed phone 1.79 2.3
Corporate mobile phone 2.67 1.9
Own mobile phone 72.07 60.7
Total 100.0 100.0







TABLE 13 • Relationship of initiation and termination technologies (percentages)*





TotalFrom fixed From mobile
Fixed 77.9 22.1 100.0
Mobile 6.2 93.8 100.0
b) Distribution of call reception by call initiation
Initiating device
Received calls




* Part a) of the table shows the ratio of calls to fixed and mobile networks, respectively, among calls started from each network 
type, while part b) shows the ratio of calls from fixed and mobile networks, respectively, among calls received in each network type.
TABLE 14 • The distribution of calls by location (percentages)
Fixed Mobile Total
Location when initiating the call
Home 91.4 49.2 60.2
Work/school 7.1 22.5 18.6
Street, car, public transport 0.0 17.9 13.3
Other location 0.5 10.4 7.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Location of called party at the time of the call
Home 67.9 39.6 47.1
Work/school 22.8 30.1 28.2
Street, car, public transport 6.3 17.1 14.2
Other location 2.9 13.2 10.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
TABLE 15 • The distribution of calls by called party
Called party Fixed Mobile Total
Direct relative, family 60.2 53.2 55.0
Friend, acquaintance 23.2 30.2 28.4
Official matters, private business 11.4 8.2 9.0
Work-related 5.1 8.4 7.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
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The distribution of calls by urgency level is somewhat surprising, as it does not in-
dicate a very significant difference between the two technologies; the data do not show 
mobile phones being used more often for urgent calls from the perspective of either 
the calling party or the called party (Table 16). It is clear, however, that thanks to the 
available call plans, fixed phones are more often used for calls that are not urgent at all.
Table 17 sums up respondents’ claims about how they would have reacted to 
higher service prices – i.e. the effects of price changes on usage. The answers to the 
question about the last five calls provide insight into the usage substitution taking 
place between the two networks.
Most respondents (about 60% for both services) would not change their last 
five calls in any way in case of a price rise. A smaller but still significant number 
of respondents (about 30%) would try to adapt to the higher prices in some way 
(shorter calls, calls made at discounted times, fewer calls). The rate of usage substi-
tution is rather low: if fixed calls became more expensive, only 3.9% of consumers 
would switch to making calls from a mobile phone, and only 1.2% would switch in 
the other direction if mobiles became more expensive.
TABLE 16 • Percentage distributions of call urgency and the technology chosen
How urgent was the call?
Calling party
TotalFixed Mobile
Quite urgent 35.7 41.5 39.3
Not really urgent, but call needed to be made sooner or later 41.9 44.8 43.7
Not urgent at all 22.5 13.7 17.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
How urgent was the call?
Called party
TotalFixed Mobile
Quite urgent 35.9 40.9 39.3
Not really urgent, but call needed to be made sooner or later 41.6 45.0 43.7
Not urgent at all 22.5 14.1 17.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
TABLE 17 • Effects of price rises (percentages)
What would have been different if prices were 20% higher?* Fixed Mobile Total
No change 56.4 63.0 60.5
Would have made shorter calls 33.0 25.6 28.3
Would have switched to mobile/fixed 3.9 1.2 2.2
Would have made the call at a cheaper time of day 2.6 4.6 3.8
Would not have made the call 3.2 4.2 3.8
Would have chosen other means of communication 0.9 1.5 1.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
* With respect to the last five calls.
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This shows that usage substitution with regard to specific calls is low – especially 
when compared to the results obtained regarding access (see Figure 4), where 13.1% 
of consumers (as opposed to the 3.9% listed in Table 17) reported that they would 
use their mobile phone more if fixed prices were to increase. The proportion is 
10.1% for mobile price rises (compared with 1.2%).
This notable difference seems contradictory at first sight, but there is a fairly 
simple explanation for it. While questions regarding specific calls measure con-
sumers’ short-term reactions and adaptation, the data on usage substitution sup-
plied with regard to subscriptions covers much more long-term adaptations. It is 
perfectly clear that in the short term, consumers adapt to price changes less than 
in the long term, in which case instead of changing decisions about individual calls, 
they change their habits.
Price elasticity assessments
As stated in the section on methodology, elasticity was examined using a relatively 
large 20% price change that provokes strong reactions. The methodological conse-
quence of this choice is that we examine a section (arc) of the demand function, not 
a single point. Therefore, results obtained by calculating the change based on the 
original volume (before the price change) or the changed volume (after the price 
change) may be significantly different. In order to reduce any distortions as far as 
possible, we used the mean of the two quantities, calculating the arc elasticity.
Own- and cross-price elasticities were calculated with regard to both fixed and 
mobile telephone service and both price rises and price reductions. As described 
above, the information effect and the effects of prices were separated from each 
other, and the information effect was not taken into account when assessing elasticity. 
However, we also calculated elasticities using the assumption that the respondent’s 
decision to accept a market offer and not just the 20% reduced offer is also the result 
of the price reduction. The results of this calculation, to be treated as a top-range 
estimate, are presented in the last row of Table 18.
TABLE 18 • Access elasticity assessment results
Price change
The effects of mobile access price changes on The effects of fixed access price changes on
mobile demand* fixed demand** fixed demand* mobile demand**
20 percent price increase –0.27 –0.12 –1.39 –0.04
20 percent price reduction –0.06 0.14 –0.07 0.022
20 percent price reduction  
(including the information effect)
–0.211 — –0.10 —
* Own price elasticity. ** Cross-price elasticity.
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CONCLUSIONS
Interpreting price elasticity assessments
With regard to own price elasticity, we can determine (primarily based on responses 
to price rises) that there is a significant difference between the two technologies. 
Mobile access is very inelastic (–0.27), but fixed phone price elasticity is much 
greater (–1.39). This indicates that mobile access is much less readily substituta-
ble than fixed access. The obvious cause is the extra feature at the core of mobile 
telephony: mobile phones can be used anywhere. More precisely, the reduced 
substitutability expressed in low price elasticity is caused by the fact that mobility 
has become widespread and there is a very high demand for it; also, at the time of 
the study, the mobility surcharge was already low compared to other available op-
tions. On the other hand, mobile phones can provide a functionally almost perfect 
replacement for fixed phones, and, as the prices are relatively close to each other, 
even a small increase in fixed prices makes the switch to mobile worthwhile for 
many consumers.
It should also be noted that responses to price rises are stronger than the re-
sponses to price reductions: the price reduction response is less than –0.3% even if 
it is exaggerated by including the information effect.
Interpreting the results is more complicated with regard to cross-price elastic-
ities. An examination of substitution shows that – as expected – these values are 
positive for price reductions. However, the values are negative for price increases. 
According to standard approaches used in economics, positive cross-price elastic-
ity is an indicator of substitution, while negative values indicate a complementary 
relationship. Own price elasticities indicate that demand for mobile services is rel-
atively inelastic, which means that mobile phones have no strong substitute (i.e. for 
regulatory purposes, they constitute a separate relevant market). Demand for fixed 
access is price-elastic, but its mobile cross-price elasticity is negative, which would 
appear to indicate that it is not being substituted by mobile access.
However, before leaping to the conclusion that mobile and fixed telephones do 
not substitute each other, a closer inspection of the issue is in order.
The first important methodological comment concerns cross-price elasticities. 
If a product’s price is raised, the following effects may appear:
1. the consumer has less money left in total, and has to reduce consumption of the 
second product as well (the income effect);
2. if the two products are complementary, demand for the second product may also 
fall due to the fact that less of it is needed to complement the smaller quantities of 
the first product (this leads to negative cross-price elasticity if the income effect 
is filtered out);
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3. if the second product is a substitute, then due to the relative price change, con-
sumption of the first product needs to be substituted with the second product, 
thus increasing demand for the second product (which leads to positive cross-
price elasticity.)
If the telecommunications budget hypothesis presented above is correct, i.e. if peo-
ple devote a fixed (or more or less fixed) sum to telecommunications, then the first 
effect (the income effect) is strengthened. Thus, it is quite possible that the nega-
tive cross-price elasticity in case of price rises is due to the effects of the telecom-
munications budget, and the two products are not complementary but substitutes. 
A consumer who has both types of access may feel that as a result of a mobile price 
increase, their telecommunications costs rise beyond the amount they are willing to 
spend in this area, and therefore they need to reduce their consumption. If however 
the consumer still values mobile access more than fixed access, they will cancel the 
latter – despite the fact that it has just become relatively cheaper. In this case, cross-
price elasticity may be negative, not as a result of complementarity but because of 
the income effect and the effects of the telecommunications budget.
It should be noted that the two access types are not in a complementary relation-
ship in the traditional sense (hardware and software, for instance), as the consumption 
of one does not necessarily require or involve the consumption of the other. Further-
more, access demand is a special case in that there is no way to “consume less”; the con-
sumer only has two options in case of a price rise: to cancel or to keep the subscription. 
Therefore, the classical complementarity effect described in paragraph 2 does not ap-
ply to fixed and mobile telephone access. The cross-price elasticity indicators present-
ed here are created by a mixture of the income effect and the complementarity/sub-
stitution effect (as opposed to econometrics models for instance, where cross-price 
elasticity is measured using controls, separated from the income effect), and so the is-
sue of complementarity and substitution cannot be resolved on the basis of these indi-
cators alone. Therefore, the negative cross-price elasticity presented (if the income ef-
fect and the effect of the telecommunications budget are not filtered out) can certainly 
not be taken as evidence of a complementary relationship between the two products.
It should also be noted that the results presented here reflect the “average” re-
sponses of consumers, who are all in different situations. Consumers in different 
groups have different relevant options when faced with a price rise.
Canceling one connection if the price of the other is raised is an available option 
only for people who have both. The classic substitution effect could only be observed 
in people who have only one type of access, and are switching to the other service 
due to the price rise (and canceling the service that has become more expensive).
Taking into account own price elasticities and cross-price elasticities together, we 
can conclude that fixed access is only a substitute for mobile access in a very limited 
way. This is also confirmed by the low own price elasticity.
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The own price elasticity of fixed telephone access is high, which suggests strong 
substitutability, but mobile cross-price elasticity is low. The question is whether 
this is due to fixed phones being substituted by some other service instead of mo-
bile phones, such as VoIP calls. This is not likely, as indicated by the fact that other 
forms of communication (e.g. VoIP) provide a significantly poorer substitute for 
fixed calls than mobile calls do. (In case of a price rise on fixed calls, 3.9% would 
have substituted them with mobile calls, and only 0.9% would have chosen other 
means of communication; see Table 17). These results indicate that mobile phones 
still serve as the strongest candidate for substituting fixed phones.
The above explanations show why cross-price elasticity is low. Mobile and fixed 
access are by definition on/off options. If nearly everyone has a mobile phone, then 
there is limited scope for the effect that the traditional cross-price elasticity measures, 
i.e. consumers buying a mobile phone because of rising fixed prices. In an extreme 
case, where every single person has a mobile phone, this cross-price elasticity will not 
be positive. Therefore, the traditional concept of cross-price elasticity is not suitable 
for analyzing the type of substitution relationship where the consumer has both types 
of access and decides to cancel the fixed subscription and substitute it by using their 
mobile phone more. Yet this may be the most common consumer response today.
To examine these results in a wider context, it can be observed that the follow-
ing phases followed each other in the development of Hungarian fixed and mobile 
telephony over the last twenty years:
1. an increasing number of consumers bought a mobile phone in addition to their 
fixed phone (complementary role, 1990s);
2. more and more of the traffic moved to mobile networks, owing to falling mobile 
prices, convenience and the fact that more and more people had mobile phones 
and mobile to mobile calls are cheaper than fixed to mobile (stronger usage sub-
stitution, around the turn of the millennium);
3. cancellation of fixed phones due to low usage, as maintaining the subscription was 
not worthwhile (after 2000) because significant monthly fees and declining usage 
meant that the total per-minute cost was getting progressively higher for consumers.
The cross-price elasticity of fixed access in case of increasing prices would be the 
best indicator of a substitution effect in the first of these phases, when most con-
sumers still had only fixed access and might have switched to a mobile and canceled 
the fixed phone at the same time as a result of a price increase. However, at the time 
of the study, due to the widespread nature of mobile telephony, the indicators of 
phases 2 and 3 are already more suitable for examining the relationships between 
demand for fixed and mobile phones. These indicators suggest a significant element 
of substitution. Phase 2 is characterized by usage substitution. Examining specific 
calls shows that usage substitution using mobile phones is relatively low: 3.9% in 
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case of a 20% price increase. This cross-price elasticity value of nearly 0.2 is not in-
significant, especially considering that this is a realistic alternative only for people 
who have both access types (who make up less than 40% of subscribers). We also 
need to take into account that asking the question itself – by referring to substitu-
tion in a specific situation – measures short-term, non-planned effects, and there-
fore somewhat underestimates substitution. The most relevant indicator of phase 
3 is the own price elasticity of fixed access, which our data show to be rather high.
It should be noted that access substitution, usage substitution and complemen-
tarity work differently in the three phases. In the first phase, when the penetration 
level of both services is generally increasing, the two connection types are comple-
mentary. Phase 1, the appearance of widespread mobile access (access complemen-
tarity) made it possible for usage substitution to emerge between the two services in 
phase 2, with fixed calls being substituted by mobile calls progressively more often. 
This process led to access substitution in phase 3, as fixed telephony (taking into 
account the average per-minute rate including the monthly fee) became more and 
more expensive compared to mobile services. It is also true that in this phase the 
cancellation of fixed subscriptions is associated more with increased mobile traffic 
than with increased mobile access.
Our interpretation of the data is that fixed access is being substituted by mobile 
access, despite the fact that cross-price elasticity is relatively low. With mobile phone 
penetration nearing 100%, access substitution can best be detected by examining the 
cross-price elasticity of usage and the own price elasticity of fixed access. In these 
circumstances, one cannot expect the number of mobile subscriptions to increase 
when the price of fixed access increases (since nearly all consumers already have 
a mobile subscription), but the cancellation of fixed lines and the parallel increase in 
mobile traffic clearly show that consumers are substituting fixed access with mobile.
From a regulatory perspective, too, the primary consideration is own price elas-
ticity, not cross-price elasticity. What needs to be examined using the hypothetical 
monopoly (or SSNIP) test when determining relevant markets is whether raising the 
price of a product would be profitable. If own price elasticity is low, then the answer 
is yes and the product can be viewed as a separate market. If own price elasticity is 
high, then a price rise would generate a loss, and the market needs to be expanded 
by adding the closest substitute product. This is where cross-price elasticity has 
a role to play, in helping to identify the strongest of the candidate substitute products.
Thus, the most important conclusion drawn on the basis of the substitution sur-
vey is that the own price elasticity of fixed access is high, and the closest substitute 
is mobile access; therefore, expanding the fixed access market by adding the mobile 
access market may be justified from a regulatory perspective. On the other hand, the 
own-price elasticity of mobile access is so low that even if there is a certain amount 
of substitution towards fixed telephones, it cannot be large enough to raise doubts 
regarding the definition of the mobile market as a separate relevant market.
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The results in the context of previous research
Above we identified three phases in the demand for fixed and mobile telephone 
services. Previous analyses of fixed-mobile access substitution generally only cov-
ered the first of these phases. For instance, Horváth–Maldoom [2002] and Rod-
ini–Ward–Woroch [2003] analyzed the effects of fixed prices on purchases of new 
mobile subscriptions, while Sung–Kim [2002] studied the relationship between the 
cancellation of fixed subscriptions and the purchase of new mobile subscriptions. 
Rodini–Ward–Woroch [2003] measured the cross-price elasticity of mobile sub-
scriptions and fixed prices in the US at 0.18 in 2001 and 0.13 in 2001. According to 
the authors’ calculations, the own price elasticity of mobile subscriptions was –0.6 
and –0.43 in the two years, respectively.
Our research generally found lower cross-price elasticities than this, which is 
entirely understandable in the light of the analysis presented in the previous section: 
the Hungarian market was for the most part already in phase 3 at the time of data 
collection. We also measured lower own price elasticity in mobile services than the 
values measured in the US. As previously explained, the cross-price elasticity of 
mobile phone services and rising fixed prices was low in Hungary in 2009 because 
of the high mobile phone penetration. The own price elasticity of mobile servic-
es measured with regard to price reductions was low for the same reason: even if 
a relatively high proportion of people with no mobile phone were to subscribe, this 
would still produce a low level of elasticity as there is only a very small pool from 
which to draw new subscribers.
However, this is not the reason why we measured mobile service demand as 
relatively inelastic with regard to price rises. This needs to be interpreted bearing 
in mind that along with the spread of mobile telephony, mobile phone prices have 
been falling continuously and quite significantly over the last decade,9 thus chang-
ing the relative price of mobile and fixed telephone traffic. Calling a mobile phone 
number from a mobile phone now costs about half as much as making the same 
call from a fixed phone – and prices were almost equal ten years ago. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that people would generally not give up their mobile access even 
in case of a 20% price increase: they could call mobile numbers significantly more 
cheaply even after the increase. If the two prices were close to each other, more 
people would probably consider this option.
Thus, it is easy to see why, given the market’s current characteristics, elasticities 
are entirely different than a few years earlier. The price ratios played a significant 
role in this. Therefore, even though they were not reached using econometrics 
methods, our results probably approximate the current Hungarian market situa-
tion much better than any estimate of elasticities based on the results of a thorough 
 9 See the European Commission’s annual implementation reports on this issue. 
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econometric analysis carried out in a country with a completely different market, 
or at a different time.
In addition to the papers known at the time of the 2009 data collection, a few 
papers have been written subsequently using newer data and data that overlap with 
our data collection period. The results presented in this paper need to be viewed 
in the light of these results as well, because they focus mostly on the phenomena in 
phases 2 and 3. In general, these papers use careful wording regarding the issue of 
fixed-mobile substitution, placing the emphasis not on specific numerical results 
but rather on the general trends they indicate. They identify a basic relationship of 
substitution between the two services, but at a relatively low intensity.
Suarez–Garcia-Marinoso [2013] examined the main driving forces behind 
fixed-mobile substitution on the Spanish residential market between 2004 and 2009 
using household panel data, focusing specifically on situations where households 
substitute fixed access with mobile access by canceling their fixed subscription. The 
conclusion was that this type of substitution does happen, but only at a low rate 
(0.35%/quarter). Furthermore, the authors found that the likelihood of substitution 
is affected much less by the amount and composition of the sum spent on fixed te-
lephony than by the lack of Internet access, the existence of mobile access and the 
demographic characteristics of the household (young age, single person household, 
sparsely populated area), all of which are factors that significantly increase the like-
lihood of substitution.
Grzybowski–Verboven [2013] studied fixed-mobile substitution in 27 EU coun-
tries between 2005 and 2011 based on Eurostat survey data. The authors found that 
mobile and fixed telephones are generally seen as potential substitutes for each other 
in households, and the parameter measuring substitution is significantly negative. 
At the same time, the level of substitution was much lower in the first three years 
(2006–2008) than in subsequent years. According to the authors’ estimate, the 
existence of mobile phones only reduced fixed penetration by 6% in 2007. In 2012, 
however, fixed penetration would have been 14% higher if mobile phones had not 
existed. At the same time, significant differences were found between individual 
households and different regions: in many cases, households used the two services 
in a complementary manner. The rate of substitution was much higher in Central 
and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. According to the conclusions of the 
study, households with different socioeconomic characteristics have different atti-
tudes to fixed-mobile substitution.
Macher at al. [2013] analyzed the telecommunications decisions of US house-
holds between 2003 and 2010, using data from the annual National Health Inter-
view Survey. The results of the empirical analysis of close to 200,000 observations 
supported the notion that mobile phones became close substitutes of fixed phones 
between 2003 and 2010. The study even attempted to divide “full substitution” into 
its constituent elements. Only a relatively low rate of substitution was observed 
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between 2003 and 2006: only about half of the consumers who previously only had 
a fixed connection and bought a mobile connection switched to a “mobile-only” 
arrangement, with the other half subscribing to both services. After 2007, the dom-
inant model became canceling the fixed service and using a mobile phone alone.
Barth and Heimeshoff [2012] estimated the effects of mobile substitution on fixed 
traffic based on panel data regarding 16 Western European countries between 2004 
and 2010. According to their results, the own price elasticity of fixed calls varied 
between –0.1378 and –0.1661 in the short term, and between –0.4692 and –0.4867 
in the long term. The effect of mobile prices on fixed traffic (cross-price elasticity) 
was between +0.1250 and +0.1256 in the short term, and between +0.4254 and 
+0.3680 in the long term.
The role of mobile telephony as a functional substitute for fixed telephony is 
obvious; however, substitution in the economic sense regarding a specific location 
can only established by analyzing that specific market situation.
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THE HUNGARIAN POSTAL SECTOR
This paper summarizes recent developments on the Hungarian postal markets and the 
manner, in which they are regulated. In the first part of this study, I describe the evo-
lution and main features of the relevant Hungarian regulations. In the second section, 
I outline the process of market opening and the emergence of market competition, 
including key Hungarian legal cases concerning anti-competitive market conduct. In 
the third section, I assess the economic performance of the Hungarian postal sector 
and its various segments, examining changes in prices over time and price regula-
tions in a separate section. Finally I provide a summary of service quality indicators.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSTAL REGULATIONS IN HUNGARY
Reform of Hungary’s postal regulations began in the early ’90s, drawing on the 
postal regulations of the European Union as they developed. Following institution-
al separation of postal, telecommunications and broadcasting services in 1990, 
separate legislation was introduced for the three sectors from 1992 to 1993. Act 
XLV of 1992 on Postal Services replaced the earlier Act II of 1964. The 1992 Act 
indicated, to a certain extent, the intention of opening the hitherto entirely mo-
nopolized postal markets and allowing other players to be present, subject to pos-
session of the relevant license. The conditions set down in law did not enable ac-
tual market entry.
The concept of the convergence of the information and communications markets, 
which gained ground in the ‘90s, also impacted on Hungarian legislation: the need 
for common framework regulations for these sectors arose as part of the commu-
nications modernization program that got under way in the late ’90s. Accordingly, 
Act XL of 2001 on Communications set the framework regulations for various infor-
mation and communications activities. When regulating postal services under the 
Communications Act, the first EU postal services directive, namely Directive 97/67/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, was taken into account, with 
the result that the fundamental principles of provision of universal postal services 
and market opening were adopted. The 2001 Act opened up those market segments 
involving non-universal services to new entrants. The impact was reflected in the 
increase in the number of market players – 18 registered service providers were 
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present in these market segments in 2002 (the first year of the Communications 
Act), with that number rising to 43 in 2003.
However, the delegation of the European Commission that assessed implementa-
tion of the first postal services directive, criticized several aspects of the Hungarian 
Act on the grounds that it extended the privileges of the universal service provider. 
Criticisms were made in two important respects: first, regarding extension of the 
scope of reserved services (to include cash transfers and payment intermediary ser-
vices) contrary to the directive, and, second, regarding contributions to the subsidy 
fund for universal postal services. In the meantime the second EU postal services 
directive (Directive 2002/39/EC) was adopted, with the result that there was both an 
internal and external need for reform of the Hungarian legislation. However, while 
preparing the amendment to the Act, it became increasingly clear that it was not 
expedient to set out the regulations in a joint law owing to the unique character-
istics of the telecommunications and postal sectors. For that reason, these sectors 
were again regulated separately. Act CI of 2003 on Postal Services and Act C of 2003 
on Electronic Communications were passed. The new Postal Services Act, which 
drew on the second EU postal services directive, was adopted, and within a short 
time the key government decrees and ministry decrees supplementing the Postal 
Services Act came into force.
As the regulations evolved, the scope of universal services was defined with 
increasing precision based on the directives. Although the 1992 Act used different 
terms (namely basic postal services and basic provision of services), it introduced 
numerous elements of universal services (for example, mail not weighing more 
than 2 kilograms and money orders). The provision of universal postal services 
as defined in the 2001 Communications Act was obliged to provide countrywide 
services with respect to domestic packages not weighing more than 10 kilograms, 
postal payment services and financial services, and the following extra services: 
registered mail, delivery with return receipt and insured mail. It also introduced 
a number of quality indicators.
The 2003 Postal Services Act extended the scope of universal services to in-
clude packages weighing up to 20 kilograms and set new, more exacting quality 
requirements. In addition, with respect to the manner of providing postal services, 
the obligations tied to universal services were defined with increasing precision. 
That manifested itself, for example, in provisions concerning household delivery to 
addresses beyond municipal boundaries. The Communications Act and the 2003 
Postal Services Act also regulated access to universal services (minimum opening 
hours of permanent postal service points and minimum times that mobile services 
and mobile post offices are required to spend at the designated access points). These 
two Acts, unlike the 1992 Act, no longer allowed the universal service provider to 
not even attempt delivery of mail weighing over a specified amount to addresses 
outside municipal boundaries.
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The 2003 Postal Services Act defined universal and reserved services as follows:
Scope of universal postal services:
 • postal services involving domestic and international letters, addressed advertising 
mail and forms not weighing more than two kilograms;
 • postal services involving domestic and international packages not weighing more 
than 20 kilograms;
 • postal services involving domestic and international mail not weighing more than 
seven kilograms and containing Braille;
 • extra services (registered mail, delivery with return receipt and insured mail) that can 
be ordered by the person posting the mail to supplement the services defined above.
Reserved postal services within the scope of universal services:
 • services involving domestic or international letters or addressed advertising mail 
not weighing over 50 grams if the price of the service is less than two and a half 
times (earlier three and a half times) the price of a letter in the first weight category 
of the fastest service category of the universal services segment,
 • postal services involving official documents, unless otherwise regulated by law or 
government decree.
With respect to market competition, another important question is how market 
entry is regulated in the various segments. The earlier postal services directive set 
out the possibility for the various Member States to apply a licensing procedure to 
non-reserved universal services, recommending two forms of licensing: the more 
liberal general license and the more stringent individual license. The practices of 
the Member States with regard to licensing can be categorized into four groups. In 
increasing order of stringency and difficulty of entry, these groups are as follows: 
a) no license is required; b) a general license is required; c) an individual license is 
required only for letter mail in the non-reserved universal segment or a limited scope 
of such letters; d) an individual license is required for all universal postal services 
(including packages). Hungary was among the countries in the last group, i.e. those 
countries that apply the strictest licensing procedures. The earlier 2003 Postal Ser-
vices Act classified postal activities into three groups regarding entry requirements.
1. Non-universal postal services (express mail, courier mail, integrated mail and 
document exchange) can be performed subject to registration (which is a straight-
forward process, requiring only a formal declaration of intent).
2. Non-reserved universal postal services can be performed subject to an individual 
license (licensed service providers are not only entitled, but are also obliged to 
perform the universal service for the mail types and geographical area, to which 
the license applies).
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3. The universal postal service provider (Magyar Posta Zrt. (Hungarian Post)), which 
has the exclusive right to provide reserved postal services, was designated by the Act.
To what extent the requirement for an individual license represents a barrier to 
entry also depends on the related conditions and obligations prescribed by the 
regulations and the national regulatory authority. One indicator of the extent, to 
which the requirement restricts entry may be the number of service providers pres-
ent in the various universal postal service sectors. Even among the countries in the 
last group listed (countries where universal postal services can only be performed 
subject to an individual license) significant differences can be observed. (While 
for example, in 2005 more than 200 service providers operated in certain universal 
service segments in Italy, where an individual license is also widely prescribed, in 
Hungary there was not a single service provider aside from the designated univer-
sal service provider.)
Hungary was granted a moratorium until December 31, 2012 to transpose the 
third postal services directive into domestic law and to fully open its postal markets 
to competition. Following protracted negotiations and drafting, Parliament adopt-
ed the new Postal Services Act in fall 2012 (Act CLIX of 2012 on Postal Services) 
virtually at the last moment. The government decrees and ministry decrees for 
implementation of the Act then came into force in December 2012 (Government 
Decree no. 335/2012 (XII. 4.), Government Decree no. 336/2012. (XII. 4.), National 
Development Ministry Decree no. 67/2012. (XII. 15.).
The most important change in the new legislative environment was that almost 
all services were removed from the scope of reserved services, thereby opening up 
the hitherto monopolized postal service segments to competition. The only field, 
in which the universal postal service provider retains the exclusive right to provide 
postal services is the official documents segment.
The new Postal Services Act distinguishes between three types of postal services:
1. Universal postal services:
a) non-registered domestic or international mail (differing from the mail defined 
in b)–d)) not weighing more than two kilograms;
b) domestic or international packages not weighing more than 20 kilograms;
c) domestic or international mail containing Braille;
d) official documents.
However, only services provided pursuant to the general terms and conditions 
constitute universal services. If the universal postal service provider provides the 
service according to terms and conditions set out in an individual agreement that 
differ from the terms and conditions for the universal postal service, according 
to an individually set price, then the service qualifies as a service replacing a uni-
versal service (hereinafter: replacement universal service).
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2. Any postal service involving any mail type qualifies as a replacement universal 
service that does not come under the scope of the services specified in Section 
8 of the Act (services that do not replace universal services; see the summarized 
group of the services in the section below) and is not provided by the postal 
service provider under its universal postal service obligation. In other words, re-
placement universal services are postal services involving all mail in the universal 
category if they are not provided by the universal service provider, or if they are 
provided by the universal service provider, but not under the general terms and 
conditions applicable to the universal service.
3. The below postal services that provide added value compared to universal postal ser-
vices or replacement universal services constitute postal services that do not replace 
universal postal services (hereinafter: non-replacement universal postal services).
a) courier service,
b) express mail service,
c) international EMS service
d) mail service including at least one of the below supplementary services that 
represent considerable added value:
 • mail tracking,
 • service with delivery time guarantee,
 • cash-on-delivery service,
 • service whereby the mail is delivered at a time individually agreed with the 
recipient after the postal service provider has taken receipt of the mail,
 • delivery solely to the person designated as the recipient,
 • other supplementary services connected to mail delivery that are tailored 
to the needs of the sender and are provided on the basis of an individual 
agreement, provided they do not come under the scope of supplementary 
services that must be offered in connection with the universal postal service, 
and whose use means that from the perspective of the user the given service 
no longer qualifies as a replacement universal postal service.
Non-replacement universal services may be performed by any business organiza-
tion based on registration (services subject to registration). By contrast, a license 
is required for performance of replacement universal services (services subject 
to a license). Only the universal service provider may provide universal servic-
es. The Act designates Magyar Posta Zrt. as the universal service provider until 
December 31, 2020.
The Act prescribes that the prices of universal services should be cost-based, but 
only the pricing of individually posted domestic letters not weighing more than 50 
grams and domestic services involving official documents is regulated. The meth-
od for regulating these prices is set out in National Development Ministry Decree 
no. 67/2012. (XII. 15.). In place of the earlier regulatory prices, price cap regu-
lations were introduced (which will be discussed later under “prices over time”).
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The new Act creates the possibility for a Subsidy Fund for Universal Postal Servic-
es to finance the undue additional burden posed by the universal service obligation. 
Payments to and from that account are governed by a separate government decree 
(Government Decree no. 336/2012. (XII. 4.). All service providers, including the 
universal service provider that provides replacement universal services is obliged 
to make contributions to the subsidy fund from their revenue from replacement 
universal services. This contribution is payable according to market share on the 
relevant market (replacement universal services), according to the formula set out in 
the government decree. However, each postal service provider is not obliged to pay 
more than 10 percent of its net revenue from replacement universal services. The 
level of the contribution is determined by a formula set out in the decree according 
to the undue additional burden posed by the universal service. The amount of the 
undue additional burden is established by the National Media and Infocommuni-
cations Authority.
The Hungarian postal sector regulator
In Hungary state service provision and regulatory activities were separated in 1989. 
It was at that time that the separate, state-owned Hungarian Telecommunications 
Company, the Hungarian Broadcasting Company and the Hungarian Post Company 
were established. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Transport, Communications and 
Water Management assumed the role of regulatory authority. In 1993, based on the 
authorization of the Telecommunications Act (Act LXXII of 1992), a combined 
communications authority was created: an independent central authority (commu-
nications authority) operating under the control and supervision of the Transport, 
Communications and Water Management Minister, for the performance of postal, 
telecommunications and frequency management authority tasks. Its central body 
was the Communications Inspectorate General and its local bodies were the regional 
communications inspectorates. As successor to the Communications Inspectorate 
General the Communications Inspectorate was established by Government Decree 
248/2001. (XII. 18), pursuant to which it became a central public administration 
body with legal personality and nationwide competence, operating under the con-
trol of the government and the supervision of the Minister in Charge of the Prime 
Minister’s Office. In January 2004 the National Communications Authority (NHH) 
was established as legal successor to the Communications Inspectorate pursuant to 
the Act on Electronic Communications, and was vested with significantly greater 
powers than its predecessor (as it was granted regulatory, market-shaping and, un-
der certain circumstances, legislative powers by the law).
The current regulatory authority, the National Media and Infocommunications 
Authority (NMHH) was established on August 11, 2010 by Parliament with Act 
LXXXII of 2010 on the amendment of certain laws governing media and commu-
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nications. The NMHH was created by merging the National Radio and Television 
Authority (ORTT), which regulated the media, and the National Communications 
Authority (NHH), which regulated the communications sector.
The NMHH is a central budgetary body with independent financial manage-
ment; it covers the costs of its operation from its own revenues. It is tasked with 
promoting the smooth, effective operation and development of the communications 
markets: it protects the interests of those performing communications activities 
and of communications users and it strives to ensure the development and main-
tenance of fair and effective competition and oversees legal compliance of entities 
performing communications activities. However, the independence of the NMHH 
is reduced by certain provisions of the new Act: 1) the head of the authority may 
be appointed by and removed from office by the prime minister, 2) the duties and 
powers of the regulatory authority may be prescribed not only by law, but also by 
government decree. Moreover, the new Act states that the NMHH is involved in 
the implementation of the government’s communications policy.
Market structure and market size
In terms of competition, the Hungarian postal sector can be broken down into three 
categories up to the time of total market opening:
 • absence of competition (because it was prohibited): reserved universal services: 
segment involving letters weighing below 50 grams,
 • minimal competition: non-reserved universal services (until 2009 Magyar Posta 
did not have a competitor; in 2009 a competitor emerged with a small market 
share),
 • strong competition: non-universal postal services, for which the service provider 
needs to be registered (courier services, express mail services, integrated postal 
services, postal intermediary activities, document exchange services).
International experiences show that, in addition to general reduction of reserved 
services, competition was primarily boosted by fully liberalizing segments of the ad-
dressed mail market (eliminating the reserved scope determined by weight limits in 
those segments), in which competitors were rapidly capable of offering competitive 
services. For example, the opening of the outbound international mail segment, the 
total liberalization of addressed advertising mail (e.g. in the Netherlands) or liber-
alization of the market involving (otherwise reserved) postal services that are sup-
plemented by services with added value (e.g. in Germany the “D-license” or hybrid 
mail in Bulgaria). In Hungary’s case, these market segments (within the prescribed 
weight limits) were classed among reserved services until the prescribed deadline 
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for total market opening. The Hungarian regulations have consistently made full 
use of any flexibility allowed by the effective postal services directives to make the 
scope of reserved services as broad as possible. Throughout, Hungary has been in 
the group of countries that have made the least advances in terms of market opening.
In the case of non-reserved universal postal services, the earlier postal services 
Act (Act CI of 2003 on Postal Services) tied provision of such services to obligations 
that acted as a barrier to entry for a long time. As mentioned above, the provision of 
universal services was subject to a license in Hungary pursuant to the earlier Postal 
Services Act. Licensed service providers were not only entitled, but also obliged to 
provide universal services in the geographical region and for the mail types, to which 
the license applied. A license could be requested for provision of non-reserved uni-
versal postal services in one of the following public administrative regions:
 • one or more settlements, with the exception of towns or cities;
 • at least one county with the exception of Pest County;
 • Pest County and at least one county;
 • Budapest and – with the exception of Pest County – a combination of at least two 
counties;
 • countrywide.
The obligations entailed by the license prevented potential market entrants from 
picking and choosing the more profitable market segments within universal services. 
However, they also hindered the development of competition in the non-reserved 
universal services segments. It was not until 2009 that a competitor emerged in those 
market segments, namely Feibra Kft. (a subsidiary of Österreichische Post (Austrian 
Post)). Feibra Kft. commenced operations in 1990, and for a long time focused on the 
unaddressed advertising mail market. In 2008, following a merger with Cont Média, 
it became the largest market player on the unaddressed advertising mail market, 
with a market share of 60 percent. Having established the necessary infrastructure, 
it entered the market for mail weighing more than 50 grams, which is classified as 
a universal service, in 2009. No reliable data are available with respect to the market 
share it achieved in that universal mail segment, but it is highly probably that, in 
line with the experiences of other countries with a liberalized postal market, it did 
not capture a significant share of Magyar Posta’s market.
Following the complete market opening, in January 2013 Feibra Kft. submitted an 
application to provide replacement universal services (for which a license is required). 
However, the outcome of the authority assessment indicates that even the new Postal 
Services Act failed to lessen the entry barriers resulting from the regulations. Feibra 
Kft. was not granted a license by the regulatory authority for the postal sector (the 
authority established that the company’s accounting procedures were not sufficiently 
transparent). Another applicant came on the scene in 2015. City Mail Hungary Kft. 
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submitted a license application to the authority to perform replacement universal 
services in Hungary, in addition to the postal services it was providing on the basis 
of registration. The NMHH also rejected that license application on the grounds that 
the necessary conditions for reliable delivery performance of the service provider in 
the whole public administrative area of Budapest and material conditions for pro-
viding the service were not in place. As a result, no competitor managed to enter 
the most recently opened market segments within the scope of universal services.
The anti-competitive tax conditions also act as a barrier to entry. Despite much 
criticism of the EU system of exemption from VAT, it is still the case that only a few 
Member States apply an equal level of VAT to the universal service provider and the 
other service providers on the market. In most countries either all activities of the 
universal service provider or its services involving mail that comes under the scope 
of universal services are exempted from VAT or receive a VAT discount, which sig-
nificantly distorts competition. In Hungary, like in most Member States, universal 
postal services are exempt from VAT (on the grounds that they are in the public 
interest) 1, while replacement services are not, with the result that Magyar Posta’s 
competitors are at a significant competitive disadvantage in those segments. In order 
for entrants to the universal services segment to make their services attractive (for 
instance, to the financial sector or public sector, which cannot reclaim VAT), they 
have to offer their services at below the universal service provider’s prices, less the 
VAT amount, which significantly distorts price competition. That limits the range 
of potential customers, and thereby the commercial opportunities of competitors.
There is, however, fierce competition in the field of non-universal postal servic-
es. Table 1 shows steady growth in the number of service providers in the various 
service categories (although the number of deleted service providers also rose 
sharply in 2009, the year following the financial crisis). Since 2010 the number of 
 1 Section 85 (1) of Act CXXVII of 2007 on Value Added Tax.
TABLE 1 • Number of non-universal postal service providers by service category
(based on service categories designated at the time of registration, number of service providers)
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2015*
Total number of registered service providers in the various  
non-universal service categories
96 111 137 178 237 265 179
Deleted in the respective year 8 24 49 66 92 36 n/a
Other courier services 54 75 88 114 139 150 94
Only express mail 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Integrated 0 10 13 12 12 15 10
Combined (courier, express, integrated, and intermediary services) 44 24 30 45 76 100 69
Postal intermediary services 0 2 6 7 10 20 2
 * Data as of July 1, 2015 from the NMHH’s searchable database.
Source: Data provided by the NMHH.











registered service providers has declined; according to the searchable database of 
the NMHH there were 179 postal service providers providing non-universal ser-
vices at the start of July 2015.
Magyar Posta’s main competitors in the non-universal packages segment and the 
express mail and courier segments are the large international integrator companies, 
namely DHL, TNT, FedEx, UPS, GLS, and Road Parcel Logistics. In those market 
segments, the role of international service providers has continuously grown, with 
Magyar Posta’s market share falling from almost 30 percent in 2002 to around 15 per-
cent in 2007. In 2007, the CR5 index indicating market concentration (the combined 
market share of the five companies with the largest market shares) in these segments 
was 75 percent (ITA–WIK [2009a] p. 60.). In addition to the large international ser-
vice providers, there are also several small enterprises, which chiefly provide local 
courier and express mail services. In these competitive segments, Magyar Posta’s 
market share (based on revenue) in 2006 was as follows in the various segments: 82 
percent in the express mail segment, 1.5 percent in the courier segment (Magyar 
Posta is not present in the integrated mail services segment). (Ecorys [2008] p. 56)
Magyar Posta met with a considerable challenge in the newspaper distribution 
segment in 2007. At the end of 2006, three large newspaper publishers (Ringier, 
Népszabadság and Sanoma) and the Fiege Group established a new newspaper 
distribution enterprise called Médialog Fiege Zrt., which set up an independent 
distribution network in Budapest and another 104 towns and cities. As a result, on 
the newspaper distribution market, Magyar Posta had to scale down its activities 
to smaller settlements not affected by Médialog.
Figure 1 below shows the weighting of the various market segments in 2010. The 
market segments with actual competition accounted for approx. a quarter of the total 
postal industry in 2006. That figure increased to 32 percent in 2008, and was at rough-
ly the same level in 2010 (33 percent). Between 2006 and 2008, revenue in the universal 
services segment grew to a lesser extent than that of the competitive segments, so the 
weighting of the competitive segment within the total revenue of the postal sector in-
creased. However, between 2008 and 2010 the service providers in the competitive seg-
Source: NMHH.
FIGURE 1 • Breakdown of postal revenues by service type in 2010 (based on revenue)
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ment were hit harder by the effects of the financial and economic crisis than the univer-
sal service provider (which held a monopoly or near monopoly in many of its markets).
Table 2 shows the volume of mail handled by the various competitive segments. 
We can see from the mail volume data that integrated postal services are the largest 
market segment within non-universal postal services, as is also shown by the rev-
enue data set out in Table 4. Of the competitive segments, the combined revenue 
of the service providers is by far the greatest in this market segment (integrated 
mail services: HUF 37,585 billion, courier services: HUF 3,560 billion, express mail 
services HUF 1,411 billion).
From Table 3 we can see that the number of letters handled by Magyar Posta 
unlike packages), contrary to international trends, has not yet fallen significantly 
(although, despite the minor fluctuations, a slight downward trend can be observed). 
In the case of packages, the decline can be attributed to the fact that some of the mail 
volume has shifted to services with greater added value (e.g. express mail services, 
courier services and integrated mail services). The majority of letters even in 2010 
were in the reserved (i.e. monopolized) segment involving mail weighing below 50 
grams (94 percent of letters and 73 percent of addressed advertising mail).
TABLE 2 • Breakdown of mail in the competitive segments, 2010
  Courier Express Integrated Total
Domestic delivery 1,944,761 493,448 17,371,463 19,809,672
Posted abroad/inbound 0 79,725 2,229,808 2,309,533
Outbound international 0 31,913 1,544,715 1,576,628
Forwarded by another service provider 0 9,683 49,834 59,517
Forwarded to another service provider 1,921 36,329 34,123 72,373
Undelivered 148 17 33,677 33,842
Total 1,946,830 651,115 21,263,620  
Source: NMHH.
TABLE 3 • Volume of domestic mail in the universal services category over time, 2005–2010
(number of mail items)
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Standard letters 546,581,962 577,675,535 625,071,170 644,007,359 611,849,821 625,983,883
Registered 91,653,008 89,626,214 80,382,591 78,370,999 75,954,598 71,557,794
Value-declared letters 328,715 465,036 351,082 312,881 325,161 305,105
Official documents 38,307,238 39,640,710 43,774,374 45,799,263 46,712,382 50,398,334
Addressed advertising mail 75,490,746 89,579,418 31,721,887 27,788,101 27,509,099 26,930,883
Forms 13,138,625 10,330,540 5,766,055 3,338,148 5,031,472 2,314,206
Packages 4,559,849 2,673,383 1,760,958 1,541,523 1,443,324 1,379,066
Of the above: insured 1,881,753 1,033,462 1,178,690 1,303,731 252,201 200,743
Universal mail 770,060,143 809,990,836 788,828,117 801,158,274 768,825,857 778,869,271
Source: Data provided by the NMHH.
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From the data in Table 4 we can see that in recent years the net sales revenue 
increased in both the non-competitive universal services segment and in the com-
petitive express mail services and integrated mail services segments, while the ag-
gregate revenue from courier services decreased significantly between 2008 and 
2010. If we examine the development of these market segments by looking at the 
volume of mail, we can see that during the three years the mail volume of the uni-
versal service provider showed a negative tendency, with some fluctuations, while 
the growth rate of the mail volume in the competitive segments was typically greater 
than the revenue increase in those same segments.
Payment services and financial intermediary activities play a highly significant 
role at Magyar Posta. If we look at Magyar Posta’s 2011 Annual Report (Magyar 
Posta [2011]), we can see that revenue from payment services and financial inter-
mediary services accounted for approx. 32 percent of its total revenue (Table 5).
TABLE 4 • Net sales revenue, broken down by market segment (HUF millions)





Universal service 74,000 85,001 95,346 +14.87 +12.17
Courier service 2,455 7,237 3,560 +194.79 –50.81
Express mail service 1,484 349 1,411 –76.48 +304.30
Integrated mail service 22,406 31,227 37,585 +39.37 +20.36
Source: NMHH and Magyar Posta [2006], [2008], [2010].
TABLE 5 • Revenue of Magyar Posta over time, 2009–2011
Services
2009 2010 2011
HUF millions % HUF millions % HUF millions %
Letter mail services 83,977 48.8 85,311 49.6 85,786 49.0
Newspaper services 6,173 3.6 5,489 3.2 5,364 3.1
Logistics services 7 ,497 4.4 7,608 4.4 8,549 4.9
Postal finance services 46,133 26.8 45,989 26.8 46,942 26.8
Banking and investment services 7,487 4.3 7,635 4.4 7,509 4.3
Insurance services 1,198 0.7 1,360 0.8 1,730 1.0
Retail and postal outlet activity 7,540 4.4 6,460 3.8 6,868 3.9
International services 12,038 7.0 12,058 7.0 12,432 7.1
Total revenue 172,043 100.0 171,910 100.0 175,180 100.0
Source: Magyar Posta [2011] p. 14.
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Competition authority and regulatory authority proceedings
The proceedings of the regulatory authorities can be divided into three main cate-
gories. The cases in the first group are typical of the earlier period of regulation of 
the postal markets and resulted from the particular features of those regulations, 
namely cases concerning interpretation of the boundaries of the reserved scope of 
services. Since the universal service provider was granted exclusive rights to provide 
services in certain sectors, the exact boundaries of those sectors were a key ques-
tion in terms of competition. It was naturally in the interest of the universal service 
providers for the reserved segment to be as broad as possible.
The second category of proceedings involves cases investigating conduct that 
restricts competition. Such cases involve abuse by universal service providers of their 
market strength (discriminative price discounts, cross financing that distorts com-
petition, pricing that drives out competitors, and problems concerning accessibility). 
The earlier system of reserved services meant that there were exclusive rights in 
certain market segments. As a result, one purpose of the regulations was to prevent 
cross financing between services provided in a monopoly and services provided 
under competitive conditions in the case of economic players with exclusive rights. 
As the proportion of competitive markets has increased, the regulator also needs 
to examine whether companies extend their established dominant position on one 
reserved market to their activities in liberalized segments, or whether they abuse 
their monopoly by discriminating between the various consumer categories. Since 
the market strength of the incumbent national postal companies had not declined 
significantly after the market opening in the previously reserved segments, such 
regulatory cases remained important following the total market opening.
The third main group of competition authority proceedings involves merger 
inspections resulting from the international expansion of the large universal postal 
service providers. This last group does not differ from competition authority pro-
ceedings in other industries,2 so I will not discuss it in detail, and will instead provide 
a summary of cases in the first two groups.
Proceedings concerning anti-competitive market conduct were launched against 
Magyar Posta in 2005. The NHH conducted an investigation into the discount system 
of the designated universal postal service provider. The authority chiefly investigated 
whether the pricing and discount system applied by Magyar Posta Zrt. to its contrac-
tual customers as per its key partnership agreements, and to other major consumers, 
were in line with the provisions of the Postal Services Act on the pricing of postal ser-
vices and application of such prices, and whether the requirement for non-discrimi-
natory treatment was met with respect to Magyar Posta’s contractual partners. The 
Authority ruled that several aspects of the key partnership agreements gave cause for 
 2 A summary of such cases can be found in the paper of Geradin and Henry [2004].
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concern and ordered Magyar Posta to review its discount system and to develop a set 
of contractual conditions in line with the principles set out in the ruling and to render 
its active contracts legally compliant (ruling no. PS-19.710-4/2005 – NHH [2006]).
With respect to that same period, the Competition Authority also examined 
whether Magyar Posta had abused its dominant position (Vj-174/2005/55). In co-
operation with the NHH, it examined in relation to Magyar Posta’s discount system 
whether the conclusion of certain exclusive agreements had led to closure of the 
market. The Competition Authority terminated the proceedings since it established 
that Magyar Posta had only concluded an exclusivity agreement with Magyar Tel-
ekom Rt. and that Magyar Telekom Rt.’ s share of the letter mail market was less 
than 10 percent. The Competition Council therefore concluded that the agreement 
did not lend itself to preventing competitors from entering the market or creating 
a disadvantageous market situation for such competitors (i.e. closure of the market).
The Competition Authority earlier examined whether Magyar Posta’s discount 
system constituted abuse of its dominant position on the grounds that the discount 
system led to the bundling of products in a way that restricts competition. The 2011 
proceedings (Vj-167/2001/52) focused on Magyar Posta’s practice of giving greater 
than usual discounts to those customers that also had the delivered mail (typically 
invoices) produced by Magyar Posta. The investigation, although it was launched 
in relation to a specific order (Émasz public procurement), identified objectionable 
discounts in contracts between 1999 and 2001. According to the ruling, Magyar 
Posta used its dominant position on the basic postal services market to restrict and 
distort competition on the mail delivery market, which can be termed competitive. 
Thanks to the special discount it offered, it persuaded customers to commission it 
with mail production too. The Competition Authority fined Magyar Posta HUF 20 
million and ordered it to desist from the practice in question.
It is also worth mentioning two other Hungarian legal cases concerning the an-
ti-competitive conduct of Magyar Posta. The Competition Authority’s Competition 
Council launched proceedings against Magyar Lapterjesztő Zrt. and Magyar Posta 
Zrt. on the grounds that they had concluded an agreement restricting competition, 
and established that their conduct had restricted competition in its ruling of No-
vember 8, 2007. Pursuant to an earlier agreement in effect between 1998 and 2001 
in connection with the privatization of Magyar Posta’s newspaper distribution com-
panies, Magyar Posta would not compete for the delivery of newspapers from the 
printing presses to retailers. In exchange, Magyar Posta managed to have the com-
mission paid by Lapker for newspapers sold in Magyar Posta’s post offices increased 
from 13 to 23.5 percent in the cooperation agreement concluded between the two 
companies for the period between 2002 and 2007. In the amendment of the agree-
ment effective from January 2003, the newspaper distributor agreed not to engage 
in subscription-based newspaper distribution, which was considered to be Magyar 
Posta’s domain. In connection with the non-compete agreement, Magyar Posta re-
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ceived one-off market organization fee of HUF 260 millionfor not impeding Lapker’s 
business for another five years. The Competition Council ordered Magyar Posta Zrt. 
and Lapker to pay a fine of HUF 468 million each. The appellate ruling of April 22, 
2009 reduced that amount to HUF 250 million each (ruling no. Vj-140/2006/69).3
The other case worth mentioning involves postal services, but does not concern 
the letter and package markets. On November 8, 2007, the Competition Authority 
launched proceedings against Magyar Posta on the grounds of abuse of its dominant 
economic position. According to the investigation, Magyar Posta applied terms and 
conditions to the authorization or conclusion of contracts concerning the produc-
tion of cash transfer orders that were liable to distort competition on the related 
market for the production of forms (on which Magyar Posta is itself present) or in 
certain segments of that market. The Competition Council, based on the evidence 
available, found that on at least five occasions between 2004 and 2007 Magyar Posta 
declined to authorize the production of forms required for cash transfer orders. In 
one case it had technical reasons for declining, but in the other cases its decision 
was based on commercial considerations. However, it was established during the 
proceedings that several enterprises are present on the market for production of the 
forms required for cash transfer orders, and that those market players are significant 
competitors of Magyar Posta, so, in the period examined, Magyar Posta’s conduct 
would not have jeopardized competition on the market for production of forms for 
cash transfer orders or on other markets, and damage to consumers was also not 
considered likely. By its ruling of July 8, 2008, the Competition Council therefore 
terminated its competition supervision proceedings (ruling no. Vj-186/2007/36).4
MARKET PERFORMANCE
Economic performance
According to the estimates of the international study carried out by the ITA-WIK 
group, in Hungary the letter mail segment accounted for 59 percent of the mail 
volume of the postal industry in 2007 (with an estimated market value of EUR 405 
million), while activities involving packages and express mail accounted for 41 per-
cent (estimated market value of EUR 280 million) (ITA–WIK [2009b] pp. 59–60). 
By comparison, letters accounted for 56 percent of the EUR 94 billion revenue of 
the total EU mail sector in 2007, while packages and express mail accounted for 
44 percent (ITA–WIK [2009a] p. 25). In general, the packages and express mail 
segment is growing more dynamically than the letter mail segment. Total internal 
 3 http://www.gazdasagkifeheritese.uni-corvinus.hu/images/8/8b/GVH_-_lapterjesztokartell.pdf.
 4 http://www.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/2008-09-18-Hungary03Doc_82_.pdf.
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EU letter mail grew in the past 10 years by 0.4 percent on average, while package 
and express services rose by 6.1 percent on average (ITA–WIK [2009a] p. 36 and p. 
140). First, that reflects the stimulating effect of competition, which developed far 
sooner internationally on those last two markets. Second, the fact that new forms 
of electronic communication are gaining ground primarily poses a challenge to the 
letter mail segment, since such information can be conveyed by other methods with 
new communications technology solutions. That is less true of package and express 
mail services involving tangible, physical mail.
Of course considerable deviation of the various Member States lies behind the 
EU averages. We can see from Table 6 that the growth rate was considerably lower 
in the Western European Member States, which have more mature postal markets, 
than in the Southern and in particular Eastern Member States. The data, however, 
show that despite the more marked growth rate, the letter mail markets of the latter 
country groups are still significantly “less developed” (in the sense of saturation/
maturity of the market): the number of letters per capita is significantly below the 
Western European average. Table 6 shows that in Hungary the volume of mail per 
capita is below the EU average (and considerably lower than that of the Western 
Member States, which have more mature postal markets), but higher than that of 
the Eastern Member States that have joined the EU more recently. Understandably, 
the growth rate was lowest in the period between 2003 and 2007 in those Member 
States with a mature (and therefore largely saturated) postal market.
The negative Hungarian growth rate is somewhat misleading, however. If we 
look in more detail at the underlying data (Table 7), we can see that of the growth 
rates of the three separate groups of addressed domestic letters (numbers in italics), 
newspaper distribution is the only segment with a negative growth rate. That, how-
ever, is highly distorted, since for that segment the data only reflect the mail volume 
handled by Magyar Posta, which decreased considerably in 2007 as described above, 
owing to the arrival of a new competitor. The conclusion cannot be drawn from the 
data that the total volume of mail actually decreased to that extent on the newspaper 
distribution market. Further, the data concerning addressed advertising mail do not 
give an accurate impression of that segment, since Magyar Posta’s classification of 
mail has since changed; in 2007 some mail types were reclassified from the earlier 
addressed advertising mail segment into the unaddressed advertising mail segment. 
If we eliminate all those distortions from the growth data of the cited international 
study, then the growth of the Hungarian letter mail market (dominated by the 0.7 
percent growth rate of letters), would be around the modest EU growth average, 
below the 2.2 percent growth of the Eastern Member States, but, as we can see from 
Table 6, with a greater number of mail items per capita.
With respect to packages and express mail, the Hungarian 18.5 percent growth 
rate shown in Table 6 is in line with the average growth trend of the Eastern Euro-
pean Member States.
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The vast majority of mail is sent by companies and public organizations. Eighty-
eight percent of the total volume of letters in the EU is sent by such market players 
(B2X) and just 12 percent by private individuals (C2X) (including micro enterprises 
and sole traders). Of the letters posted by businesses, 35 percent are addressed to 
other businesses (B2B), while 65 percent are addressed to private customers (B2C). 
Unfortunately data of such depth are not available for Hungary, but the proportion 
of letters posted by businesses is estimated to be around 95 percent, i.e. higher than 
the EU average (correspondence by private individuals has steadily declined since 
2004). (ITA–WIK [2009b] p. 60)
In Table 8 more detailed data for the last three years have been compiled showing 
the performance of the postal sector and of the universal service provider.
TABLE 6 • Domestic letter mail within the EU–27, 2007
Member States
Number of mail items  
per capita*
Compound annual growth rate, 
2003–2007 (percentage)
Share of revenues from mail 
within the EU (percentage)
Letters
Western Member States 297 0.2 81.4
Southern Member States 94 1.1 14.5
Eastern Member States 68 2.2 4.1
Hungary 98 –1.5 –
Packages and express mail
Western Member States – 5.4 75.1
Southern Member States – 9.3 21.7
Eastern Member States – 18.8 3.2
Hungary – 18.5 –
Western Member States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, United Kingdom, Finland, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, 
Sweden; Southern Member States: Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Italy, Portugal, Spain; Eastern Member States: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia.
*  Weighted average (weighted by population).
Source: based on ITA–WIK [2009a] p. 38, p. 143 and ITA–WIK [2009b] pp. 59–60.
TABLE 7 • Size and growth of the Hungarian letter mail market
Market segment
Items per capita,  
2007
Compound annual growth rate,  
2002–2007 (percentage)
Domestic letter post 98 –1.5
 Letters 90 0.7
 Addressed advertising mail 3 20.6
 Newspaper distribution 5 –23.1
 Unaddressed advertising mail 70 15.5
Outbound international mail 2 –1.3
Note: Data on the segments publications, unaddressed advertising, and cross-border outbound generally refer to incumbent 
postal operator / universal service provider.
Source: ITA–WIK [2009b] p. 59.
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TABLE 8 • Data showing the economic performance of the Hungarian postal sector  
and the universal postal service provider (2006–2008)
Designation 2006 2007 2008
Percentage change
2006–2007 2007–2008
Net sales revenue (HUF millions)
Universal servicea 74,000 79,465 85,001 +7.37 +6.98
Courier service 2,455 3,281 7,237 +33.65 +120.57
Express mail service 1,484 1,865 349 +25.67 –81.29
Integrated mail service 22,406 26,066 31,227 +16.33 +19.80
Number of mail itemsb (in thousands)
Universal service 809,990.8 788,828.1 801,158.2 –2.61 +1.56
Courier service 1,192.1 1,789.6 2,599.5 +51.42 +45.26
Express mail service 411.0 501.5 483.6 +22.02 –3.57
Integrated mail service 8,167.9 10,072.8 13,133.7 +23.32 +30.39
Number of employees
In the postal sector 39,706 37,648 n/a –5.18 –
Universal service providerc 38,686 36,429 35,973 –5.83 –1.25
Productivityd
Postal sector revenue (HUF million/employee) 2.53 2.94 n/a +16.21 –
Number of mail items handled by the postal sector  
(in thousands/employee)
20.65 21.28 n/a +3.05 –
Revenue of universal service provider  
(HUF millions/employee)
1.91 2.18 2.37 +14.13 +8.72
Number of mail items handled by the universal 
service provider (in thousands/employee)
20.93 21.65 22.27 +3.44 +2.86
Investment (at current prices, in HUF billions)
Postal sector total 18.30 16.20 n/a –11.47
Postal sector, proportional to revenuee 0.18 0.15 –16.67
Universal service provider, totalf 13.63 11.29 7.97 –17.17 –29.41
Universal service provider, proportional to revenue f 0.18 0.14 0.09 –22.22 –35.71
a Magyar Posta [2006], [2007], [2008].
b Number of mail items with domestic delivery.
c Magyar Posta [2006], [2007], [2008].
d The productivity of the industry measured in output per employee and productivity of the incumbent service provider measured 
in output per employee (calculated on the basis of the other data in the table)
e Investment per forint of revenue (investment/sales revenue)
f Magyar Posta [2006], [2007], [2008].
Source: Unless otherwise indicated, the data are taken from the communications statistics database of the National Communications 
Authority (NHH).
We can see from the data in Table 8 that the net sales revenue increased in both 
the non-competitive universal services segment and in the competitive market 
segments (courier, express and integrated mail services) in the period shown, but 
the competitive segments showed much stronger growth. If we examine the devel-
opment of these market segments by looking at mail volume, we can see that in the 
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case of universal services the volume of mail tended to fall, with some fluctuations, 
while the growth rate of the mail volume in the competitive segments was typically 
greater than the revenue increase in those same segments.
The output per employee was calculated as a measure of productivity, meas-
uring output in revenue or volume of mail. The indicator calculated on the basis 
of the number of mail items is not suitable for the comparison of various industry 
segments (or for the comparison of the industry average and the universal service 
provider), because the mail types are very different in the various segments (Magyar 
Posta handles a significantly higher proportion of letters than its competitors, which 
chiefly operate in the packages and express mail segments). However, it can serve as 
a more useful indicator of development over time within the given market segment 
than the productivity indicator, which is calculated on the basis of revenue, since 
the latter can change as result of price increases, i.e. it does not necessarily reflect 
an actual change in efficiency. We can see that distinction, for instance, in the case 
of the indicators of the universal service provider, since the increase in mail volume 
per employee (3.44 and 2.86 percent in the periods of 2006–2007 and 2007–2008 
respectively) was considerably more modest in the period examined than the reve-
nue increase per employee (14.13 and 8.72 percent in the same periods respectively). 
The income per employee, however, is worth comparing directly for the various 
market segments. We can see from these data that the productivity of the sector as 
a whole was greater in that period than that of the universal service provider (the 
productivity of the sector as a whole was HUF 2.53 million/employee and HUF 
2.94 million/employee in 2006 and 2007 respectively, while the productivity of the 
universal service provider was HUF 1.91 million/employee and HUF 2.19 million/
employee) in 2006 and 2007 respectively).5
If we examine investments over time, we can see that there is not a considerable 
difference in investments proportional to revenue (investment per forint of revenue) 
of the sector as a whole and of the universal service provider. From the last rows of 
Table 8 it can, however, be seen that in recent years the investments of the universal 
service provider decreased to a greater extent (by 17.17 percent between 2006 and 
2007) than the investments of the sector as a whole (by 11.47 percent). Moreover, 
the investments of the universal service provider decreased even more sharply in 
the following year (by 29.41 percent between 2007 and 2008).
 5 Caution is advised when drawing conclusions since the number of employees refers to the entire 
workforce (those whose duties only include mail services do not constitute a separate group), 
while the revenues are from mail services only. In the case of Magyar Posta, the proportion of 
other, non-mail activities is greater (for example, in 2008 financial activities accounted for approx. 
31.5 percent of Magyar Posta’s revenue – Magyar Posta [2008] p. 13) than at its competitors, so 
the proportion of employees performing non-postal tasks within the total workforce is likely 
higher.
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PRICING REGULATIONS AND PRICES OVER TIME
In most Member States price regulations refer to universal services as a whole, but in 
some countries they only apply to those universal services segments where there is 
no discernible competition. In Hungary until the complete market opening, only the 
prices of reserved services were regulated despite the fact that for a long time Magyar 
Posta did not have any competitors in the non-reserved universal services segment, 
so the universal service provider’s prices in that segment were not restricted by either 
market competition or regulations. In Hungary, until the end of 2012 (until the time 
of total market opening), prices were regulated ex ante by ministry decree (by decree 
of the Ministry of National Development, and earlier by decree of the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs and Transport and of the Ministry of Informatics and Communications).
Price cap regulations came into force in Hungary too following the complete market 
opening. As of January 2013, National Development Decree no. 67/202 (XII.15.) sets 
out the method for determining the postal fees for individually posted domestic let-
ters not weighing more than 50 grams that come under the scope of universal services 
(quantity and price in the respective year qti and pti, quantity and price in the preceding 
year pt – 1i) and of official documents (quantity and price in the respective year qti and 
pti, quantity and price in the preceding year pt – 1i). The price cap has to be specified 
per mail type, and the growth rate in the respective years is tied to the consumer in-
dex. If the latest forecast of the Hungarian National Bank (RPIt – 1MNB) indicates a rise 
in the consumer price index, the postal service provider is entitled to increase the 
price, and obliged to decrease it if a decrease in the consumer price index is forecast.
Given the possible inaccuracy of the forecast, the deviation from the actual 
change in prices (data published by the Hungarian Statistical Office: RPIt – 1KSH) 
needs to be taken into account when prices are changed in the following year as 
an inflation correction factor (Zt = RPIt – 1MNB – RPIt – 1KSH). If the service provider 
is loss-making despite providing services effectively, then it is exempt from the 
obligation to reduce prices and does not need to apply the inflation correction rate 
(the loss needs to be demonstrated to the National Media and Infocommunications 
Authority). The percentage value of price changes of the respective year for mail 
of the postal service provider that comes under this category can be calculated as 
follows (using a Paasche-type price index):6
 6 The Paasche-, Fisher- or Törnquist-type indexes can also be used for ex post regulations. The Törn-
quist index is widespread in telecommunications, whereas in the postal industry the Paasche index 
is frequently used, despite the fact that the Paasche indexes do not have Fisher-type properties 
and do not stand the time test (for there to be a multiplicative inverse relationship between the 
indexes calculated by inverting the time periods) or the factor test (i.e. the price index multiplied 
by the volume index does not give the value index).
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Should the service provider fail to calculate the price change level in that man-
ner, then an authority correction factor (Xt = ΔVt – 2 – ΔPt – 2) may be applied. That 
authority correction factor is reflected in the maximum extent of the annual aver-
age price change of services to which regulated prices apply: Pt = RPItMNB – Zt – Xt.
We can only directly examine price changes of those mail segments with regulated 
prices, since information for Hungary is only available for those segments. We can 
draw cautious conclusions about the other segments only by comparing the mail 
volume data and revenue data. In most Member States price regulations refer only 
to universal services, but in some countries they only extend to those segments of 
universal services where there is no perceptible competition. In Hungary until the 
complete market opening only the prices of reserved services were regulated, despite 
the fact that for a long time Magyar Posta did not have any competitors in the non-re-
served universal services segment, so the universal service provider’s prices in that 
segment were not restricted by either market competition or regulations. As men-
tioned earlier, it was not until 2009 that a competitor entered the non-reserved market 
segments involving addressed letters (primarily advertising mail) weighing more than 
50 grams. From the data set out in Tables 3–5 above, we can attempt to draw cautious 
conclusions about prices over time in the various market segments. If we compare 
the growth rate of revenue and the volume of mail, we can see that in the non-com-
petitive universal services segment, the overall volume of mail declined slightly in 
recent years (by almost 3 percent from 2008 to 2010), while revenue increased (by 12 
percent). The difference between the two indicates an increase in prices exceeding 
inflation in this market segment. By contrast, in the competitive segments the vol-
ume of mail increased to a greater degree than the resulting revenue, which suggests 
that prices did not increase significantly in those segments (we have to be cautious, 
however, when drawing conclusions, since we do not have information at our disposal 
concerning changes in the breakdown of mail types in the various price categories, so 
we cannot filter out the effect of changes to the proportions of the various mail types).
Table 9 shows regulated prices over time in the reserved segments. From the 
data it can be seen that prices increased for every mail type. The greatest price in-
crease (for both letters and addressed advertising mail) was in the most frequent 
(non-priority standard) category (85 percent from 2007 to 2014 for letters and ad-
dressed advertising mail).
We can see therefore that in recent years the prices for letters weighing less than 
50 grams, which are regulated, increased to a greater extent than inflation, in par-
ticular from 2011 to 2012, when the increase in price for letters and advertising were 
between 12.5 percent and 16.66 percent. We can also see from the data in the table, 
however, after the total market opening, which coincided with the introduction of 
price cap regulations, the increase in prices slowed. While in the previous years the 
increase in prices was considerably higher than the inflation rate; in 2013 and 2014 
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the stricter price cap regulations, rather than the total market opening directly, since 
new competitors did not manage to enter the universal services segment.
The figures below summarize price changes in the letter mail segment and the 
addressed advertising mail segment.
The prices of letters increased continuously (Figure 2). In the case of addressed 
advertising mail (Figure 3) following a minor decline in 2008 (there was no change 
in the most frequent category (non-priority standard) and a slight decline in the 
other categories), in 2009 prices went up again. In total, the combined price in-
crease of those three years was at the same level as the price increase in the letter 
mail segment.
Source: Table 9.
FIGURE 3 • Regulated prices for postage of addressed advertising mail  
and official documents over time
Source: Table 9.
FIGURE 2 • Regulated prices for postage of letters (letters, plain postcards,  
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If we wish to assess the performance of the Hungarian postal sector and the reg-
ulations in terms of price changes, then it is worth comparing the prices of services 
with the data from other countries. For international comparisons, the price of 20 
gram letters is a frequently used measure since the majority of mail is in that cate-
gory. The prices of postal services differ considerably among European countries. 
Figure 4 shows that the prices for 20 gram letters ranged between EUR 0.23 and 
EUR 0.8 in 2009 (adjusted for purchasing power). If the prices are simply converted 
to EUR and compared, then the Hungarian prices would seem relatively high (in 
the top third of the EU Member States). If, however, we compare the prices after 
adjusting for purchasing power, then the Hungarian prices were not high in 2009 
and were below the EU average, despite the fact that the prices of services increased 
fairly significantly in Hungary between 2005 and 2009. A greater price increase than 
in Hungary was only experienced in four countries during that period (Figure 5).
Source: Copenhagen Economics [2010] p. 39.
FIGURE 5 • Annual growth rate of nominal prices for 20 gram tariff letters, 2005–2009
Source: Copenhagen Economics [2010] p. 37.
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Service quality
With respect to universal services, the Hungarian Postal Services Act (similarly to the 
postal services directive), not only defines the scope of service obligations, but also 
contains provisions concerning regional accessibility and opening times, and quality 
requirements pertaining to those services. Below I will give a summary of the perfor-
mance of the Hungarian universal postal service provider in light of those indicators.
Accessibility of services7 • In 2010 no interruptions in the operation of postal service 
points, delivery districts or collection services were experienced. Services were pro-
vided in compliance with the legal requirements, and there was full household de-
livery in compliance with the law in all (3,154) settlements. Magyar Posta complied 
with the requirements for opening times (referring both to the times when mobile 
post offices are present and to the opening hours of permanent postal service points).
Compliance with the provisions concerning geographical accessibility in 2010 
was as follows:
 • Universal postal services were not available in three of the 1,250 settlements with 
a population of fewer than 600 residents.
 • Three settlements with between 600 and 1,000 residents did not have the pre-
scribed permanent postal service point.
 • Currently 1,037 settlements only have a mobile post office, in addition to which 
services are provided by means of a combination of a mobile post office and a per-
manent service point in 85 settlements. An access point was designated and a post-
box was installed in each of those settlements that only have a mobile post office.
 • Of the 1,394 settlements with a population of greater than 1,000 residents, avail-
ability was not in compliance with the law in one case.
Act CI of 2003 also prescribed that when establishing and operating postal access 
points, it needs to be ensured that those using the services (including persons living 
with disabilities) can easily access the postal network without barriers.
 • 1,743 of the 2,740 permanent postal service points did not comply with the legal 
requirements, despite the fact that the relevant grace period expired in 2007;
 • 74 of the 8,988 postboxes available to the public did not comply with the statutory 
requirements;
 • 17 of the 3,890 designated delivery/collection boxes outside municipality bound-
aries did not comply with the requirements for barrier-free access;
 • the designated access points could be accessed barrier free in 1,036 of the settle-
ments that only have a mobile post office; that was not possible in 70 settlements.
 7 Based on data provided by the NMHH.
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Service quality indicators • In 2010 Magyar Posta’s operations complied with all 
the quality indicators prescribed by law. There has been improvement in respect 
of almost all delivery time indicators in recent years. The indicators for reliability 
of mail forwarding showed either no change or a slight worsening, but the service 
provider’s performance was well above the statutory requirements regardless. These 
quality indicators are summarized in Table 10.
TABLE 10 • Postal service quality indicators, 2008–2010*










Delivery time: speed and reliability indicators
























Quality requirements for the date stamp
Proportion of mail with an illegible date stamp ≤ 0.15 0.0017 0.0005
Requirements for reliability of mail forwarding
Proportion of totally or partially lost registered domestic mail ≤ 0.06 0.0338 0.0338
Proportion of damaged registered domestic mail ≤ 0.05 0.0038 0.0080
 * The specific quality requirements were established as a percentage of mail items arriving with a given number of business days 
following the day of being posted (D), i.e. the percentage of mail items that need to arrive by the given day. For each category 
there is a so-called speed indicator (D + 1 for priority letters and packages, D + 3 for other mail) and a reliability indicator (D + 3 
for priority letters and packages, and D + 5 for other mail).
Source: NHH [2009] and the NMHH.
SUMMARY
Reform of the regulations of the Hungarian postal sector began in the early ‘90s. 
The postal, telecommunications and broadcasting services were had been previously 
combined into a single company with a state monopoly, and it was not until 1990 
that the three fields were split into three separate companies. These fields were 
then also regulated separately by law. The Postal Services Act of 1992 opened up 
certain segments of the postal market (using current terms, certain non-universal 
segments) to competitors. Nevertheless, there were no actual market entrants owing 
to the strict conditions set out in the legal regulations. The Communications Act of 
2001, which combined regulation of the information and communications markets, 
created an actual market opening in the field of non-universal services. After the 
Communications Act came into force, the number of registered service providers 
in the courier and express mail segments rapidly multiplied. The regulations set 
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out in the Communications Act concerning the postal sector were intended to be 
in line with the first EU postal services directive (Directive 97/67/ EC). However, 
the Act was strongly criticized by the European Commission in its examination of 
Member State implementation of the postal services directive on the grounds that 
the privileges of the universal service provider had been extended (primarily with 
reference to extension of the scope of reserved services to cash transfers, payment 
intermediary services and postal order services contrary to the directive).
As there was both internal and external need to amend the legislation, a new Act 
on postal services was adopted in 2003, in which the regulation of the postal sector 
was again separated from the telecommunications and other communications ser-
vices. The second postal services directive (Directive 2002/39/EC) was taken into 
account when drafting that Act. Hungary was granted a moratorium until December 
31, 2012 for transposition into Hungarian law of the third postal services directive 
and total market opening. Owing to the lengthy negotiating and drafting procedures, 
at almost the last minute, in fall 2012, Parliament adopted the new Postal Services 
Act, which almost entirely eliminated reserved services. The only field, in which the 
universal postal service provider retains the exclusive right to provide postal services, 
is the official documents segment. Hungary consistently sought to define both uni-
versal services and reserved services as broadly as possibly (to the extent allowed by 
the EU directives), and prescribed conditions for entry to the opened universal ser-
vices segments that barely allow for the emergence of new competitors. Hungary was 
in the last group of EU Member States with respect to the extent of market opening.
The anti-competitive tax conditions also act as a barrier to entry. In Hungary, 
similarly to most Member States, universal postal services (in view of being in the 
public interest) are exempt from VAT, while replacement universal services are not, 
with the result that Magyar Posta’s competitors in those segments are at a consid-
erable competitive disadvantage. In order for entrants to the universal services 
segment to make their services attractive (for instance, to the financial sector or 
public sector, which cannot reclaim VAT), they have to offer their services at below 
the universal service provider’s prices less the VAT amount, which significantly 
distorts price competition.
In terms of competition, the Hungarian postal sector can be broken down into 
three categories up to the time of total market opening:
 • absence of competition (because it was prohibited): reserved universal services: 
segment involving letters weighing below 50 grams,
 • minimal competition: non-reserved universal services (until 2009 Magyar Posta did 
not have a competitor; in 2009 a competitor emerged with a small market share),
 • strong competition: non-universal postal services, for which the service provider 
needs to be registered (courier services, express mail services, integrated mail 
services, postal intermediary services, document exchange services).
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Nor did the picture change after total market opening, since competitors have 
not managed to enter the most recently opened reserved services segment (mail 
weighing less than 50 grams) since then. The two entry applications were rejected 
by the regulatory authority on the grounds that they did not fulfill the statutory 
requirements. There is, however, fierce competition in the field of non-universal 
postal services. In the non-universal packages segment and the express and courier 
segments. Magyar Posta’s main competitors are the large international integrator 
companies. In addition to the large international service providers, there are also sev-
eral small enterprises, which chiefly provide local courier and express mail services.
Based on revenue, the competitive segments account for just over a third of the 
total Hungarian postal sector, and the mail volume of the competitive segments 
grew faster in the last ten years than that of universal services. As a result, the total 
revenue of the competitive sectors as a proportion of the total industry revenue is 
increasing slightly from year to year. Integrated mail services are the largest market 
segment (26 percent in 2010) within competitive, non-universal postal services. 
Contrary to international trends, the number of letters handled by Magyar Posta 
(unlike packages) has not yet fallen significantly (though a slight negative trend can 
be observed despite minor fluctuations). The majority of letters sent in 2010 were 
in the reserved (i.e. monopolized) segment of mail weighing less than 50 grams: 94 
percent of letters and 73 percent of advertising mail (in which Magyar Posta does not 
currently have a competitor). Payment services and financial intermediary services 
continue to play a major role within Magyar Posta’s activities (accounting for roughly 
a third of its total revenue). The performance data from the period examined here 
show that the productivity of the total sector including the competitive segments 
was greater than the productivity of the universal service provider (measured in 
revenue per employee).
In Hungary until the complete market opening only the prices of reserved servic-
es were regulated, despite the fact that for a long time Magyar Posta did not have any 
competitors in the non-reserved universal services segment, so the universal service 
provider’s prices in that segment were not restricted by either market competition 
or regulations. Until the end of 2012, prices were set by the relevant authority ex 
ante – the regulated prices of reserved services were stipulated by ministry decree. 
Price cap regulations came into force in Hungary too, following the complete mar-
ket opening. Within universal services, the price cap regulations apply to the prices 
of individually posted domestic letters not weighing more than 50 grams and to 
official documents. The regulated prices have increased every year in the past ten 
years for every type of mail. The greatest price increase (with respect to both letters 
and addressed advertising mail) was in the most frequent (non-priority standard) 
category (by a total of 85 percent from 2007 to 2014 with respect to letters and 
addressed advertising mail). The increase in prices slowed following the complete 
market opening, which coincided with the introduction of price cap regulations. 
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While in the previous years the increase in prices was considerably higher than 
the inflation rate, in 2013 and 2014 it only slightly exceeded inflation. The slowing 
down of the price increase is due to the stricter price cap regulations, rather than 
the total market opening directly, since new competitors have not managed to enter 
the majority of the universal services segment.
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COMPETITION AND REGULATION • 2013
I. OVERVIEW
Gergely Csorba • What Kinds of Standards are Applicable  
to Economic Analysis and its Judicial Review? A Competition Economist’s 
Interpretation
The paper demonstrates the role of economic analysis in competition policy case, 
and discusses the best practices that could be expected from the parties building 
on such economic arguments. Based on the summary of European case law, it dis-
cusses the evaluation criteria applied by the European Courts when they reviewed 
the most important cases involving economic reasoning (which are mostly mergers). 
Finally, it discusses two recently decided cases by the European Courts (the Ryanair/
Air Lingus merger and the abuse of dominance case against Tomra) to demonstrate 
whether these more settled evaluation criteria did indeed increase the quality of 
economic reasoning applied, but it finds mixed results.
László Lőrincz • The Role of Competition and Competition Policy  
in Promoting Economic Growth
Competition policy in addition to a number of other policy areas impacts the inten-
sity of market competition. This literature review first identifies these areas. After-
wards, it discusses the theoretical relationships between innovation, productivity 
and growth, and also touches the necessary fundamentals of macroeconomic growth 
models. Next, the results of econometric analyses on the relationship between com-
petition and innovation and between competition and productivity are presented, 
which is an area that has shown significant progress the recent years. When dis-
cussing the econometric results, it also presents the policy measures, which were 
used for identification. Based on the presented studies, liberalization essentially 
can be associated with improvements in productivity, but between innovation and 
competition an inverted U-shaped relationship can be assumed. Considering the 
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direct relationship between competition policy and growth, suspending competition 
policy measures in the United States in the thirties was shown to cause substan-
tial negative impact on the GDP. In the final sections, the study briefly discusses 
the results considering the effect of trade liberalization on economic growth, the 
consequences of bankruptcy regulations, and the effects of reallocation policies on 
productivity and growth.
Judit Szabó • State Aid and Public Service Obligations  
on the European Market: The European Regulation of Services  
of General Economic Interest
The paper reviews the recent European regulation of services of general economic 
interest (SGEI) from an economic point of view. The emphasis is on the significant 
changes put forth by the European Union rules on state aid to services of gener-
al economic interest („State aid SGEI package”) during the years 2005-2006 and 
2011–2012. The paper outlines also important previous changes in some relevant 
European rules and that of some relevant judgements of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI). The paper puts the emphasis 
on the birth of the compensation approach of state aid and gives an economic in-
terpretation of this approach and its application. The paper doesn’t evaluate the 
performance of the compensation approach in practice, but gives a detailed survey 
of its forming since the 1970’s until being part of the European rules in the 2000’s. 
This review might make some grounding for the future empirical analyses.
II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF PRICE REGULATION
Csongor István Nagy • The EU Law Framework of National Price Regulation, 
with Special Emphasis on Liberalized Markets
The paper, in the first step, examines the applicability of EU competition rules 
(antitrust and state aid) to national price regulation. Afterwards, it analyses the 
requirements against regulated prices erected by free movement (internal market) 
law. The paper also examines how market-opening and liberalization rules (and the 
judgments of the European Court of Justice in Federutility and ENEL) affect the 
Member States’ playing field as to price regulation. It demonstrates the differences 
between electricity and natural gas sectoral regulation entailed by the fact that the 
former qualifies as an EU universal service, while the latter does not. Finally, it syn-
thetizes the EU law requirements against national price regulation and assesses the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice from a critical perspective.
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Balázs Felsmann • The Impacts of the Price Regulation on the Level of Retail 
Electricity Prices in Europe
There is a strengthening debate within the European Union in recent years about the 
impact of the affordable industrial and household electricity prices on the general 
competitiveness of European economies. While the European Institutions argues 
for the further liberalization of the energy retail sector, there are others who believe 
in centralization and price control to achieve lower energy prices. Current paper 
reviews the regulatory models of the European countries and examines the con-
nection between the regulatory regime and consumer price trends. Although the 
current regulatory practice is heterogeneous within the EU member states, there 
is a clear trend to decrease the role of regulated tariffs in the end-user prices. The 
study did not find a general causal relationship between the regulatory regime and 
the level of consumer electricity prices in a country concerned. However, the quan-
titative analysis of the industrial and household energy prices by various segments 
detected significant differences between the regulated and free-market countries. 
The first group of member states tends to decrease the prices in the low-consuming 
household segments through cross-financing technics, including increased network 
tariffs and/or taxes for the high-consuming segments and for industrial consumers.
Pál Belényesi • Pricing of Water Services: The Hungarian Market
Pricing of water supply and related services has been, and continue to be, a principal 
concern in Hungary – and not purely as part of the conundrum around the govern-
ment’s price minimizing propaganda of utility payments. The exclusion of the water 
services from European-wide liberalization, their restriction for concession-related 
activities in the directive designed to open up markets in the EU are only some of the 
worrying elements. Renationalization of network elements and forced appropriation 
of the service provision are attempts to consolidate water service provision in Hunga-
ry. The paper examines the influential European trends of water supply provision in 
the light of the 2011 market reform in Hungary. It is examined whether benchmark-
ing, competition for the market, regulatory competition, regulated monopolist, free 
market competition would qualify as good examples for the Hungarian market. The 
importance of environmental externalities in water pricing is introduced in detail.
Károly Miklós Kiss and Zsolt Stenger • Price Regulation in Postal Markets
The first part of the study summarizes the purpose and causes of price regulation and 
its relations with other regulatory targets. Not only pure efficiency considerations 
show up in prices, since they are limited by some welfare objectives, such as the 
universal service obligation. Then it presents the development of the EU regulatory 
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framework of postal services as well as the implementation of main requirements 
(cost-based, transparent, non-discriminatory and affordable pricing) defined in the 
guidelines at Member State level. In the next section the specifications of cost-ac-
counting are reviewed as the basis for price regulation. Then it discusses the fea-
tures, advantages and disadvantages of the applied pricing principles and methods 
(ex-ante, price cap or ex-post). In a separate section it analysed the characteristics 
of the Hungarian postal regulation. Closing the study some critical remarks were 
drawn up about the price regulation of postal services in the EU.
III. MARKETS AND REGULATIONS IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES
Gábor Koós • Market Opening in Rail Transport: The Fourth Railway Package
The aim of this study is to shortly present the fourth railway package announced by 
the European Commission as the newest stage of the European rail market opening 
process focusing on its differences to the earlier stages. Although the objective of 
the Commission’s proposal was quite clear and progressive already the amendments 
adopted by the European Parliament in the end of February 2014 has shown that it 
will be very difficult to get through them especially in the so-called market pillar. To 
bring the gradual market opening process to the end is highly questionable therefore 
it is worth to detect from time to time the problems of this sector and to discuss the 
attempts made by the Commission to fulfil its mission to make this sector much 
more effective. The study contributes to this task through systematically presenting 
the main content of the fourth railway package, the main results of the recast and 
the main consequences of the judgements of the ECJ in this sector.
Pál Valentiny • Institutional Changes at Regulatory Authorities
The paper assesses the development of institutional settings at regulatory and com-
petition authorities. It follows their path from municipal concession contracts to 
state and federal level regulation. Technological change, competitive pressures 
and convergence between services are emphasized among the prime movers. The 
study discusses the experiences in the US and in the EU in the context of changing 
relations between regulation and competition policy.
András Mezősi and László Szabó • Cost-Benefit Evaluation of Electricity 
Network Investments in Central Eastern Europe
The paper analyses the complex welfare impacts of proposed transmission invest-
ments in the Central Eastern Europe (CEE) region with the application of the EEMM 
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electricity model. The applied model is bottom-up model, having 36 European coun-
tries, 85 aggregated transmission connections and detailed technological breakdown 
of the European power systems (over 5000 generation units are modelled). The as-
sessment is made at regional level, as new transmission lines have significant spill-
over effects over third countries. The cost-benefit assessment (CBA) focused on the 
CEE region identifies those transmission lines that increase the regional welfare the 
most. In addition, the paper also identifies those methodological and policy issues, 
that have significant impact on the results. The results indicate, that many projects 
are interlinked, so an individual project assessment would only bring partial results.
COMPETITION AND REGULATION 2014
I. OVERVIEW
Gergely Csorba • Competition Policy Assessment of Parallel Events  
in Merger Control
This article discusses the questions concerning the competition policy assessment 
of parallel events. First, it reviews the statements of economic theory on sequential 
mergers and optimal merger policy. Then it presents the implications derived from 
the European Commission’s general methodology on merger assessment, and the 
arguments for and against the priority principle used in practice. Finally, it presents 
three groups of mergers to discuss the various problems that can arise and how the 
scarce case practice dealt with them.
Pál Belényesi • How Do I Get My Money? The Economics behind the Design 
and Application of Contingency Fee Arrangements in Antitrust Private 
Damages Actions
The present study examines the more significant country examples of contingency 
fee arrangements in Europe, in particular for competition law related private damage 
claims. Furthermore, it analyses the economics behind such agreements, the reasons 
why such agreements are on the borderline of competition economics and law. The 
final section concludes on what lies behind efficiency claims of both parties. Second 
part of the study observes the financial and the economic arrangements that urge 
or discourage potential private claimants from initiating such actions. Finally, this 
section details the specific arrangements, which may have direct impact on the right 
to access to justice. In its conclusions, the paper argues for a parallel application of 
private and public tools in order to draw the right balance between frivolous suits 
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of private parties and the under-deterrence of administrative fines when it comes to 
mandating contingency fee arrangements in EU Member States. The paper argues 
that the current framework – in spite of the recent changes in EU legislation – is 
still imperfect and significant improvements are needed. A well-designed, promoted 
and efficiency-based contingency fee coupled with class action arrangements could 
substantially expand the possibilities for the parties involved.
Csongor István Nagy • The Right to Fair Trial and Judicial Review  
in Competition Proceedings
The paper examines the right to fair trial as to the judicial review of competition 
authority decisions. It presents the general administrative law models of judicial 
review and analyses the recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 
the European Court of Justice and the Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria); it also 
addresses the structural questions of Hungarian competition procedure.
II. ECONOMICS IN ANTITRUST AND REGULATION
Pál Valentiny • Does Forensic Economics Really Exist?
In the last couple of years forensic economics obtained a JEL code, as a tribute to 
its scientific performance. This paper is about the emergence of this sub-discipline 
and the different interpretations of its notion. First the study provides a brief insight 
into the development of the discipline of industrial organization and its use in legal 
enforcement. Then mapping the procedures in antitrust and regulation it examines 
the changing relationship between law and economics and lawyers and economists. 
Finally it delivers an answer for the question in the title.
Balázs Muraközy • Application of Quantitative Methods in Selected 
Competition Law Cases, 2009–2013
This study discusses the role of quantitative methods in some important cases of 
four competition authorities between 2009 and 2013. The most complex quanti-
tative methods, like merger simulation, can only be applied in ‘textbook’ cases in 
reality. When data are less suitable, market structure or the competitive concern is 
less standard, often less sophisticated empirical methods are applied. The cases we 
focus on suggest that recently the role of measuring the positive effects of mergers, 
non-horizontal fusions and specialized models for some markets has increased and 
these issues also present important empirical challenges.
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Krisztina Antal-Pomázi • On the Choice of Court-Appointed Experts
This paper examines the use of court-appointed experts under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 706. The use of economic expert witnesses is common in civil litigation. In an 
adversarial system, expert opinions are expected to be contradicting, or even slant-
ed according to the interests of the parties. The more disputed the field of science 
concerned, the harder a judge or jury may find it to decide on the expert testimonies’ 
credibility. It often happens that all expert opinions are excluded, and the case is 
decided on the basis of the non-expert evidence. To avoid the welfare loss caused by 
the waste of resources spent on this way of proof, several authors recommend the 
more extensive use of court-appointed experts. Taking in concern that it might be 
hard for a judge to pick a ‘neutral’ on his own, the paper first examines the proposal 
that the parties should agree upon a ‘neutral’ expert to be appointed by the court. 
The more informed the parties are, the less likely are they to reach an agreement. 
Second, an alternative mechanism is proposed for the uninformed judge to choose 
a ‘neutral’ expert on the basis of information acquired from the well-informed par-
ties. The mechanism implements in Nash-equilibrium the social choice rule that 
the plaintiff should win the lawsuit if and only if she is right.
László Paizs • Market Power in the Electricity Generation Market:  
A Survey of Game-Theoretic Electricity Market Models
A large volume of research on strategic behaviour on deregulated electricity markets 
has accumulated over the last 25 years. Among the different approaches, the study 
surveys the game-theoretic models of power generator behaviour. It provides a re-
view of both theoretical and empirical findings in the oligopoly and auction literature.
Balázs Muraközy and Pál Valentiny • On the Measurement of Welfare Effect 
of Competition Policy
In parallel with the increasing role of competition policy and data availability, assess-
ing the decisions of Competition Authorities becomes more and more important. 
After discussing the possible assessment frameworks, it focuses on one specific 
method, the ex ante impact assessment of consumer welfare conducted by the 
Competition Authorities, and shows how it is applied in different countries, what 
are its main challenges and their possible solutions.
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III. MARKETS AND REGULATIONS IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES
Zoltán Pápai and Bertalan Papp • Competition Issues on the Liberalized 
Postal Markets and the Evaluation of the Hungarian Experience
The study examines the competition problems that emerged in the postal markets 
throughout the multi-step liberalization process of the European Union. Following 
a review of the prevailing barriers to entry, the paper investigates 1) the deterrence 
arising from incumbent strategies, 2) the legal and administrative hindrances from 
state regulation, and 3) the regulatory discrimination of the incumbent. Finally, the 
Hungarian liberalization act of postal markets is scrutinized, including the assess-
ment of the 2012 Postal Law’s effect on regulatory barriers. The study comes to the 
conclusion that, instead of allowing for a meaningful competition on the postal 
letter market, the Hungarian state policy and regulation is still protective of the 
incumbent postal operator.
Adrienn Selei and Borbála Takácsné Tóth • Short-term Effects of the 
Ukrainian Crisis on the Security of Gas Supply in Central-Eastern Europe and 
Hungary
In this paper the vulnerability and the short term resilience of the European gas mar-
ket to supply side shocks are modelled. The paper analyses the effect of regulatory 
interventions on the wholesale gas price and welfare of the most vulnerable Central 
and Eastern European gas markets. A short term security of supply situation is mod-
elled through a one month disruption of Russian gas supplies through the Ukraine 
in January, and a longer term crisis is modelled through a six month disruption on 
the same route. Three short term measures were analysed that aim to increase the 
resilience of gas markets to supply disruptions in the short run through the better 
use of existing infrastructure: by allowing spot trade on all interconnection points; 
allowing virtual trade against the physical flow; allowing bidirectional flows on all 
EU-EU borders. It was found that the first two measures have rather local effect on 
the markets, but bidirectional physical flows increase the security of supply of the 
whole region - mostly because of better connecting Central and Eastern Europe to 
the Western gas markets. It concludes that Hungarian consumers realize significant 
part of the monetized benefits that are measured; hence Hungary has a profound 
interest in supporting the European gas market integration. It was also found that 
the Hungarian strategic storage is a useful tool to mitigate the damages of a potential 
crisis not only within the Hungarian borders but also on a regional basis.
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The Institute of Economic Sciences at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
launched a new series of publications entitled “Verseny és szabályozás” 
(Competition and Regulation) in 2007. Eight annual volumes have been 
published so far, all in Hungarian. The current volume is the first one in English, 
and it contains 12 selected translations from the crop of the first seven years. 
It offers the reader a glimpse into the current state of research in its chosen 
field in Hungary. The published studies covered a very broad range of topics. 
Some articles of general theoretical and methodological nature dealt with the 
background in the law and economics of regulated markets. Others investigated 
current legal, economic and policy issues and cases. Others again dealt with 
regulation and the regulators themselves. The functions, methods, analytical 
tools, the institutions and the impact of regulation were discussed in those 
articles. Special attention was paid to regulation by the European Union, and 
also to recently de-monopolized key industries such as communications, energy, 
media, the postal sector or water and sewage. The publications were designed 
to provide a meeting place for economists and lawyers to work together on the 
economic background of legal problems and the legal solutions to economic 
problems. Five of the 12 articles selected for publication in English in this tome 
deal with broad economic and legal issues of competition and regulation, 
while the remaining 7 discuss the state and specific problems of key industries 
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